Libya: Gadaffi dead but risk of split remains - By Exclusive Analysis Ltd.
October 20, 2011
Rising risks of collateral damage to Sirte basin oil assets and contract
revisions.
On 20 October, media reported that Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, Libya's former
leader, was killed by National Transitional Council (NTC) forces. If
confirmed, this would not alter the risk of assassination and bomb attacks
against foreigners, especially those working in oil fields in the
southwestern fields of Ubari and Murzuq, and against NTC officials. Gaddafi
would have been very unlikely to play an operational role in such actions.
The most important people in the conduct of such operations are Abdullah
Sanusi, Gaddafi's head of intelligence and his sons, Saif al-Islam and
Mu'tassim, whose capture or death has not been confirmed. Other key players
are mid-level security operatives under Gaddafi and members of his Gadadfa
tribe and their allies the Warfala tribe, who are likely to aspire to a role
in the future of Libyan politics. These individuals would have both the
networks and the technical and operational expertise to conduct such a
campaign.
On 4 October, the NTC said it would form a new government after Sirte was
captured, which occurred on 20 October. Elections are set to be held eight
months after that. The drafting of a new constitution is then due to begin,
which we expect to reveal strong differences among the rebels over the
allocation of oil and gas revenue to the provinces, the power of the central
government relative to provincial governments and the ability of the
provinces to contract foreign firms for infrastructure and oil projects. A
failure to reach agreement on these constitutional issues within a few
months of elections, combined with fighting between former rebels from
Tripoli and rival factions from other north-western regions such as Zintan
or Misurata, would increase the likelihood of secession by eastern Libya.
This region has traditionally had a separate identity to north-western Libya
(known as Tripolitania) and could be economically self-sufficient.
We do not assess this to be the most likely scenario in the one-year
outlook, however. Rather, we are more likely to see small-scale fighting
among the rebels, preceding and following an agreement over a weak federal
state that leaves significant economic and security powers with the regions.
However, secession would become more likely if the former rebels in
north-western Libya fight one another using heavy weaponry for two or three
months and if squabbling over a new constitution drags on for many months
after elections.
If eastern Libya secedes, the coastal area around Sirte, which includes the
oil towns of Sidr, Brega and Ras Lannuf, would likely see most of the
fighting to demark the border line and for control of the Sirte basin oil
fields, such as Waha, operated by ConocoPhillips, and Raguba. It is unlikely
that fighters from the east or the west would be able to reach the major
population centres of the other side, indicating that risks to airports and
ports in Tripoli, Misurata and Benghazi in such a scenario would not rise
significantly. If Sirte falls firmly into the east's hands, this would
indicate much lower risks of collateral damage to oil fields such as Sarir,
Bu Attifel and other fields around Awjala and Jalu, where companies like
Wintershall, Shlumberger and Eni operate. Revisions of Gaddafi era oil
contracts would be very likely under this scenario
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http://www.exclusive-analysis.com/> Exclusive Analysis is a specialist
intelligence company that forecasts commercially relevant political and
violent risks worldwide.
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Received on Thu Oct 20 2011 - 17:51:52 EDT