Analysis-Somalia: Political Effects of U.S. Recognition of the Somali
Federal Government
Feb 05, 2013 - 11:59:47 PM
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
During the first month of 2013, the only significant political development
concerning the territories of post-independence Somalia was the announcement
by U.S. secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, on January 18, that "for the
first time since 1991, the United States is recognizing the Government of
Somalia."
The implications of Washington's announcement for the distribution of power
among domestic Somali political actors (the provisional Somali Federal
Government [S.F.G.], Puntland, Somaliland, and less organized territories of
south-central Somalia) became clear in Clinton's response to a question
posed at the press conference, at which the recognition was announced, about
whether Washington had abandoned its "dual-track" policy of dealing
simultaneously with a Somali central government and the governments of
regional states. Without answering the question directly, Clinton signaled a
shift in U.S. policy: "So we have moved into a normal sovereign
nation-to-sovereign nation position."
Although it is not wise to read too much into Clinton's words, it is worth
considering what the effects would be of a shift in U.S. policy from
dual-track (central government-region) to a mono-track (sovereign nation) on
the major Somali domestic actors. They are in the throes of a dispute over
the form that a future state or states would take in the territories of
post-independence Somalia. Any shift in the distribution of power among the
major domestic political actors affects their respective abilities to
achieve the kind of political order that they desire: strong
federalism/decentralized unitary state (S.F.G.), weak
federalism/confederalism (Puntland), and separation (Somaliland).
Assuming a shift in U.S. policy has occurred, the consequences of it for the
distribution of power among Somali domestic political actors would depend on
how it was implemented. At one extreme, nothing would change from the
present; Washington could still find ways of dealing directly with the
regional states and a self-declared independent state. At that extreme,
"recognition" would have only been nominal. At the other extreme, Washington
would do its business with Puntland and other possible regions, and
Somaliland through the S.F.G. That extreme or something more in the
direction of it than towards the status quo is most likely to occur. Should
that be the case, the S.F.G. will have gained an advantage in the domestic
distribution of power, and Somaliland, Puntland, and aspring regional states
modeling themselves on Puntland will have taken a loss.
An Altered Distribution of Power
The effects on Somaliland of a U.S. mono-track policy would be the most
severe. The territory of the S.F.G. formally includes the territory of
Somaliland, which means that recognition of the former preclues recognition
of the latter's independence. That does not mean that Somaliland, which has
de facto authority over its territory, will case to function as it has, as a
self-declared independent state; it means that Somaliland will have to
resign itself to existing in a condition of political limbo that will render
it increasingly vulnerable to pressure from Western "donor"-powers to reach
a deal with the S.F.G. for some kind of association. Recognition of the
S.F.G. will make it difficult for Somaliland to negotiate on the
state-to-state basis on which it insists rather than on a central
state-region footing. It is possible that the "donor"-powers will pressure
Somaliland to cooperate with the S.F.G. by channeling aid for the former
through the latter.
It is not surprising that Somaliland's government reacted harshly to news of
the recognition. On January 21, as reported by Garoweonline, Somaliland's
interior minister, Mohamed Nur Arale, called the recognition a "slap in the
face" to the independence project, adding: "This U.S. recognition of the
Somali Federal Government will not bring anything positive for Somaliland."
The hit taken by Somaliland from the recognition comes when the
administration of Somaliland's president, Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo, has
encountered opposition from domestic political forces that accuse his
administration of rigging recent local elections. The dispute over the
elections has brought to the surface grievances and splits that had been
festering in Somaliland's political society, and has disaffected clans that
accuse Silanyo of locking them out of power.
The deterioration of Somaliland's standing in the domestic Somali
distribution of power is propelled by the intertwining of the recognition
and the internal opposition to Silanyo. Faisal Ali Warabe, the chair of the
opposition UCID political party, accused Silanyo of having failed to press
Somaliland's case for independence before the international community. It is
not clear what Silanyo will do next. How will he position himself for the
"donor"-power conference on Somalia in London on May 7, when plans for
regularized aid will be broached? Will he come with the Somaliland public
behind him? In what role and with what title will he be received there? Will
he attend at all?
Puntland has also suffered a deterioration of its standing in the domestic
distribution of power as a result of U.S. recognition of the S.F.G.,
especially if that means that Washington has turned away from the dual-track
policy. Puntland's president, Abdirahman Farole, thought he had secured
traction for his model of a decentralized federation of regional states for
the territories of post-independence Somalia by seeing it written into the
current provisional federal constitution, and by having a constitution for
Puntland approved in advance of the provisional federal charter. Now the
success of those careful preparations is in doubt.
Already on January 7, as reported by Garoweonline, the S.F.G.'s president,
Hassan Sh. Mohamud, had said: "The government and the parliament must work
together to change the provisional constitution, as Somalia needs time to
implement federalism." Washington's recognition of the S.F.G. only raises
the chances that the latter will be able to modify the provisional
constitution in the direction of a more centralized model.
