Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2014 22:30:05 +0200
How to stabilise Yemen
In today's fractured Yemen, the solution is not with Hellfire missiles, it
is with fixing the economy.
Last updated: 15 Apr 2014 11:02
Watch two Videos at this site-
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/how-stabilise-yemen-2014471
01723593175.html
Alastair Sloan
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/profile/alastair-sloan.html>
Alastair Sloan
Alastair Sloan is a London-based journalist. He focuses on injustice and
human rights in the UK, and international affairs including human rights,
the arms trade, censorship, political unrest and dictatorships.
Recent developments in Yemen demonstrate that al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) is restive, capable and emboldened, but the militaristic
approach of the United States is only worsening the situation.
<http://www.reprieve.org.uk/articles/drones_yemen_facts/> According to the
UK charity <http://www.reprieve.org.uk/articles/drones_yemen_facts/>
Reprieve, which has campaigned against the use of drone strikes, 10
provinces (roughly half the country) live under the hum of "unarmed aerial
vehicles". The technology might look impressive to the top brass when it's
being flown around an airfield in Virginia, but once deployed, these weapons
create more problems than they solve.
One of the under-appreciated reasons to stop the drone strikes is the impact
they have on Yemen's fragile transition process. The attacks have been
<http://islamicpostonline.com/article/yemeni_conference_declares_drone_strik
es_illegal-596> technically illegal in Yemen since 2013, but their
continued deployment by the CIA, leaning heavily on intelligence from the
Yemeni security services, dangerously delegitimises a beleaguered Sanaa
government. The Houthi rebels in the north, the secessionist south and
numerous tribal interests already deeply mistrust the elites in the capital.
To be sure, cronyism and corruption are their principal gripes - but
collaborating with foreign powers, particularly on such a tendentious issue,
puts
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/03/yemen-president-appoints-n
ew-officials-201437191754302313.html> President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi in an
extremely awkward position.
Drone strikes are also the military equivalent of jabbing a large stick into
a hornet's nest - hornets which are relatively well-armed, well-funded and
dangerously indoctrinated. In one infamous botched attack,
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/01/yemenis-seek-justice-wedd
ing-drone-strike-201418135352298935.html> 12 wedding guests lost their lives
under fire from US missiles. A mid-level al-Qaeda leader, who was the
intended
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/how-stabilise-yemen-201447
101723593175.html>
targethttp://savingsslider-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png,
escaped on foot. Similar tragedies have claimed the lives of up to 70 others
since the CIA programme began, according to the Bureau for Investigative
Journalism. The Pentagon nicknamed these unfortunate incidents "bugsplats",
and has yet to make apologies. The official position is that drone strikes
are a secret programme - and as such
<http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/02/11/cias-drones-barely-secret-receive-
rare-public-nod/> will rarely be discussed publicly.
Hornet's nest and bugsplats
In both Yemen and the US this position needs to be questioned vigorously.
The drone strikes are no longer a secret. Simply moving the programme from
the CIA to the Department of Defense would make the operation acceptably
transparent. And officials in Sanaa should be questioning whether
involvement in the assassinations will help or hinder a delicate reform
process.
With no remorse from the US for innocent lives lost, the government in Sanaa
typically steps in with compensation. It has also announced investigations
into the most severe civilian bombings. But persuasive
<http://www.businessinsider.com/obamas-covert-drone-war-in-yemen-prompting-m
ore-terror-2012-5> AQAP recruiters are also appearing around the smoking
craters too. For those who have lost family members, recruiters offer far
larger compensation packages, as well as the opportunity to become fighters,
and avenge their families' deaths. This is the most compelling reason to
stop the CIA from taking out al-Qaeda targets in this fashion. They provide
a short-term fix, but long-term they radicalise more Yemenis.
Instead, the US and regional partners should properly address economic
issues and help build civil institutions that strengthen the rule of law.
Yemen has the youngest population in the world, with an
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/04/02/world-bank-grant-
supports-employment-creation-yemens-neediest-youth-women> unemployment rate
as high as 40 percent. A quarter of the Yemeni economy
<http://www.indexmundi.com/yemen/economy_profile.html> rests on oil - which
will <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7739402.stm> probably run out by 2017, and
much-needed rebalancing plans have been overshadowed by unrest.
Half the population still lives below the poverty line. The International
Monetary Fund has effectively
<http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/banking-and-finance/2013/05/29/IMF
-hopes-to-agree-loan-for-Yemen-mobilize-donor-aid.html> offered a
medium-term financing deal to Sanaa; the issue is that no economic body yet
exists to receive and manage the loan. Helping to set up this body would
play to key capabilities within either the US or the UN, and should be done
as a matter of priority. The US could also lean more heavily on local
partners - Saudi Arabia has done a good job of
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/85c1ba8c-a4df-11e1-9908-00144feabdc0.html?siteedi
tion=uk> marshalling aid and recently stepped in with $3bn.
<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-east/9804-federalism-and-
yemens-great-game> The planned federalisation of Yemen, agreed in December
and ratified in February, is undoubtedly a major development. It might be
that localised governments are seen as more legitimate, reducing unrest. Or
the move may encourage southern secessionists, or Houthis in the north, to
break away completely.
Either way, federalisation should be seen as an opportunity for the US to
stitch up some of the wounds laid bare in the last 20 years. Concerns have
already been raised over the lack of detail in the plan - especially with
regard to how civil institutions will be set up in each state to manage the
local government. In fact, Washington is well positioned to assist Sanaa
with filling in the details of their federalisation scheme.
Yemen isn't a failed state yet, but it's come close too many times to
mention. What can be ascertained with some confidence is that the new
government is weak. President Hadi must contend with powerful elite
interests, an economy that barely meets the needs of the people, let alone
the government, and even ex-President Ali Abdullah Saleh,
<http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/14808> who still maintains influence over
some parts of the military. The latter are stretched between an al-Houthi
insurgency in the north and policing unrest in the south. Al-Qaeda is
constantly antagonistic and their activity further threatens the peace
process.
Just last week, AQAP
<http://nationalyemen.com/2014/04/06/aqap-announces-formation-of-new-armed-g
roup/> announced the formation of a new armed unit - specifically tasked
with attacking Houthi rebels, whose leaders already suspect that Sanaa
politicians have stronger links with al-Qaeda than they are admitting. These
suspicions will only worsen when AQAP attacks on the Houthis begin.
Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia bear out a poignant hypothesis for the 21st
century: Where there is chaos, there is blood. In today's fractured Yemen, a
terrorist group could not choose a better place to call its home. But the
answer to removing them is not with Hellfire missiles, it is with fixing
Yemen.
Alastair Sloan is a London-based journalist. He focuses on injustice and
human rights in the UK, and international affairs including human rights,
the arms trade, censorship, political unrest and dictatorships.
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