Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2014 15:40:11 +0200
Chatham House Briefing Paper: Sanitizing Occupation is not Creative
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Eritrean Centre for Strategic Studies (ECSS)
Asmara, 18 April 2014
The Chatham House Briefing Paper of 10 April 2014 by Jason Mosley, titled
“Eritrea and Ethiopia: Beyond the Impasse”, supposedly sets out to challenge
and rectify obsolete perceptions of the Horn of Africa’s political dynamics
and prevailing reality. This is refreshing and must be welcomed at the
outset. Indeed, the author debunks certain presumptions here and there in
order to clear the way for what he aptly calls “creative engagement” of the
international community vis- a-vis the two countries, and especially
Eritrea.
Jason Mosley lucidly underscores the fact that conventional “Western” (read
US) foreign policy towards the region has thus far failed in promoting a
lasting and meaningful peace. And, as a panacea to past flawed policies and
approaches, the author pleads for policy makers in principal Western
countries to reassess their negative and often times overtly biased stance
against Eritrea. Unfortunately, he simultaneously argues for continuation
of “the special treatment” and cuddling of Ethiopia. This ambivalent and
palpably contradictory disposition severely punctures the “novel approach”
that he wants to earnestly enunciate.
Mosley rightly calls on the “international community” to reconsider and
reverse the ineffective and counterproductive policy measures taken against
Eritrea. In this vein, he boldly argues for the lifting of the unwarranted,
US-engineered, UN sanctions on Eritrea as a vital and long-overdue
gesture of goodwill and confidence-building.
Mosley appropriately calls on IGAD to facilitate the resumption of
Eritrea’s membership that has been blocked by Ethiopia for several years
now. He highlights the urgent need for the international community to
increase proactive economic engagement with Eritrea instead of paying undue,
or perhaps untimely, attention to internal affairs under the pretext of
human rights and democracy. All these views and approaches are certainly
positive and reinforce new trends that have gained currency in the recent
months.
In as far as the Algiers Peace Agreement and the Eritrea-Ethiopia
Border Commission’s ruling are concerned, the author explicitly states:
“Eritrea has the weight of international law on its side, and correctly
accuses Ethiopia of occupying its sovereign territory…”
This unequivocal legal acknowledgement surely vindicates Eritrea’s firm
position which is in consonance with fundamental tenets of international
law, the UN and AU Charters, as well as, with time-tasted AU principles on
the sanctity of colonial treaties and borders. But unfortunately, the
author changes tack at this point to advocate a “pragmatic approach” that
makes a caricature of basic edifices of international law. As it happens,
Mosley opines:
“…the reality of Ethiopia’s demographic and, increasingly, economic
predominance in the Horn of Africa must be understood, accepted and
accommodated by its neighbours, including Eritrea, and by international
actors…. it will probably mean violating the letter (if not the spirit) of
the 2000 peace deal, and working around the EEBC ruling, since Ethiopia
cannot be forced to comply with it…”
Why the author presumes that Ethiopia can ride roughshod and trample, with
impunity, fundamental pillars of international law is really mind-boggling.
The Algiers Peace Agreement contains explicit provisions empowering the UN
Security Council to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take punitive
measures against the recalcitrant party. Surely, Ethiopia is not a
veto-wielding permanent member of the UNSC and/or does not possess
unassailable diplomatic clout to defy and forestall appropriate punitive
action by the latter.
Furthermore, Chatham House and the author must know full well by now that
the putative “controversy” does not revolve around the “final and binding”
EEBC’s ruling anymore. This is now a case of unlawful occupation; pure and
simple. The EEBC had indeed closed shop in 2007 after undertaking its
demarcation of the border by coordinates and depositing its demarcation
decision with the UN Cartographic Office as well as both parties.
In the event, Mosley’s reasoning can make sense only if and when the
political radar is zeroed on the United States. If the author’s
subliminal argument is that Ethiopia cannot be persuaded to abide by
international law as long as it enjoys the blind protection of the United
States; that is another matter. But then, one would expect the author not
to mince his words; and, to call “a spade a spade”. In any case, this has
nothing to do with a novel, “out of the box”, approach. It epitomizes a
meek endorsement of power politics; it represents toeing the line of the
powers that be. And of course, this approach can only set a dangerous
precedent, a Pandora’s Box, for unresolved border conflicts in the global
south and elsewhere in the world. It undermines the integrity of
international treaties and the validity of Arbitration processes and awards
by circumventing international law despite solemnly signed international
agreements and unequivocal rulings. It is not even helpful to Ethiopia as
its historical claim on the Ogaden ultimately rests on international
treaties and the sanctity of colonial borders.
