From: wolda002@umn.edu
Date: Wed Jan 07 2009 - 22:05:29 EST
HAMAS AND THE ARAB STATES
By Kamran Bokhari and Reva Bhalla
Israel is now in the 12th day of carrying out Operation Cast Lead against
the
Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas in the Gaza Strip, where Hamas has been
the
de facto ruler ever since it seized control of the territory in a June 2007
coup. The Israeli campaign, whose primary military aim is to neutralize
Hamas'
ability to carry out rocket attacks against Israel, has led to the reported
deaths of more than 560 Palestinians; the number of wounded is approaching
the
3,000 mark.
The reaction from the Arab world has been mixed. On the one hand, a look at
the
so-called Arab street will reveal an angry scene of chanting protesters,
burning flags and embassy attacks in protest of Israel's actions. The
principal
Arab regimes, however, have either kept quiet or publicly condemned Hamas
for
the crisis -- while privately often expressing their support for Israel's
bid
to weaken the radical Palestinian group.
Despite the much-hyped Arab nationalist solidarity often cited in the name
of
Palestine, most Arab regimes actually have little love for the Palestinians.
While these countries like keeping the Palestinian issue alive for domestic
consumption and as a tool to pressure Israel and the West when the need
arises,
in actuality, they tend to view Palestinian refugees -- and more Palestinian
radical groups like Hamas -- as a threat to the stability of their regimes.
One such Arab country is Saudi Arabia. Given its financial power and its
shared
religious underpinnings with Hamas, Riyadh traditionally has backed the
radical
Palestinian group. The kingdom backed a variety of Islamist political forces
during the 1960s and 1970s in a bid to undercut secular Nasserite Arab
nationalist forces, which threatened Saudi Arabia's regional status. But
9/11,
which stemmed in part from Saudi support for the Taliban and al Qaeda in
Afghanistan, opened Riyadh's eyes to the danger of supporting militant
Islamism.
Thus, while Saudi Arabia continued to support many of the same Palestinian
groups, it also started whistling a more moderate tune in its domestic and
foreign policies. As part of this moderate drive, in 2002 King Abdullah
offered
Israel a comprehensive peace treaty whereby Arab states would normalize ties
with the Jewish state in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal to its 1967
borders. Though Israel rejected the offer, the proposal itself clearly
conflicted with Hamas' manifesto, which calls for Israel's destruction. The
post-9/11 world also created new problems for one of Hamas' sources of
regular
funding -- wealthy Gulf Arabs -- who grew increasingly wary of turning up on
the radars of Western security and intelligence agencies as fund transfers
from
the Gulf came under closer scrutiny.
Meanwhile, Egypt, which regularly mediates Hamas-Israel and Hamas-Fatah
matters, thus far has been the most vocal in its opposition to Hamas during
the
latest Israeli military offensive. Cairo has even gone as far as blaming
Hamas
for provoking the conflict. Though Egypt's stance has earned it a number of
attacks on its embassies in the Arab world and condemnations in major Arab
editorial pages, Cairo has a core strategic interest in ensuring that Hamas
remains boxed in. The secular government of Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak is
already preparing for a shaky leadership transition, which is bound to be
exploited by the country's largest opposition movement, the Muslim
Brotherhood
(MB).
The MB, from which Hamas emerged, maintains links with the Hamas leadership.
Egypt's powerful security apparatus has kept the MB in check, but the
Egyptian
group has steadily built up support among Egypt's lower and middle classes,
which have grown disillusioned with the soaring rate of unemployment and
lack
of economic prospects in Egypt. The sight of Muslim Brotherhood activists
leading protests in Egypt in the name of Hamas is thus quite disconcerting
for
the Mubarak regime. The Egyptians also are fearful that Gaza could become a
haven for Salafist jihadist groups that could collaborate with Egypt's own
jihadist node the longer Gaza remains in disarray under Hamas rule.
Of the Arab states, Jordan has the most to lose from a group like Hamas.
More
than three-fourths of the Hashemite monarchy's people claim Palestinian
origins. The kingdom itself is a weak, poor state that historically has
relied
on the United Kingdom, Israel and the United States for its survival. Among
all
Arab governments, Amman has had the longest and closest relationship with
Israel -- even before it concluded a formal peace treaty with Israel in
1994.
In 1970, Jordan waged war against Fatah when the group posed a threat to the
kingdom's security; it also threw out Hamas in 1999 after fears that the
group
posed a similar threat to the stability of the kingdom. Like Egypt, Jordan
also
has a vibrant MB, which has closer ties to Hamas than its Egyptian
counterpart.
As far as Amman is concerned, therefore, the harder Israel hits Hamas, the
better.
Finally, Syria is in a more complex position than these other four Arab
states.
The Alawite-Baathist regime in Syria has long been a pariah in the Arab
world
because of its support for Shiite Iran and for their mutual militant proxy
in
Lebanon, Hezbollah. But ever since the 2006 war between Israel and
Hezbollah,
the Syrians have been charting a different course, looking for ways to break
free from diplomatic isolation and to reach some sort of understanding with
the
Israelis.
