Analysis-Somalia: The Political Poisoning of the F.G.S. by Belgian Waffles
Sep 22, 2013 - 1:43:16 AM
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
"It's a bit like Belgian Waffles; sweet on the outside but really has not
much substance to it." So commented the revolutionary Salafist movement,
Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S.M.), in a September 16 tweet addressing
"The Somali Compact" between the Federal Government of Somalia (F.G.S.) and
the Western "donor"-powers that was instituted on the same day in Brussels.
What H.S.M. meant by its metaphor was that the promises of financial aid
made by the "donor"-powers to the F.G.S. were "hollow;" "the billions
promised will most likely be unpaid." If past performance is anything to go
by, H.S.M. is probably correct; but there is another Belgian Waffle in the
compact that has been largely overlooked - what the F.G.S. has been tasked
by the "donor"-powers to give them in return politically for their money,
the expenditure of which is contingent on the fulfillment of those political
tasks, to which the F.G.S. has been committed.
With actors, analysts, and commentators fixated on the money, there has been
a tendency to forget that Brussels initiated a compact, which has two sides.
It is necessary to examine the other Waffle in order to understand the sham
of Brussels and what its consequences are likely to be.
As tedious as it might be, the following analysis will put a microscope to
the F.G.S. Waffle's political promises.
PSG 1: Inclusive Politics
PSG means Peace and Statebuilding Goals. They are the "priorities" that the
F.G.S. is expected to fulfill. Priorities 2 and 3 - "Finalizing and Adopting
a Federal Constitution by December 2015" and "Prepare for and hold credible
elections by 2016" - are explicitly contingent on Priority 1 - "Advance
inclusive political dialogue to clarify and settle relations between the
federal government and existing and emerging administrations and initiate
processes of social reconciliation to restore trust between communities."
Attention will be given here to Priority 1, on which all political progress
is supposed to depend.
The following analysis will unpack Priority 1, using the four explanatory
paragraphs that follow it and comments on the situation on the ground in
order to determine its operative political meaning.
The aim of Priority 1 is to "settle relations between the federal government
and existing and emerging administrations," which is restated in the first
explanatory paragraph as "the emergence of a national political settlement."
Priority 1 is, first of all, a confession by the F.G.S. of its failure
during the first year of its four-year term to engineer a "national
political settlement." In 2012, the F.G.S. had plans to appoint interim
administrations in the regions of south-central Somalia that would prepare
for the establishment of federal states through a bottom-up process. That
plan has now been dashed to bits and with it the F.G.S.'s claim to
sovereignty in the eyes of the "donor"-powers.
Rather than managing a process of "statebuilding," as a sovereign government
would, the F.G.S. has now been given the charge, according to the second
explanatory paragraph, to "facilitate an inclusive political dialogue for
the establishment of regional administrations in all accessible areas, in
line with the Provisional Constitution" (the proper interpretation of which,
on that issue, is in dispute). The F.G.S. has been demoted from sovereign
to facilitator of a "national political settlement" that it failed to guide.
A year has passed, as years used to pass under the F.G.S.'s predecessor, the
Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), without political progress, and
the "donor"-powers realize that and have given up politically on the F.G.S.
and on the centralized federalist model that it represented. The parts
proved to be stronger than the whole and the "donor"-powers have accepted
that - and they have left the F.G.S. to "facilitate" what, if any,
alternative arrangement (decentralized federalism? separation? a mix of
both? a welter of confused authorities? - nobody knows) might come to be. It
is possible that the tipping point to the Balkanization of the territories
of post-independence Somalia has been reached with the demotion of the
F.G.S. by the "donor"-powers. They were responsible for the F.G.S.'s failure
by imposing the F.G.S. on the territories of post-independence Somalia
before a political settlement had been reached and, more fundamentally,
before social reconciliation had been achieved. It is the "donor"-powe
rs that actually have failed and they cover their failure and admit it
backhandedly by tasking the F.G.S. with "facilitating" a political
settlement and social reconciliation that were unmet prerequisites for the
success of the "permanent government" that they engineered.
But, can the F.G.S. even begin to facilitate a political settlement and
social reconciliation?
To begin with, to expect the F.G.S. to initiate a statebuilding process as a
"facilitator" when it was unable to do so when at least the pretension was
made by the "donor"-powers that it was a sovereign government beggars
belief. The F.G.S. always suffered from a severe power deficit; now it is
in the throes of a power failure.
How is the F.G.S. to initiate "an inclusive political dialogue" when
Somaliland has been granted a separate "compact" by the "donor"-powers
(Somaliland is now out of the national political settlement), Puntland has
suspended cooperation with the F.G.S., Ahmed Madobe's Juba administration is
in charge of Kismayo, the Digil and Mirifle elders in the Bay and Bakool
regions have broken with the F.G.S., the A.S.W.J. in Galgadud has suspended
its alliance with the F.G.S., competing claims between Galmudug, A.S.W.J.,
and Himan and Heeb have not been resolved, and the Khatumo administration
dissents from the compact? The question answers itself. The F.G.S. does not
have sufficient power to function as a "facilitator."
