From: Biniam Haile \(SWE\) (eritrea.lave@comhem.se)
Date: Sun Mar 22 2009 - 10:44:29 EST
ONLF: The Case for an Urban Insurgency
By Aden Sheikh Hassan
Marcch 19, 2009
The Ogaden National Liberation Front, ONLF has now been locked in a
low-level guerrilla insurgency against Ethiopia for decades. Since 1995,
the ONLF has been engaged in the traditional, rural-based guerrilla
tactics which vacillated between a dormant rebellion and an escalating
insurgency. The rebellion has an enviable socio-political milieu; a
marginalized and oppressed ethnic group who view their association with
Ethiopia as just a sad geopolitical nightmare merely lingering around to
be cleared by the maiden glimmer of dawn. Ethiopia is also a rebel's
paradise because of the country's innate political dysfunction and
historical infatuation with dictatorship and oppression. Moreover, the
ethnic variegation of the country makes it susceptible to perennial
conflicts and discontent.
The two most critical political events in Ethiopia in the past two
decades have been the overthrow of the Dergue regime and the successful
secession of Eritrea. Notably, both milestones have been achieved
through guerrilla rebellions.
So far, the struggle by ONLF for the past one and a half decade can
summarily be onsidered as episodic, erratic and insufficiently intense.
This is due to a multiplicity of factors, most critically lack of
financial and military backing. To their credit, they have managed to
sustain the insurgency and occasionally yank the obscure Ogaden conflict
into the international spotlight. But on the whole, Ethiopia has
succeeded in enshrouding its problems in the Ogaden and concealing its
military casualties because of the media blackout it has imposed and the
primitive social, economic and educational conditions in the region.
More crucially, however, Ethiopia has big and powerful friends in the
West and its shrewd stow-away antics in the war on terror has allowed it
get away with whatever violations that make it to global headlines. So,
logically, what do you do when you are a subjugated minnow, a broke
insurgent with indigent friends, fighting a regional bully with affluent
allies and well-heeled sympathizers? What do you do when your military
successes are hushed up, your people are oppressed, their humanity
violated and their honour desecrated? When your women are raped,
boreholes destroyed, livestock decimated and livelihoods dismantled? And
then none of it is noticed outside your borders? It is apparent you are
losing a crucial component of the war, that is, propaganda and
publicity. Losing this facade is a presage of an imminent military
capitulation. Just what do you do? The only way to salvage your fortunes
is revolutionizing your modus operandi. Evaluating your tactics and
strategies and grafting some dynamism into your operations. Guerrilla
war has long been the natural human reaction when confronted by a
superior occupation. Throughout the history of human conflict, guerrilla
warfare has remained the unmatched choice of the weak, the downtrodden
and the rebellious. Its endurance as a choice strategy for the weaker
side is as a result of its dynamism and flexibility. This is what has
been lacking in the ONLF campaign since it began fighting.
ONLF has stuck, probably for too long, to the classical rural-based
insurgency of roaming the countryside, ambushing military convoys and
occasionally attacking army outposts. The portrait of the glorified,
quintessential rebel, with a bushy head, dented cheeks chiseled by the
unyielding elements, scabrous skin and sunken eyes is still maintained
by the group's fighters. But this rural rebellion is not working. ONLF
must adopt radical
approaches if it is to progress beyond the image of the ceremonial
rebellion it often depicts. Radical measures will have to include an
urban guerrilla insurgency to supplement the traditional rural-based
operations.
Candidly, an urban guerrilla offensive is not as easy as a rural
rebellion. It demands multi-faceted sophistication in training,
equipment, coordination as well as in communication. It requires a level
of logistical expertise and intelligence networking capable of measuring
up to the rival military capacity. It will therefore require a
significant material muscle which the ONLF may not easily acquire. But
it will be a worthwhile investment for anyone fighting a modern
guerrilla war with the odds massively tilted in favour of the enemy.
