Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2013 22:56:16 +0200
Wikileaks: Ethiopia want to access sea by swapping land with Eritrea [full
text]
August 11, 2013
top-amb-kenzo-oshima-and-minister-seyoum-mesfin-bottom-amb-legwaila-and-mrs-
viki-huddleston_th
A leaked Cable of US Embassy Addis Ababa reveals Ethiopia threatened to
‘reoccupy the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), which lies entirely within
Eritrea, in the event UNMEE withdrew’ back in 2004.
The Cable also indicates Ethiopia deems negotiation on ‘access to the sea’
and ‘territory swaps’ as key issues to resolve the current ‘no peace, no
war’ situation with Eritrea.
The Cable, prepared by the then Chargé d’affaires of the Embassy, Viki
Huddleston, is a summary of a November 7, 2005 meeting at the US Embassy in
Addis Ababa where Amb. Kenzo Oshima, Chairman of the UN Security Council’s
Working Group on Peace-keeping Operations, gave a briefing on the status of
the Ethio-Eritrean relations.
According to the Cable, the meeting was attended by diplomats in Addis
representing UN Security Council members and troop-contributing countries
(TCC), as well as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG)
Amb. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, his deputy Amb. Azouz Ennifar, and UNMEE
Force Commander Major-General Rajender Singh.
The meeting was held following Amb. Oshima’s meeting with Ethiopian Foreign
Minister Seyoum on the same day and his expected visit the following day to
Asmara, Eritrea. Amb. Oshima defined his mission as “technical” and ‘his
most important message was to push Eritrea to lift its restrictions on
UNMEE’.
Background: UNMEE was established following the 1998-2000 war between
Ethiopia and Eritrea, which the later started. Following the humiliating
defeat by the Ethiopian army which advanced deep into her territory, Eritrea
agreed that the contested areas remain under Ethiopian forces and for a
demilitarized zone 25 KM deep into her territory patrolled by peacekeeping
forces. That is, until the disputes are resolved, as per the Algiers
Agreement signed by both parties in June 2000. Ethiopia reported to have
lost slightly above 17 thousand troops in the war, though the International
Crisis Group (ICG) estimates the combined loss of the two countries around
70,000.
Consequently, in 2002, the Ethio-Eritrean Border Commission(EEBC) issued a
decision, which counts as border delimitation, that divided the 40 km long
Badme district into two comparable areas, though the town is awarded to
Eritrea.
Though the decision is unpopular in Ethiopia, the parliament adopted in 2004
a 5-point resolution accepting the ruling ‘in principle’, yet demanding the
demarcation process be conducted ‘according to international norms’ and also
a negotiation to resolve outstanding issues ‘in a give and take’ manner.
What Ethiopia wants to negotiate on has always been a subject of
speculation, as the government refused to disclose its negotiation strategy,
except that a sustainable peace is the objective.
On the other hand, Eritrea continued to breach the Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement and elements of the Algiers Agreement by engaging in a range of
activities to destabilize Ethiopia, an allegation corroborated by UN
reports.
Moreover, Eritrea continued to obstruct the operation of UNMEE, whose
presence is a pre-requisite for conducting the border demarcation. In fact,
Ethiopian forces withdrew from Eritrean territory at the end of the war was
on the condition that a demilitarized zone patrolled by UN would be
established in the Eritrean side of the border.
As Eritrea’s obstruction of UNMEE troops movement picked in 2004, so did
tensions in the region, thus prompting the UN Secretary General send on Amb.
Oshima, who was Japan’s UN Permanent Representative at the UN Security
Council and also Chairman of the UN Security Council’s Working Group on
Peace-keeping Operations.
Amb. Oshima met the then Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Seyoum
Mesfin on Nov. 7. Later that day, at the US Embassy, Oshima described the
meeting as follows, according to the Cable:
Seyoum continued to assert that actual demarcation of the border would
require “readjustments,” e.g., to ensure that a village not be divided in
two. Seyoum also had said that the border issue was not the sole issue
between Ethiopia and Eritrea: economic trade, normalization of relations,
and access to the sea were also key.
Amb. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, Special Representative of the UN
Secretary-General (SRSG), who also attended the US Embassy meeting was
quoted as saying:
SRSG Legwaila observed that Ethiopia had, on several occasions, proposed
swapping territory, and that the final point of PM Meles’ five-point plan
proposed dialogue, which Eritrea had rejected.
