<
http://erigazette.org/?p=5856> AFRICA Somalia Expected Council Action In
July, the Council will likely renew the mandate of the Monitoring Group of
the 751/1907 Sanctions Committee concerning Eritrea and Somalia
Expected Council Action
30.06.2013
In July, the Council will likely renew the mandate of the Monitoring Group
of the 751/1907 Sanctions Committee concerning Eritrea and Somalia (it
expires on 25 August). The Council will also receive the final reports on
Eritrea and Somalia from the Monitoring Group and a 120-day briefing from
the chair of the 751/1907 Sanctions Committee. The report from the Emergency
Relief Coordinator on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia is
due on 22 July.
Key Recent Developments
The security situation in Somalia took a dramatic turn for the worse in
June. On 19 June, Al Shabaab attacked a UN compound in Mogadishu, resulting
in at least 20 deaths including five civilians, four Somali security guards,
three foreign contractors, one UN international staff member and seven Al
Shabaab militants. Government and AMISOM troops secured the compound within
an hour of the attack. Al Shabaab claimed responsibility, posting on Twitter
during the attack: “The UN, a merchant of death & a satanic force of evil,
has a long inglorious record of spreading nothing but poverty, dependency &
disbelief”. The Council issued a press statement condemning the attack and
reiterating its resolve to support Somalia’s transition to peace and
stability ( <
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11039.doc.htm>
SC/11039).
The Council last received a 120-day briefing from Ambassador Kim Sook
(Korea), chair of the 751/1907 Sanctions Committee, in consultations on 12
March. The briefing covered the work of the Committee as well as the
semi-annual reports of the Monitoring Group, which highlighted regional and
international networks of the Al Shabaab insurgency, chronic governmental
corruption and weaknesses in the enforcement of sanctions on charcoal
exports.
On 3 June, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) officially deployed
for an initial period of one year, as specified in resolution 2102 of 2 May.
Unlike its predecessor—the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), which
was principally based in Nairobi—UNSOM staff will be located in Mogadishu,
Hargeisia and Garowe. A further expansion of UNSOM’s field presence to
Baidoa, Beletdweyne and Kismayo among other cities is anticipated as
political and security conditions permit. The deployment of UNSOM has a
particular significance both in terms of the Council’s intent and Somali
public perception, considering the relative lack of UN staff based in the
country since the departure of UN peacekeepers in March 1995.
On 6 June, Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson briefed the Council on the
report of the Secretary-General released 31 May (
<
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E
4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_326.pdf> S/2013/326) and other recent developments in
Somalia (
<
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E
4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_6975.pdf> S/PV.6975). Somali Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs Fowsiyo Yusuf Haji Adan and Ambassador Tekeda
Alemu (Ethiopia) also addressed the Council, the latter speaking on behalf
of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). After the
briefing, the Council adopted a presidential statement welcoming the
international conference on Somalia held in London on 7 May and the
deployment of UNSOM (
<
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E
4FF96FF9%7D/s_prst_2013_7.pdf> S/PRST/2013/7).
Following conflicting claims on 15 May to the presidency of the
self-declared state of Jubaland, whose formation remains unrecognised by the
federal government, fighting erupted on 7 June among rival clans in the
economically significant port city of Kismayo, leaving at least 18 dead
after two days of clashes. On 13 June, Assistant Secretary-General
Tayé-Brook Zerihoun briefed Council members in consultations under “any
other business” regarding the situation in the Juba regions of Somalia.
After the briefing by Zerihoun, the Council issued a press statement (
<
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11032.doc.htm> SC/11032) welcoming
the commitment of the federal government to take the lead in reconciliation
and supporting the offer of assistance made by IGAD in its communiqué of 24
May.
On 13 June, the Chairperson of the AU Commission released a
<
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-report-somalia-13-06-2013.pdf.> report
addressing several issues raised by resolution 2093 of 6 March. The report
is highly critical of the current support package provided by the UN for the
AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): low budgetary allocations; slow logistics;
poor equipment servicing; and insufficient armoured personnel carriers and
helicopters for the geography of operations. The report also suggests AMISOM
is inadequately staffed and resourced to assume guard force tasks on the
scale required by UNSOM. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) then issued
a <
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-379-com-somalia-13-06-2013-3-2-.pdf>
communiqué on 13 June calling for: additional force multipliers and
enablers; logistical support for the Somali National Security Forces;
dedicated funds for training and capacity-building; and a re-evaluation of
the guard force.
