Date: Tue Apr 14 2009 - 01:22:36 EDT
- Foreign Policy Journal - http://foreignpolicyjournal.com -
‘Shift’ Towards Iran Under Obama Is Change in Tact, Not Policy
Posted By Jeremy R. Hammond On April 10, 2009 @ 8:13 am In Analysis,
Featured, Iran, Jeremy R. Hammond | 4 Comments
The Obama administration announced this week that it would participate in
negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, something that is being
characterized as a significant change from the Bush administration in
Western media accounts. The Wall Street Journal, for instance, reported 
that the move marks “a shift in U.S. policy toward Iran”, while AFP
called it  a “new direction of US policy”.
But while the “shift” might qualify as a change in tactics, every
indication so far is that the actual policy towards Iran under the Obama
administration will continue to be indistinguishable from that of the
The Obama administration announced that it would participate with other
nations in the talks. The other parties to would be Britain, France,
Russia, China, and Germany. Together with the United States, these are the
five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany, and so are
sometimes collectively called the “P5+1″.
Under the Bush administration, the three European members of the P5+1 had a
dialogue with Iran, but the U.S. refused to participate in direct contacts.
President Obama, by contrast, has said  his administration is
“committed to diplomacy”, and the State Department announced this week
that the U.S. would join in the talks.
But that is so far the only extent to which there has been any identifiable
change in approach. The policy goal remains the same, which is to force
Iran to acquiesce to Western demands that it halt uranium enrichment
activities. Both Bush and Obama administrations have accused Iran of
attempting to develop nuclear weapons, while Iran asserts that its nuclear
program is solely for energy production.
That acting assumption remains the same under the new administration,
despite the fact that even U.S. intelligence agencies have acknowledged in
a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Iran today has no nuclear
weapons program. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the nuclear
watchdog group, has repeatedly reported that it has found no evidence that
Iran has such a program.
Despite the lack of evidence, the U.S. policy under both administrations is
founded upon the same assumption. Along with the announcement that the U.S.
would participate in talks, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared
, “There’s nothing more important than trying to convince Iran to
cease its efforts to obtain a nuclear weapon.”
In its report, the Wall Street Journal also noted that “A number of U.S.
officials say they’re skeptical Iran is interested in serious
negotiations.” This is remarkable since Iran has repeatedly reached out
to the U.S. to engage in talks over its nuclear program while it is the
U.S. which has rejected such talks. Given the framework carried over from
the Bush administration under which the new administration is operating, it
is clear is that it is the U.S., not Iran, which will continue to
demonstrate no interest in serious negotiations.
While the announcement marks a change in tactic, the actual U.S. policy
remains constant. Vice President Joseph Biden in February announced the
Obama policy towards Iran in terms indistinguishable from that of his
predecessor. The U.S. would be “willing to talk to Iran”, he said, but
only if Iran acquiesces to the Obama administration’s demands to abandon
its nuclear program.
Now the administration is saying it will talk to Iran, but only to insist
on this same demand. Iran has already made clear that it has every
intention to continue to enrich uranium for its civilian nuclear program, a
right guaranteed under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) to which
Iran is a party.
The outcome of any talks operating under the present framework is perfectly
predictable. The Obama administration will announce that no fruit came of
the talks, that Iran was not serious about negotiations, and that only a
hard-line approach consisting of the threat of the use of force, either
from the U.S. or from its regional ally, Israel, along with tougher
sanctions will suffice to accomplish the goal of getting Iran to surrender
its nuclear ambitions.
The slight shift in tact will allow the Obama administration to claim that
it tried diplomacy, and then justify its hard-line approach on the basis
that diplomacy failed. The purpose for the shift, in other words, is to
improve U.S. public relations, and not to change its approach towards Iran
in any meaningful way.
This is perfectly well understood, and rather candidly stated, despite the
propaganda spin about there being a “shift in U.S. policy” designed for
consumption by a passive and uncritical public audience. A poll published
this week found  that a majority of Americans favor of the government
holding talks with Iran. The shift is designed to appease both domestic and
international opinion, which was overwhelmingly critical of the Bush
administration’s unwillingness to attempt to even appear to engage in
One may read  in the New York Times, for instance, that “By showing a
readiness to engage Iran, American officials said, the administration is
trying to build support among allies like Germany and France, and more
skeptical players, like Russia, so that if diplomatic efforts fail, it can
marshal support for tougher sanctions against Tehran.”
The Wall Street Journal account similarly stated  that the Obama
administration is “examining ways to increase financial sanctions on Iran
if it doesn’t agree to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities.”
Iran’s unwillingness to comply with the U.S. ultimatum is in turn
interpreted by the administration as an indication of its intention to
produce nuclear weapons, despite the admitted lack of evidence and despite
the fact that Iran has enriched uranium only to fuel-grade and not to the
amount necessary to even theoretically be able to produce a nuclear weapon.
There is also a consensus among analysts, including at the IAEA, that Iran
would have to kick out the nuclear inspectors if it wanted to go forward
with a weapons program.
A spokesman for the State Department rhetorically asked , “If Iran
means very seriously that its program is for civilian purposes only, then
why doesn’t it comply with the basic things that the international
community has asked Iran to do?”
The U.S. approach towards Iran is complimented by an aggressive Israeli
stance. Israel has repeatedly threatened to attack Iran if it does not cede
to the U.S. demand to cease uranium enrichment. The new Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently remarked  that Iran “hopes to
exploit the dialogue with the West and Washington to advance toward the
production of an atomic bomb” and hinted that Israel would act militarily
if talks failed, while the head of U.S. Central Command General David
Petraeus said  that “the Israeli government may ultimately see itself
so threatened by the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon that it would
take preemptive military action to derail or delay it.”
Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Silvan Shalom expressed solidarity with the
idea of the U.S. participating in talks with Iran, but similarly suggested
 any dialogue would be “an attempt at buying time” for Iran, which,
he claimed, was “soon to reach a point of no return” in its alleged
attempts to produce a nuclear weapon. Shalom said “There must be a time
limit” for such talks, and that sanctions against Iran “must be
genuine”, presumably meaning they should be backed by all the major
powers, including Russia and China, who have been more reluctant than the
U.S. and European countries to punish Iran for exercising a right
guaranteed under international treaty.
By insisting in the same policy towards Iran as that of the Bush
administration, the U.S. is effectively precluding any possibility for
there to be any meaningful and productive outcome from the proposed talks
that might serve to diffuse rather than escalate tensions between the U.S.
and its allies and Iran.
Bookmark and Share 
Article printed from Foreign Policy Journal: http://foreignpolicyjournal.com
URL to article:
URLs in this post:
 called it:
 remarked: http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200903u/netanyahu
 Image: http://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php