Commenting on the issues Oshima said:
Oshima said that while it would be useful if the GOE were to state publicly
that it accepted the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission’s (EEBC) decision
as “final and binding,” as stipulated by the Algiers peace accord, the GOE
continues to agree with the decision only “in principle”. Highlighting the
difference, Oshima questioned whether “I will marry you in principle” meant
the same as “I will marry you unconditionally.”
Amb. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, added:
Describing himself as an “expert in linguistic contortions,” SRSG Legwaila
agreed that this represented a significant caveat. Legwaila said mutual
acceptance of the EEBC decision would be a good basis for parties to begin
dialogue. Not accepting the finality of the EEBC decision was a violation of
article 415 of the peace agreement, Legwaila added.
Oshima also made a vague remark that was presented on the Cable as follows:
According to Oshima, Eritrea’s charge d’affaires in New York had told him
that the GSE had proposed a bilateral arrangement to Ethiopia, but had not
pursued it further, as Ethiopia had rejected it.
Concerning the possibility of another war, Legwaila cautioned that:
allowing UNMEE’s withdrawal would be the “quickest way to war,” as the
Government of Ethiopia had pledged to reoccupy the TSZ in the event UNMEE
withdrew (ref A). The TSZ was intended to keep Eritrean troops 25 kilometers
from the border, he said. Current restrictions hampering UNMEE’s freedom of
movement, especially during the night, were thus not only “making nonsense
of the Temporary Security Zone,” but also breeding suspicion, which could
ultimately “force war quickly,” he said. Legwaila said movements of troops,
tanks, or aircraft were a secondary concern, compared to the GSE’s flight
ban on UNMEE; reversing the ban would allow UNMEE to monitor and assess such
movements.
The French and Indian ambassador concurred with Legwaila’s assessment.
Legwaila also asked for satellite imagery from US, according to the Cable.
He was quoted as saying:
the restriction on UNMEE flights prevented UNMEE from monitoring 60 per cent
of the border. UNMEE could not determine whether Eritrea was now building up
forces along its side, he said. He noted that UNMEE had requested satellite
imagery from the United States (ref C), as “there is no other alternative”
to aerial surveillance. Without aerial surveillance, UNMEE Force Commander
Singh said he would need 15 times more troops (i.e., 45,000) to monitor the
border.
Read the full text below.
**********************************
Reference ID – 05ADDISABABA3837
Created – 2005-11-12 12:15
Released – 2011-08-26 00:00
Classification – UNCLASSIFIED
Origin – Embassy Addis Ababa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the
original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 003837
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E AND IO
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO ET ER UNSC EE BORDER
SUBJECT: UNSC MISSION TO ETHIOPIA-ERITREA BREAKS NO NEW GROUND
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 3769
B. ADDIS ABABA 3760
C. ADDIS ABABA 3725
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Japan’s UN PermRep Amb. Kenzio Oshima told UN Security
Council members and troop-contributing countries in Addis that his November
7-8 trip to Ethiopia and Eritrea on behalf of the Council was “technical” in
nature, and did not aim at promoting political dialogue. Providing a readout
of his meeting with Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin, Oshima said Ethiopia’s
position on border demarcation had not changed: Ethiopia accepted the
boundary commission’s decision “in principle”, which was not the same as
“final and binding.” Despite its opposition to immediate demarcation, Oshima
praised Ethiopia’s “restraint” in responding to Eritrea’s restrictions on
UNMEE, noting that UNMEE characterizes Ethiopia’s military deployments as
“defensive.” UNMEE officials, meanwhile, were more vocal in highlighting
UNMEE’s inability to monitor 60 per cent of the border, especially military
movements on the Eritrean side. According to UNMEE Force Commander Singh,
both sides have activated airfields and air defenses; moreover, each side
appears to have deployed two additional divisions, supplementing existing
troops along the border. UNMEE SRSG Legwaila warned that UNMEE’s withdrawal
would be “the quickest way to war,” as Ethiopia threatens to re-occupy the
Temporary Security Zone separating the two countries if UNMEE leaves. While
France agrees that UNMEE’s withdrawal would be “a catastrophe that must be
avoided at all costs,” Japan believes that revising UNMEE’s mandate could
generate cost savings. The UNMEE SRSG strongly opposes the current Greek
draft UNSC resolution, believing that it comes too late after the issue was
first brought to the Security Council a month ago, and that it would only
“enrage” both parties. UNSC members voiced support for a U.S. special envoy;
UNMEE SRSG underscored that the envoy should represent the United States,
not the United Nations, as Eritrea had rejected the previous UN envoy as
“illegal.” Charge replied that U.S. would seek an envoy, whether U.S. or UN
or both, that Eritrea and Ethiopia would accept. UNMEE again pleaded for
satellite imagery of the border in order to improve the safety and security
of UNMEE troops. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (U) At a November 7 meeting hosted by the Charge, Japan’s UN PermRep
Amb. Kenzo Oshima, Chairman of the UN Security Council’s Working Group on
Peace-keeping Operations, briefed heads of mission from UNSC members and
troop-contributing countries (TCC) on his meeting earlier that day with
Ethiopian FM Seyoum and his expected visit the following day to Asmara.
