The Lord’s Resistance Army: End Game?
Africa Report N°182 18 Nov 2011
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/182%20
The%20Lords%20Resistance%20Army%20-%20End%20Game.pdf
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) remains a deadly threat to civilians in
three Central African states. After a ceasefire and negotiations for
peaceful settlement of the generation-long insurgency broke down in 2008,
Uganda’s army botched an initial assault. In three years since, half-hearted
operations have failed to stop the small, brutally effective band from
killing more than 2,400 civilians, abducting more than 3,400 and causing
440,000 to flee. In 2010 President Museveni withdrew about half the troops
to pursue more politically rewarding goals. Congolese mistrust hampers
current operations, and an African Union (AU) initiative has been slow to
start. While there is at last a chance to defeat the LRA, both robust
military action and vigorous diplomacy is required. Uganda needs to take
advantage of new, perhaps brief, U.S. engagement by reinvigorating the
military offensive; Washington needs to press regional leaders for
cooperation; above all, the AU must act promptly to live up to its
responsibilities as guarantor of continental security. When it does, Uganda
and the U.S. should fold their efforts into the AU initiative.
The Ugandan army’s attempt in December 2008 to crush the LRA, originally an
insurgency in northern Uganda but now a deadly, multinational criminal and
terror band, by destroying its camps in north-eastern Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) went badly wrong. Joseph Kony, the group’s leader, escaped and
quickly organised reprisals that left hundreds of civilians dead in the
following months. The U.S.-backed Operation Lightning Thunder became a
campaign of attrition, as the Ugandan army began hunting small, scattered
and highly mobile groups of fighters in thick forest. It followed them into
South Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR) and scored some early
successes, but the operation lost steam in mid-2010, allowing the LRA to go
on plundering villages and seizing hundreds of captives and new recruits in
the tri-border area. As the UN Security Council agreed on 14 November 2011,
this must stop.
The reasons for military failure are at root political. Museveni scaled down
the operation to pursue other ventures he felt would win him greater
political capital at home and abroad. Since the LRA has not been able to
operate within Uganda for years and no longer endangers its security, few
opposition politicians or community leaders there demand its defeat. Efforts
to pursue it in the DRC are dogged by the host’s refusal to cooperate and
grant access to LRA-affected areas. Uganda invaded in the late 1990s,
plundered DRC resources and earned President Kabila’s lasting mistrust. As
Congolese elections, still scheduled for late 2011, draw near, the army has
demanded the Ugandans pull out and, while waiting for the official decision,
forbidden them to leave camp. Most LRA senior commanders and fighters are
now in the CAR but could return to the DRC at any time and, with the
Ugandans restrained, find safe haven. CAR President Bozizé distrusts
Uganda’s army, envies its U.S. support, has ordered it to withdraw from
diamond areas and could hamper operations further unless satisfied his own
army is benefiting.
There is no prospect of a negotiated end to the LRA problem, given the
collapse of the multi-year Juba process and the lack of any apparent
interest on the part of either Museveni or, especially, Kony to go that
route again after three more years of fighting. Instead, the AU, under
pressure from some member states and the U.S., announced in late 2010 that
it would authorise a forceful mission against the LRA and coordinate
regional efforts. A year and counting, however, planning has foundered over
its inability to reconcile differences with and between key member states
and donors. Uganda and the three directly affected countries hoped the AU
initiative would open the door to more Western funding for their armies but
are little interested in political guidance or civilian programs. The U.S.
wanted the European Union (EU), the AU’s main donor, to share some of its
burdens. However, the EU prefers the AU to act politically and is reluctant
to finance the armies. Uganda resists ceding any of its military and policy
freedom to the African regional body.
Frustrated with the ineffectiveness of Operation Lightning Thunder, the U.S.
announced on 14 October that it would deploy about 100 troops to assist the
Ugandan army – a majority to stay in Kampala, the rest to advise in the
field. The move is part of a broader ramping up of its political and
military engagement against the LRA. It has also offered to train more
Congolese soldiers and has given equipment to the CAR army in order to win
the operation political space. The few score field advisers should be able
to improve the Ugandans’ performance. However, the Obama administration, a
year from its own elections, is cautious about testing U.S. tolerance of
another overseas military commitment. The deployment, it has made clear,
will be short term.
The Ugandan army, even with U.S. advisers, is a flawed and uncertain
instrument for defeating the LRA. Due to its record of abuses and failures
to protect civilians, the governments and populations of the LRA-affected
countries distrust it. That Kony no longer presents a direct threat to its
interests leaves room for scepticism about Kampala’s political will to see
the military job through to the end. But the Ugandan army is also essential,
because no one else is prepared to send competent combat troops to do the
job. U.S. support, both military and political, is important but may be
short-lived. AU money and civilian programs are helpful but cannot stop LRA
violence.
Uganda, with U.S. advice and support, should, therefore, lose no time in
launching a reinvigorated attack on the LRA, if possible while most of the
group’s senior commanders and fighters are still in the CAR and before they
can return to the DRC’s more restrictive operational environment. A key part
of the advice the U.S. should press on the Ugandan army is the need to
prioritise protecting civilians, provide access to humanitarian agencies and
accept stricter accountability for its actions.