The fragmented and contentious situation on the ground, which, to repeat, is
the result of the absence of prior reconciliation, is compounded by the
desire of the "donor"-powers for a national political settlement, the
prospect of which has set off a scramble among all the unreconciled factions
to press their particular claims in order to gain whatever advantages they
can in case there is such a settlement: the demand for a "national political
settlement" undermines social reconciliation by bringing grievances forward
and opening up old wounds.
The disconnect between the halls of diplomacy and the streets has never been
greater. The distance between the diagram and the reality has never been so
vast. Do the "donor"-powers do anything next? At least they will have ample
opportunity and cover to withhold their money, because it is difficult to
see how the F.G.S. will discharge its duties.
Annex 1 to the compact, which refers to PSG 1 is a "Results Matrix of Somali
Peace and Statebuilding Goals" made up of "Milestones," "Delivery Dates" for
them, "Responsibilities" of the F.G.S. in reaching them, and "Support" of
"development partners." In brief, it is another "roadmap," like the one used
in the "transition" from the T.F.G. to the F.G.S., needed because the first
roadmap had too many short cuts that have led to dead ends. Call it what you
will, the "donor"-powers are starting all over again, only this time it is
unlikely that they will exert as much pressure as they did to get the F.G.S.
started (since they have given up on the F.G.S. politically and have no new
"sovereign" in mind to replace it).
There are five "Milestones." The first calls for the establishment of a
"National reconciliation commission" and the development of "reconciliation
programmes" in 2014. The cells for listing the responsibilities of the
government and the support of donors have been left blank. The second
Milestone calls for "Inclusive consultations on the establishment of
administrations conducted in at least 10 regions and administrations
established" in 2014. Again the other cells are blank. The third calls for
"Inter-regional dialogue on the formation of federal states" to be initiated
in 2014, with the responsibility and support cells again blank. The fourth
Milestone calls for an "Annual conference on political dialogue with the
executive head [sic.] of states of existing and emerging administrations" to
be convened by the F.G.S. in 2014 (responsibility and support cells blank).
Finally the fifth Milestone (responsibility and support cells blank) sets
the final goal of a "Decision on the federal model" to be reached in 2015.
It is here, in Annex 1, that the Belgian-Waffle metaphor takes on its full
resonance. The political Waffle is indeed "sweet on the outside" - it
promises a resolution of the most fundamental political issue concerning the
territories of post-independence Somalia, the determination of the form of a
future Somali state. Yet the promise is hollow, given the conditions on the
ground sketched above. In addition, the Waffle is half-baked, since it does
not specify F.G.S. responsibilities and donor support. And, most
importantly, it appears that it will end up undercooked, because it is due
to be ready for its federalist topping in a year from now - another rush
job courtesy of the master chefs, the "donor"-powers. One awaits the "annual
conference on political dialogue." Who will come? Will all factions
disputing the same territory be invited? And will the "national
reconciliation commission" have reconciled those who do come if, indeed, the
conference is ever held?
Synopsis
In summary, the "donor"-powers have set up a new roadmap for another
"transition," with new "milestones" in their familiar pattern of rushing
political solutions before social reconciliation has been achieved,
guaranteeing failure. And this time, they have compounded the damage by
making the weakened (in part, by them) F.G.S. the "facilitator" of a
"national political settlement," the prospect of which has exacerbated
conflicts on the ground even more than they were before.
The question of state-form is once again totally up for grabs, but this time
the interests in favor of centralized federalism are on the back foot.
Although decentralized federalism is a viable option, the possibility of
Balkanization has become real if confederalism is not precisely balanced. A
two-state solution appears to have been adopted, with Somaliland having been
granted quasi-recognition, making a league of states a possibility if
Puntland splits with south-central Somalia and follows Somaliland on the
independence track. Civil war also is possible, as is a resurgence of H.S.M.
Hyper -fragmentation is unchecked. The political Waffle has been drowned in
a poisonous stew of contention.
Why do the "donor"-powers continue to repeat what appears to be their
pattern of behavior that is destructive to the Somali people and seemingly
self-defeating for them? For H.S.M., it is an anti-Muslim strategy of
infidels. The present writer finds no evidence to support that explanation.
Rather, it seems to him that Somalia is simply a low priority for the
"donor"-powers, but not a low enough priority to be left alone. As a result,
they keep producing half-baked half measures in an endless succession.
The Somali people need to find a better diet than toxic Belgian Waffles.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University in Chicago weinstem_at_purdue.edu