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From: Tsegai Emmanuel (emmanuelt40@gmail.com)
Date: Fri Jan 22 2010 - 10:24:06 EST
Iran: Stirring the Pot with Al Qaeda in Yemen
Stratfor Today » January 22, 2010 | 1946 GMT
AHMAD GHARABLI/AFP/Getty Images
Yemeni soldiers with an anti-terrorism unit scan a mountain area near
Sanaa on Jan. 9Summary
Iran has a number of militant proxies — both Shiite and Sunni — spread
throughout the region to let its rivals know that it can inflict pain
if provoked. One of Iran’s most recent forays into the Sunni militant
landscape is in Yemen, where al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is
eager for support, even if that support comes from an ideological foe.
Analysis
With tensions escalating between the United States and Iran over the
latter’s nuclear program, the Iranian regime has spent much time
lately highlighting the many retaliatory levers it possesses in the
region with which it can inflict pain on the United States and its
allies should the Islamic republic be sufficiently provoked. Tehran’s
Shiite militant proxy force in Lebanon and Iraq is well known, but
less well known is that the Iranian regime also selectively supports
militants across the Sunni jihadist landscape. This is most notable in
places like Yemen, where al Qaeda has a burgeoning presence, combined
with the intent to attack U.S. and Saudi interests beyond Yemen’s
borders.
STRATFOR has explored the warning signals Tehran has been telegraphing
to Washington over the instability it can create in Iraq through its
Shiite allies in the lead-up to March elections. STRATFOR has received
reports from sources connected to Hezbollah and Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that reveal rather grandiose
Hezbollah plans to pre-empt an Israeli attack on Iran with a
cross-border assault into Israel from southern Lebanon this spring.
While this particular threat is questionable, that it was disseminated
at all was designed to give Israel and the United States pause in
their military planning.
Iran has a proven ability to move beyond its traditional Shiite
militant strongholds in Lebanon and Iraq and develop non-Shiite
militant assets. For example, the Sunni militant group Hamas in the
Gaza Strip has witnessed a surge of Iranian support in the past three
years as Tehran quickly worked to exploit the group’s isolation in the
Palestinian territories. Even hard-core Wahhabi and Deobandi
ideologues in al Qaeda and the Taliban have worked with the IRGC over
the years.
Iranian support for al Qaeda in Yemen has attracted particular
attention. In the summer of 2009, Iran directed resources toward a
rebellion by Zaidi al-Houthi rebels in the northern Saada Mountains
along the Yemeni-Saudi border. STRATFOR sources at the time reported
that IRGC and Hezbollah military trainers were in Yemen supporting the
al-Houthis. The Iranian role also came to light when the Saudi
Interior Ministry revealed in May 2008 that Abdullah al-Qarawi, one of
Saudi Arabia’s 85 most-wanted militants, had been operating from Iran
for three years, where he allegedly had 100 other Saudis working under
him. The al-Houthi insurgency escalated rapidly in the summer and
began spilling into the Saudi kingdom, pulling Riyadh into a proxy
battle with Tehran.
The United States, however, refused to take the bait. Though U.S.
military advising, training and intelligence support in Yemen runs
deep, Washington was careful to avoid openly acknowledging the Iranian
role in the al-Houthi conflict. Whereas Iran wished to use the
al-Houthi proxy battle to complicate and prolong its nuclear
negotiations with the United States, the U.S. government — under heavy
pressure from Israel — was doing its best to maintain some semblance
of progress in those talks. Washington thus avoided opening a new
front with the Iranians.
After having failed to elicit the desired response from Washington
with the al-Houthi insurgency, according to STRATFOR sources, Iran
began accelerating support for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) in Yemen. This is no easy task, particularly given the
logistics and sectarian complications involved, but Iran has proven
ability to work with certain elements in the Sunni jihadist movement.
The IRGC reportedly runs training bases in the northeastern Iranian
province of Razavi Khorasan, which borders Afghanistan and
Turkmenistan. A number of the militants training in these camps have
been brought there from other recruiting hotspots in the region.
According to different STRATFOR sources throughout the region, Syrian
intelligence was involved in contributing several jihadists to Yemen
that it had been running in Syria and Lebanon, much like Syria has
done in the past in funneling IRGC-trained militants to Iraq. Syria’s
intelligence apparatus operates a labyrinthine militant supply chain
to support Damascus’s foreign policy agenda. In this case, Syria
reportedly struck a deal with Iran to relocate some of its Islamist
militant proxies to IRGC training camps in Iran. Syria could then
claim in its ongoing efforts to extract financial concessions from the
Saudi government that it has followed through with its pledge to deny
jihadists an operating base. Many of the militants reshuffled in this
way are then deployed from Razavi Khorasan to Yemen after their
training.
Iran’s support for the al-Houthi rebellion in Yemen thus far may have
failed to grab Washington’s attention, but Iran’s support for al Qaeda
in Yemen is a different story. The sophistication of AQAP operations
is a far cry from that of al Qaeda prime in the pre-9/11 era, but the
group is clearly developing a more transnational targeting philosophy.
Rather than focusing attacks on civilian and security targets inside
Yemen, AQAP has demonstrated a continued interest in more challenging
and strategically valuable targets beyond its borders, evidenced most
recently by the failed assassination attempt on the Saudi deputy
interior minister in August 2009 and the failed attempt to blow up a
U.S.-bound airliner in December 2009. Between being strapped for cash
and confronting regular security breaches, AQAP faces a number of
challenges in carrying out effective operations from its base in
Yemen. The role of an external patron like Iran, however, could make a
significant difference in the group’s operational capabilities — that
is, should Tehran feel strategically compelled to make such a
difference.