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Date: Mon Apr 26 2010 - 23:52:23 EDT
Globalizing Contemporary War
Thursday, March 18, 2010
By Melissa Zisler for JAPSS
A plethora of social problems exist throughout the world in which America
has deemed a type of ‘war.’ Some of these unconventional wars include:
The War on Poverty presented in 1964; The War on Drugs announced in 1971;
The War on Cancer began in 1971; The War Against Illiteracy began in the
1970s; and after September 11, 2001 The War on Terror was announced (Raz,
2008). These contemporary ‘wars’ have transformed the meaning of the
word ‘war.’
Labeling these missions ‘wars,’ presents a stigma and encourages a
dichotomy between good and bad; when in fact these ‘wars’ as they are
presented do not have an attainable end in which a winner is declared. The
definition of war is, “a state of usually open and declared armed hostile
conflict between states or nations” or “a state of hostility, conflict,
or antagonism; a struggle or competition between opposing forces or for a
particular end” (war, 2008).
This successful attempt to downplay war has produced detrimental effects
around the world. The most recent, War on Terror, is perhaps the most
misleading of them all. This War on Terror signifies a war on a method.
Terror is a method used on an enemy to inflict harm. As there is no formal
agreed upon definition of terrorism, I will utilize the definition from the
Department of Defense (2008). It states, “The calculated use of unlawful
violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to
coerce governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally
political, religious, or ideological” (p. 560). Waging war on a tactic
promotes a militaristic ideology that shadows the globe. The hegemonic
discourse of the United States has provoked global turmoil surrounding this
term. I will examine the semantics behind this struggle, the War on Terror.
I will identify key components of how this ‘war’ began. Finally, I will
analyze the effects of this struggle in the international arena with
respect to several nations’ policies. It is alleged that several state
governments have used this ‘war’ as an opportunity to advance their own
ideologies or goals.
2. Semantics
Following the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, the United States did
not declare it “an international crime against humanity,” instead it
was an act of ‘war’ (Vanaik, 2007, p. 119). Vanaik (2007) argues that
this declaration was intentional. The label of war enables the opponent to
respond with military action at any time. The further label of a
“global” war on terror enables the opponent to respond anywhere they
deem necessary.
The War on Terror, and the means in which it is presented, suggests an
ongoing struggle. To rid the world of “terror” is a massive task that
cannot be accomplished in one lifetime. Therefore, this ‘war’ has
created an aura of waiting. In essence, the United States is “waiting for
the next attack, waiting for the spread of a virus, waiting for the killing
of terrorists, waiting as a prolong moment of suspension and anxiety, of
terror transformed into spectacle…” (Aretxaga, 2001, p. 141). The
language surrounding this struggle has cultivated a society on edge.
It has transformed the ways in which the world functions. It is necessary
to analyze the semantics surrounding the War on Terror, and terrorism
itself, in order to comprehend this timeless struggle. The media plays a
persuasive role in the War on Terror. The media presents information by
framing it, which constructs “an entire social reality” (DiMaggio,
2008, p. 21).
This method of framing social issues allows a world filled with ‘wars’
on nouns. The media chooses a topic to center the majority of the reports
on in any given period (DiMaggio, 2008). This creates an unconscious frenzy
surrounding a social concern. In turn, the public accepts a declaration of
‘war’ on that issue. In addition, the media is believed to go one step
further and sway, or even manipulate public opinion one way or another on
current events. As the media or television, is the only means in which many
Americans retain their news, the influence of that media is substantial
(DiMaggio, 2008).
The rhetoric used by George W. Bush in his addresses to the nation
following the September 11 attacks, promotes an old-school, warlike
ideology. This rhetoric was extremely persuasive in increasing nationalism,
patriotism, and a sense of collective within the United States. In
addition, the words and phrases that President Bush exercised contributed
to the militaristic actions of the nation and attitudes of the people at
that time. He spoke about the “crusade of good against evil,” “a war
to save the world” (Aretxaga, 2001, p. 141). He stated that every nation
is “either with us or with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001). The President
spoke of defending freedom and democracy throughout the world, repeatedly,
regardless of those region’s wishes. He stated, “Some speak of an age
of terror. I know there are struggles ahead and dangers to face. But this
country will define our times, not be defined by them” (Bush, 2001). This
has not been confirmed yet. The rhetoric used by President Bush possesses
an aura of Jervis’s cognitive approach in accounting for war. Jervis
states that coming to over simplified conclusions based on your own bias
and worldview will lead to conflict (Cashman, 2000).
