Date: Thu, 17 Apr 2014 23:19:23 +0200
Nairobi's solution to terrorism: blame the Somalis
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/flavie-halais> Flavie Halais 17 April
2014
Last week's crackdown on Somali refugees reads like a show of force by a
government that desperately wants to hide the cracks in its
counter-terrorism efforts.
Perhaps due to the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan
genocide last week, the Nairobi police's substantial crackdown on Muslims
and illegal immigrants failed to hit international headlines. Over 4,000
people were arrested in just a few days, in response to yet another grenade
attack killing six in the infamous Eastleigh neighbourhood on March 30th.
Although most were released shortly, an unknown number of detainees who have
failed to present proper ID
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FrF065v_eRs&feature=youtu.be> remain held
at the nearby Kasarani stadium in substandard conditions, and police sweeps
have since expanded to other neighbourhoods. Human rights and humanitarian
organizations were initially denied the right to visit the stadium, despite
children being among the arrested; they were finally allowed in at the end
of the week. At least one woman gave birth while in detention.
Eastleigh, a largely Muslim neighbourhood near downtown Nairobi, nicknamed
"Little Mogadishu" for its large population of ethnic Somalis, is a frequent
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/flavie-halais/nairobis-solution-t
o-terrorism-blame-somalis>
theatrehttp://cdncache1-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png for both
terror attacks - the previous one, a bomb blast in a local bus, claimed four
lives last December - and
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3HVZ8ZcgxiU&feature=youtu.be> police
harassment. Arbitrary arrests and physical abuse are known to routinely
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/flavie-halais/nairobis-solution-t
o-terrorism-blame-somalis>
targethttp://cdncache1-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png Somalis,
many of which are refugees who escaped the squalid, overcrowded camps of
Dadaab and Kakuma in the country's north (Kenya hosts 610,000 documented and
500,000 undocumented refugees from Somalia).
The current crackdown is no exception to this routine abuse. Although
Kenyans from other ethnicities and other foreign nationals have been
arrested, ethnic Somalis are clearly the main targets. To be sure, the
arrests come as Kenya's Interior Minister Joseph Ole Leku's announced that
all Somali refugees living in Kenya's urban areas should head back to the
camps, citing "emergency security challenges" after the March 30th blast and
another attack that killed six near the coastal town of Mombasa on march
23rd.
For the refugees, this is simply history on repeat. In late 2012, a bomb
blast in Eastleigh had already led Kenya's government to order them back to
the camps, a decision that was later quashed by the country's High Court.
During the following 10 weeks,
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/29/kenya-police-abuse-nairobi-s-refugees>
at least 1000 refugees were arbitrarily detained and some raped, beaten or
tortured. "The current crackdown is not only in breach of the High Court
judgement, but has also been implemented unlawfully," reads a
<http://amnesty.org/en/news/kenya-somalis-placed-catch-22-amid-crackdown-ref
ugees-2014-04-11> release from Amnesty International from April 11th.
The recent wave of arrests demonstrates the intensification of the
repression since Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabab claimed
responsibility for last September's attack on the Westgate shopping mall,
which killed at least 67. The attack gave Kenya's government the validation
sought to hold Somali terrorists responsible for the sad state of Kenya's
interior security, while allowing president Uhuru Kenyatta to conveniently
divert public attention away from his trial in front of the International
Criminal Court and from a yet-to-be-formed commission of inquiry into the
Westgate debacle that would likely put part of the blame on Kenya's military
and its intelligence services.
In recent months, Kenya's government has readily associated Somali refugees
with terrorists, claiming some of them have ties to al-Shabab or its local
affiliate al-Hijra. This connection was once again invoked last autumn as
the government announced a three-year plan to repatriate refugees to
Somalia. Although the return of refugees is supposed to be voluntary and
focusing on Somalia's most stable areas, a
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/kenya-somali-refugees-unlawfully-forced-out-
country-2014-02-19> recent investigation led by Amnesty International
revealed that a large portion of returnees
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/flavie-halais/nairobis-solution-t
o-terrorism-blame-somalis#_msocom_1> [F1] felt compelled to leave because
of intimidation and worsening conditions in the camps (last November, the
World Food Programmme was notably forced to reduce its food rations in
Dadaab and Kakuma by half due to a shortage of funds).