Senior officials from the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)
accompanied Oshima, including Special Representative of the UN
Secretary-General (SRSG) Amb. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, Deputy SRSG Amb.
Azouz Ennifar, and UNMEE Force Commander Major-General Rajender Singh.
—————————–
UNSC MISSION ONLY “TECHNICAL”
—————————–
¶3. (SBU) Amb. Oshima defined his mission as “technical”: he would meet with
UNMEE, UNSC members, TCCs, and, if possible, representatives of Ethiopia
(GOE) and Eritrea (GSE). His most important message was to push Eritrea
(GSE) to lift its restrictions on UNMEE, while expressing the UNSC’s
confidence in how UNMEE troops performed under difficult circumstances. “I’m
not here for any negotiations or political discussions,” he declared. Oshima
had met with Ethiopian FM Seyoum, and was awaiting confirmation from the GSE
of appointments the next day in Asmara. (NOTE: A November 8 UNMEE press
briefing confirmed that Oshima met with Colonel Zacarias Ogbagaber,
Eritrea’s Chief of the Commission for Coordination with UNMEE, and with
presidential advisor Yemane Ghebremeskel. END NOTE.) UNMEE officials
explained that Oshima would not visit the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ),
which lies entirely within Eritrea, as doing so required too much transit
time, due to Ethiopia and Eritrea’s refusal to allow direct flights between
their two countries.
¶4. (SBU) Reviewing UNSC actions, Oshima said “operational problems
affecting TCCs”, resulting from the GSE’s ban of UNMEE flight operations and
other restrictions, were a “matter of great concern” to the UN. The UNSYG
had reported movements of troops in areas adjacent to the Temporary Security
Zone (TSZ), he said, as well as “irregular movements” within the TSZ itself.
He referred to the UNSC statement issued on October 4 (S/PRST/2005/47). No
decision had been taken on a draft UNSC resolution proposed by Greece, he
added, but despite different views, there was no disagreement among members
that the GSE had to lift restrictions on UNMEE. In addition to addressing
the “immediate issue” of the GSE’s restrictions on UNMEE, the UNSC was
concerned about the root cause of the stalemate between Ethiopia and
Eritrea, he said, acknowledging that there was “frustration at the lack of
progress in demarcation”.
¶5. (SBU) Oshima said he would report his findings to the UNSC, but noted
that the SRSG had already reported recent border developments to that body.
Possible next steps included considering whether to approve a new
resolution, appoint a special envoy, or propose that “witnesses” to previous
agreements either meet or intervene. Oshima said no decision had been
reached yet, after consultations between the UNSYG and the USG, on whom the
envoy would represent.
——————————————— ————-
NO CHANGE IN ETHIOPIA’S RESERVATIONS ON BORDER DEMARCATION
——————————————— ————-
¶6. (SBU) Oshima said he had a “good meeting” on November 7 with GOE FM
Seyoum, but reported no change in Ethiopia’s position from its October 31
letter to the UNSC. According to Oshima, Seyoum continued to assert that
actual demarcation of the border would require “readjustments,” e.g., to
ensure that a village not be divided in two. Seyoum also had said that the
border issue was not the sole issue between Ethiopia and Eritrea: economic
trade, normalization of relations, and access to the sea were also key.
¶7. (SBU) Oshima said that while it would be useful if the GOE were to state
publicly that it accepted the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission’s (EEBC)
decision as “final and binding,” as stipulated by the Algiers peace accord,
the GOE continues to agree with the decision only “in principle”.
Highlighting the difference, Oshima questioned whether “I will marry you in
principle” meant the same as “I will marry you unconditionally.” Describing
himself as an “expert in linguistic contortions,” SRSG Legwaila agreed that
this represented a significant caveat. Legwaila said mutual acceptance of
the EEBC decision would be a good basis for parties to begin dialogue. Not
accepting the finality of the EEBC decision was a violation of article 415
of the peace agreement, Legwaila added.