In an effort to modernize British political thinking and contribute to
peaceful endeavors at home, the British cabinet ministers eliminated the
phrase ‘War on Terror’ in December 2006. They deemed this phrase to
encourage isolation and militancy. Based on intelligence, the Foreign
Office concluded that the reference to this struggle as a ‘war’ or
‘battle’ only increased support with young British Muslims. In
relinquishing these terms, it was anticipated that the next generation
would not defend the ‘War on Terror’ (Burke, 2006).
3. Strategy
On an international level, the decision to launch these types of timeless
wars, such as the War on Terror, can be attributed to the strong hegemonic
stance of the United States in the global system. According to Cashman
(2008), the dominant player will remain aware of all long-term threats.
Therefore, since the United States has not launched preventative wars, in
recent decades, it can be assumed that the preventative wars, the ‘wars
on’ metaphors, have assumed the role of long-term threats. The War in
Iraq has accompanied the War on Terror as a measure of protection.
According to prospect theory, a party will intrepidly act, accepting great
risk, when faced with the prospect of great loss (Cashman, 2008).
The individual worldviews of U.S. leaders is important in understanding the
techniques and actions that were implemented. The first school of thought,
and the dominant one within the Bush administration, was the traditional
realists. This included G.H.W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, and Colin Powell.
They refrained from deploying U.S. forces for “peacekeeping missions and
nation building” and were reluctant to engage in humanitarian missions
(Cashman, 2008, p. 329). They believed these efforts were “idealistic”
in nature and their efforts would be better spent on improving
international relations with major powers (Cashman, 2008, p. 329).
The next group was the assertive nationalists, including Dick Cheney and
Donald Rumsfeld. Though they agreed with the realists, they would prefer to
engage in defeating enemies and taking on national threats. They were
concerned about the American image and did not want to appear weak
(Cashman, 2008). The neoconservatives, though a long list, they consisted
of the secondary level of the cabinet. They viewed politics in terms of
absolutes: good versus evil. They were in favor of forceful promotion of
American ideals (Cashman, 2008). It has been suggested that the War on
Terror, and the aftereffects of September 11, 2001, caused the President to
adhere to more risky behavior. The President is heavily religious and has
presented the War on Terror as the mission of his generation. He is a
fundamentalist and sees the world in “Manchurian terms” as was evident
in his speech rhetoric (Cashman, 2008, p. 335). It is believed that
President Bush is a pragmatist, who does not think twice, and makes
decisions in the moment (Cashman, 2008); hence the “War on Terror”
being born.
According to Cashman (2008), rational choice theory was utilized by the
zero-sum Bush administration. Rational choice theory advocates war when the
gains outweigh the losses. Cashman (2008) speculates on the rationale
behind the decision to wage war: 1) The perceived costs including economic,
military, and political were low. 2) The U.S. military was significantly
stronger than the opponent was. 3) The success of regime change was
probable. 4) The outcomes of invasion were high and outweighed the negative
aspects of neutrality. For example, the prospect of democracy, removing
Saddam Hussein, etc, compared to weapons of mass destruction entering the
wrong hands and creating terrorist safe havens. 5) It was improbable that
Iraq would gain military allies in the struggle. Therefore, the
administration advocated the invasion. This decision was a central
component to the War on Terror. Clearly, rational choice theory has several
shortcomings. The concept of a collective versus an individual within this
theory presents a potential conflict. The method that is best for the
individual may not be best for the group. In addition, social norms and
structure contribute to the decision in question. Therefore, the same
rational being in one society will make a completely different decision if
raised in a different environment (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004). The rationale
is entirely subjective and is not a concrete means of assessment.
