From: wolda002@umn.edu
Date: Tue Mar 24 2009 - 23:54:21 EST
Qatar Steps into the Breach
Doha skyline
Doha skyline
As efforts continue to heal the breach in regional relations in the Middle
East, Qatar emerges as an important player on a stage devoid of functional
mediating forces, Dominic Moran writes for ISN Security Watch.
By Dominic Moran in Tel Aviv for ISN Security Watch
Qatar stands in a unique position, bridging the gulf between the regional
US-allied bloc led by neighbor Saudi Arabia and Egypt and its regional
rivals Syria and Iran.
This bridging position and attendant Qatari influence is fostered through
both a close relationship with most state and several key non-state
players, including Hizbollah and the exilic Hamas leadership.
Chatham House's Professor Gerd Nonneman told ISN Security Watch, "The
[Qatari] role has been one of profiling itself […] and of trying to
somehow take the sting out of some of the worst conflicts that might
rebound on its own interests."
It is the fact that the emirate is not one of the primary competitors in
the wider diplomatic contest for influence or a key mover in the deep
destabilization of the regional power structure of recent years that has
allowed Qatar to emerge as a trusted mediator in a series of international
disputes and conflicts from the Sudan to Lebanon.
Qatari influence is premised, if not solely reliant, on the emirate's
ability to provide financial backing for its peace and reconciliation
efforts. Qatar is the world's largest liquefied natural gas exporter, with
the world's third largest known gas reserves and significant oil deposits.
The importance for international states in building energy ties with the
tiny Gulf emirate and its neighbors was emphasized this week with the
announcement that eight Latin American leaders will attend the second
Arab-South American Summit in Doha on 31 March.
Major achievement
Qatar had sought for several years to develop an interceding role in
regional conflicts, failing in efforts to mediate between Hamas and Israel
and Palestinian factions. The reverses had bolstered the impression that
Qatar was a well-meaning but lightweight player seeking a role too great
for its actual level of influence.
This impression was shattered by the successful Qatari mediation effort in
Lebanon which culminated in the Doha Agreement of May 2008, ending a
debilitating 18-month political stalemate.
In Lebanon, Qatar was able to parlay its role as a largely neutral and
disinterested Arab regional player and Sunni-predominant state, with
established relations with the Hizbollah-led March 8 bloc, to lay the basis
for a return to power-sharing where the Saudis had demonstrably failed.
The resultant agreement clearly favors the March 8 parties but is in effect
little more than a confirmation of the dominant position enjoyed by
Hizbollah and allies in the wake of the violence of May 2008.
"Although sometimes they are accused of being pro March 8, pro-Syria, in
fact they do try to remain neutral as far as they can," a Doha-based
academic, who asked that his identity be protected, told ISN Security Watch
The post agreement calm, while solving none of the underlying factors
hampering the development of a stable consociational governance structure
in Lebanon, is nonetheless a triumph for Qatari diplomacy.
The inter-factional deal is a confirmation that the wealth of the emirate
and the catholic nature of its foreign policy can be transposed into
genuine diplomatic clout where competing factions have a clear interest in
coming to terms.
Ongoing efforts
Qatar is maintaining or seeking an important role in a number of regional
crises, providing philanthropic and other support to the competing Lebanese
factions. It has also sought to unilaterally actuate a wider Arab League
commitment to solving the Sudan crisis, hosting Justice and Equality
Movement ( JEM) and Sudanese government representatives in February for a
peace parlay in which an initial agreement to pursue peace negotiations was
agreed.
JEM subsequently pulled out of the negotiations, citing the impossibility
of coming to terms given the Sudanese government's response to the
International Criminal Court decision to charge President Omar al-Bashir
with war crimes.
Asked how successful the Qatari mediation effort has been in Sudan,
Nonneman said, "Not particularly, yet. They are stretching themselves
rather far."
Sudanese religious scholars called on al-Bashir Tuesday not to follow
through on his acceptance of a Qatari offer to attend the annual Arab
League summit in Doha at month's end, apparently paving the way for the
Sudanese leader to back out on his earlier commitment.
Nonneman noted that Qatar is also a key international player in efforts to
bring an end to the al-Houthi rebellion in the north of Yemen: "They have
obviously not succeeded in settling the whole thing and have occasionally
pulled out in frustration but they have gone back," he said. "They're
recognized as just about the only player that seems to be able to make any
difference."
Suspension
Until the January Gaza conflict, Qatar was the only Gulf state to enjoy
open, low-level relations with Israel, hosting an Israeli trade mission and
now-Israeli President Shimon Peres in January 2007. Israel has sought
Qatari help in the past to negotiate the release of a captured Israeli
soldier – a role subsequently assumed by Egypt.
