Former British ambassador to Sudan on secession, peace efforts
Exclusive Asharq Al-Awsat interview with Alan Goulty on the second
anniversary of the secession of South Sudan
22 Jul, 2013
Washington, Asharq Al-Awsat-Alan Goulty is one of the leading British
experts on Sudan, having served in a variety of diplomatic posts in the
country. In an exclusive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat on the second
anniversary of the secession of South Sudan, Goulty takes a look at the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ultimately led to this, in addition
to Omar Al-Bashir's role in the secession, and what lies in store for both
Sudan and South Sudan.
In the early 1970s, Goulty served as a diplomat at the British Embassy in
Khartoum; in 1995, he returned as ambassador, holding this post for four
years. While in 2002, he returned again as Britain's Special Representative
to Sudan. Goulty represented Britain in efforts to stop the war between the
North and the South, and reach an agreement between the Khartoum government
led by President Omar Al-Bashir and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM) led by the late Dr John Garang. In 2005, these efforts culminated in
the CPA, which was signed in Naivasha, Kenya. In 2011, a referendum in the
South, prescribed by the CPA, led to the creation of an independent South
Sudan, now led by President Salva Kiir. Goulty returned to Sudan again in
2005 to represent Britain in the Darfur negotiations.
He retired in 2008, after 40 years service as a British diplomat, including
postings as ambassador to Tunisia and Director of the Foreign Office for the
Middle East and North Africa. For the last few years, Goulty has been a
senior scholar at Washington's Woodrow Wilson Center for International
Scholars, focusing mainly on Sudan.
Asharq Al-Awsat: On its second anniversary, how would you describe South
Sudan?
Alan Goulty: It is no surprise that the country is facing problems. What is
remarkable is how well it has done, taking into account its lack of
resources, both material and human, and the ongoing disputes with Sudan.
The people of South Sudan deserve our continued support as they tackle the
challenges of building a new nation, founded on mutual interests rather than
on simple hostility to Khartoum.
Q: What's your view on the ongoing disputes between South Sudan and Sudan?
It is clear that neither country, and neither people, can hope to prosper
without good neighborly relations and practical cooperation. This does not
mean only the oil issues, but open borders and free movement of people; the
right of citizens to work and own property in both countries; free trade;
arrangements for the seasonal migrations of herders and their livestock; and
so on.
All these measures would benefit the people of both countries, especially
those who live in the "Tamazuj" border states.
Sadly, the interests of their peoples do not seem to rank highly amongst the
priorities of their leaders. In both countries, both governments and their
opponents are obsessed by the question of whose turn it is to eat, not by
ensuring that what resources exist are fairly shared, and their countries
well-governed.
The immediate priority is to halt the fighting in Darfur, South Kordofan,
and the Blue Nile; ensure access for humanitarian aid; and begin the process
of national reconciliation and reconstruction without which there will be no
peace either within Sudan, or between Khartoum and South Sudan.
All parties, and especially the leaders of the armed movement, must shoulder
their responsibilities and play their part in this.
Q: In a previous interview with Asharq Al-Awsat in 2005, you revealed that
you first met Salva Kiir in 1997. Did he support unity at that time? If so,
when, and why, did he change his mind and move towards secession?
He was certainly a loyal supporter of Garang. I don't recall whether we
talked about unity or secession at that first meeting. Our focus at that
time was on how to end the war between the North and the South.
Q: When did Kiir start to support secession?
After Dr. Garang's death in 2005 and the loss of his strong personality,
many Southern leaders who were his followers had second thoughts regarding
his leanings towards unity. I believe many of those leaders had had
reservations about his unity ideas. But, they thought that his command of
Arabic, and his appeal among the Northerners, might help him to compete with
and defeat Bashir in a general election to become the first Southern
president of Sudan, a noble and exciting aspiration.
That was why, after Garang's death and the end of such hopes, many Southern
leaders began to lean more towards independence, and Salva Kiir went along
with the majority view.
Q: How about Garang? Was he really and whole-heartily a unionist?
I believe Garang always wanted to give unity a chance. But, of course, he
knew that the general feelings in the South tended to be anti-North. So, he
had to be careful, and to think about an alternative to unity.
Q: In your previous interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, you denied that Garang's
death was an accident. Seven years later, the debate continues about whether
he was intentionally killed because of his pro-union opinions. What's your
view now?
Of course, Garang's death was a tragic event. Of course, people have
different theories about that. But nobody has produced clear-or indeed
any-evidence that he was murdered.
Q: When did it become clear to you that the South would choose secession?
This became increasingly clear after the 2010 elections.
Q: Not during the 2005 negotiations that led to the CPA?
The SPLM consistently called for self-determination in the South, without
arguing about unity or independence. Don't forget that the SPLM signed the
CPA that called for making unity attractive.
The SPLM saw the 2010 elections in the North as a sign that the North would
accept separation. And when Bashir said he would accept separation if the
South voted for it in the scheduled 2011 referendum in the South, the door
was open for that outcome. Remember, by that time, Garang with his pro-union
views, was no longer around.
I felt that if Bashir would accept separation, separation could not be
stopped. Then came the referendum and the South'a overwhelming vote for
independence.
Q: You previously criticized Bahsir's name being being submitted to the
International Criminal Court (ICC) saying: "Consideration must always be
given to the balance between justice and peace." Do you stand by this view
or have you changed your mind?