At the same time, if this new activism is to succeed, the AU must break its
political deadlock and put its initiative in play. Adding the AU to the
equation is vital to rally the political commitment of Uganda, the DRC, the
CAR and South Sudan by giving the undertaking clear continent-wide
legitimacy. The central elements of the initiative should be appointment of
a special envoy to smooth relations between Kinshasa and Kampala and
authorisation of a multinational and multi-dimensional mission – what AU
planners call the Regional Intervention Force (RIF). This will likely
involve only those troop contributors presently engaged against the LRA,
primarily the Ugandans, but should introduce a new, common operational and
legal framework for the Ugandan and host armies and create new military
structures to improve coordination between them. Once the RIF exists, their
anti-LRA efforts should be placed under its umbrella.
The AU planners should work closely with the U.S. to ensure that from the
start the African organisation’s initiative prioritises the same principles
as Washington needs to press bilaterally on the Ugandan army. Donors,
particularly the EU, should meanwhile fund complementary civilian work,
especially to entice LRA fighters to leave the bush. Only such a
multi-dimensional approach is likely to bring peace to the tri-border area
and begin the slow task of healing the physical and social wounds the long
LRA nightmare has inflicted.
RECOMMENDATIONS
For mustering and maintaining political will
To the African Union:
1. Appoint urgently a special envoy with a robust mandate to coordinate
African and other international efforts against the LRA, including by
persuading:
a) President Museveni to commit more troops and equipment to the military
operation while increasing efforts to protect civilians and rendering it
more accountable; and
b) Presidents Kabila (DRC), Bozizé (the CAR) and Kiir (South Sudan) to grant
the Ugandan army access to all areas where the LRA is active for six months,
reviewable after five months, and to instruct their armies to increase
civilian protection.
2. Set up the special envoy’s office with sufficient staff, equipment and
resources to operate for at least one year.
To the Government of Uganda:
3. Demonstrate full commitment to anti-LRA efforts by accepting a
multi-dimensional AU initiative, including a robustly-mandated AU special
envoy; committing more troops and equipment to the military operation while
rendering it more accountable; and increasing efforts to protect civilians.
To the Governments of the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan:
4. Demonstrate full commitment to anti-LRA efforts by accepting a
multi-dimensional AU initiative, including a robustly-mandated special
envoy; granting the Ugandan army access to all LRA-affected areas; and
ensuring national armies increase efforts to protect civilians.
To the U.S. Government:
5. Support fully the launch of a multi-dimensional AU initiative, including
a robustly-mandated special envoy.
6. Maintain pressure on Uganda, the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan to commit
fully to a multi-dimensional AU initiative, including a robustly-mandated
special envoy.
7. Be prepared, along with other donors, to scale down military and
development assistance if the four presidents fail to demonstrate
appropriate commitment.
8. Appoint a special envoy for the Great Lakes region to work with the AU
special envoy in mustering political commitment for anti-LRA efforts.
To the EU:
9. Provide funds to the AU enabling it to set up an office for the special
envoy with sufficient resources to lead anti-LRA efforts for at least one
year and to establish a Regional Intervention Force (RIF).
For launching an urgent military push prioritising civilian protection
To the Governments of Uganda and the U.S.:
10. Intensify promptly military operations against the LRA, prioritising:
a) increased efforts to protect civilians;
b) enhanced civil-military relations, including by setting up two-way
channels of communication with state authorities and other local leaders,
such as church leaders and customary chiefs, and, in the CAR and South
Sudan, by working closely with self-defence groups;
c) enhanced information management and coordination, including by setting up
joint intelligence and operations centres with national armies in the CAR
and South Sudan; and
d) strict accountability measures, including by implementing a code of
conduct, rules of engagement and investigations of alleged human rights
abuses and accusations of illegal exploitation of natural resources.
To the African Union:
11. Finalise the operational and legal framework for a Regional
Intervention Force (RIF) that includes the priorities set out in
Recommendation 10 above, as well as the standard operating procedures used
by the Ugandan army stipulating the quick transfer of women and children LRA
escapees to international protection agencies.
For intensifying complementary civilian efforts
To the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), the UN Mission in
South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Peacebuilding Office in the CAR (BINUCA):
12. Coordinate a region-wide Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation,
Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) program, including by:
a) expanding the communication campaign that encourages LRA fighters to
surrender so it covers the whole tri-border region and continue it until LRA
groups no longer pose a threat to civilians; and
b) coordinating efforts of international and national NGOs and church groups
in the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan to help former LRA members return home
safely and reintegrate into civilian life including through job creation
programs and psycho-social care.
To the U.S. Government, the EU, the UN and other donors:
13. Support development and implementation of a region-wide DDRRR program
and the repair and improvement of communications and transport
infrastructure in the LRA-affected area.
For planning ahead
To the AU and its international partners:
14. Draw up a clear exit strategy that foresees the RIF in operation for
one year and review after eight months whether a half-year extension is
needed.
15. Plan to maintain and support the RIF and DDRRR operations after Kony
and his top commanders are caught or killed, until residual LRA groups no
longer pose a threat to civilians.
16. Request RIF participating countries to transfer the LRA leaders against
whom the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued arrest warrants
(Kony, Odhiambo and Ongwen) to the ICC if they are captured and to hand over
other LRA commanders not subject to such arrest warrants to the authorities
of their country for prosecution or other appropriate accountability
processes.
Nairobi/Brussels, 17 November 2011
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Received on Fri Nov 18 2011 - 08:49:47 EST