Somalia: The S.F.G.'s Strategy of Political Conflict
Feb 25, 2013 - 11:49:31 PM
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
A confrontation over the form of federalism that a future Somali state would
adopt is looming, as confidential sources report that the provisional Somali
Federal Government (S.F.G.) is in the process of making a concerted push to
control the formation of local, regional, and presumptive regional-state
administrations in south-central Somalia.
The S.F.G., say the sources, is attempting to resist the early formation of
a Jubbaland state in the south that would base itself on a
decentralized-federal model, as Puntland has done; head off a similar
process to the one in the south in the southwestern Bay and Bakool regions
by placing an administration allied to it in charge there; counter the
Galmudug authority in the east-central area by backing ex-warlord Abdi
Qeybdid against the sitting government; and influence the leadership that
will succeed the recently-deceased chair of the Ahlu Sunna wal-Jamaa
(A.S.W.J.) movement, Sh. Mohamed Yusuf Hefow, that controls most of the
central and east-central regions of Galgadud and Hiiraan. On each of those
political fronts, the S.F.G. faces opposition, both locally and nationally
by the autonomous state of Puntland, which resists the S.F.G.'s bids for
control.
The S.F.G.'s Strategy of Political Conflict
By adopting a strategy of political conflict in south-central Somalia's
regions, the S.F.G.'s president, Hassan Sh. Mohamud, is attempting to solve
his most pressing political problem, which is to establish the S.F.G.'s
authority - dominance and control - over those regions. In the process of
trying to do so, Mohamud is forcing the issue of what the state-form of
Somalia will be. The options have narrowed down to two, a centralized
federalism favored by the S.F.G. and its allies, and a decentralized
federalism advocated by Puntland and its allies. The core political conflict
in Somalia is between the S.F.G. and Puntland over state-form; the
south-central regions are the arenas in which that conflict is being played
out. Both the S.F.G. and Puntland are aware of the high stakes involved in
their confrontation; if the S.F.G. prevails in the south-central regions,
Puntland will be politically isolated and subject to pressure to abandon its
autonomy, which gives it generous control over its natural resources and
security policy; if Puntland is able to block the S.F.G., the latter will
have had to cede significant authority over nascent regional states. The
S.F.G.'s pursuit of a strategy of political conflict has turned a
constitutional issue into a political power struggle.
Whether or not the S.F.G.'s strategy succeeds - and its success is highly
problematic - that strategy is intelligible and follows from the power
position of the S.F.G. The new federal government was to all intents and
purposes imposed by the Western "donor"-powers/U.N. under veiled and
explicit threats to withdraw financial support. The "donor"-powers wanted a
"permanent" government established in Somalia so that they could decrease
their commitment to the country and at the same time make agreements
favorable to them with it. In pursuing those aims, they ended up settling
for a provisional/interim entity operating under an incomplete constitution
that left the fundamental question of state-form open; absent from the
constitution was a determination of centralized or decentralized federalism,
and there were not yet regional states set up in south-central Somalia.
As a result of the "donor"-powers' actions, the S.F.G. was left with the
challenge of establishing its authority in the south-central regions without
a constitutional basis, scant resources to buy allies in the regions, and
military forces that did not extend beyond the capital Mogadishu. Under
those constraints, the S.F.G. had few options; it could renounce the attempt
to control the south-central regions and allow those regions substantial
autonomy, which would weaken whatever (potential) power it might have; or it
could do what it has chosen to do, which is to contest the forces for
decentralized federalism region by region by allying with factions in each
region that felt marginalized by nascent autonomous administrations with
power bases independent of the S.F.G. The new federal government opted for
the latter, which set up the conditions for political conflict. A source
reports that the strategy of political conflict was urged upon Hassan by his
inner circle of advisers from his Damul Jadid movement.
The consequences of the conflict strategy carry severe risks to stability.
The divide between the forces of centralized and decentralized federalism
has become confused with sub-clan rivalries within the regions, exacerbating
animosities that already existed. Those rivalries have also given the
revolutionary Islamist movement, Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S.M.),
which had been pushed out of control over its most lucrative territories, an
opportunity to recruit from disaffected sub-clans, and it has drawn Puntland
into the fray.
The conflict strategy shows the power deficit of the S.F.G. and its efforts
to rectify it. None of what the S.F.G. feels that it has had to do would
have been necessary had an effective process of state-building been
instituted, which would have involved a process of social-political
reconciliation among Somali factions leading to a constitutional agreement
to which the major factions would have signed on. That possibility was
eliminated by the "donor"-powers' actions, and that constitutes their most
egregious political failure.
