Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2014 16:04:06 +0200
Eritrea 每 Ethiopia Conflict and Resolution
Part I
The Cause of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Conflict
22.04.204
I. Introduction
The Cause of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Conflict by Alemseged Tesfai
by Alemseged Tesfai | Two premises or assumptions have governed
Ethio-Eritrean relations of the past sixty years. First is the notion carved
into the minds of generations of Ethiopians by the Haileselassie regime that
Eritrea is, by nature and logic, part of Ethiopia. The well known arguments
of a common history, religion and culture is invoked here and Eritrea is
defined as Ethiopia＊s natural ※outlet to the sea§.
The second premise, which is linked to and complements the first, regards
Eritrea as economically weak and unviable, such that its very survival
totally depends on Ethiopian resources. This line of thinking further
depicts Eritrea as an ethnically, linguistically and regionally divided
※Italian creation without the makings of a state§＃.
These two Ethiopian assumptions gained international currency in the 1940∩
s, when leading Powers like the U.S. and Britain adopted them mainly to
satisfy their own strategic needs and led the fledgling UN into passing a
resolution federating Eritrea to Ethiopia ※under the sovereignty of the
Ethiopian crown§. The people of Eritrea were not consulted in this decision
over their fate and, consequently, they spent the next forty years, thirty
of these in armed struggle, fighting for independence. When in 1991 the EPLF
led a united Eritrean people to their hard-earned freedom from Ethiopian
rule, Ethiopia＊s fallacious premise that Eritrea forms an ※inseparable
part and parcel of Ethiopia§ was finally defeated.
The economic argument too had, of course, no basis in Eritrean reality. As
an Italian colony and a British occupied territory, Eritrea had a developed
industrial and infrastructural base. These were systematically dismantled by
successive Ethiopian administrations, such that, in the 1950-1960∩s,
Eritrea became a big source of skilled manpower mainly to Ethiopia, but also
to Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Sudan. Most of the Eritreans being expelled from
Ethiopia to-day are the migrants of those years. To-day, Eritrea＊s natural
resource, tourism and services potentials are showing signs of great future
and promise.
In 1991, when the TPLF assumed power in Ethiopia, there was every reason to
believe that the above mentioned Ethiopian fallacious assumptions would come
to a final rest. Indeed, all the pronouncements of the TPLF leadership at
the time left no room for doubt or apprehension in Eritrean minds that they
were genuine. It appears, however, that there was more to these than met the
eye.
In an interview he gave to the American writer, Paul Henze, in March 31 and
April 1, 1990, Meles Zenawi, then head of the TPLF, expressed his feelings
about post-independence Eritrea. He told him, first, that he did not expect
Eritrean unity to hold, once the Derg was expelled from Eritrea. The main
reason he gave for this was that Eritrea was a religiously divided nation
and that he expected to see internal conflict once the enemy had gone.
Second, he also expressed his unreserved preference to see, not an
independent Eritrea, but one linked to Ethiopia in a federal arrangement. In
explaining this, he told Paul Henze,
※We look at this from the viewpoint of the interests of Tigre, first, and
then Ethiopia as a whole. We know that Tigre needs access to the sea and the
only way is through Eritrea ＃. There are many Tigreans in Eritrea ＃.. They
don92t want to be treated as foreigners there ＃ They have the same history.
We are worried about Eritrea because we are not sure that differences among
different groups can be kept under control§. (Paul B. Henze, Conversations
with Meles Zenawi, J3 26/002/92/3 31 March/ 1 April 1990).
The above comments, expressed slightly over a year before Eritrean
independence are self-explanatory. Its public declarations notwithstanding,
it appears from Meles＊s thinking that the TPLF had, itself, never been free
from the old fallacies of Ethiopian ruling classes. One exception is that,
the TPLF wanted Eritrea, not for Ethiopia as a whole, but, again according
to Meles＊s own admission, to enhance the interests of Tigrai.
Since the start of the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, this
hitherto hidden agenda has been consistently coming to the fore in Tigrayan
propaganda literature and the utterances of the TPLF leadership. In fact,
according to TPLF propaganda, the issue is no longer their allegations that
※Eritrea occupied by force, Ethiopian territory at Badme§. It is, rather,
Eritrea＊s internal political and economic problems, which presumably, is to
be ※corrected§ by the TPLF＊s declared war on Eritrea. In short the
re-occupation of Eritrea or parts thereof is the real reason for the present
conflict.
This paper will try to set the record straight by disproving the fallacy of
※the economic argument§ and proving, instead, that the border dispute is
the direct result of the TPLF＊s expansionist policies and disposition. The
first part of this paper deals with the most relevant aspects of the
post-1991 cooperation agreements between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The second
part will narrate, in summary form, the events that led to the border
dispute at Badme. These are separate papers, but should be read together so
that the real cause of the war may be firmly established.
