Somalia: Taking Positions in the Jubbaland Deadlock
18 Aug, 2013 - 2:52:25 PM
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
Having failed to displace the Jubbaland administration in Kismayo militarily
through the militia of the Marehan alliance led by Barre Hirale in July, the
Somali Federal Government (S.F.G.) attempted to broaden the conflict in
Somalia's deep south by securing support from external actors.
That effort appeared to bear fruit on August 4, when the heads of state and
government of the troop contributing countries (T.C.C.) of the African Union
mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and Ethiopia and the S.F.G. released a
communique in which the principals expressed support for the S.F.G. in
"establishing its authority in the Jubba Region especially its control of
the state owned infrastructure including the seaport and airport." Giving
some teeth to their backing of the S.F.G., the T.C.C. "agreed that AMISOM
and the Chiefs of Defense Forces of Ethiopia and Somalia . urgently work out
the modalities and operationalization of an AMISOM multinational force to be
deployed in Kismayo."
Were the S.F.G. to be successful in taking over Kismayo's seaport and
airport from the Jubbaland administration, which now holds them, the S.F.G.
would have won the prize of the deep south and would have effectively
crippled the Jubbaland administration. Whether that will happen remains in
doubt. What is clear is that the T.C.C. and Ethioopia are on record siding
with the S.F.G. in its dispute with the Jubbaland administration over
control of Kismayo; the S.F.G. has scored a diplomatic victory that has
allowed it partially to recover from its military loss. The situation on the
ground, however, remains what it was, with the Jubbaland administration in
charge of Kismayo and determined to stay there.
The deadlock in Jubbaland between the S.F.G. and the Jubbaland
administration remains in place, with the possibility that the deadlock
might be broken eventually in favor of the S.F.G. by external actors. The
word "possibility" must be stressed; it is not clear whether or not the
S.F.G. has gained any practical benefit from the T.C.C. decision.
Kenya Put on the Back Foot Pushes Back
The S.F.G. was enabled to gain an opening to secure external support by its
accusation that the Kenyan contingent of AMISOM that has lead responsibility
for Kismayo had aided the Jubbaland administration militarily in its ousting
of Barre Hirale's militia from the city. That allegation, backed up by
testimony on the ground (disputed by Kenya), allowed the S.F.G. to argue
that the Kenyan Defense Forces (K.D.F.) in AMISOM were not neutral
peacekeepers, much less on the S.F.G.'s side as the
internationally-recognized government of Somalia; but were allies of the
Jubbaland administration.
Kenya's position in the conjuncture of actors in Kismayo was weakened as a
result of the perception that its forces had been responsible for the
Jubbaland administration's victory. The S.F.G.'s resistance could gain favor
among external actors that had their own interests for opposing Kenya. The
T.C.C. communique reflected an alliance between the S.F.G. and Uganda, which
is the major contributor to AMISOM and the lead state in the mission. The
communique was the result of a struggle inside the T.C.C. between Uganda and
Kenya.
The S.F.G., which had requested the meeting of the T.C.C. that preceded the
communique, came to the meeting with a maximum program that called for the
removal of the K.D.F. contingent from Kismayo. Africa Review reported that,
at the August 4 meeting, Kenya "strongly objected" to the S.F.G.'s demand,
and that the S.F.G. withdrew it. The diplomatic trench warfare then
proceeded, with Uganda's president, Yoweri Museveni, who hosted the meeting
in Kampala, holding out for an agreement close to the S.F.G.'s demand, and
Kenya's president, Uhuru Kenyatta, pressing to maintain Kenya's presence in
Kismayo. The result was the call for a multinational force in Kismayo that
would back the S.F.G.'s control of Kismayo's seaport and airport. Kenya had
won a wording that allowed the possibility that the K.D.F. would form part
of the multinational force, but it had to concede Jubbaland's control of
infrastructure and its lead position in AMISOM in Kismayo. Strategically, if
the T.C.C. position is implemented, Kenya would have to surrender its
interest in having a buffer state (Jubbaland) on its border and a dominant
sphere of influence in Somalia's deep south. At best, Kenya had succeeded in
doing some damage control, leaving the Jubbland administration in the lurch.
Uganda's interests in supporting the S.F.G. are not perfectly clear. It had
an interest in having an undisputed lead role in AMISOM, maintaining
influence with the S.F.G. in Mogadishu and gaining economic advantages from
the S.F.G., and getting an edge in its competition with Kenya for influence
in East Africa. An additional consideration was provided by an August 8
analytical article in Uganda's Observer newspaper, which assessed expert
judgments on Uganda's position. The Observer's angle was that the core of
the communique was the "ceding" of the seaport and airport to the S.F.G.,
which could be construed as a cover for a Ugandan "drawdown" from AMISOM, or
as a redirection of AMISOM's forces towards a "surge" to take Somalia's
hinterland from the Salafist revolutionary Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen
(H.S.M.). The Observer cited evidence for both scenarios; the communique
asks for an increase in AMISOM forces, but there is a likelihood that the
European Union, which provides the biggest share of funding for AMISOM,
intends to "slush" the mission.