¶8. (SBU) SRSG Legwaila expressed concern that FM Seyoum had repeatedly told
him, DSRSG Ennifar, and the UNMEE Force Commander that “the Boundary
Commission will never open offices in Ethiopia,” when in fact the EEBC has
two offices in Ethiopia that have been closed as a cost-saving measure. As
the EEBC requires offices on both sides of the border for demarcation,
Seyoum’s comment challenges the notion that Ethiopia is ready to demarcate
the 85 per cent of the border that is not in dispute, Legwaila said.
¶9. (SBU) Asked if he was satisfied with Ethiopia’s reaction to Eritrea’s
restrictions, Oshima said FM Seyoum “reassured us of restraint.” Ethiopia
had responded “appropriately,” he said, adding that both the UNMEE SRSG and
Force Commander had characterized Ethiopia’s redeployment of forces as
“defensive.”
¶10. (SBU) According to Oshima, Eritrea’s charge d’affaires in New York had
told him that the GSE had proposed a bilateral arrangement to Ethiopia, but
had not pursued it further, as Ethiopia had rejected it. SRSG Legwaila
observed that Ethiopia had, on several occasions, proposed swapping
territory, and that the final point of PM Meles’ five-point plan proposed
dialogue, which Eritrea had rejected.
—————————————
UNMEE CANNOT MONITOR ERITREAN MOVEMENTS
—————————————
¶11. (SBU) SRSG Legwaila interjected that the GSE’s restriction on UNMEE
flights prevented UNMEE from monitoring 60 per cent of the border. UNMEE
could not determine whether Eritrea was now building up forces along its
side, he said. On the Ethiopian side, there was “more transparency”: UNMEE
knew Ethiopia had been amassing troops since December 16, ¶2004. He noted
that UNMEE had requested satellite imagery from the United States (ref C),
as “there is no other alternative” to aerial surveillance. Without aerial
surveillance, UNMEE Force Commander Singh said he would need 15 times more
troops (i.e., 45,000) to monitor the border; even more would be needed if
the GSE imposed further restrictions, such as allowing only foot patrols.
Singh noted that UNMEE operated under Chapter VI (peaceful settlement of
disputes) of the UN Charter, and therefore depended on consent from both
parties, which was now “incomplete.” “We have lost our ability to serve as a
tripwire, and to warn the international community,” Singh lamented.
——————————————— ————–
AIRFIELDS AND AIR DEFENSE ACTIVATED ON BOTH SIDES OF BORDER
——————————————— ————–
¶12. (SBU) UNMEE Force Commander Singh outlined key military developments:
– Both sides had activated airfields and air defenses.
– Ethiopia had deployed two additional divisions in the western sector,
along with two special forces units. These were in addition to eleven
divisions deployed along the border in December 2004, and seven more
divisions added in January 2005. Singh noted that PM Meles had notified him
and the SRSG of the January deployment.
– Eritrean troops were now deployed on (rather than near) the border, and
maintaining and preparing defenses.
– UNMEE had recently observed one to two new Eritrean divisions in areas
adjacent to the TSZ, but now could no longer locate them.
– Within the TSZ itself, the GSE had restricted UNMEE from patrolling the
western and central sectors at night. UNMEE had also curtailed challenge
inspections in many areas.
——————————————— —-
UNMEE,S WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE “QUICKEST WAY TO WAR”
——————————————— —-
¶13. (SBU) SRSG Legwaila cautioned that allowing UNMEE’s withdrawal would be
the “quickest way to war,” as the Government of Ethiopia had pledged to
reoccupy the TSZ in the event UNMEE withdrew (ref A). The TSZ was intended
to keep Eritrean troops 25 kilometers from the border, he said. Current
restrictions hampering UNMEE’s freedom of movement, especially during the
night, were thus not only “making nonsense of the Temporary Security Zone,”
but also breeding suspicion, which could ultimately “force war quickly,” he
said. Legwaila said movements of troops, tanks, or aircraft were a secondary
concern, compared to the GSE’s flight ban on UNMEE; reversing the ban would
allow UNMEE to monitor and assess such movements.
¶14. (SBU) France’s ambassador to Ethiopia remarked that the withdrawal of
UNMEE would be “a catastrophe that must be avoided at all costs.” He added
that many parties had attempted to reach out to Eritrea, without success.
¶15. (SBU) As chairman of the UNSC’s working group on peace-keeping
operations, Amb. Oshima said he had convened a separate meeting with TCCs.
Five recent casualties among UNMEE peace-keepers prompted concerns that TCCs
could withdraw their contingents, he said, as the GSE’s flight ban included
medical evacuations.
¶16. (SBU) Amb. Oshima said Japan was concerned about UNMEE,s $186 million
annual cost, as peace-keeping operations cost $5 billion annually. Mandate
review could generate savings, he said.