An urban insurgency offers the guerrillas more flexibility in terms of
military targets and timing of events. It increases the fighter's
versatility, compelling him to adapt to diverse situations and acquire
as many skills as possible. Since it flourishes on stealth and
deception, the fighters have a better command of the situation as they
often strike fast and withdraw before the target recovers from the
shock. For an organization that is fighting in its backyard against a
conventional army, the bulk of whose personnel happen to be foreigners,
this should further level the equation. The guerrilla has superiority in
his intimate knowledge of the environment and the support of the local
population. Through a network of informers, sympathizers, safe houses
and sleeper cells, the rebel will relatively feel at home as he
constructs his plans.
The ONLF will be able to extricate itself from the publicity blackout
imposed on it by Ethiopia. The military might manage to conceal dozens
of conscripted soldiers killed in the wilderness. It cannot cover the
death of its military commanders and political collaborators felled by
assassin bullets in towns. Nor will it blot out a daring raid on its
installations and barracks. This will amount to a propaganda coup and
the ONLF can compete with the government on a more balanced footing.
Liquidating valuable targets in towns and attacking military
installations will erode the fictitious aura of normalcy that Ethiopia
has worked so hard to weave around the restive province. A liberation
struggle must often play to the gallery of public pride and assuage the
people's battered egos. In the Ogaden, there are well-known individuals
within the military establishment who consistently commit atrocities
against the civilian population. There are known figures who specialize
in torture, execution and rape. It is common knowledge that the most
prolific rapists are the commanders and interrogators who rape women in
prisons to break them. Assassinating these targets will have an immense
impact on the people's psychology and elevate the standing of the
resistance. It is always easier to fight within an ambience of a robust
public confidence. The Ogaden is a vast, under-developed and
under-guarded region. It would therefore not be difficult to smuggle
modern weapons suitable for urban operations. The massive popular hatred
of the system works to the advantage of the ONLF. It would not very
expensive planting and maintaining agents and sleepers in such an
auspicious backdrop. The urban guerrilla is anonymous and blends with
the population easily. This allows him to carry out espionage, sabotage
or assassination hits without blowing his cover.
An urban rebellion will enable ONLF to take the battle to the Ethiopian
military. Presently, it is the army which initiates the offensive and
the fighters ambush them. How about reversing the trend and raiding
their barracks and patrols inside towns and wrenching the initiative
from their grip? The psychological impact of this will be devastating.
In addition, this is likely to deflect some of the burden from the rural
fighters who are now bearing the full brunt of the military machine.
They will get more opportunities to more effectively storm military
outposts, because a military that is fighting on two fronts will have to
spread its personnel more thinly and this works best for an outnumbered
organization.
The urban warfare is the most potent technique to hit the military
spirit where it hurts most. You can imagine how terrified a Tigray or
Amhara soldier will be when his camp is raided overnight and the next
morning he is trapped in a street ambush. The crippling fear that
nowhere is safe works wonders on even the most tenacious of men.
Military offensives don't yield without a corresponding psychological
onslaught.
The ONLF must be capable of hitting centralized targets such as
military/police stations, prisons, arsenals, offices and officials. It
should be raiding prisons and releasing its prisoners of war and even
idnapping soldiers.
Urbanizing armed resistance is not just about fighting in urban centers.
It is easier for the resistance operatives to engineer public revolt
from within rather than preaching via radio. These views may sound quite
irrational and incendiary. Why would anyone
goad a party to a conflict to expand the conflagration which is already
taking a heavy toll on the people and the region? Why not prod the sides
towards a diplomatic route?
The answer is as blunt as it is simple: diplomacy needs a ripe moment.
Unfortunately, it is not in sight. It has to be conjured, somehow.
It is vital that ONLF raise the stakes in this conflict. It is good for
them, for the Ogaden citizenry and even eventually for Ethiopia. This is
because Ethiopia has irreversibly discarded reason and prudence and
decided to settle matters militarily. If the only thing that can bring
Ethiopia to reason is gunfire, then let there be plenty of it.
It always does get worse before it begins to get better, doesn't it?
-- Aden Sheikh Hassan http://ogaden.com/onlfcase200309.htm