Misreading the War Against Al-Shabaab
- By Abdihakim Ainte
Posted on
<
http://africanarguments.org/2013/09/27/misreading-the-war-against-al-shabaa
b-by-abdihakim-ainte/> September 27, 2013
The news from Nairobi over the last few days has been appalling. But, given
the frequency of Al Shabaab's grenade-throwing over the past 18 months, the
attack shouldn't have come as much of a surprise to watchers of the region.
Yet, despite the magnitude of the death toll, the Kenyan government has
shown a remarkable sangfroid, both in managing the crisis and taming the
potential for ethnic flare-ups.
While investigations are still in progress, analysts and experts have
choreographed the attack into different interpretations, but it seems to me
the focus has been misplaced.
The Kenyan invasion of the southern Somali city of Kismayo only broke the
back of the Al-Shabaab and, more importantly, created an opportunity for the
group to reorganize and rebrand its operational tactics. Just a few days
before the attack, I wrote a piece in which I argued that Al-Shabaab is now
far more lethal than it has ever been before.
To showcase its strength, over the last six months, Al-Shabaab has carried
out multiple attacks; half of them targeted at heavily guarded government
institutions in Somalia - the UN complex, airports and embassies.
As the blame game starts, it should be understood that the biggest failure
of the Kenyan government wasn't whether its security fraternity or Intel
agencies were prepared for the attack. They were. However, the overwhelming
majority of terrorist experts agreed before the siege began that, at some
point, a terrorist attack was more or less inescapable.
The first misreading lay in the thinking that toppling Al-Shabaab from
Kismayo and subsequently declaring victory would wipe it from the terrorist
map. On the contrary, it opened a Pandora's Box in which Al-Shabaab
retreated back into society and re-established itself as a guerrilla force
able to strike back.
The attack at Westgate is, if anything, an indication of their new
asymmetric tactics - the hallmark of Al-Shabaab 2.0. Booting Al-Shabaab out
of Kismayo was a just and rational act, but the idea that it is now on the
back foot is misplaced. Also, the notion that insurgency can be defeated by
force displays a fundamental misreading of the enemy's strength.
The second misreading is Kenya's preoccupation with Kismayo. When Ethiopian
troops broke the power of the Islamist Courts Union in 2007, they cautiously
avoided any preoccupation with any one region, and expanded their operations
across Mogadishu. Kenyan troops seem to have underestimated the adaptability
and vitality of the organization's threat. Al-Shabaab, like Al-Qaeda, is now
a diffuse organization that has clandestine cells and sympathizers across
the region. It still controls large swathes of provinces in much of the
south and central part of the country. Despite its recent structural crisis,
and loss of key strongholds, it is now morphed into monolithic organization
that has a coherent ideology and determination to apply itself to a global
jihadist ideology.
Although Kismayo was Shabaab's largest revenue-making source, it was not,
however, the greatest income generating means available to them. Conversely,
the largesse of its budget comes from its core donor sympathizers and a few
charitable individuals who believe in their cause.
Short on specifics, operation Linda Nchi has fed the perception that Kenya
is pursuing a buffer zone through proxies, allowing Al-Shabaab a rallying
cause by painting the KDF as intruders from afar. In addition, relations
between Nairobi and Mogadishu over the KDF's role in Kismayo have been
hostile, preventing a joint and genuine cooperation against al-Shabaab.
While Nairobi and Mogadishu have generally showed a common interest in the
war against Al-Shabaab, they have not come to a clear term of reference on
how to combat terrorism.
Worse yet, Somali legislators tabled a motion demanding Kenyan troops pull
out from Kismayo, fueling already rancorous relations. Furthermore, the
operation of Kenyan maritime assets is a source of great concern for the
Somali government, which has publicly called for international stakeholders
to support its own navy.
As of now, relations between Kenya and Somalia can best be summarized as
that of 'frenemies'.
Al-Shabaab uses the stalemate as an organizing factor for its audiences,
arguing that the two governments are squabbling amongst themselves at the
expense of you - the people. Needless to say, Al-Shabaab is widely despised
in Somalia but, after all, it was born out of foreign troops stumbling into
the country, which helped them to reinforce their narrative of 'foreign
imperialism'.
There is a clear connection between Kenya's post-Kismayo interventions, the
Westgate attack, and the political standoff between Kenya and Somalia.
That said, both countries have historical relations that date way back and
share key concerns. To avert future attacks, both need to understand that
Al-Shabaab's threat cannot be managed without their mutual cooperation. And
the international community at large needs to encourage and support a
collaborative discourse between Nairobi and Mogadishu.
Abdihakim Ainte is political analyst and he tweets at _at_Abdikhakim
Received on Sat Sep 28 2013 - 13:50:05 EDT