Ethiopia: Prospects for Peace in Ogaden
Africa Report N°207 6 Aug 2013
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Nearly a year after the talks facilitated by Kenya between the Ethiopian
government and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) rebels stalled in
October 2012, there are signs that the process may restart. Ostensibly, it
was the ONLF’s refusal to recognise the Ethiopian constitution that halted
the initial dialogue, but that issue covers more fundamental divides, and
these remain. Nevertheless there are solid reasons why this is a promising
time for both parties, as well as neighbouring countries and other
international partners, to try to renew meaningful talks. Two decades of
deadly conflict – especially an intense five-year, relatively successful
government counter-insurgency campaign – have exhausted the local
Ethiopian-Somali population sufficiently to push the ONLF back to the table.
Likewise, Addis Ababa’s determination to accelerate economic growth,
especially by exploiting the resources of its lowland peripheries, not least
hydrocarbons, also argues for sustainable peace.
Ethiopia’s commitment to the talks is important but undermined by a parallel
strategy of piecemeal deals with disgruntled ONLF members. Concessions to
the rebels risk alienating the “loyalist” stronghold that the federal
government has built up within the majority clan – the Ogaadeni – in the
Ogaden region, formally called the Somali National Regional State (SNRS).
These tactics have proved useful in the counter-insurgency campaign, but a
meaningful peace process will have to address the clan tensions and
exacerbated intra-communal violence they have also deepened.
The drive for peace has suffered from the death in August 2012 of
longstanding Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who took a strong personal
interest in resolving the Ogaden conflict and had the power to negotiate a
deal. Though his successor, Hailemariam Desalegn, is a potential dove, he
lacks the political strength to challenge the military-security hawks who
led the counter-insurgency operations and are, at best, sceptical of the
need for a deal with the weakened ONLF.
The ONLF’s leadership lacks a unified vision of the talks’ outcome, shifting
along a spectrum of options, between reconciliation with the state in return
for significant autonomy and outright secession. Though the Ethiopian
constitution formally allows for secession, it is not a real option for the
government and is complicated by pan-Somali irredentist dreams, driven by
the Ogaadeni clan’s trans-national reach. In its attempts to guard against
the subversion of its cause by wider Somali interests, the ONLF has been
forced to look for allies further afield, especially Eritrea, whose
invaluable tactical support has embroiled an internal Ethiopian issue in
wider regional rivalries. Unless its regional relations, especially with
Eritrea but also with Somalia, improve, Addis Ababa will continue to view
the Ogaden issue through a national security lens.
Kenya’s involvement in the peace talks is based on security cooperation with
Ethiopia, especially over Somali issues, as well as growing aspiration to
increase bilateral economic ties. Trans-national clan links also pushed it
to take on facilitation, led by a team of Kenyan Ogaadenis, including a
government minister, two parliamentarians and an ex-civil servant. However,
Nairobi was distracted by its March 2013 election, which partly contributed
to loss of momentum in the process. The team has now had its mandate renewed
by President Uhuru Kenyatta’s government, but its task is complicated by the
growing instability in Kenya’s Somali counties and the Kenyan military
intervention (under the African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM) in
neighbouring southern Somalia – two regions dominated by the Ogaadeni clan.
Balancing Ogaadeni interests in the three neighbouring states would make it
more possible in the longer term to build sustainable regional peace. The
international community – traditional donors and new economic actors
interested in Ethiopia’s resource-rich peripheries alike – should give their
attention to renewed talks. Development aid and economic partnerships could
significantly improve prospects for Ethiopian-Somali communities exhausted
by years of counter-insurgency, marginalisation and political violence.
But the peace talks can only transform sub-regional economic integration if
they address fundamental governance issues – especially resolution of
historical Ethiopian-Somali grievances.
A meaningful peace process requires unprecedented concessions from both
sides and, potentially, enhancement of Kenya’s role from facilitator to
guarantor, as well as the channelling of technical support through the
regional peace and security organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority
on Development (IGAD). To improve the prospects of a new round of talks, the
parties could consider a number of options:
* a greater role for Kenya’s good offices in light of its shared
security concerns with Ethiopia and the shared stakes of its Ogaadeni
facilitators for regional peace. IGAD could also conceivably play a role,
especially through its Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism’s
(CEWARN) Rapid Response Fund designed to prevent and mitigate
pastoralism-related conflict;
* shared acknowledgement of the post-1991 devolved administration’s
achievements, especially the investments of the last five years, and of the
potential for further reforms in the regional government (in partnership
with the existing SNRS administration), particularly if a balance is
maintained between ensuring security and pursuing much needed development;
again, IGAD’s technical programs on pastoralism could be supportive;
* a potential role for both traditional clan- and state-based justice
in accounting for crimes committed during the conflict and achieving
reconciliation within Ogaadeni sub-clans and with other Somali clans,
perhaps including a commission of inquiry, led by neutral Ethiopian and
Kenyan elders, into the 50-year legacy of conflict in the region;
* commitment to greater transparency of the trade and customs regime
in SNRS, including creative concessions, eg, incentives to pay duty on
cross-border Somali trade with Kenya and Somaliland; and
* recognition of the federal government’s authority over oil and
natural gas concessions, but also shared commitment to public scrutiny of
exploration’s impact on pastoral livelihoods and consultation on regional
social and economic development if commercial exploitation starts.
Nairobi/Brussels, 6 August 2013
Received on Wed Aug 07 2013 - 09:01:40 EDT