Connecting Dots in the Triangle of Threat
Horn of Africa
by <
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/author/abukararman/> Abukar Arman | on
January 13th, 2013 |
Just as the temperature of the "security threat" slowly declines in Somalia,
it rises in other parts of East Africa. Elements of mainly political,
religious, and clan/ethnic nature continue to shift and create new volatile
conditions. Though not entirely interdependent, these conditions could
create a ripple effect across different borders.
Depending on one's purview, it is high anxiety period in the
region-especially the area that I would refer to as the triangle of threat-
Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. These three countries are bound by complex web
of history, geopolitics, and kinship which became the foundation of
transnational
<
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/07/11/post-transitional-political-fault-
lines/> fault lines snaking through them. Though the same could be argued in
relation to Djibouti, the absence of certain clan dynamics and any flammable
<
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06NAIROBI1224> residual
mistrust (active or dormant) makes it an anomaly.
Positive Momentum after vicious Anarchy
For the past sixteen months, there has been a momentum of positive
developments in Somalia following two decades of senseless violence,
political turmoil and famine. Several months ago the seemingly unfathomable
task of reducing the parliament to 275 from 550 during the transitional
period and the Council of Ministers to 10 from 18 during that same period
came to pass. This, of course, would never have happened without improved
security emanating from the ousting of al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and other
major cities.
Al-Shabaab has been suffering successive defeats, though some may say the
last chapter of that saga is not yet written.
In the meantime, as they leopard-crawl on the quicksand of history, we are
reminded that the natural fate of violent extremists is nothing but short
lifespan and a bloody end. Throughout history, various religious and secular
extremist groups have emerged and established one brutal system propelled by
draconian laws or another only to watch them self-destruct by falling on
their own swords. Their myopic vision takes for granted the innate human
tendency to rise against and resist despotism, tyranny, and all other form
of oppression.
And although Somalia seems to have crossed the Rubicon and all proverbial
bridges leading back to anarchy are burned down, it still faces two major
menaces that could, at the very least, discredit and undermine the new
administration as previous governments.
Peace and stability would remain fragile so long as Ethiopia and Kenya
remain knee-deep in Somalia's internal political affairs and exert proxy
influence through their respective client militia groups and special
interest projects. Likewise, peace and stability would remain fragile so
long the international community continues its <
http://amisom-au.org/>
AMISOM-focused approach and treats the government as a spectator on the
sideline; or worse, as a stranger in its own homeland.
Even as the new government continues to improve its institutions with
competent technocrats and systems of checks and balances, the international
community continues to apply its benevolent deprivation (for lack of a
better description) that kept the new government running on empty since its
inception. As the new government realizes that it cannot any services to its
people with the current revenues, frustration is a thinly veiled secret. The
government would have no choice but to reach out beyond its current circle
of friends and explore other alternatives such as the
<
http://thediplomat.com/indian-decade/2012/11/27/brics-the-worlds-new-banker
/> BRICS economic block.
Going back to the "AMISOM-focused" approach: Indeed, this African
peacekeeping force has done a commendable job in helping stabilize Somalia.
However, prudence dictates to set up specific date for ending the
peace-keeping mission and turn focus on rebuilding the Somali national
security apparatus. This would require an effort far beyond the current
cosmetics; an effort that makes lifting of the
<
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/31/us-somalia-un-idUSBRE89U1SZ201210
31> U.N. Arms Embargo a priority. These steps are crucial before the tide of
public opinion turns against AMISOM and ruins its well-earned golden page in
history. This is an opportune time as the U.N. Security Council is set to
discuss renewing AMISOM's mandate on March.
Rising Tension in the Old Empire
Over the past couple of years, like in much of the world, Ethiopia's 91
million multi-ethnic, multireligious and multilingual population has been on
a fast-track in terms of political consciousness. Various groups have been
actively asserting their communal identities and expressing various
political grievances; some, of course, more emphatically than others. The
writing is on the wall; the masses are no longer politically passive and are
no longer willing to remain submissive in maintaining status quo.
A case in point:
<
http://africanarguments.org/2012/11/16/ethiopia-government-increasingly-int
olerant-of-islam-risks-radicalization-of-muslim-population-%E2%80%93-by-alem
ayehu-fentaw-weldemariam/> the manifest discontent of the Ethiopian Muslim
community that led to a yearlong protestation against "government
interference in religious affairs." Among other things these protesters
demanded that the alleged government hand-picked
<
http://africanarguments.org/2012/11/16/ethiopia-government-increasingly-int
olerant-of-islam-risks-radicalization-of-muslim-population-%E2%80%93-by-alem
ayehu-fentaw-weldemariam/> Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (Majlis) be
replaced by elected representatives through a community-based transparent
process. On its part the Ethiopian government claims that protesters are
extremists who are connected to al-Shabaab and al-Qaida, hence any use of
force and 'targeted imprisonments' are necessary and justified. This comes
at a time when Ethiopia, according to
<
https://www.amnesty.org/en/region/ethiopia/report-2012> Amnesty
International Annual Report 2012, has been scoring low marks when it comes
to dealing with political opposition groups and human rights in general.
