Egypt, Ethiopia Headed For War Over Water
By: Mustafa al-Labbad Translated from
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/about/sources/assafir> As-Safir (Lebanon).
March 25, 2013.
In the coming years, Egypt and Ethiopia may be forced to fight a 'water war'
because Ethiopia's ambitions contradict Egypt's historical and legal rights
in the Nile waters. Ethiopia can only be deterred by the regional and
international balance of powers, which in recent years has favored Ethiopia.
For any Egyptian government, Egypt's water share and securing the Nile's
headwaters are the top national security priorities, irrespective of the
Egyptian government's ideology or domestic policies. This fact is dictated
by geography. For thousands of years, Egyptian rulers have been aware how
important water is for Egypt. Water is the lifeline of Egypt (97.5% of Egypt
is barren desert). Egyptian rulers have always used any means to defend
their country's historic rights to the Nile waters. As Greek historian
Herodotus said, "Egypt is the gift of the Nile. Egyptian civilization,
which is one of history's greatest civilizations, depends on the Nile. To
illustrate the Nile's importance, we should remember that Egypt is the
largest desert oasis in the world. Life in Egypt is concentrated on the
river banks where 90 million people live. In short, any Egyptian government
should have one eye on the Horn of Africa - on Ethiopia, where the source of
the Nile lies - and another eye on the Sinai Peninsula and the Levant, and
the balance of power there. History has shown that most of Egypt's invaders
entered through that door.
Egypt's sentries against the country's internal and external foes have been
sleeping on the job. Their first eye failed to notice the developments at
the Blue Nile's source in Ethiopia (the Blue Nile constitutes 86% and the
White Nile 14% of the Nile water volume. The two tributaries meet in Sudan
before flowing to Egypt). Their second eye had lost the ability to
distinguish friend from foe. Now, with the worsening economic crisis and the
political deterioration between the ruling
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/egypt-muslim-brotherhood-
governance.html> Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition, the balance of power
is more and more tilting toward Ethiopia, which may unilaterally increase
its water usage. That will affect Egypt's historic rights of the Nile water
and cause a serious threat.
In the report below, we will try to shed light on the Nile conflict and on
why Ethiopia's negotiating position toward Egypt has improved. We will end
with a recommendation.
The conflict over the Nile waters
The two groups fighting over the right waters are as follows: the first
group are the downstream countries, it includes Egypt and Sudan. The other
group are the upstream countries which includes Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda,
Congo, Burundi, Tanzania, Southern Sudan, Rwanda and Kenya.
Egypt depends on the Nile River for 95% of its water needs for drinking,
agriculture and electricity generation. The growing Egyptian population is
increasingly dependent on Nile water. Egypt has historical rights to these
waters under the
<
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/69025/pierre-crabites/the-nile-water
s-agreement> Nile Water Agreement signed with Britain in 1929. It gave Egypt
the right to veto any project in upstream countries affecting Egypt's share
of water flowing to it. It is worth mentioning that the 1929 agreement is
binding for the three upstream countries - Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda - on
the grounds that Britain, which colonized these countries, was their legal
representative and could sign binding international agreements on their
behalf.
Egypt codified its legal status in an agreement with Sudan in 1959. The
agreement gave Cairo 55.5 billion cubic meters of water (or 66% of the total
water flow), which would go to the Aswan Dam, and Sudan received 18.5
billion cubic meters (22%). The remainder, 12%, is lost to evaporation.
The downstream countries argue that they were not a party to those
agreements at the time, and therefore do not recognize their legitimacy. The
upstream countries want to modify the water-sharing agreement and keep more
of the water by building dams, which will directly affect the water share of
the downstream states, Egypt and Sudan.
The problem is compounded by the projected large population increase in the
Nile basin. The UN projects that the population in the 11 basin states will
reach 860 million people by 2050. This is pressuring both sides to try to
improve their positions in the conflict over the Nile waters.
In May 2010, Ethiopia drafted the Entebbe Agreement to modify the historical
and legal basis for the sharing of water. Most upstream countries supported
the agreement but Egypt and Sudan refused it. It is true that the Entebbe
Agreement is not legally binding for Egypt and Sudan, but it does show that
Ethiopia is aware of the balance of power and its ambition to impose facts
on the ground regarding the construction of dams, which will necessarily
affect Egypt's share in the Nile waters and thus represent an existential
threat to Egypt. It is true that Ethiopia cannot force Cairo to sign, but
the Entebbe Agreement shows that a major crisis between Cairo and Addis
Ababa is on the way. What follows is an explanation of the Ethiopian
diplomatic attack on Egypt and Sudan.
