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From: wolda002@umn.edu
Date: Tue Mar 16 2010 - 23:45:30 EST
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/5-reasons-why-russia-isnt-china/401597.html
5 Reasons Why Russia Isn’t China
15 March 2010
By Yevgeny Bazhanov
Ever since Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary 25 years ago last
week, the world has compared China’s successful economic reforms, which
were first set into motion in late 1978 under the leadership of Deng
Xiaoping, with the Soviet Union’s and then Russia’s largely
unsuccessful attempts to overhaul its economy. The conventional version is
that Moscow somehow took the wrong path toward reform and things would have
been a lot better had Russia copied the Chinese model. But this is an
oversimplified analysis. The two countries are far too different for Russia
to have copied China’s reform program in a cookie-cutter fashion.
First, consider the domestic situations in each country. China was
embroiled in chaos after the Great Cultural Revolution, which lasted from
1966 to 1976. By 1978, the overwhelming majority of Chinese officials and
citizens understood the need to institute fundamental reforms. The
situation was quite different in the Soviet Union in 1985. Most Soviets
viewed the country in 1985 as a superpower with a relatively functioning
economy, social stability and order — particularly when compared with the
stagnation years under Leonid Brezhnev and in comparison with the
widespread poverty and hunger in China before Deng started economic
reforms.
Second, the state apparatus in both countries differed considerably. The
authority, power and unity of the Chinese leadership had been severely set
back by the Cultural Revolution that the more conservative members could
not put up any organized resistance to those who called for fundamental
reforms. It was clear to all that something drastic had to be done to
revive the country. By contrast, Gorbachev’s reforms was heavily resisted
by the Politburo’s conservative members and among the military top brass.
Third, two very different individuals headed the reform movements in both
countries. China’s reforms were led by the highly experienced, former
revolutionary figure Deng. He enjoyed enormous authority and had the
liberty to take bold steps toward reform. In the Soviet Union, the burden
of reform fell on the shoulders of a less experienced, provincial party
functionary who was only capable of experimenting within a very limited
political and economic framework that was defined by the old guard.
In the end, Deng was able to institute deep and far-reaching reforms, while
Gorbachev had to settle for only insignificant economic reforms that were
frequently pointless or even detrimental. It is notable that in one of the
few cases in which Gorbachev was able to institute a radical economic
reform — the introduction of private business cooperatives in 1988, the
first time since Lenin that Soviets were given the right to own private
businesses — he was forced to retract it a year later.
The fourth factor was the social and economic conditions that prevailed in
both countries. China remained an agrarian country. Eighty percent of the
people were peasants who hungered for the right to work their own land, and
Deng gave them this right. As a result, the situation in the villages
quickly improved, and even inveterate skeptics were forced to admit that
the reforms were successful. From agriculture, Deng set out to reform to
the industrial and other sectors of the economy as well.
Gorbachev was faced with a completely different situation. Unlike in China,
the military-industrial complex was the backbone of the Soviet economy. To
stimulate and diversify the economy, it was necessary to make drastic cuts
and reforms to the military-industrial manufacturing sector, which
permeated virtually all sectors — from producing intercontinental
missiles to manufacturing women’s shoes. But this was fiercely opposed by
the top military brass for obvious reasons, and they had an ideological and
military basis for resisting such reforms — that the United States and
NATO were a direct threat to the country’s national security.
Further, Gorbachev’s attempted agricultural reforms were stifled by 50
years of backwardness in the country’s collective farms, fierce
opposition from Communist Party apparatchiks to any type of change and —
very much in contrast to what happened in China — the lack of desire
among Soviet farmers to work harder even under more liberal economic
conditions to improve their well-being. On the whole, it was far more
difficult to reorganize the more military-based, industrialized Soviet
economy than it was China’s more agricultural-based, primitive economy.
Fifth, the foreign policies of the two countries differed significantly.
China had close military and political ties with the West based on a common
opposition to what was perceived as the Kremlin’s expansionist foreign
policy. As a result, the United States and its allies enthusiastically
participated in Chinese reforms both on a governmental and private-sector
basis. Chinese nationals living overseas also played a key role in the
process.
The Soviet Union could not even dream of receiving such assistance from
abroad. Gorbachev’s first priority was curbing the arms race that had
been bleeding the country dry. And that goal could only have been achieved
had the conservative elements within the Politburo been willing to downsize
and restructure the massive military-industrial complex.
After his first two years in office, Gorbachev realized that his economic
reform plans had reached a dead end. In 1987, in an attempt to jump-start
the process and overcome the conservative resistance, Gorbachev focused on
political reforms, hoping to rally the people behind his reforms. But this
backfired on him. Democratization and pluralism eroded the very foundation
of the Soviet regime and weakened the glue that had been holding the Soviet
republics and Russian society together. As a result, the Soviet Union was
crippled by an intense struggle between liberals and conservatives within
the Politburo, between Moscow and the provinces and among nationalities in
the republics. This type of “shock democratization” has almost always
led to chaos in totalitarian regimes.
Thus, the Soviet Union was caught in a vicious circle of political and
economic instability. Gorbachev’s political reforms led to a debilitating
political conflict between liberals and conservatives within the Kremlin,
which made it impossible to institute economic reforms. Both of these
factors this took the Soviet Union down a slippery slope toward a severe
political and economic crisis. Unlike China in 1978, the Kremlin in the
mid- and late 1980s could not develop a unified strategy for economic
reform — much less to put such a strategy into practice. Ensnared in a
deep political deadlock amid deteriorating economic conditions, the
Communist regime collapsed in 1991.
Russia has been struggling to implement its economic reforms ever since,
while China is celebrating nearly 32 years of economic success.
Yevgeny Bazhanov is vice chancellor of research and international relations
at the Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy in Moscow.