Factual Inaccuracies and Flawed Assumptions
The Chatham House Briefing paper also contains several assumptions and
factual errors as we illustrate below:
1. Causes of the war: The article quotes Tekheste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll
to substantiate the view that the cause of the conflict transcends a
good-faith border dispute. The problem with these sources is that they are
not neutral researches. Tronvoll has long-standing business associations
with Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry. Tekheste Negash was against
Eritrea’s independence during the liberation war (was involved with the
Mengistu regime as late as 1989) and openly stated, in an interview with an
Ethiopian Newspaper few weeks ago, that “the problem with the EEBC ruling is
not the mechanics of demarcation. The central issue is there should be no
demarcation or border between the two countries at all”. Clearly,
description/analysis of events by “scholars” with well-known political
biases and perspectives cannot be taken at face value. In any case, as
far as Eritrea is concerned, disagreements on and pursuance of divergent
policies would shape and influence the ebb and flow of bilateral ties
between the two countries; but they cannot be a cause of war. And for the
record, Eritrea-Ethiopia bilateral ties of cooperation were exemplary, and
perhaps among the best in the region, prior to the eruption of the border
war in 1998.
2. Economic and power asymmetry between the two countries: A central theme
of the article revolves around the assumption of an economic asymmetry
between the two countries. (“… Ethiopia’s demographic and increasingly
economic predominance in the Horn of Africa must be understood…”). The
validity of this assumption is dubious. True, Ethiopia has a much larger
population and considerable natural resources and endowments. But Eritrea
has also substantial natural resources/potentials (mining etc.) as well
vital locational and comparative advantages. In a congenial environment
of regional peace, Eritrea can develop its mining, tourism, agricultural,
manufacturing, fisheries and locational (ports) advantages to ensure rapid
economic growth on a sustainable basis. In a level playing field of
peaceful competition and cooperation, Eritrea’s economic prospects and
performances will not lag behind that of Ethiopia. (This is discounting
religious/ethnic fault lines which are deep and pronounced in Ethiopia).
Apart from the distortions entailed by war and its sequel, one must also
factor in the massive international aid injections into Ethiopia’s economy
in the last ten years. Furthermore, it is worth noting here that despite
myriad challenges – mostly externally driven – Eritrea has managed to
creatively and conscientiously work on rebuilding and strengthening its
economy in ways that has impressed even the most skeptical observers.
Some of the tangible achievements include: the visible change in the quality
of lives in all the rural areas; the remarkable rise in school enrolment and
literacy rates since independence; the increased access to clean water and
health facilities and thus the ability to control many communicable
diseases; the completion of major infrastructure projects that lay the
foundation for future expansion and growth and much more. In the event,
the relative economic growth of the two countries in the past ten years with
all its distortions cannot serve as a good indicator of trends in the
future.
3. Eritrea’s presumed propensity to trigger proxy wars to undermine Ethiopia
: This is an utterly wrong perception. As briefly indicated above,
Eritrea’s regional policy is firmly anchored on the precepts of a safe
neighbourhood. Eritrea’s developmental and security interests are better
served in a regional architecture of conflict prevention and avoidance of
tension. War and/or continued tensions usually imply higher expenditure on
defence, prolonged national military service and other negative consequences
for trade and investment which are not positive factors for a small country.
Indeed, Eritrea demobilized 65,000 soldiers, downsizing the size of
the new Eritrean National Defence Forces (EDF) to 35,000 only, immediately
after independence when the regional security environment was relatively
conducive. Eritrea also launched a two-phased, World Bank financed,
demobilization programme in 2001 when the Algiers Peace Agreement was signed
with Ethiopia. And until 2004, it demobilized around 105,000
soldiers from the National Military Service. But when Ethiopia reneged on
its treaty agreement, the demobilization programme was shelved and
postponed. In Somalia, Eritrea was not involved in a proxy war
with Ethiopia. This would not make sense in pure military terms even
from logistical considerations. But more pointedly, Eritrea is not involved
in the business of incubating “proxy wars” with Ethiopia for the overriding
developmental considerations outlined above. The US and Ethiopia know
these facts full-well. Still, the accusations that were conceived
originally for the purposes of imposing the unfair sanctions are willfully
perpetuated in order to rationalize their continued maintenance. The
speculation that South Sudan may become another arena of proxy war between
Eritrea and Ethiopia is equally unfounded and peddled for other ulterior
reasons. In brief, these misperceptions are not based on facts but used by
the US and Ethiopia to portray Eritrea as a “pariah State” in order to
maintain the unfair sanctions.
4. Economic interdependence of the two countries: In Eritrea’s view,
long-term and ultimate continental economic cooperation can only be realized
through consolidation of regional economic cooperation and integration at
the level of the RECs. In the Horn of Africa, IGAD is the appropriate
vehicle for incremental regional economic cooperation. Eritrea’s economic
ties with Ethiopia will be seen, in the future, within this context.
Eritrea has interests to develop economic ties with the Sudan, the Republic
of South Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, as well as Kenya and Uganda.