The geopolitical framework strengthens Ethiopia's position
In recent years, the geopolitical framework has clearly shifted in
Ethiopia's favor, and it shifted the balance of power between Ethiopia and
Egypt. The geopolitical changes that favor Ethiopia can be seen in six key
indicators:
First, the
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/01/02/somalia-and-the-vicious-circ
le.html> disintegration of Somalia, Ethiopia's traditional rival with which
it fought a tough war over the Ogaden region, removed the geopolitical
balance facing Ethiopia's political ambitions in the region. Ethiopia
exploited Somalia's disintegration to strengthen its regional presence in
the Horn of Africa. For years, Ethiopia has been "fighting terrorism"
emerging from Somalia. Ethiopia has been doing that under an American
umbrella from 2006 to 2009 and then again since 2011 until now.
The second indicator is represented by the partition of Sudan into two
states: Sudan and South Sudan. That development has weakened Sudan (and thus
Egypt) in the Horn of Africa and allowed Ethiopia to participate, since
2012, in the UN peacekeeping forces in the Abyei region, which is disputed
between Sudan and South Sudan.
The third indicator is the following: the weakening of Sudan has shifted the
balance of power in Ethiopia's favor. The crisis in Darfur and the
international isolation of
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/02/sudan-regime-fall.html>
the Sudanese president (an international arrest warrant was issued against
him by the International Court of Justice in The Hague in 2009) has
significantly limited Khartoum's ability to maneuver in the Nile conflict.
The fourth indicator is the improved relationship between Ethiopia and the
West in general, and between Ethiopia and the US in particular, after Addis
Ababa emerged as a reliable partner in the Horn of Africa. Every year,
Ethiopia gets $4 billion in military, development and food assistance. But
the matter is not limited to direct aid. The West has started looking at
Ethiopia differently in regard to development projects, such as the
construction of dams in Ethiopia. The West had opposed such projects for
decades because they were considered a threat to regional security.
The fifth indicator is about China. China is Ethiopia's primary trade
partner and Beijing has expressed willingness to finance a dam construction
in Ethiopia and offered Chinese expertise in building large dams. China
wishes to have a foothold in the region. There is oil in South Sudan and the
Congo has mineral resources.
The sixth indicator is the weakening of Egypt's political weight in the Horn
of Africa. Egypt has no role in Somalia and was not even a key party in the
negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan. Egypt's preoccupation with
internal matters is weakening its ability to confront regional and
international players, such as China. Even though Egypt is the biggest
market for Chinese goods among the 11 basin countries, China has favored
other considerations over Egyptian priorities and Egypt's rights in the Nile
waters. So much so that China has offered its technological expertise in
constructing dams, which is a complete disregard to Egyptian rights. What
will Egypt do about all that? Only God knows.
A recommendation
In the coming years, Egypt and Ethiopia may be forced to fight a "water war"
because Ethiopia's ambitions contradict Egypt's historical and legal rights
in river waters. Ethiopia can only be deterred by the regional and
international balance of powers, which in recent years has favored Ethiopia.
The government of
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/03/qandil-iraq-visit-success.
html> Hisham Qandil (an irrigation expert, not a diplomat, legal expert or
strategist) seems unable to manage such a complex issue with legal,
political, economic, military and international aspects. His government is
unable to solve everyday problems that are less complex, such as security,
traffic, and fuel and food supplies. This portends dire consequences for
Egypt.
What is needed is a way to manage the crisis and use Egyptian soft power
toward Ethiopia, especially the Coptic Orthodox Church, which is the
Ethiopian Church's mother church. It is necessary to form a fixed Egyptian
team to manage this highly sensitive issue. The team should go beyond party
affiliation and include leading Egyptian Nile specialists. Ideological or
religious affiliation should not be a factor in choosing that Egyptian
crisis team. What is important should be the capabilities and competencies
of the team members, who will come from the "clay" of the country, not from
a particular group, party or political current. Clay, to those who don't
know, is what Egyptians call their country's soil, which is a fertile soil
resulting from the mixing with the Nile water.
Will Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi realize the seriousness of the
situation and deal with that issue as a major national matter and quickly
implement the required policies and procedures, or will he hesitate, as
usual, and go down in history as someone who squandered the historic rights
of Egypt and its future generations?
Received on Mon Mar 25 2013 - 20:37:17 EDT