¶17. (SBU) India’s ambassador to Ethiopia agreed with SRSG Legwaila that
Ethiopia would reoccupy the TSZ if UNMEE withdrew. He did not directly
threaten to withdraw Indian troops (who, along with a contingent from
Jordan, comprise the majority of UNMEE’s military strength), but questioned
what UNMEE,s future would be if it could not fulfill its mandate. India
advocated a meeting of “friends” of Ethiopia and Eritrea, and launching a
parallel political process to address the current impasse. (NOTE: No
representative of Jordan attended Oshima’s briefing. END NOTE.)
——————————————— ——–
NEXT STEPS: U.S. ENVOY INSTEAD OF NEW UNSC RESOLUTION
——————————————— ——–
¶18. (SBU) Addressing possible next steps, SRSG Legwaila said he strongly
opposed the draft Greek resolution, saying it would simply “enrage” the
parties. “This resolution has now outlived whatever usefulness it might have
(had),” he said. Legwaila said Ethiopian FM Seyoum was “violently opposed”
to the proposed resolution (ref B), and that the GSE’s reaction would be
even worse. The UNSC should have passed a restriction solely addressing the
GSE,s flight ban on October 5-6, he continued, in conjunction with its
presidential statement, in response to the call for “emergency action”. Now,
he added, the proposed resolution was too late and irrelevant. “We should
forget about the resolution and do something else,” he said. Charge observed
that the UNSC did not want to make a delicate situation more difficult. Amb.
Oshima remarked that the “reflexes of the Security Council” are to pass
repeated resolutions and condemnations, but he questioned whether a strong
resolution would help address the current situation.
¶19. (SBU) UK Ambassador Bob Dewar expressed reservations about a meeting of
“witnesses.” While this was an important option, it needed to be approached
carefully, he said, “to ensure it adds value.”
¶20. (SBU) Legwaila argued that any new special envoy should represent the
United States, not the United Nations. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea had said
the United States was the only interlocutor it could accept, he noted. Thus,
“it would be absolutely tragic” if the UNSYG appointed another UN special
envoy who failed. Legwaila explained that Eritrea considers the UN
“irrelevant” and perceived former Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy,s
earlier appointment as UN Special Envoy as an attempt by the UNSYG to
renegotiate the EEBC decision. Some GSE officials thus considered Axworthy’s
appointment as UN Special Envoy illegal, Legwaila said. “No one should ask
the Secretary-General to appoint a special envoy,” given the circumstances
of the earlier UN envoy’s failure, Legwaila said. If a second UN envoy
failed, Legwaila said, then even someone with the stature of the former
President Bush would not succeed. “The United States must take a chance for
peace,” Legwaila concluded, urging the appointment of a U.S. envoy.
¶21. (SBU) Charge told Legwaila that the key for the United States was not
whether the envoy was UN or U.S./UN or U.S., but whether he was accepted by
both sides. Brazil’s ambassador said he supported bilateral (vice UN)
intervention to address Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions, as well as consultations
with academic experts. Norway poloff said his country supported a US envoy,
whether US or UN-hatted, but that the envoy needed to make tough demands on
both sides, and have the international community unite behind him.
¶22. (U) Greek ambassador noted that the Council of Europe had been able to
enforce unpopular decisions on its members, who accepted them as binding; he
questioned why demarcation of commonly accepted portions of the border could
not begin. In response, SRSG Legwaila reiterated the well-established
differences between the parties’ positions on the EEBC decision:
– FM Meles has publicly stated that Ethiopia seeks dialogue prior to
demarcation.
– Beginning in August 2003, Ethiopia refused to implement the EEBC’s
demarcation directives to the chief surveyor to fix lines along the border.
– Eritrea refuses to allow demarcation of the east, so long as Ethiopia
refuses to allow demarcation of the entire border.
Legwaila underscored that in demarcation of the border, Ethiopia seeks
adjustments in delimitation; and that the GOE’s acceptance of the EEBC
decision only “in principle” remained a major stumbling block.
¶23. (SBU) COMMENT: Amb. Oshima’s “technical” visit on behalf of the UN
Security Council provided him with a first-hand introduction to the issue in
both countries and also clarified where each stands. The visit also
demonstrated continuing UN commitment to avoid another war. Post continues
to await guidance in response to UNMEE SRSG Legwaila’s October 26 request to
the USG for satellite imagery (ref C), as UNMEE troops would feel more
secure if they had better information about the parties’ troop deployments.
END COMMENT.
HUDDLESTON
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