While congratulating the S.F.G. for gaining Washington's recognition,
Puntland has cultivated its relations with the factions attempting to form a
regional state (Jubbaland) modeled on Puntland in southern Somalia, has
opposed lifting the U.N. arms embargo against the S.F.G., and has repeated
its calls for the formation of regional states in the south-central regions.
On February 1, Farole said: "Puntlnad will not watch and sit if the Somali
federal constitution is violated nor will the international community."
It is still the case that if a Jubbaland state modeled on Puntland is
realized, then the decentralized federal model will most probably prevail in
the territories of post-independence Somalia, except for Somaliland. The
convention to set up the Jubbaland state, which was scheduled to occur in
January has, however, been delayed until sometime in February. U.S.
recognition of the S.F.G. now gives the latter more leverage in determining
the result of the Jubbaland process or derailing it altogether.
As it is for Somaliland, the loss taken by Puntland from the recognition
depends on how the U.S./"donor"-powers implement the mono-track policy; that
is, will the U.S. work directly with Puntland and to what extent, and to
what extent will it deal with Puntland through the S.F.G.? If Puntland does
not prevail in Jubbaland and/or is frozen out by the S.F.G., then Puntland
will have to consider moving towards separation from south-central Somalia.
A threat of that sort would show the S.F.G. that it needs Puntland to be a
credible Somali government rather than a rump state; but it might also exile
Puntland to the limbo in which Somaliland exists.
Just as in Somaliland, the recognition comes at a time in Puntland when the
Farole administration is facing overt domestic political opposition, here
based on disapproval of Farole's decision to serve a five-year term as
president, rather than the four years that his adversaries believe he
constitutionally deserves. The constitutional dispute has, as the election
dispute has in Somaliland, opened up grievances in Puntland's political
society that have festered in the shadows. Having staked his presidency on
securing for Puntland a model of federalism in Somalia that would maximize
Puntland's authority to make its own decisions on security, resources, and
commercial relations, the recognition exacerbates the deterioration in the
relative standing of Puntland in the domestic Somali distribution of power,
adding to Farole's difficulties with his opposition.
None of the above is to say that Puntland faces a political crisis, only
that it will now find it more difficult to have its project of decentralized
federalism prevail in Somalia. That project is far from dead, however, its
success depending on how quickly regional states modeled on Puntland become
functional.
In the redistribution of power among domestic Somali political factions that
will probably result from the U.S. recognition, the S.F.G. gains the
advantages that are the counterparts of Somaliland's and Puntland's losses.
Yet at present those advantages are still promises. While the S.F.G. is
formally called "sovereign" over the territories of post-independence
Somalia, its control on the ground is severely limited, and it does not
control the authorities and quasi-authorities that have sprung up in
south-central Somalia as Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen has drawn back under
military pressure. Whether the S.F.G. gains traction for its model of
centralized federalism will depend on whether recognition means strong
financial and diplomatic support for the S.F.G. from the U.S. and other
"donor"-powers. If that support is lacking or insufficient, official
recognition will just be a piece of paper.
The S.F.G. also faces political opposition, with Hassan being accused by
adversaries of violating the provisional constitution, freezing some
sub-clans out of government positions, and surrounding himself with a close
circle of advisers from his Damul Jadid faction. Despite U.S. recognition,
the S.F.G. still faces the same situation that it did at the end of 2012: it
is being pulled apart by the "donor"-powers and Somali domestic factions
abetted by neighboring states. It now has a promissory note from the U.S.,
and there is no assurance that Washington will make good on it. It is
unlikely that the S.F.G. will get serious support until after the London
conference in May, and it is quite possible that it will not come then, as
it has not come to Somali governments in the past.
Conclusion
A review of the power distribution among the major domestic Somali political
actors in light of the U.S. recognition of the S.F.G. and its likely
modification of its dual-track policy shows a general condition of weakness
among the domestic actors. None of those actors is headed by a leader who
has a unified constituency, and Somaliland and Puntland have been further
impaired by the recognition. The S.F.G., which has gained from the
recognition, remains weak and will not benefit by the U.S. action unless the
latter backs it up with concrete support, which would be an even greater
change in Washington's policy than abandonment of the dual track. The future
state-form for the territories of post-independence Somalia remains
undecided, even more than it was before recognition.
Does Washington understand the consequences for domestic Somali political
actors of its apparent decision to cast its lot with the S.F.G. in a
fundamental constitutional conflict? To repeat, for the moment it has
weakened Somaliland and Puntland relative to the S.F.G., and has given the
S.F.G. an IOU. It is likely that the U.S. is not attending to the effects of
its decision on the power distribution among Somali actors; it is interested
in "normalizing" relations with "Somalia" so that it can back away from the
country and let drones and special forces take care of the "war on terror."
Somalia is already being written down and written off as a "success story"
and even a model, as attention turns to Mali. Yet the fundamental political
conflicts in the territories of post-independence Somalia are far from
resolved. The outlook for the future is more clouded than ever.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University in Chicago weinstem_at_purdue.edu
