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From: Tsegai Emmanuel (emmanuelt40@gmail.com)
Date: Wed Jun 02 2010 - 08:48:03 EDT
Somalia: Al Shabaab as a Transnational Threat
Summary
Two figures from the Somali jihadist group al Shabaab — Omar Hammami, an
American-born commander in the group, and Mohammad Ali, a suspected member
of the group thought to be trying to cross the U.S.-Mexican border — have
drawn attention to the group lately, giving voice to ambitions of
transnational militant attacks. Al Shabaab is not likely to go global
itself, but it could well inspire “lone wolf” and grassroots jihadists to
strike the West.
Analysis
Omar Hammami, an American-born commander of the Somali jihadist group al
Shabaab, was featured in a propaganda video released May 11 calling for
jihadists to spread the battle around the world and specifically to “bring
America to her knees.” Then on May 27, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security issued a terrorism threat alerting local authorities to be on the
lookout for Mohammad Ali, a suspected al Shabaab member allegedly attempting
to cross the U.S.-Mexican border. Finally, on May 30 an Aeromexico flight
from Paris to Mexico City was forced to land in Montreal because a man on
board, Abdirahman Ali Gaall, was on the U.S. no-fly list. Few other details
are available at this time, but it appears so far that Gaall had connections
to al Shabaab. This confluence of events has attracted STRATFOR’s attention
to the Somali jihadist group. While al Shabaab remains focused on Somalia,
it could pose more of a transnational threat, inspiring “lone wolf” and
grassroots jihadists to hit back at the West.
In 2008, as foreign jihadists began their flight from Iraq, STRATFOR wrote
that al Shabaab<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/somalia_implications_al_qaeda_al_shabab_relationship?fn=3616393094>“had
an opportunity to transform Somalia into a central jihadist theater.
Growing its ranks with foreign fighters and enjoying the increasing support
of al Qaeda sympathizers, the Somali militants could reach the tipping point
in their insurgency against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in
Mogadishu.”
Two years later, al Shabaab is putting up a consistent fight against
Western-backed forces in central and southern Somalia, making significant
gains in southern Somalia and even controlling large portions of Mogadishu,
but it has been unable to completely defeat the TFG. The TFG, along with
African Union (AU) peacekeeping forces and an array of allied militias, is
managing to hold onto the most strategic parts of Mogadishu, namely the
seaport. The United States is providing the TFG with arms, training and
assistance in an effort to keep al Shabaab at bay.
The United States has pursued a strategy of fighting other regional al Qaeda
nodes that pose a threat to the United States, such as in Yemen and
Algeria<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090624_algeria_taking_pulse_aqim?fn=9516393052>,
by supporting the local government forces with intelligence, training and
supplies (with the occasional overt use of U.S. special operations forces or
air power<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/somalia_united_states_targets_militant_leaders?fn=4016393056>to
hit specific high-value targets). U.S. forces target senior al Shabaab
commanders with ties to al Qaeda, while lower-ranking al Shabaab fighters
are left for local forces. These local forces are relied on as much as
possible to avoid large mobilizations of U.S. troops.
This strategy has largely worked in areas like
Indonesia<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100513_indonesia_dismantling_another_militant_cell?fn=2216393044>and
Algeria, where the governments (for the most part) control the
territory
and can command a competent security force to combat the militants. However,
in Somalia, the TFG is struggling just to survive and cannot fight a serious
counterterrorism campaign because it does not control large swathes of
Somali territory. The TFG lacks a sufficiently sized and capable military
force of its own, plus it is wracked by political infighting that limits its
ability to go on the offensive against al Shabaab. Ethiopia withdrew its
troops from Somalia in early
2009<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090113_somalia_strategy_behind_ethiopian_pullback?fn=7516393049>.
The United States still relies on Ethiopia’s support for the Somali Islamist
militia and TFG ally Ahlu Sunnah
Waljamaah<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100315_somalia_tfg_makes_deal?fn=1116393032>,
and Ethiopian military operations meant to keep jihadists from spreading
into Ethiopia. However, the TFG’s incoherence limits the United States’
ability to pursue its usual strategy of relying on the local government’s
counterterrorism operations to contain a militant group.
This helps al Shabaab. As long as the United States is willing to maintain
the current level of deterrence, al Shabaab will maintain its capability of
long-term survival. If Washington does not view al Shabaab as a direct and
imminent threat to U.S. security, the U.S. response to al Shabaab will be
limited. Striking at the United States (or anywhere outside Somalia) would
raise al Shabaab’s profile dramatically, risking increased U.S. involvement.
Therefore, STRATFOR does not expect the group’s core leaders to adopt a
transnational strategy anytime soon.
However, there exists in Somalia a tradition of violent and anti-Western
jihadist ideology. Indeed, those responsible for the August 1998 bombings of
the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, while not
connected to al Shabaab, did have connections to
Somalia<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/somalia_al_qaeda_and_al_shabab?fn=2716393060>.