It is a common practice for a nation to use war as a scapegoat for internal
pressures (Cashman, 2000). This serves to divert attention from the
domestic problems that could be attributed to the leader of that nation and
create illusive downtime in which a resolution can be created for the
internal issue, or the internal struggle can later be attributed to the
war. In the meantime, the nation experiences a surge in patriotism. In a
democratic nation, it is considered more ‘difficult’ to go to war than
in an autocratic nation. This is due to the nature of a democracy, as
popular support is vital. A surge in patriotism established by scapegoating
can yield positive results for mending internal concerns (Cashman, 2000).
4. New Wars
The shock of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil caused an almost immediate
reaction to implement symmetric war strategies used for traditional
warfare.
“Which is more representative of modern war: The United States unleashing
high-tech arsenals to defeat dubious Third World regimes swiftly or
machete-wielding insurgents fighting brutal civil wars in Africa? The short
answer: both. Yet neither of these scenarios conforms to the classic model
of warfare as a titanic struggle between rival great powers. It’s time to
update the textbooks and reappraise the nature of war” (Freedman, 2003,
p. 16).
The era of traditional wars is over and new wars are beginning to surface.
Old wars are centered on battles between soldiers in uniforms, fighting
from different states. Old wars are fought (ideally) based on certain rules
from the Geneva and Hague Conventions (Kaldor, 2005). Traditional wars
advocated state building whereas new wars are often contextualized within
states affected by globalization causing dissolution. The rise of
globalization has contributed to the increase in contemporary wars
(Malesevic, 2008). According to Kaldor (2005), new wars are fought between
both state and non-state actors with the goal of constructing a new
identity. New wars omit a sense of “shared political community”
(Kaldor, 2005, p. 492). These wars encompass the more recent conflicts
evident around the globe, including struggles against terrorism, religion,
ethnicity, and genocide.
Malesevic (2008) contests the theories of Bauman, Shaw, and Kaldor who
state that new wars are solely based on identity. They postulate that the
previous notions of ideology and nationalism are no longer a cause of war.
Malesevic (2008) argues that identity is a key component of these ideals.
In support of Malesevic’s theory (2008), one simply does not exist
without the other. New wars are conceived in a holistic foundation. The
nationalistic root of these wars on nouns is the very reason for their
existence. It brings together a community to instill a common goal.
In order to defeat or eliminate these new wars, it is imperative to adopt
alternative strategies then those used in old wars. For example, in the War
on Terror, terrorists are given political status as the enemy. This is in
turn what they are striving for, to be involved in a ‘war.’ However, if
the terrorists were described and labeled as criminals, this would enable
the United States and its allies to precede with new war tactics such as
policing and intelligence and abandon such a militarized strategy (Kaldor,
2005). Thus far, the tactics employed in the War on Terror have been
conventional, such as airstrikes and covert operations.
However, there is evidence suggesting that the U.S. military has recruited
several individuals from Hollywood to predict possible terrorist targets
(Aretxaga, 2001). The traditional schools of military tactics such as
deterrence and containment would not be effective in this environment. The
‘enemy’ is not a state; it is hard to define. Deterrence theory
advocates bullying and threats (Cashman, 2000); this tactic would not be
effective to combat terrorist entities. Containment is not effective as the
‘enemies’ belongs to “rogue states” (Cashman, 2008, p. 329).
Therefore, the U.S. administration’s old school ideologies would suggest
that preemptive measures are the only alternative.
Due to the language and tactics utilized in this ‘war,’ several
scholars have gone as far as to cast the label of Western imperialism
(Aretxaga, 2001). Brzoska (2004) suggests that new wars can only be ended
by “external intervention” (p.113). However, it is not clear what is
meant by external. An external peacekeeping force could intervene with
resolution tactics, or a nation that is not a main participant could
intervene; however, these forces will still possess some bias towards one
side or the other. The nation may be an ally or the organization may be
financially supported by one side or the other. It is imperative to define
what is meant by “external intervention” in this case.
