After enemy's second offensive the EPLF (Eritrean People Liberation Front),
was on the waiting to conduct strong resistance against the third offensive
by constructing trenches in the eastern plains at Mamide and Azhara, and
also at Genfelom in Keren-Afabet route. As expected, the third offensive
was launched through these two directions. Bearing in mind that the
defensive place of Genfelom Front has been stretched too much, some units
of the EPLF withdrew from that area to Gogay just before the launch of the
offensive and took positions in an area that starched from mount Agombosa
to the hilly areas of Agamet. This way the enemy's infiltration attempt of
the 1979 was blocked. Nevertheless, on January 25 of the same year the
enemy had attempted to divert the EPLF's attention through mobilizing its
strongest army division 505 from Massawa to Marsa Teklay and its mechanized
units to Mahmimet- North Eastern Sahel in a way that seems to launch an
attack on Mamide Front.
Since the EPLF's leadership had already expected the possibility of enemy's
coming through the Red Sea, it assigned two battalions around Mahmimet and
Marsa Teklay areas so as to prepare themselves for any eventuality.
However, as the enemy forces advanced towards North-Eastern Sahel, a large
portion of EPLF units withdrew from Mamide to Goreyto and Wedgan leaving
two battalions behind in Aget. Consequently, haven areas around Debat,
Ziero,Seberkete, Blekat, Fah, Mahmimet that harbored people as well as
essential goods and equipment of the EPLF had fallen under a threat of
Enemy's attack. The EPLF had therefore to take a swift action to transport
people and goods before it is too late. Taking the advantage of a very
limited number of EPLF combatants who were in Mahmimet and Marsa Teklay,
the enemy marched to Goreyto and Wedgan. So, the EPLF had to launch an
attack to prevent the areas from being attacked by the enemy. Thus, in the
first week of February 1979 the EPLF forces pushed the enemy to the plains
and paved a way for save transportation of people and goods to
Geregir-Asmara, Kebreweat, Halibet, and Agrag. Following the successful
transportation of people and goods to safer sites, the EPLF took positions
which stretched for about 40 kilometers from Wedganto Taba Selam, and
through Desnett, Hatseynet and Debre-Emen and thereby to Tigih and that
ends in Alalieb. Hence, North-Eastern Sahel Front was formed in these areas.
Documents of the EPLF indicate that with the ongoing war and successive
offensives of the enemy the Noth-Eastern Sahel Front was by far stretched
and interconnected with trenches of Nakfa to cover a total area of 667
kilometers.
In connection to the developments in the North-Estern Sahel Front, the EPLF
withdrew from the Keren-Afabet route to Qokay and leaving Afabet city
behind moved to Hiday River and fortified a position in the mountains of
Haras Harmaz. After making the enemy face heavy loses, the EPLF finally
withdrew to Mount Denden situated at the very gates of Nakfa and took its
final defense line along the chain of terrains thereof. The enemy forces
started to disturb Nakfa-the only un-captured city-with areal bombardments
and heavy artillery.
But the EPLF was not at ease to strengthen the last stronghold chosen to be
in Nakfa terrains due to ceaseless bombardments.Thus, the EPLF found it
necessary to launch a strong counter attack on 13 February 1979 against the
enemy forces who were marching in a hurry desperate to recapture Nakfa
Through this attack the EPLF out routed the enemy forces and ultimately
pushed them down to Hiday River. As the enemy suffered huge losses and the
EPLF found the opportunity to establish its defense fortification so that
enemy would never attempt to recapture Nakfa.
The EPLF was constantly confronting the enemy in places and times of
convenience in the war engagements that continued for about nine years
while simultaneously solidifying its position. It has been also engaged in
conducting surprise attacks against the enemy in different places in a bid
to weaken it so that it would never be strong to conduct huge offensives.
While establishing a permanent position at the Nakfa front it also moved
some brigades to the North-Eastern Sahel Front. The aim of establishing
this front had been to weaken the enemy forces through ambushes and
eventually route them out from the strategic areas of the coastline and
deny supply lines.
Likewise the enemy forces were making rearrangements in their tactics and
were constantly moving here and there in order to gain aground of
conducting an offense. The 505 military division (Gbri-hayl) of the enemy
had been station at the North-Eastern Sahel Front. This army unit of the
enemy had two infantry and two mechanized brigades that were heavily
armed.There were also other backup forces along with this hugely armed unit.
Even though the 505 military division which founded the North-Eastern Sahel
Front on the enemy's part was heavily weakened and all its members were
frustrated due to subsequent loses in three offensives, the Derg regime
decided to continue the war as it set out to destroy Eritrean revolution
once and forever no matter what it takes through engaging the EPLF forces
in ceaseless battles. Thus, after a one and half month preparation and
reorganization, the enemy launched the fourth offensive in April 1979.
The war tactic in which the enemy employed in the 4th offensive had been to
make use of all available weaponry and deploy a number of soldiers as much
as possible so as to penetrate the EPLF's stronghold. The mountainous areas
and terrains were not, however, favorable for the enemy and therefore the
enemy had not been in the position to launch an attack on the two wings of
the front. All attempts of penetration faced EPLF's strong resistance.
Through such a heavy battle the EPLF totally discarded the enemy from
Debreemen and Ela-Tsada. Another counter attack by the EPLF cleared the
enemy from Korora-Shigelet route. The enemy experienced heavy lose in the
4th offensive and had been slammed hard unable to continue its advance.
Likewise the enemy launched a heavy attack that was accompanied by
ceaseless areal bombardments to penetrate EPLF's frontline particularly at
the right wing of Nakfa Front.
Before launching the 5th offensive the enemy was in a three months of
preparation and recovery period. As most of its army had been irrecoverably
beaten from the first through the 4th offensives, it mobilized an
additional of 20,000 infantry and other supporting units and this also
ended with the defeat of the enemy.
The 5th offensive begun on 13 July 1979 in Medne-Hjak which had been newly
established front and it continued until 26th of July. None of the attacks
launched in the two frontlines had been in favor of the enemy. Attempts
made to win through the third front had been all in vain. As the EPLF
expected the enemy would come in other directions some units were deployed
to conduct ambushes in a bid to block enemy forces. Hence, the EPLF's
brigade 44 took a position in the mountainous terrains of Agra'e and has
been engaged in fierce battle for four days. Meanwhile, another unit set
out for a pre-planned attack on enemy's command line. In this surprise
attack, commander of the front Colonel Kassa Ghebremariam and other army
commanders were killed and thus the enemy was in commotion and with no
leadership.
Parallel to the attack carried out on the command post, a counter attack
had been also taken in the main front-line and the enemy was scattered
everywhere. Like its predecessors the 5th offensive which continued for 11
days was also concluded with EPLF's victory burdening the enemy with
causality of nearly 13,000 of its troops.
Written by shabait Administrator
Received on Mon Apr 07 2014 - 12:00:12 EDT