Furthermore, as expected, foreign jihadists have moved to Somalia from other
theaters such as Iraq, the Caucasus and Pakistan as well as Western
countries like the United States and Canada, bringing with them a broader
jihadist mindset. These foreigners can basically be divided into two groups:
trained and experienced militants looking for a fight, and inexperienced
ideologues yearning to get into one. STRATFOR sources say that al Shabaab
has a few hundred foreign fighters — among them many inexperienced
ideologues — but only a couple of dozen more experienced foreign commanders.
(Al Shabaab has an estimated overall force of around 4,000 fighters — both
foreign and local — deployed in groups in southern and central Somalia and
in Mogadishu.)
Hammami — who fights under the nom de guerre Abu Mansour al-Amriki —
exemplifies the foreign born commander with aspirations beyond Somalia. In
his video, he exhorted jihadists worldwide to spread the fight “from Spain
to China” and to “bring America to her knees,” saying the “first stop” is
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital. These foreign, more jihadist-inspired
fighters are crowding out the more nationalist-oriented and Islamist
fighters like the splintered Hizbul
Islam<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100513_brief_splinter_group_forms_somalias_hizbul_islam?fn=9716393034>,
whose focus was primarily on winning Somalia. Al Shabaab also exhibited an
interest in foreign targets when it issued threats against Uganda and
Burundi<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20091027_uganda_addressing_al_shabaab_threat?fn=8116393047>in
October 2009. Neighboring Kenya constantly receives threats, and al
Shabaab has been named as a potential threat to the upcoming World Cup in
South Africa<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100516_security_and_africas_first_world_cup?fn=5016393031>.
The devolution of al
Qaeda<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100106_jihadism_2010_threat_continues?fn=4516393070>has
meant that the core group of jihadists who conducted the 9/11 attack
does not have the same militant capability as before. However, the al Qaeda
franchises in Somalia, Algeria and the Arabian Peninsula possess a growing
militant capability, and the more publicity they get the more recruits they
can attract — and the more people they can inspire to carry the fight beyond
the region. Such lone
wolf<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090603_lone_wolf_lessons?fn=5316393051>and
grassroots<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100317_jihadism_grassroots_paradox?fn=8916393062>jihadists
do not have to be bona fide members of a militant group to carry
out attacks. There is a lengthening list of jihadist operatives who have hit
(or plotted to hit) Western targets, including U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Malik
Hasan<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20091111_hasan_case_overt_clues_and_tactical_challenges?fn=3316393011>,
who attacked troops in processing at Fort Hood, Texas, after being
radicalized watching online videos of cleric Anwar al-Awlaki from al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP)<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090902_aqap_paradigm_shifts_and_lessons_learned?fn=6416393027>;
Najibullah Zazi<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090924_u_s_more_revelations_zazi_case?fn=1116393091>(born
in Afghanistan but a naturalized U.S. citizen), who attended a
Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP)<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20091125_pakistan_south_waziristan_offensive_continues?fn=5316393060>training
camp in Pakistan and returned to the United States with plans to
attack New York’s subway system; and Omar Farouk Abdul
Mutallab<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100113_airline_security_gentle_solutions_vexing_problem?fn=1616393051>,
a Nigerian who traveled to Yemen to obtain an explosive device and be
trained to use it in order to blow up a U.S.-bound airline.
Like AQAP and the TTP, al Shabaab has the capability to train would-be
militants to conduct simple attacks against soft targets in the West. Al
Shabaab also has a sizable group of American recruits, indicating that the
group has significant pull in some Somali communities in the United States.
The FBI has investigated dozens of cases in which U.S. citizens (often
first- or second-generation immigrants from Somalia) have returned to the
Horn of Africa to fight for al Shabaab. Al Shabaab operatives need not do
this themselves; they need only to find a willing sympathizer to do it for
them. Individuals who have traveled to Somalia from the United States likely
would not be able to sneak back into the United States, but they do have
connections with people still in the United States who could be radicalized
and convinced to act out their ideological support for al Shabaab in the
form of an attack. Recruits from the Somali diaspora in Europe and Canada
will also be susceptible to al Shabaab recruiting.
While those members of al Shabaab’s leadership who are focused on the near
enemy (the TFG and its AU supporters) may not have the strategic intent to
carry out attacks against the West, conditions in Somalia allow for
recruiting or even passively radicalizing and convincing outsiders to carry
out attacks on their behalf. It is here that the law of unintended
consequences comes into play. Al Shabaab is not a monolithic force that can
control the actions of all of its commanders or members, many of whom
operate with significant autonomy. Some of these commanders and members are
known to harbor anti-Western sentiments and have even called for violence
against the West. While this may not necessarily benefit the original
purpose of al Shabaab (to take over Somalia), it appears that it is the
intent of some of its members to strike out at the West.
The good news for the West is that most lone wolf and grassroots jihadists
are untrained and inexperienced and end up failing to carry out their plots
— either because they are detected by authorities before they are able to
act or because they are tactically unable to carry out an attack. (One of
the main reasons jihadist attacks fail is because they are overly
complex<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100526_failed_bombings_armed_jihadist_assaults?fn=4816393053>).
It is the simple attack — one involving firearms or a rudimentary bomb —
that most likely will be seen in the West, conducted by a single operative
(likely who already lives in the area) on behalf of al Shabaab.
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100601_somalia_al_shabaab_transnational_threat