The ties of the distant past will not have much impact with what is and will
develop in the future. One must also take into account the economic
development trajectories of the individual countries in question. In the
case of Eritrea, for instance, development of its high-growth potential
sectors: tourism, mining, fisheries, etc., will depend on investment/trade
ties with players outside the region. In short, Eritrea and Ethiopia are
not Siamese Twins joined at the hips when it comes to future economic
growth and developmental trajectories.
5. Eritrea’s purported international isolation: This perception is also
wrong. True, Eritrea has a major problem with the United States. This is
not of its making. But it has reasonably good ties with the international
community. It has investment/trade and bilateral/multilateral ties of
cooperation with the European Union, China, Japan, India, the Middle Eastern
countries and a plethora of other countries in the rest of the world as well
as with various international agencies.
6. Assuaging Ethiopia: The author gives undue weight to “mollifying Ethiopia
first” prior to any positive action of the “international community” in
regards to Eritrea. This unwarranted “note of caution” and role-reversal is
intriguing. Ethiopia has no levers that it can wield against the
international community, depending, as it does, on massive development
assistance/budget support for its survival. Indeed, it is quite odd that a
WB grant was withheld in the case of Uganda for passing legislation that had
over 85% approval and yet similar measures cannot be called for against a
country like Ethiopia whose more than 50% recurrent budget comes from IFIs.
In terms of international law on the border issue, it is Ethiopia which is
on the wrong; not Eritrea or the international community. Eritrea has no
interest and innate proclivity to destabilize Ethiopia or the region for all
the reasons explained above. Yet, the author emphatically pleads: “… a
firm rhetorical stance by the international community that it will not
tolerate efforts to destabilize the region, or destabilize Ethiopia
specifically should be maintained as part of efforts to reassure Ethiopia”.
This conclusion, which emanates from wrong assumptions and perceptions, is
not tenable by any stretch of imagination. As underlined above,
circumventing the border ruling and postponing pressure on Ethiopia in this
regard is not warranted and only creates negative precedence in
international law.
7. Mr. Mosley also makes allusions to “Ethiopia’s concerns for
avoiding spillover in case of a disorderly political transition in Eritrea”.
Ethiopia’s long-standing approach is in fact the opposite. Ethiopia has
throughout supported an assortment of subversive, if ineffective, armed
groups against Eritrea (RASDO, Kunama Liberation Front, Eritrean Jihad
groups etc.). Ethiopia also talks about an official policy of “regime
change” in Eritrea. Above all, Ethiopia remains glued to a zero-sum power
game; wants to see the continuation of the sanctions as its recent secret
instructions to its diplomats underscores, and was behind the false story
associating Eritrea with Reich Machar in the crisis in South Sudan.
The Way Forward
Mosley has tried to blaze a new road by provoking fresh
perspectives and approaches of “creative engagement”. But his effort did
not produce a novel and viable road-map, hampered as it was, by flawed
assumptions and principally, a misguided approach that relegated the pivotal
issue of occupation to the back burner. In our view, the elements of a
viable approach must revolve around and constitute of the following:
• The Horn of Africa region is obviously undergoing through a difficult
phase in its collective history. On the one hand, the flash-points of
internal and/or inter-State conflicts remain multiple and intractable. On
the other hand, this region which connects the Middle East and Africa and
that straddles major routes of global maritime traffic has huge economic
potential in terms of a collective market of more than 150 million people;
considerable strategic resources and prime geopolitical advantages. These
vantage points will be unleashed when the multiple problems besetting the
region are incrementally and irrevocably resolved. The region’s external
partners can be a force of good when they act not only to advance their
interests but also the principal interests of the peoples of the region in a
balanced and judicious manner. This includes both comprehensive and
piecemeal measures to assist and facilitate in the resolution of pending
conflicts. The various players must also recognize that the old paradigm
of client/patron States and subordination of the region to narrow
geopolitical exigencies will not, indeed, have permanence and sustainability
in a changing global reality.
• As expounded above, Ethiopia’s occupation of sovereign Eritrean
territories in flagrant violation of international law is not only
untenable by all standards but it is also fraught with endangering peace
and security in the Horn of Africa region. As such, a “business as usual”
approach of rewarding Ethiopia with extensive support and assistance is
counterproductive to the quest of peace and the long-term cooperation of the
peoples of Ethiopia and Eritrea. In the event, it behooves on the United
States, more than ever before, to review its policies vis-à-vis Eritrea and
Ethiopia in regard to these cardinal issues.
• Demonization and harassment of Eritrea through various means, including
the unlawful UN sanctions, will not promote the cause of regional peace and
security. The challenges of economic development and nation building in all
the countries of the Horn remain enormous, and, they should not be shrugged
off and underrated lightly. In this context, it is imprudent and
counterproductive for external partners to try to influence the national
developmental trajectories through heavy-handed conditionalities and
interferences. The ground rules and matrices for sustainable partnership
must be better articulated and agreed through symmetric consultations and
negotiations.
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