For the Syrians, support for Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and several
other
radical Palestinian outfits provides tools of leverage to use in
negotiating a
settlement with Israel. Any deal between the Syrians and the Israelis would
thus involve Damascus sacrificing militant proxies such as Hezbollah and
Hamas
in return for key concessions in Lebanon -- where Syria's core geopolitical
interests lie -- and in the disputed Golan Heights. While the Israeli-Syrian
peace talks remain in flux, Syria's lukewarm reaction to the Israeli
offensive
and restraint (thus far) from criticizing the more moderate Arab regimes'
lack
of response suggests Damascus may be looking to exploit the Gaza offensive
to
improve its relations in the Arab world and reinvigorate its talks with
Israel.
And the more damage Israel does to Hamas now, the easier it will be for
Damascus to crack down on Hamas should the need arise.
With Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Syria taking into account their own
interests when dealing with the Palestinians, ironically, the most reliable
patron Sunni Hamas has had in recent years is Iran, the Sunni Arab world's
principal Shiite rival. Several key developments have made Hamas' gradual
shift
toward Iran possible:
Saudi Arabia's post-9/11 move into the moderate camp -- previously
dominated by
Egypt and Jordan, two states that have diplomatic relations with Israel.
The collapse of Baathist Iraq and the resulting rise of Shiite power in the
region.
The 2004 Iranian parliamentary elections that put Iran's ultraconservatives
in
power and the 2005 election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose public
anti-Israeli views resonated with Hamas at a time when other Arab states had
grown more moderate.
The 2006 Palestinian elections, in which Hamas defeated its secular rival,
Fatah, by a landslide. When endowed with the responsibility of running an
unrecognized government, Hamas floundered between its goals of dominating
the
Palestinian political landscape and continuing to call for the destruction
of
Israel and the creation of an Islamist state. The Arab states, particularly
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, had hoped that the electoral victory would lead
Hamas
to moderate its stance, but Iran encouraged Hamas to adhere to its radical
agenda. As the West increasingly isolated the Hamas-led government, the
group
shifted more toward the Iranian position, which more closely meshed with its
original mandate.
The 2006 summer military confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel, in
which
Iranian-backed Hezbollah symbolically defeated the Jewish state. Hezbollah's
ability to withstand the Israeli military onslaught gave confidence to Hamas
that it could emulate the Lebanese Shiite movement -- which, like Hamas, was
both a political party and an armed paramilitary organization. Similar to
their
reaction to the current Gaza offensive, the principal Arab states condemned
Hezbollah for provoking Israel and grew terrified at the outpouring of
support
for the Shiite militant group from their own populations. Hezbollah-Hamas
collaboration in training, arms-procurement and funding intensified, and
almost
certainly has played a decisive role in equipping Hamas with 122mm BM-21
Grad
artillery rockets and larger Iranian-made 240mm Fajr-3 rockets -- and
potentially even a modest anti-armor capability.
The June 2007 Hamas coup against Fatah in the Gaza Strip, which caused a
serious strain in relations between Egypt and Hamas. The resulting blockade
on
Gaza put Egypt in an extremely uncomfortable position, in which it had to
crack
down on the Gaza border, thus giving the MB an excuse to rally opposition
against Cairo. Egypt was already uncomfortable with Hamas' electoral
victory,
but it could not tolerate the group's emergence as the unchallenged power in
Gaza.
Syria's decision to go public with peace talks with Israel. As soon as it
became clear that Syria was getting serious about such negotiations, alarm
bells went off within groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, which now had to deal
with the fear that Damascus could sell them out at any time as part of a
deal
with the Israelis.
Hamas' relations with the Arab states already were souring; its warming
relationship with Iran has proved the coup de grace. Mubarak said it best
when
he recently remarked that the situation in the Gaza Strip "has led to
Egypt, in
practice, having a border with Iran." In other words, Hamas has allowed
Iranian
influence to come far too close for the Arab states' comfort.
In many ways, the falling-out between Hamas and the Arab regimes is not
surprising. The decline of Nasserism in the late 1960s essentially meant the
death of Arab nationalism. Even before then, the Arab states put their
respective national interests ahead of any devotion to pan-Arab nationalism
that would have translated into support for the Palestinian cause. As
Islamism
gradually came to replace Arab nationalism as a political force throughout
the
region, the Arab regimes became even more concerned about stability at home,
given the very real threat of a religious challenge to their rule. While
these
states worked to suppress radical Islamist elements that had taken root in
their countries, the Arab governments caught wind of Tehran's attempts to
adopt
the region's radical Islamist trend to create a geopolitical space for Iran
in
the Arab Middle East. As a result, the Arab-Persian struggle became one of
the
key drivers that has turned the Arab states against Hamas.
For each of these Arab states, Hamas represents a force that could stir the
social pot at home -- either by creating a backlash against the regimes for
their ties to Israel and their perceived failure to aid the Palestinians,
or by
emboldening democratic Islamist movements in the region that could threaten
the
stability of both republican regimes and monarchies. With somewhat limited
options to contain Iranian expansion in the region, the Arab states
ironically
are looking to Israel to ensure that Hamas remains boxed in. So, while on
the
surface it may seem that the entire Arab world is convulsing with anger at
Israel's offensive against Hamas, a closer look reveals that the view from
the
Arab palace is quite different from the view on the Arab street.
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