The Kenyan government has never concealed its wish that all refugees
eventually return home. "All the camps should be closed and the debate on
whether or not it is appropriate has been passed by time," said interior
minister Joseph Lenku last November, in direct opposition with conditions of
the tripartite agreement signed with the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and Somalia's government. Meanwhile, Kenyan authorities
have mostly ceased to register new refugees coming into the country, thereby
forcing them to remain in a legal void and face arrest and deportation.
Already, 82 of those arrested last week have been flown back to Mogadishu,
with more deportations to be expected.
Connections between al-Shabab and Somali refugees have yet to be proven. The
biggest threats to national security, security experts say, are instead to
be found in the porous border between Kenya and Somalia, failed
counterterrorism and intelligence efforts, corruption of immigration
officials, and the radicalization of some of the local Muslim youth. This
latest point seems largely ignored by Kenyan authorities, who consistently
undermine the effects that poverty, lack of education, and unemployment have
had on local youth, regardless of their ethnic background. For ethnic
Somalis, police harassment and historical marginalization only adds to the
long list of factors that might lead them into radicalism.
Framing Somali refugees as terror suspects has inevitably led to racial
profiling against all Somalis - with local media generously participating -
many of whom, hailing from Kenya's North Eastern province or having
immigrated to the country years ago, hold Kenyan citizenship. Kenya's
authorities have similarly failed to underline the economic role played by
ethnic Somalis, notably in Eastleigh, now a thriving business hub in spite
of years of neglect by the city government.
The current plight of ethnic Somalis in Kenya should be framed within a
decades-long national counter-terrorism effort that has targeted the
country's Muslim population, notably the coastal Swahili people, who have
historically been marginalized for religious, ethnic and political reasons.
Through the 1990s and 2000s, the Kenyan government - heavily influenced by
the U.S., which considered Kenya to be a "breeding ground" for terrorism -
sought to prove that Muslims from the coast and in Nairobi were involved in
terrorist attacks, without success. The investigation into the 1998 U.S.
embassy bombing in Nairobi, for instance, was initially directed at Muslims
from Mombasa, before revealing that most participants in the bomb plot were
foreigners.
Since the early 2000s, Kenya's various security agencies have received
considerable financial support, assistance and training from the U.S.
"American aid has allowed Kenyan authorities to expand their security
infrastructure significantly; however this infrastructure has yet been seen
to affect authorities' ability to identify terrorists, foil terrorist plots,
and bring criminals to justice," wrote Jeremy Prestholdt, from the
University of California, San Diego. Indeed, Kenya's security agencies have
often been accused of infringing on human rights. The Kenya Anti-Terrorism
Police Unit (ATPU), for instance, has been accused of torture, unlawful
killings and disappearances, and renditions of detainees to countries where
they faced a risk of torture.
Pressure from the U.S. to intensify counter-terrorism efforts and
concentrate on the supposed threat posed by the local Muslim population has
undoubtedly reinforced pre-existing ethnic and religious tensions in the
country. Similarly, good relationships between Kenya and the U.S. have
likely pushed Kenya to take part in peacekeeping operations in Somalia,
starting in 2011, first as part of a coordinated military operation with the
Somali army, then within AMISOM (Africa
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/flavie-halais/nairobis-solution-t
o-terrorism-blame-somalis>
Unionhttp://cdncache1-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png Mission in
Somalia).
Kenya's government has vowed to pursue its military operations in Somalia in
spite of the increased terrorist threat - the attack on the Westgate
shopping mall was conducted by al-Shabab in direct retaliation for Kenya's
presence in Somalia - without having addressed the factors that are likely
to facilitate the entrance of terrorists on the territory. It is still
likely easy to procure a fake ID through the government's corrupt
immigration services, for instance. In that regard, the crackdown on
Nairobi's ethnic Somalis and its Muslim population at large will likely only
serve to increase racial profiling and religious tension, without preventing
the next attack.
_____
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/flavie-halais/nairobis-solution-t
o-terrorism-blame-somalis#_msoanchor_1> [F1]Figures of returnees vary
according to sources. It's unclear how many have returned so far.
(image/png attachment: image001.png)