As a result of the "donor"-powers' actions, the domestic Somali actors have
been left to pick up the pieces. Absent political reconciliation and the
trust that comes with it, the Somali domestic actors are constrained to
pursue their perceived interests and attempt to make them prevail. There is
no reconciliation process in place; the stage is set for sub-clan-impelled
constitutional confrontation abetted by ex-warlords and revolutionary
Islamists. Interpreted through the dramaturgical model in political science,
a tragedy is unfolding in which the protagonists-antagonists can see nothing
to do but play a zero-sum game.
The Status of the Conflict
It is too early in the conflict over the state-form that Somalia will/might
take to make a grounded prediction about its outcomes. The S.F.G. has only
attempted to implement its strategy of political conflict in earnest since
the return of Hassan to Mogadishu in mid-February from his round of visits
to the external actors with interests in Somalia. Having touched base and
gotten promises of support, Hassan had to try to "deliver" on his end of the
bargain, showing that he led a (potentially) effective government.
attention, is the south, where a convention is slated to be held on February
23 to form a Jubbaland state comprising the Lower and Middle Jubba regions
and the Gedo region. Approximately 500 delegates, including elders from the
three regions are expected to attend, with the S.F.G. and regional states
(Ethiopia and Kenya) as observers. Up until the present, it has appeared
that the Jubbaland process would issue in a regional state modeled on
Puntland. The S.F.G. will try to reverse that outcome.
According to one source, Hassan's strategy has found willing supporters
among sub-clans in the south that feel disadvantaged by the dominance of
Ahmed Madobe, the interim governor in Kismayo, and his Ras Kamboni militia,
which is allied with Kenyan forces in the south and is mainly composed of
members of the Mohamed Suber sub-clan of the Ogaden-Darod. That leaves other
Ogaden sub-clans, the Majertein-Darod (with ties to Puntland), and the
Marehan-Darod more or less disposed to thwart any attempt by Madobe to
dominate the Jubbaland state.
Another source confirms open-source reports that ex-warlord and Marehan
leader, Barre Hirale, has met with Hassan and is "on good terms with the
S.F.G." The source says that the Marehan will "listen to Hirale if he is
empowered." Meanwhile, on February 13, Garoweonline reported that a
delegation whose members are involved in forming a Jubbaland state met with
Puntland's president, Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, to discuss how "Puntland's
efforts to establish [the] Jubbalnad state could be improved." On February
15, Garoweonline reported that Hassan and the S.F.G.'s prime minister, Abdi
Farah Shirdon, who is Marehan, had split on the Jubbaland issue, with
Shirdon supporting the ongoing process and Hassan attempting to undermine
it.
The reports from closed and open sources present a picture in which fations
in the south have not (yet) fully aligned, crystallized, and polarized
around the issue of state-form, and around the S.F.G. and Puntland, with the
S.F.G. itself split. The S.F.G.'s presence at the slated convention
represents a concession by Hassan by virtue of his acknowledging the
Jubbaland process, but it also is an opportunity for him to influence its
outcome. Puntland will not be present at the convention, but it will attempt
to work through its allies. How the local factions will align, insofar as
they do, and how big a role the regional external actors decide to play, and
on which of the sides, will determine the outcome, in addition to the
efforts of Hassan and Farole.
The second front opened by Hassan in implementing his strategy of political
conflict is the southwestern Bay region, dominated by the Rahanweyne clan,
where an attempt to form a regional state composed of the Bay and Bakool
regions was underway but had not advanced as far as it has in the southern
regions. In the south, Hassan has been constrained to try to turn an ongoing
process that was going against him to his favor or to subvert it, whereas in
the southwest he has attempted to head off such a process before it began to
function independently of the S.F.G.
Hassan moved by issuing an S.F.G. decree replacing the longtime Bay
political leader and sitting governor, Abdifatah Gesey, who had been backed
by Ethiopia and had forces in the region, with Abdi Hasow. Gesey resisted
the S.F.G.'s action, declaring that he remained governor. According to a
closed source, Ethiopia turned against Gesey and used its forces to oust
him. On February 15, Garoweonline reported that Gesey had mobilized his
militia and was still in the Bay region's capital, Baidoa, whereas Hasow was
out of public view. According to Garoweonline's sources, the confrontation
between Gesey and Hasow had caused the Bay administration to grind to a
halt. Efforts to mediate the dispute were initiated and a delegation was
sent to the region by the S.F.G.
On February 21, Garoweonline reported that Gesey was taken by S.F.G.
security forces to Mogadishu after mediation efforts had failed. Sources in
Mogadishu told Garoweonline that Gesey was "promised another title" in the
regional government.
