From: wolda002@umn.edu
Date: Fri Oct 23 2009 - 00:45:01 EDT
The Next Nuclear Continent
October 20, 2009
By Chris Hildebrand, Contributor
Africa is going nuclear. Russian companies are exploring uranium reserves
in Namibia. They hope to build nuclear reactors in Nigeria and Egypt. South
Africa is looking to export its unique reactor technology, and Algeria and
Morocco are both considering launching nuclear energy programs.
Egypt’s nuclear program, while perhaps behind South Africa’s, has the
most potential for new growth, due in large part to international interest
in securing a prolific contract to build an Egyptian nuclear power plant
facility. At around $2.5 billion per reactor, the “nuclear renaissance”
has reached Africa.
A Nuclear Continent
South Africa’s nuclear program is the oldest of any African nation. The
program is suspected of generating several weapons, starting from the late
1970s until 1990; they are now believed to be dismantled. The program was
later abandoned, and in 1996 South Africa signed the African
Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone following the passage in 1995 of the
Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act in Parliament. South
Africa currently operates two nuclear power plants, Koeberg-1 and
Koeberg-2, which satisfy approximately 10 percent of overall electricity
demand in the country.
Libya, as well, operated a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Unlike
South Africa, Libya voted for full disclosure and disarmament in 2003,
after the U.S. invaded Iraq, in exchange for significant concessions and
the removal of U.S. sanctions. Currently, Libya’s Renewable Energies and
Water Desalination Research Center (REWDRC) manages a minor peaceful
nuclear program focused mostly, as the title suggests, around water
desalination research.
While no other major nuclear programs exist on the African continent, it
would be overly presumptuous to assume that there are no nuclear-related
activities underway on the continent. In fact, Russian companies, enabled
by President Medvedev’s latest visit to Africa, have begun to explore the
possibility of uranium mining and extraction in Namibia and Nigeria. One
Russian company has selected “priority areas for exploratory drilling,
[and plan to commence], pending the results, a pre-feasibility study for a
uranium mine construction.”
Egypt’s Nuclear Program
Egypt has been a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since
1981, a treaty which nearly all other Arab states—including Libya and
Syria—belong to. The treaty grants Egypt the internationally recognized
right to “develop and be assisted in the development of nuclear energy
for civilian purposes.”
Although Egypt signed the treaty in 1981, their nuclear program actually
began many years earlier, in March 1958, during the depths of the Cold War.
Egypt’s first reactor, a 2MW reactor constructed and supplied by the
Soviets, was built for research purposes, and went critical in 1961.
Their second reactor, a much larger 22MW pool-type reactor, was built by
the Argentine company INVAP in 1997. Both reactors fulfill the same
purposes: medical and nuclear solid-state research, nuclear engineering
tests, and the education of scientists and technicians. The second reactor,
unlike the first, is fueled with Egyptian uranium from their Fuel
Manufacturing Pilot Plant.
Egypt has several potential sites of conventional uranium deposits, as well
as several unconventional deposits that require a unique, albeit
cumbersome, extraction process. These uranium deposits, however, provide
some of the catalyst for a new nuclear program. Uranium has immense
economic and political value for Africa. As a natural resource, it should
fuel Africa’s energy demands, instead of being exported and sold on
international markets.
Can Egypt Be Trusted?
There are skeptics. Most notably, critics point out that Egypt chose not to
ratify the 1997 Additional Protocol of the NPT, which would have granted
international inspectors the ability to perform in-depth inspections of
Egyptian facilities with little prior warning.
Dr. Pierre Goldschmidt, a former Deputy Director General of the IAEA,
recently expressed concern about IAEA reports on Egypt’s nuclear program.
He believes that the “IAEA Secretariat appears reluctant to fully,
promptly, and explicitly report its findings on Egypt.”
Dr. Goldschmidt’s complaints perhaps hold some merit. An IAEA report
leaked to Reuters in May of 2009 revealed that trace amounts of highly
enriched uranium (HEU), which can be weapons grade, was discovered in
samples taken in 2007-2008 from Egypt’s Inshas Nuclear Site, the site of
Egypt’s two research reactors. The extent and grade of the discovered
material is not known. However, in 2007, a nuclear research reactor in
South Africa was attacked by a gunman who nearly gained control of the
facility. To avoid a similar incident, security must be of paramount
importance.
Egypt moved quickly to respond, claiming that the material was from
containers for medical and agricultural research and that the IAEA had been
satisfied with their explanation. As a sign of goodwill Egypt allowed
Pugwash, a global arms and disarmament conference, to meet in Cairo in
2006.
At the same time, Egypt leveraged a few charges of its own. They pointed
out that Israel’s failure to participate in the NPT fails to create a
safe regional environment for Egypt—an environment the NPT is supposed to
help foster. How, then, can the region be expected to abide by the NPT?
Beyond the squabbling and rhetoric, however, the international community
has little to fear from Egypt’s nuclear program. Egypt has consistently
remained committed to establishing a nuclear-weapons free zone in the
Middle East. It does not experience nearly the same corruption or
destabilizing terrorism as some other African states. Perhaps most
importantly, Egypt has nothing to gain but much to lose from a secret
nuclear weapons program.
It’s the Economy, Stupid
Indeed, from a realist point of view, Egypt has little motivation to
acquire nuclear weapons technology. Iran’s program is closely monitored
by Israel and the U.S. and Egypt has seen the problems North Korea has
caused in South East Asia. Egypt’s conventional security forces can
easily counter its African neighbors.
International energy prices rose dramatically in 2008, and continue to
experience more fluctuations due to the global financial crisis. Part of
Egypt’s plan to reduce the impact of unreliable energy costs has been to
augment current energy supplies with a low-cost, domestically produced
alternative.
Nuclear power can partially and cheaply satiate domestic energy demands,
releasing Egyptian reserves of natural gas and oil for exportation to
international markets. On the other hand, a hidden weapons program, if
discovered by the Western world, would only bring sanctions and economic
difficulty.
Careful, Careful…
The application of Egypt’s nuclear power, however, must be carefully
controlled. Nuclear power can provide concrete economic benefits. It should
not be, however, the sole catalyst of Egyptian industrial and economic
growth.
A successful nuclear energy program, however, will provide Egypt with
important international regard. Egypt can lay the foundation for further
exploration of nuclear-related activities, including more power plants.
This technological experience can, in the long-term, give Egypt the ability
to compete in the “nuclear renaissance” in the Middle East and Africa.
It will also allow Egypt to lead by example with regards to the nuclear
weapons free zone (NWFZ). This presupposes, however, that the Egyptian
government prudently and safely oversees Egyptian reactors. All eyes will
be on Egypt.
Egypt’s nuclear program, beyond simply a mechanical response to economic
stimuli, has the potential to spur long-term strategic planning and
widespread industrial, governmental, and economic reform. It should. The
marriage of Egypt’s nuclear foundation with improved domestic
infrastructure and natural uranium deposits, if carefully managed, is a
winning combination.
[DIPLOMATIC COURIER]