At press time, Hassan Dahir Aweys, one of Al Shabaab’s senior leaders, is
reported to have surrendered to the government of Somalia. Aweys is
currently subject to an asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo under the
Somalia sanctions regime.
The previous report from the Emergency Relief Coordinator was transmitted to
the Council on 19 November 2012 (
<
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E
4FF96FF9%7D/s_2012_856.pdf> S/2012/856). The report noted problems with
insecurity and “gatekeepers” but suggested that the diversion and misuse of
humanitarian aid has decreased.
Key Issues
In July, while watching the overall situation, the Council will be
principally concerned with issues directly related to the sanctions regime,
including:
* the influence the partial lifting of the arms embargo has had on the
dynamics of the conflict;
* the effect the charcoal export ban has had on Al Shabaab finances;
* the effect the travel ban and asset freeze have had on the
insurgency; and
* whether the sanctions have been effective, and options to improve
implementation.
Options
One option for the Council is to renew the mandate of the Monitoring Group
for one year without any substantive revisions to the Somalia sanctions
regime.
Another option would be to strengthen the Monitoring Group by increasing the
number of arms experts. (
<
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E
4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2093.pdf> Resolution 2093 gives the Monitoring Group
responsibility for assessing the government’s infrastructure and procedures
for storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of weapons, as well
as monitoring the misappropriation or sale of weapons to other groups.)
In order to improve analysis and implementation of the charcoal export ban,
a further option for the Council could be to consider the addition of an
expert on conflict commodities to the Monitoring Group.
Another option could be increasing AMISOM’s authorisation by at least 1,000
troops, as suggested in the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission,
in order to provide an adequate guard force in all four sectors.
Council and Wider Dynamics
At present, the Council appears to be united on Somalia policymaking,
particularly in comparison to when contentious issues such as structural
integration and a partial lifting of the arms embargo had not yet been
decided. This was evident in the Council quickly reaching consensus during
negotiation of the presidential statement adopted 6 June and press
statements issued on 13 and 19 June.
The difficult security situation in Somalia has significant implications for
the UN’s relations and interaction with the government, Somali civil society
and its own staff. Practical assistance with peacebuilding and statebuilding
will require frequent interaction between government officials and UN staff,
but even in Mogadishu the security conditions do not yet exist for the free
movement of civilian personnel. After the 19 June attack on the UN compound,
the UN Staff Union urged the Secretary-General to take additional security
measures prior to increasing the size of UNSOM. However, the more
substantial and restrictive these changes are, the more difficult it will be
to interact with the government and civil society and the UN could
ultimately run the risk of renewed accusations regarding a “bunker
mentality”.
As evidenced by the content of the report of the Chairperson of the AU
Commission and the communiqué of the AU PSC issued on 13 June, relations
between the AU and the UN are increasingly tenuous concerning Somalia. At a
basic level, the core issue seems to be institutional contestation over who
will bear the cost—both financial and human—for the war against Al Shabaab.
At a deeper level, current disagreements reflect long-standing tensions and
ambiguity regarding decision-making authority, the division of labour and
financing obligations.
Conflicting positions regarding the implementation of a federal system also
pose significant difficulties. Resolution of the worsening situation in the
Juba regions will be critical for the central government, particularly
because it has clear implications for relations between the core and
periphery in other contexts. If Mogadishu concedes too much autonomy to
local actors in the self-declared state of Jubaland, then it may never
attain control over the regional state-formation process. On the other hand,
if the central government either fails to facilitate reconciliation or
attempts to impose what is perceived as an inequitable solution, then a
negative precedent will have been set for future negotiations with Puntland
and Somaliland.
There are also important regional inter-state dynamics. IGAD has offered to
assist the government with mediation of the conflict in the Juba regions.
However, the situation is potentially complicated by rival claimants to the
“presidency” of the unrecognised state each having external backers: Ahmed
Madobe, leader of the Ras Kamboni militia, has been aligned with Kenya,
while Barre Hirale, a former defence minister, is widely perceived to be
tacitly supported by the central government of Somalia. Kenya may see an
allied administration in the Juba regions as a buffer against Al Shabaab and
part of its exit strategy from AMISOM. The government of Somalia cannot
afford to lose AMISOM’s Kenyan contingent, but it is also unwilling to cede
control over Kismayo.
The UK is the penholder on Somalia, and the Republic of Korea is the chair
of the Sanctions Committee on Somalia and Eritrea.
Received on Sun Jun 30 2013 - 22:06:55 EDT