The Gaza conflict led Qatari officials to announce the suspension of ties
with Israel.
"Sometimes he [Israeli representative] marketed himself as an ambassador
but he was not a formal ambassador he was a trade representative," the
academic said. "Truth be told, I do not know think there was a great deal
of trade, obviously he was a political figure."
It appears that Qatar will maintain the possibility of a resumption of
relations with Israel at some point, thus maintaining the option of acting
both as an important discursive conduit between the Gulf states and Israel
and as a mediator between Hamas (which trusts Qatar more than current
interlocutor Egypt) and Israel and Fatah.
To Nonneman the fact Qatar is maintaining relations with both the US and
Israel and its regional rivals "means that they don't get isolated. Also,
it means "that while on the one hand they keep great power protection, on
the other hand their domestic legitimacy isn't affected."
Strained ties
Ties with neighboring Saudi Arabia and Egypt were badly affected in January
by Qatar's hosting of an emergency summit on the Gaza crisis, attended by
Hamas' Khalid Meshaal, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his Iranian
counterpart Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia boycotted the summit, which ended with a
series of sharply worded statements excoriating the wider Arab state
response to the Israeli operation; statements seen in Riyadh and Cairo as
direct assaults on their regional role.
"They don't mind ruffling the Saudis' feathers, they don't mind getting the
Egyptians annoyed if it can serve the other purposes," Nonneman noted,
referring to Qatari diplomatic stances.
The summit led to an open war of words between Qatar and Egypt and the
Palestinian Authority with the latter accusing the emirate of "exploiting
the blood of the Palestinians to score political gains."
Notably, the Doha meet also ended with calls for the suspension of the Arab
League Peace Initiative (API). The importance of this lies in the fact that
the API is a key Saudi foreign policy achievement which has stood the test
of time since its initial presentation in 2002, despite significant
reversals for Saudi regional interests in Iraq, the Palestinian territories
and - most damagingly - Lebanon.
The bilateral Qatari-Saudi relationship has seen some strains over the
years. However, efforts continue to heal the rift created by the January
conference ahead of this month's Arab League meet in Doha, with the final
demarcation of the countries' mutual border cemented in a border accord
last week, signed alongside a series of bilateral deals.
Interestingly, the Doha Debates survey found that 69 percent of Qataris
felt that the appellation "cold war" aptly fitted their country's current
relations with Saudi Arabia, a concern not shared in their larger neighbor
where only 40 percent agreed with this postulation.
"The emir and Saudi King Abdullah are on good personal terms," the academic
noted, while pointing to some dissensus in ministerial relations during a
recent Kuwait-hosted economic summit. "The problems arise out of the
geopolitical context and other elements, particularly within Saudi Arabia
but relations otherwise are very good for the most part," he said.
Sources have told ISN Security Watch that the upcoming Arab League summit
will likely see Syria and Qatar reverse their January disavowal of the API
allowing its reconfirmation.
The limits of influence
While Qatar has played an important and increasing role in peacemaking and
conflict management, there remain significant limits to Qatari influence.
One of these lies in the opposition of larger players to Qatar playing such
a prominent role in regional affairs.
Referring to the January summit in Doha, Nonneman said, "The reaction of
Egypt and Saudi is partly explained […] by the fact that Egypt and Saudi
Arabia haven't so far been able to prove themselves successful solvers of
these [regional] conflicts, whereas the Qataris have on occasion. They are
needled by that."
Notably, Qatar has not played a major role in efforts to delimit the impact
of the Iraq crisis and in negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program and
is unlikely to emerge as a major diplomatic factor in either case.
The presence of the largest US troop concentration in the Gulf in the
emirate is a clear reminder of the ongoing reliance of Qatar on the
security umbrella afforded by American military power and of relative
Qatari impotence in influencing the course of the Iranian-US/Israeli
military standoff and related Gulf conventional arms race.
"How much pressure can he [the emir] exert on Washington and Tel Aviv? Very
little I would think," the academic said. "If they [Israel/US] really want
to strike Iran they can do it and this would spell disaster for Qatar and
of course everybody else as well."
Noting that the Arab elites and street can sometimes be dismissive of
Qatari interventions, Nonneman said, "In a sense, that does limit some of
their impact."
That said "if they really focus on a particular conflict, they allocate
their money towards resolving that, or shaping the positions of the various
parties, they can then be very successful."
Dr Dominic Moran, based in Tel Aviv, is ISN Security Watch's senior
correspondent in the Middle East and the Director of Operations of ISA
Consulting.