The new wars, which utilize asymmetric warfare, possess more divergent
goals then traditional symmetric warfare. An example of asymmetric warfare
is when terror is used by state or non-state actors when they do not
possess a strong military force. The challenger is striving to dismantle
political and economic systems. The goal is to continue the violence
(Brzoska, 2004). Thus, defeating the entire definition of war, which
suggests an end. Is it possible that if the War on Terror was not labeled a
war, and military efforts were not deployed at the inception, then
terrorist organizations would see a means to satisfy their goals and
achieve their means on a more peaceful level? The words ‘war’ and
‘military’ may invoke a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Aretxaga (2001) argues, “That the War on Terrorism might indeed create
the very enemy it is seeking to eradicate” (p. 147). He states that this
may enforce a constant state of war perpetuating a military and police
society, which will overthrow the fundamentals of American democracy and
capitalism (Aretxaga, 2001).
5. Global Implications
A study on the “Trends in Global Terrorism” in 2006 implicated the War
in Iraq to be a “cause célèbre” for jihadists (p. 2). The reference
to jihadist in this case is questionable; however, it is assumed a
derogatory term in reference to a terrorist. This struggle against
terrorism has created a surge in support for a “global jihadist
movement” and anti-American sentiments (Trends, 2006, p. 2). This war has
caused the movement to grow and branch out. It is no longer a centralized
mission; cells have surfaced all over the world. The U.S. Government’s
intelligence report indicated that there were four main causes for the
increasing terrorist movement:
“1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of
Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of
powerlessness; 2) The Iraq jihad; 3) The slow pace of real and sustained
economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations;
and 4) Pervasive anti-US sentiment among most Muslims, all of which
jihadists exploit” (Trends, 2006, p. 2).
The remaining document goes on to deplorably discuss old school tactics for
defeating enemies. It states that exposing the fissures in the Muslim
extremist ideology will create a reduction in supporters. It is suggesting
that a form of trickery and exposure must be utilized to attain victory. It
is suggesting that a focus on the vulnerabilities of the Muslim community
will facilitate a divide. The greatest strength, as claimed in the
document, is to dissuade the Muslim population that the terrorists seek to
gain (Trends, 2006, p. 3). It is appalling that in 2006, the administration
remains stagnant in these tactics as opposed to utilizing more affective
conflict resolution techniques that exist. This conflict is asymmetrical;
it must be tackled head on using a new communicative strategy. The efforts
to promote democracy in Iraq have spawned contrary results in other areas
around the globe.
Democracy is a conflictual term in itself as it is a subjective notion. The
American ideals of democracy may be different then the Iraqi principles of
democracy, as the War on Terror has illustrated. This conflict has caused
other regions such as Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa to
strengthen their authoritative fundamentals. They use the conditions in
Iraq to justify their resistance towards democracy (Whitaker, 2008). In
addition, several regions such as Mali, Thailand, and Indonesia, have
experienced an increase in violence due to collaboration efforts for the
War on Terror (Whitaker, 2008). A terrorist group known as Jemaah Islamiyah
(JI), with strong ties to al-Qa’ida, is centered in Southeast Asia. This
terrorist network has been identified in several terrorist attacks in the
region, including the attack in Bali in 2002.
However, the leader of JI has been detained but cells do continue to
operate in the region. Nations such as Singapore, Malaysia, and the
Philippines were quick to join forces with the U.S. in countering terrorist
activities; however, other nations in the region were hesitant to follow
suit until they identified the extent of their vulnerability as targets
(Vaughn, et al., 2007).
The United States, in an effort to advance the global War on Terror, has
constructed agreements with potential allies in the fight, and provided
arms to those countries. In a study of 25 countries, it was discovered that
these regions received five times more in arms from the United States over
the past five years, than in the five years before September 11, 2001
(Stohl, 2007). Several of these regions are politically unstable and/or are
in obvious violation of human rights practices; thus, these agreements are
in violation of the Arms Export Control Act and Foreign Assistance Act
(Stohl, 2007). In a struggle for freedom, democracy, and a world rid of
terror, selling arms to anyone who agrees to unite in the fight is not a
safe or intelligent measure.