In the wake of the T.C.C. meeting, the S.F.G.'s president, Hassan Sh.
Mohamud, expressed his satisfaction at the results on his return to
Mogadishu on August 6, saying, according to Shabelle Media, that the S.F.G.
would now "control government assets." He assured all the "Jubbaland
communities" that they would "benefit equally" from S.F.G. authority.
Kenya, however, having been placed on its back foot, immediately began to
push back. On August 5, Xinhua reported that Kenya's foreign minister, Amina
Jibril Mohamed, had said that the S.F.G. "must concentrate on winning the
hearts of its people and gaining their confidence so that it does not face
opposition," a veiled reference to the Jubbaland administration and its
supporters.
That Kenya was unwilling to accept a strict interpretation of the Kampala
communique became clear on August 7. Reuters quoted Kenya's foreign affairs
principal secretary, Karanja Kibicho: "The government of Kenya is ready to
handover the two ports, but it must hand over to someone and that someone
must be a negotiated process. Otherwise, if (Kenya) just left, we would be
sliding back to where we came from." Kenya's Daily Nation newspaper reported
that Kibicho said that the airport and seaport should be negotiated between
the S.F.G. and the leaders of "federal member states" [including, presumably
Jubbaland] in line with the "Somali constitution." The deadlock was again
firmly in place and the Jubbaland administration had gotten some breathing
space.
The Jubbaland administration joined the Kenyan push back on August 6,
issuing a Statement on the TCC Summit in Kampala that scored the T.C.C. for
"completely overlooking local reality" and the "regional administrative
process" that had created Jubbaland. Countering S.F.G. claims to legal
sovereignty over the seaport and airport, the statement noted that
Jubbaland's control of the infrastructure follows in the line of
Somaliland's control of the Hargeisa airport and Berbera seaport, Puntland's
control of the Bossasso seaport, and the Galmudug administration's control
of Hobyo. Arguing that AMISOM had no legal authority to manage "former state
infrastructure," the statement said that the issue "should be addressed at a
national level through negotiations between regional states and the national
government." The statement concluded that the S.F.G.'s move to take the
seaport and airport with external support threatened "to sabotage" ongoing
(and so far stalled) negotiations between the S.F.G. and the Jubbaland
administration. On August 11, Shabelle Media quoted Jubbaland's president,
Ahmed Madobe: "The federal government is consulting the international
disputes with foreign countries, which clearly violates the federal
constitution." The deadlock was cemented, with each side in its respective
new position.
Short-Range Forecast
Whether the T.C.C. decision to support the S.F.G. in "establishing its
authority in the Jubba regions" presages an S.F.G. takeover of Kismayo's
airport and seaport, and, therefore, the crippling of the Jubbaland
administration; or it is yet another complication in the persisting deadlock
depends on whether AMISOM deploys a multinational force in Kismayo.
At present, there are several steps still to be taken if the multinational
force is to come into being. Firstly, AMISOM and the chiefs of Ethiopia's
and the S.F.G.'s defense forces have to work out the "modalities and
operationalization" of the force. The plan must then be approved by the
Western powers that bankroll AMISOM. Finally, the plan must be implemented
in the face of Kenya's and Jubbaland's opposition. Each of those steps is
fraught with difficulties.
What the composition of the force would be is unspecified. On August 6,
Uganda's New Vision newspaper reported that it would be an Ethiopian Defense
Forces, Somali National Army, and K.D.F. operation, which, if that were to
be the case, would place the conflict directly at the heart of its proposed
resolution. As for the Western "donor"-powers, a closed source reports that
Great Britain, which has taken the lead role among the "donor"-powers, is
pressing the S.F.G. to stop opposing the Jubbaland administration and to
concentrate instead on speeding a permanent constitution for Somalia,
revealing a divergence between the "donor"-powers and the T.C.C. (Uganda).
That neither Kenya nor the Jubbaland administration seems ready to concede
to Uganda and the S.F.G. makes it likely that the deadlock will persist. The
S.F.G. scored a diplomatic victory, but the costs of turning it into a
decisive change in the balance of power appear to be prohibitive. The S.F.G.
would need greater support by more external actors to make the T.C.C.
decision stick.
It should always be remembered that the conflict in Kismayo is likely to
decide what kind of political organization - centralized federalism (S.F.G.)
or decentralized federalism (Jubbaland) - Somalia will have, if any. The
parties to the conflict have lost sight of its importance and are engaged in
"rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic."
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University in Chicago weinstem_at_purdue.edu
Received on Sun Aug 18 2013 - 17:02:17 EDT