I am not a politician; I am a practical diplomat. I believe the first step
in Sudan at that time was to end the war, reach an agreement, and work on
its implementation. I thought we should not prosecute people who were
involved in this process. We did not aim to solve all the problems of Sudan
at Naivasha.
Q: Why did the UN Security Council, clearly under pressure from the US,
refer Bashir's name to the ICC?
The Security Council, at that time, wasn't dealing with the South, but with
Darfur. By that time the CPA was already concluded.
Q: But, isn't it true that this move represented another form of pressure on
Bashir and for secession? How could the Southerners be persuaded to remain
in a union with a so-called "criminal Islamist"?
How could it be pressure? He was offered the choice of appearing at the
Hague immediately or in due course. Naturally anyone faced with such a
choice would try to hold out as long as possible. We should remember that
the indictment or the charge was just that. It wasn't a conviction. In my
country, we believe a person is innocent until proven guilty.
Q: How about the international and domestic perception on Bashir? The damage
was already done.
The mistake that was made on the part of the West was to avoid contacts with
Bashir. Especially when the West wished to influence him. You cannot
influence someone without talking to him. It wasn't necessary on the part of
the West to cut off communications with Bashir.
Q: But communications were cut off?
Yes. That was a mistake.
Q: In 1997, the US promised to lift sanctions on Sudan. Now, 16 years later,
the sanctions remain in place. Why is that?
In fact the UN sanctions have been lifted.
Q: Yes, but what about the US sanctions ? Why haven't they been lifted, even
after Bahsir accepted the partition of his country?
Ask the Americans about that. My answer is that there is no strong
inclination in the US to make friendly gestures to Bashir. There has been
strong domestic antagonism towards him in the US, as you know.
Q: In your view, if either Omar Al-Bashir or his former Islamist ally Hassan
Al-Turabi were more moderate and less radical, do you think South Sudan
would still have seceded?
That is both speculative and vague. Who is the "extremist" and who is the
"moderate"? During the 1990's, when I was ambassador in Khartoum, and met
Bashir for the first time, he told me that there could be no military
victory for either side in the Southern conflict.
But, Turabi and others called for a holy jihad, and sent untrained young
Northerners to fight in the South. So, who was "extreme" and who was
"moderate"? On the other hand, there was Turabi's theory about tawali or
political openness. But President Bashir did not see any merit in political
parties. So, who was "extreme" and who was "moderate"?
Q: What about if the democratically-elected Prime Minister Sadiq Al-Mahdi
remained in power? Do you think separation would have been avoided?
I don't know. But, I know that Sayed Sadiq's government prosecuted the war
in the South without any hesitation. Yes, there were talks about initiatives
to talk to the SPLM. But, the fact is that Sayed Sadiq in his
three-and-a-half years in power, didn't stop the war. Why should we conclude
that he would have done so had he stayed in power for another year, or two,
or three?
Q: In a report you published at Washington's Wilson Center in 2012, you
wrote: "US promises, for example, the removal of Sudan from the list of the
state sponsors of terrorism, were not fulfilled." How could the US be an
honest broker between the North and the South if it was clearly and strongly
anti-North?
That was a US problem, not ours. We, the British delegation, as observers
helping the mediation, did our best to avoid taking sides between the
parties.
Q: In 2011, in an interview at Washington's Carnegie Endowment for Peace,
you said that unity was not achieved because the "international community"
failed to use the CPA mechanism effectively. Why? Where there deliberate
efforts against unity?
The CPA set up many mechanisms, like: a unity government in the North,
autonomy in the South, joint committees, working groups and commissions,
including the Assessment and Evaluation Commission with a majority of
international members. These did not work as well as the framers of the CPA
had hoped..
Q: The CPA called for efforts to make unity "attractive"; why wasn't an
international mechanism established to help both the North and the South?
It was! The Assessment and Evaluation Commission, as I have just mentioned.
By that time, the international interest in Sudan had switched to Darfur and
the AEC was not as assertive as it might have been. I will give you an
example: The Foreign Office called me back to be their Special
Representative for Darfur. I suggested that it might be better to have me as
representative for Sudan, i.e. both Darfur and the South, as there was still
a lot of work to be done to implement the CPA. But they said just Darfur.
So, we, and the rest of the West, at that time, were completely
concentrating on Darfur and we took our eyes off North-South relations. This
helped to leave the field to those favoring secession.
Q: So you acknowledge that mistakes were made?
Yes.
Q: Who made them?
As for the West, we should not have diverted our attention exclusively to
Darfur.
Q: What about the big picture? What about the historical clash between Islam
and the West, its manifestation in Sudan, and the West's attempts to stop
the spread of Islam in South Sudan and sub-Sahara Africa?
I believe this rationalization has two problems: first, it is not accurate;
second, it is speculative.
Our aim was to end the civil war and enable Sudanese to try again to govern
their country peaceably.
Religion was not among our motives. In fact there have been no Western
attempts to divide Sudan. For many years, Sudan has been poor, weak,
war-ridden and tribally-divided. Admittedly there was little trust between
the West and Bashir. But Sudan's problems were Sudanese problems of Sudan's
making.
Q: But Sudan was partitioned as the result of the CPA?
That was what the people of South Sudan wanted and an option which neither
administration, in Khartoum and Juba, did enough to avert. But it's not a
bad outcome: many countries have been partitioned successfully. The former
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, for example.
And we are even facing a referendum on independence for Scotland in my own
country.