Meanwhile, Ethiopian forces operate in various regions in Somalia outside
the AMISOM mandate or any other legal framework to keep these forces in
check.
The Gathering Storm
Despite all the goodwill that Kenya has been accruing in the past two
decades for being a gracious host to hundreds of thousands of Somali
refugees and the venue of a number of "Somali reconciliation conferences",
in recent years it has extravagantly squandered a great deal of its
credibility and goodwill capital.
This downward spiral started with a leaked dubious deal involving her,
Norway, a former U.N. Special Representative to Somalia, and some
credulous/corrupt members of the defunct Transitional Federal Government.
The dominoes started to fall one after another when the under the table
<
http://www.innercitypress.com/los2somalia.pdf> Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) intended to bypass the Transitional Parliament and guarantee Kenya the
right to annex a portion of Somalia's oil-rich maritime continental shelf
was leaked. Despite the international embarrassment and the subsequent
unanimous rejection of the deal by the Somali Parliament, there is enough
evidence indicating that Kenya is not only pursuing that matter, it has been
actively establishing facts on the ground to secure her that objective.
Kenya's expressed desire to establish a
<
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15499534> "buffer zone" in Lower
Jubba region of Somalia is broadly recognized by the average Somali as
Kenya's relentless pursuit to exploit the 'loot Somalia' culture of the past
2 decades. This suspicion reached great heights when Kenyan Defense
Forces-never before used for war-all of a sudden (independent of AMISOM)
carried its largest ground invasion on Lower Jubba.
The original official line that "the invasion was prompted by al-Shabaab's
kidnapping of a foreign tourist in Kenya" has proven comical, especially in
social networks. Immediately the impetus behind the invasion was modified as
Kenya's neighborly duty to stabilize Somalia. This, needless to say, lead to
Kenya becoming part of AMISOM, though the KDF-unlike other contingents-still
operates autonomously.
Since KDF's invasion that ultimately lead to the squeezing of al-Shabaab out
of the strategic port of Kismayo and the takeover of Lower Jubba, sporadic
violence has been erupting in various parts of Kenya. Considering how these
terrorist operations were going after soft-targets such worshipers inside
churches and mosques and crowded markets, worst could be yet to come. Last
month a hand grenade blast outside a mosque has killed at least three and
injured a few more including a
<
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000072349&story_title=Kenya-Nair
obi-blast-kills-three,-injures-MP> Kenyan Member of Parliament, Yusuf
Hassan, who is ethnically Somali.
In addition to a several hundred thousand refugees and Somali immigrants,
there are approximately 4 million ethnically Somali Kenyans. This particular
peaceful population has suffered greatly as a result of the Kenyan security
and military's effort to crackdown these new threats. There are a number of
documented cases of KDF forces carrying out
<
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1dsGSUcv8zI> brutal public beatings of
Kenyans of Somali descent who are suspected of being al-Shabaab
sympathizers. Furthermore, there are a number of cases of rape, setting
local businesses of fire, and random killings of members of this community.
Recklessly aggravating this population and questioning their loyalty cannot
lead to improved security; not for Kenya or for Somalia. This population
already has the grievance of being economically neglected and being treated
like second class citizens in their own country. Adding collective
punishment to this might prove a dangerously imprudent endeavor.
Against this backdrop yet
<
http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-100708/igads-shocking-mou> another
controversial MOU lead by Kenya (in collaboration with Ethiopia) has emerged
stirring animated debates in various circles within the government and the
in the public sphere. The clear consensus was that the Federal Republic of
Somalia cannot and should not compromise its sovereign and give up, among
other things, its authority of oversight regarding regional and newly
forming Federal States.
Absence of Strategic Scrutiny
In the absence of frank and mutually beneficial discussions coupled with
broad-based political pressure from the international community these old
and new trends would continue.
Kenya's vibrant civil societies that initially protested the militarization
of their country are now mainly co-opted as a result of the euphoria
generated by KDF's military success in its first international military
operation. Likewise, the current Ethiopian government, though it is
seemingly less octopus-like in its attempt to micromanage Somalia's
political affairs, it remains resolved to upholding the late Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi's legacy and hegemonic ambitions.
Meanwhile, these karmic security challenges continue to threaten the
stability of the entire region and dampen the potentially lucrative economic
future of this resource-rich region.
Received on Mon Jan 14 2013 - 14:12:24 EST