An indication of why Ethiopia switched sides and altered the distribution of
power in favor of the S.F.G. is given in an Ethiopian government statement
on February 16 concerning talks between the Somali Federal Parliament's
speaker, Mohamed Osman Jawari, and Ethiopia's foreign minister, Tedros
Adhomam, in which Jawari is reported to have urged the formulation of a
"common position" between the S.F.G. and Ethiopia on the London conference
on Somalia that will be held later in 2013. In return, Ethiopia promised to
"work with Somalia on pushing donors to keep their promises." Jawari then
traveled to the ethnic Somali Ogaden region (Somali Regional State) of
Ethiopia, where he met with regional officials and visited schools. Reports
did not mention any hint that Jawari had taken up alleged human rights
violations committed by Ethiopia and Ethiopian-backed militias in the
Ogaden.
Just as in the south, the outcome of the face-off in Bay cannot be
predicted. The S.F.G. has gained a foothold and has leverage, but it has yet
to achieve the traction to push back its adversaries decisively.
A similar stand-off characterizes the situation in the Galmudug authority in
east-central Somalia, where two governments dominated respectively by
different sub-clans of the Hawiye claim claim the right to rule. According
to a source, the S.F.G. has recognized one of the contenders - the faction
led by ex-warlord Abdi Qeybdid - as the "legitimate" authority. During the
past month there have been outbreaks of politically-inspired sub-clan
violence in Galmudug with open sources claiming that Qeybdid's militia is
responsible for initiating the clashes. Again, as in the south and
southwest, the S.F.G.'s strategy of political conflict is being implemented
in Galmudug, and its outcome is uncertain.
In the central region of Galgadud and part of the Hiiraan region, the
dominant A.S.W.J. movement is in the process of naming a leader to replace
Sh. Mohamed Yusuf Hefow, who died in mid-February. Hefow had been in
discussions with the S.F.G. to merge A.S.W.J. with it. A.S.W.J., which has
several factions that support or oppose collaboration with the S.F.G. in
various degrees, has now become subject, according to a source, to pressure
from the S.F.G. to integrate with it on the S.F.G.'s terms. Again, the
outcome is uncertain, but the S.F.G.'s push is underway. The source reports
that a delegation from the federal parliament is in Galgadud, claiming that
they are "consulting with local communities on extending government rule" to
the region. The source says that the presence of the delegation has led to a
dispute between some of the A.S.W.J.'s leadership and the S.F.G.
Assessment
One of the sources contributing to this analysis has put the
S.F.G.'s/Hassan's strategy of political conflict succinctly and precisely:
Hassan is attempting to isolate some leaders and factions in each region and
to empower others favorable to him. In doing so, Hassan is splitting each
region politically, intervening in local conflicts and exacerbating them,
and working with whoever will ally with him for whatever reason, whether it
be ex-warlords, dissident clans, or factions within a movement. That is the
familiar strategy of divide-and-rule, which is used by actors who cannot
(Hassan) or do not want to expend the military and/or financial resources
required to control the outcome of a conflict.
Hassan is playing the divide-and-rule game to extend the authority of the
S.F.G. into the south-central regions, but in doing so he is carrying with
him the program of centralized federalism. Puntland has yet to play its hand
overtly, but it can be expected to do so if it appears that the
centralized-federalist project is gaining traction and momentum. Since
Hassan's strategy necessitates opposition to its implementation by the
forces that he is attempting to isolate, as it has done in each case, the
path is open not only to confrontation at the local level and the
re-activation of H.S.M., but to counter-moves by Puntland.
It is too early to predict whether or not Hassan will be successful, but it
can be said that a political battle is looming that will overshadow all
other political issues in the territories of post-independence Somalia.
Hassan's strategy is obviously high risk and high stakes. In his best-case
scenario, Hassan prevails in each south-central region and Puntland is faced
with the option of compromising its autonomy or separating from
south-central Somalia. Short of the best case for Hassan, "Somalia" becomes
irretrievably fragmented and balkanized, or its territories become a mixture
of uncoordinated regional and local forms of administration.
It is unclear whether or not the "donor"-powers understand what is happening
in Somali domestic politics and, if they do, whether they are prepared to
intervene and in what way. That the "donor"-powers will act decisively to
try to prevent political breakdown is unlikely. The United States, for
example, was prepared to support the S.F.G.'s request to have the United
Nations arms embargo on it lifted, but then backtracked after European
opposition and stated that it would wait for the completion of a U.N.
"review" of the desirability of taking such action. The U.S. backtrack was
a blow to the S.F.G., which had expected more robust support when the U.S.
recognized it.
As it stands, no actor, external or domestic, is working to avoid the
impending confrontation. There is no formal process of reconciliation
underway. The discourse of Somali political actors and intellectuals is not
addressing the issue directly or, in some cases, at all. The external actors
are silent about it. At the point at which the conflict intensifies to the
degree that it is impossible for actors to ignore it, it is likely that it
will be too late to resolve; this analysis is simply an early warning.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University in Chicago weinstem_at_purdue.edu
