The issue of Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam also brings up Egypt’s historic
relations with Sudan, which Khartoum turned its back on in December last
year, largely for selfish reasons, writes Maghawry Shehata
Sunday,06 April, 2014
Historically, Sudan and Egypt together formed the Nile Valley region, as
defined by the Nile tributaries from Ethiopia and the equatorial plateau
that converge to form the Blue Nile and White Nile respectively, and the
convergence of these two major arteries at Khartoum to form the Nile that
wends its way northward into Egypt. This crucial riparian connection has
given rise to an array of factors that combine to make Sudan one of the most
important countries to Egypt in the world. In addition to their geographical
contiguity in the Nile Valley, they share common bonds of history, religion,
language and kinship. Geopolitically, Sudan is Egypt’s gateway into Africa.
However, perhaps their most salient point in common is that they are the two
Nile estuary countries. Cooperation between them would strengthen their
position among the countries of the Nile Basin. Combined, they occupy the
largest segment of the Nile system, while both are heavily dependent on Nile
waters — Egypt primarily so and Sudan to a great extent.
Historically, a concept of unity has prevailed in the Egyptian political
consciousness of its relationship with Sudan. The ÒUnity of the Nile ValleyÓ
had existed as a nationalist calling and administrative reality until the
July 1952 Revolution. In February 1953, Cairo and Sudan signed the Sudanese
autonomous rule agreement and this was shortly followed by the
Anglo-Egyptian evacuation agreement of 1954. Nevertheless, the history of
Egypt-Sudanese political relations has been punctuated by numerous crises
that ricocheted through other dimensions of their relations, with
detrimental effects on bilateral cooperation, especially in the domain of
water resource management and hydraulic projects.
Even before the transition to Sudanese self-rule and independence, media
campaigns and various third party interventions worked to sour relations
between the Egyptian and Sudanese peoples. As a result, Sudanese society
grew sharply divided over the question of its country’s special relationship
with Egypt. While some quarters continued to support this relationship,
others opposed what they called the Egyptian mandate over Sudan.
The Sudanese civil war in the south, which rocked political stability in the
country following independence, also lured foreign intervention into
Sudanese affairs. Often, one of the aims of the foreign powers was to
further disconnect Sudan from Egypt. Although Egypt tried to remain neutral
on the civil war in Sudan, this did not spare Egypt adverse reactions from
the warring sides. The southern secessionist movement (the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement — SPLM) set itself against the Jonglei Canal project,
which therefore had to be suspended in spite of the benefits it promised to
both Sudan and Egypt. The northern Islamist front constantly accused Egypt
of helping the South.
The Machakos Protocol of July 2002 heralded further troubles for relations
between Cairo and Khartoum. The agreement was the first in a series that
would lead to the creation of a new state — South Sudan — which would
naturally have its own water needs, water rights demands and visions for
hydraulic projects of its own. This necessarily complicated Egypt’s
relationship with the North.
But Egyptian-Sudanese relations had been strained before this for other
reasons. Prime among them was contention over the area known as the Halayeb
Triangle. When, in 1992, Khartoum took measures to alter the status quo in
the area defined by Halayeb, Shalatin and Abu Ramad, Egypt responded with
measures that eventually led to the annexation of that region to Egyptian
administration. Tensions over that issue reverberated through the economic
and commercial relations between the countries. With regards to water
resources, in December 1992 Khartoum froze its cooperation in the Nile
Waters Technical Organisation. It then threatened to ignore the 1959 Nile
Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan. Khartoum accused Egypt of
confiscating a portion of Sudan’s quota (it cited five billion cubic
metres), closed the Rosaris Dam on the Blue Nile and began construction of
the Kenana and Rahaq canals without coordinating with Egypt over these
projects, in violation of the provisions of the 1959 agreement. Sudan has
other hydraulic projects that could jeopardise Egypt’s water security,
especially in view of fluctuating relations between the two countries and
volatile political relations inside Sudan itself.
In spite of such problems, water relations between the two countries have
remained uninterrupted. Bilateral communications between Cairo and
Khartoum’s water authorities have continued and it is likely that
Egyptian-Sudanese relations will improve. After all, Egyptian-Sudanese
solidarity is strategically beneficial to both sides. They are already
bound, in their capacity as the two Nile estuary nations, by a number of
bilateral water agreements that they continue to recognise, even if other
Nile Basin countries refuse to do so. These agreements are:
- The 1913 agreement: In 1913, Britain (on behalf of the government of
Sudan) notified Egypt of its plans to construct a dam as part of a plan to
irrigate a portion of Sudanese land called Al-Gazira. The two sides agreed
to study means to control the Nile in ways that would benefit both Egypt and
Sudan. The studies gave rise to proposals for the construction of the Sennar
Dam and Gazira irrigation project, the Jabal Al-Awliya Dam to create an
emergency water reservoir for Egypt, and other reservoir projects in the
Great Lakes area. Egypt initially objected on the grounds of the possible
harm that such projects might cause it. Therefore, a committee of experts
was formed to study the matter. Headed by an Indian expert, the committee
found that Egypt’s annual water need amounted to 60 billion cubic metres.
