From: wolda002@umn.edu
Date: Tue Sep 15 2009 - 00:34:28 EDT
Saturday, September 12, 2009
Is Yemen really a centralized state?
By Brian O�Neill
Commentary by
Three separate crises – the newly intense Huthi rebellion in Yemen’s
north, an increasingly violent secession movement in the south, and the
pervasive threat of the second generation of Al-Qaeda – are tearing Yemen
apart. Moreover, Yemen has to deal with these crises against the backdrop
of a financial meltdown and a looming ecological catastrophe. It has become
conventional wisdom that these three conflicts pose an existential threat
to the nation – that, together, they could push Yemen from a fragile
state to a completely failed one. This is true, but it also misses a key
point: Separately, and together, each uprising questions whether Yemen
really exists as a modern, centralized state.
How did Yemen reach this pass? To look first at the north, when the tired
Imamate that ruled north Yemen was overthrown in 1962 and replaced by a
republic after a civil war, the Shiite Zaydis who made up the old
regime’s loyalists faded into a bitter semi-acceptance of the state. But
just as the writ of the Imam barely existed past the big cities, so too did
the new government have limited control. Zaydi revivalism emerged in the
post-unification era, but with the exception of Husayn Badr al-Din
al-Huthi’s brief stint in Parliament, there was little political
participation. Tensions increased and fighting flared in 2004 – it is
still disputed who fired first.
The latest northern flare-up began in August, and is by some reports the
most vicious. There have been accusations of indiscriminate carpet bombing
by the government, as well as hostage-taking by the Huthis. Many outside
observers have interpreted the fighting as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia
and Iran, but this misses its uniquely Yemeni makeup. The fighting has
mutated over the years and even non-Zaydi tribes have become involved. They
are offended that the central government, heretofore largely uninterested
in their lives, has now demonstrated its interest using tanks and fighter
jets. In doing so, President Ali Abdullah Saleh may have broken the
previous uneasy acceptance of the distant central government by the
northern tribes.
The Al-Qaeda upheaval and the southern secession movement have their roots
partly in the civil war that came four years after the 1990 unification of
north and south Yemen. In that war, Saleh used jihadists recently returned
from Afghanistan and geared up to continue the fight against communists.
After the north’s victory, the fighters were allowed power to control
land and impose a rough version of Islamist rule on the secular south. When
a country lurches from crisis to crisis, as Yemen has done since its
inception, leaders often fail to see the ramifications that today’s
decisions will have tomorrow.
This taste of power emboldened the Islamist fighters – and among several
militant groups Al-Qaeda emerged as the most powerful. It was largely
defeated in Yemen by 2003, but has seen been reconstituted under the
leadership of Nasir al-Wahayshi and Qasim al-Raymi. This new generation is
tougher and more ruthless than the first, and less willing to play by the
time-honored Yemeni traditions of negotiation and compromise.
The new generation of Al-Qaeda leaders is also more talented and more
ambitious. In January 2009, Al-Qaeda affiliates in Saudi Arabia and Yemen
merged into Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), headquartered in
Yemen and controlled by Wahayshi and Raymi. The group carried out a series
of successful attacks, but the most shocking one came in August: a suicide
bomb attack in Riyadh that very nearly killed Saudi Prince Mohammad bin
Nayif, who orchestrated Saudi Arabia’s campaign against Al-Qaeda. The
bomber was on Saudi Arabia’s most wanted terrorist list and was hiding in
Yemen. This shows AQAP’s institutional growth, reach, boldness, regional
ambition, and perhaps most unnerving, its patience. The group’s new
leaders are content to strike when they are able, and meanwhile to let the
government struggle with its other problems.
The secession movement springs from south Yemenis’ feeling of being
colonized by their countrymen following the 1994 civil war. Southerners had
been promised integration but were treated as second-class citizens and
were largely unable to climb the ladder of the military, Yemen’s top
institution for social growth. Discontent spread and in 2008 it became a
vocal and increasingly violent uprising, as south Yemenis evolved from
being upset with their lack of inclusion in the state’s politics and
finances to a desire to no longer be part of that state.
There is no actual overlap among the three threats to the Yemeni state.
Al-Qaeda tried to capitalize on the southern secession movement but was
quickly rejected. Nor is there overlap in goals; Al-Qaeda does not want a
secular state in the south. The southerners have no interest in Zaydi
revivalism in the north; and the Zaydis are as hostile to Al-Qaeda’s
Salafism as they are to Sanaa.
Nonetheless, the three threats must be considered together because of the
catastrophic cumulative effect they are having on the state, which is
unprepared to deal with them. Saleh has made promises of decentralization
and economic prosperity to the south, as well as calling for a national
dialogue. But the southerners seem to have passed a point of no return. Not
only is there little prosperity to be shared, but the south has little
interest in remaining part of a state that is racked by terrorism and
rebellion.
As for the north, the government seems to be attempting to destroy the
Huthis militarily while kicking the can of reconciliation down the road in
order to buy some time to deal with other issues. But this most likely is a
dead end, because the current tactics will make future acceptance of
reconciliation with the state impossible.
Although the three rebellions do not share goals, they all cut to the bone
of the Yemeni state and constitute a direct challenge to the central
government, the ruling General People’s Congress, and to Saleh. It is
important to remember that there was no real Yemeni state until some 40
years ago, and it is only in the last 18 that the state has stretched
throughout historic Yemen. While there might be an ancient notion of
nationhood, the current rebellions each, in their own way, call this recent
and slapdash attempt at translating it into statehood a failure.
It would be difficult enough to address the rebellions – as well as
Yemen’s serious financial and environmental challenges – with a strong,
functioning government. Saleh’s regime is essentially neither, and now it
has millions of its citizens questioning its legitimacy. The rebellions
have Yemen poised on the brink of disaster; they are holding up a broken
mirror to the idea of a modern, unified Yemeni state.
Brian O’Neill, a former writer and editor for The Yemen Observer, is
currently a freelance writer and co-writer of the Yemen blog Waq al-Waq.
This commentary is reprinted with permission from the Arab Reform Bulletin.
It can be accessed online at: www.carnegieendowment.org/arb, © 2009,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Copyright (c) 2009 The Daily Star