After September 11, 2001, the U.S. government joined forces with the
Columbian government to combat the War on Terror. The U.S. provided
Columbia with a $93 million counterterrorism aid package. The funds were
awarded to protect the oil pipeline in Columbia, which was under guerilla
control. The U.S. deployed Special Forces to aid in the area and trained
the Columbian soldiers. There were constant guerilla attacks in the area on
the pipeline and soldiers alike. This illustrates how the War on Terror has
allowed the U.S. to send troops to an intense area plagued with unrest and
train a Columbian army brigade who holds close ties to right-wing
paramilitary groups responsible for horrific human rights violations
(Leech, 2004).
After the terrorist attacks of 2002, Kenya set up a plethora of
organizations and initiatives with the U.S. to help combat the epidemic.
They are an ally in this ‘war.’ However, Kenya prefers not to publicize
its efforts, as they fear retaliation or stigmatization, as was the case in
recent elections. They are a transitional democracy and do not want to
jeopardize their progress (Whitaker, 2008). The Bush administration did not
display great interest in the turmoil in many African regions before the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. However, after that time efforts
were made with several nations, such as with Ethiopia in 2005. Subsequent
to these efforts, the U.S. along with Ethiopia entered Somalia to tackle an
Islamic regime with supposed ties to al-Qa’ida. Critics insist that the
U.S. has only recently begun to take interest in Africa due to the War on
Terror and has turned its back on deep-rooted issues in the continent such
as poverty (Sanders, 2008).
6. Conclusion
Interventionists call for democracies to intervene and make autocratic
states more democratic (Cashman, 2000), such as the case in Iraq. President
Bush appears to be an advocate of this method as he stated in his address
after September 11. This technique transforms war into a means for peace.
As a nation, and throughout the world, it is imperative to restore the
Foucauldian notion that knowledge produces power and not vice versa
(Bayouini, 2004). This humility would produce positive affects for the War
on Terror. The barbaric notions of Carl Schmitt, for example, who is a
professor that collaborated with the Nazi party, must be abandoned. He
argued, “Even in industrial states power rested with those who could
wield violence when necessary” (Brzoska, 2004, p. 114).
The protracted struggle can continue interminable against an undefined
enemy, which could provide an ultimate scapegoat for daily acts of violence
and progression of laws infringing on civil liberties. Aretxaga (2001)
purposes that this is in effect in “many areas of the world” (p. 149),
but fails to define them. The War on Terror, in its metaphorical state,
acts as a distraction for other social problems. Due to its lack of defined
enemy, this war has the potential to continueperpetually.
A culture of fear has infiltrated America. The War on Terror has become a
household name, masked by fear and anxiety. This underlying fear felt by
all citizens gives immense power to the government. Times of turmoil
provide opportunities for governments to pursue alternative avenues without
great opposition. The era of new wars is upon us. It is imperative to rid
officials of the methods of traditional warfare and begin to think outside
the box. The field of conflict resolution can provide alternative solutions
that must be examined. The ripple effect evident across the globe, due to
the War on Terror, is limitless. We will continue to witness the effects of
the ‘war’ in every nation, both positive and negative.
The implications of this research should aid in identifying fissures within
the governments cost benefit analysis. In addition, the repercussions
involved in labels and language is vast. In today’s globalizing world, it
is imperative not to frivolously coin phrases and key terms.
Definitions are crucial in international relations. Due to the erratic
branding of the ‘War on Terror,’ the world is faced with a ‘war’
that lacks a probable conclusion. In addition, it is critical to track the
changes, spawned by the War on Terror, regarding democracy and civil rights
in nations around the world. These patterns will provide intelligence and
contribute to preventing additional clashes of civilization.
Melissa Zisler, Nova Southeastern University. This article was first
published by the Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences
(JAPSS) in the December 2009 edition of the Journal of Alternative
Perspectives in the Social Sciences (2009) Vol 1, No 3, pages 870-882
(PDF). JAPSS is a Non-Profit Organization (NGO) registered in Florida,
Texas, and Costa Rica. Its structure is a based on an international network
of original founders from countries as diverse as Japan and Costa Rica. The
article is reprinted with permission.
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