Accordingly, Britain pledged not to expand the area of reclaimed land in the
Gazira project beyond 300,000 hectares without first notifying the Egyptian
government. Following the agreement, the Sennar and the Jabal Al-Awliya dams
were indeed constructed.
- The 1929 agreement between Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan: Following the
assassination in Cairo of the British governor-general of Sudan, Sir Lee
Stack, Britain notified Egypt that it would increase the scope of the Gazira
irrigation scheme to the degree it saw fit. Faced with Egypt’s adamant
objections, however, it agreed to form a commission of experts and through
an exchange of letters in May 1925, Britain (on behalf of Sudan, Uganda,
Kenya and Tanzania) acknowledged Egypt’s rights to Nile waters and pledged
to safeguard these rights and not to undertake any irrigation or electricity
generating projects on the Nile or its subsidiaries, the Great Lakes region,
or in any areas under British control that would prejudice Egyptian rights.
Egypt was also granted the right to monitor the Nile flow in upper riparian
countries and would be given the facilities to conduct the necessary studies
on the Nile in Sudan.
- The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement: After winning its independence in 1956,
Sudan objected to the 1929 agreement on the grounds of its political nature.
Cairo and Khartoum entered into negotiations that resulted in the agreement
between Sudan and Egypt for full control utilisation of the Nile waters.
Signed in 1959, that agreement sought to regulate the use of Nile waters to
ensure its optimal utilisation in accordance with the provisions of
international law.
The provisions of the agreement, if faithfully applied, would benefit both
Egypt and Sudan and unify their positions with respect to the other Nile
Basin countries on the basis of their realisation that they are both estuary
countries endowed with natural and acquired rights. According to the
agreement, both nations have the right to undertake water-regulating
projects within the limits of their established quotas. The costs and
benefits of projects that would enhance the Nile flow by preventing
evaporation losses in the marshes of the White Nile in southern Sudan would
be shared equally between the two countries. The two countries also agreed
that Sudan would have the right to build the Rosaris Dam on the Blue Nile
and that they would share the benefits of the waters that would be retained
as the result of the construction of the High Dam at Aswan.
They determined that the average annual Nile flow was about 84 billion cubic
metres, measured at Aswan, and that of this Egypt and Sudan would have a
quota of 55.5 billion cubic metres and 18.5 billion cubic metres
respectively, after Sudan obtained 14.5 billion cubic metres of what the
High Dam furnished and Egypt obtained 7.5 billion cubic metres of the waters
of the High Dam lake. The two sides further agreed to share equally any
increase in flow due to higher than average flooding of the Nile. In
addition, Egypt agreed to pay Sudan LE15 million in compensation for damage
caused by the reservoir created by the construction of the High Dam and it
relinquished its right to waters in the reservoir of the Jabal Al-Awliya
Dam, title to which it handed to Khartoum.
The 1959 agreement also established the principle of cooperation in — and
sharing the costs and benefits of — the utilisation of lost waters in the
Nile Basin. Accordingly, the two countries created a framework for
cooperation in water loss reduction projects in the Sudanese regions of Bahr
Al-Jabal, Bahr Al-Zaraf and Bahr Al-Ghazal and in the Subat River and White
Nile basin.
In spite of the foregoing, Khartoum undertook a major shift in its position
on Ethiopian hydraulic works such as the Renaissance Dam and other major
dams on the Blue Nile. In December 2013, the Sudanese president declared his
support for the construction of the Renaissance Dam, which, he said, would
benefit Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. The shift was closely connected to a
range of domestic political issues and problems in Sudan in which Addis
Ababa is closely involved, most notably Sudan’s dispute with South Sudan
over the oil-rich Abyei region. But Sudan also stands to benefit directly
from the Renaissance Dam project. It will furnish a permanent supply of
irrigation water for territories that Sudan has earmarked for major
development projects. With the secession of South Sudan, Sudan lost the
water diversion projects in the Bahr Ghazal area and the Jonglei Canal
project ground to a halt. It is therefore searching for alternative and
perpetual water sources and believes that the Renaissance Dam is the key. In
siding with Ethiopia, Sudan has overlooked the advantages of its strategic
alliance with Egypt, especially in the face of schemes to partition it
further. It has also chosen to ignore the potential dangers of the
Renaissance Dam from erosion and other environmental problems to massive
flooding should part or all of the dam collapse.
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The writer is former president of Menoufiya University and an expert in
water issues.