II. A Commentary on Selected Aspects of Post-1991 Eritrean- Ethiopian
Cooperation
A. A Selected Look at the Agreements
1. The Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between the Transitional
Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and the State of Eritrea signed in July 1993 is
precisely a testimony to the spirit of friendship and cooperation that
characterized, at the time, the relationship between the two states,
governments and peoples. It foresaw activities of ※mutual advantage§ in
practically every field with the ultimate aim of ※gradual evolution of the
two economies and societies into a higher level of integration in accordance
with ※＃..the commitment of both countries to bring about regional economic
integration and political cooperation§ (Art.1).
The Agreement further called on the gradual elimination of all trade
barriers between the two countries and the harmonization of customs
policies, as well as the use by Ethiopia of Assab and Massawa as free ports
(Art 4). The free movement of people and the harmonization of immigration
laws was also agreed upon (Art.5). Cooperation in the financial and monetary
fields (Art. 9); cooperation and consultations in ※realizing common
objectives§ in matters of foreign policy (Art 10); cooperation at the
national and regional levels in border areas (Art. 12); ＃.were all
important parts of the Agreement.
2. Subsequent to this, several agreements were signed by respective joint
ministerial committees set up in accordance with the July Agreement. One of
these dealt with the harmonization of economic policies, signed in September
1993. This is where it was agreed that the Birr continue as a common
currency until Eritrea issues its own money (Art. 1). Here too, the
agreements were wide-ranging and quite forward-looking. The harmonization of
※exchange rate policies＃.. with the aim of establishing uniform exchange
rates§ (Art. 1.1.); harmonization of interest rate structures (Art. 1.2.);
the creation of common inflation-control mechanisms (1.3); synchronization
of policies related to foreign exchange (1.4)＃. were all laid down.
In the field of trade (Art.3), the free movement of goods and services for
local consumption in both countries was agreed upon, with the exception ※of
those goods in short supply whose movement depends on their supply
availability and related trade policies＃.§ (Art. 3.1). Goods imported from
third countries were to move freely (Art. 3.2), but there was to be no
re-exportation of goods and services originating from one contracting party
to a third country. (Art. 3.3).
In the area of investment, besides the call for joint-investments, there was
an agreement, in principle, that national investors of both countries have
the same and equal treatment in both countries. (Art.4). Another Protocol
Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Planning and Economic Development
was signed on 27 September 1993, where the two parties agreed to ※endeavour
to coordinate planning in social policies and the usage of human, material
and financial resources (Art. 2,3); the planning of strategic industries,
railway, roads, ports, air transport, major financial institutions＃.§,
including the exchange of ※social and economic statistics to coordinate
their planning and development endeavours were all important. (Arts. 4,5).
The Protocol Agreement on the Free Movement of people and Establishment of
Residence of 23 September 1993 is another important document. Here, it was
agreed that visas would not be required for nationals of both countries to
enter or leave Eritrea and Ethiopia. A valid passport or ID card was all
that was required (Art.1). Unlimited residence to both nationals was granted
without the requirement of work permits (Art. 2). Each country was to
※allow citizens of the other to engage in commercial, business and other
similar gainful activities in its territory. In furtherance of this
objective, each contracting party undertakes to grant no less favourable
treatment than that accorded to its own nationals§ (Art.3). The only
restriction appears in Article 4 where it was provided that ※each country
reserves the right of refusal to enter or remain in its territory to (sic)
any citizen of the other country where it considers the entry or presence of
such citizen undesirable.§
Other agreements covered a wide-range of fields of cooperation, but for the
purposes of this presentation, the above will suffice.
B. Who Benefited More from the Agreements?
The argument is often heard that the agreements favoured Eritrea more than
they did Ethiopia. Let us look at some facts:
1. Ethiopia enjoyed full and unrestricted use of the port of Assab. Assab
has been, by agreement and practice, its free port. The Ethiopian Shipping
Lines handled its own cargo, paying the Eritrean authorities in Birr, for
consignment fees it received in foreign currency. At the same time, the
agreements allowed Ethiopia the use of the port of Massawa for its northern
regions at negligible fees and payments 每 a transit charge of only 1.5%. In
later years, the Ethiopians were asking that this charge be reduced further.
In both of these port cities, but especially in Assab, the rate of
employment for Ethiopians was high. In Assab, Ethiopia was privileged to
open four schools operating under its own curriculum.
2. The Agreement on air services allowed Ethiopian Airlines to take
Eritrea＊s quota of IATA flight space and privileges 每 ※the fifth freedom
rights§ as they are called. Eritrea was a major region for the Airline, and
Eritreans were some of its most frequent and faithful passengers.
3. Surface or land transport also worked heavily in favour of Ethiopia, as
no embarkation or other charges were levied on Ethiopian trucks running to
and from Massawa and Assab. One ought to keep in mind that Eritrea inherited
totally dilapidated roads from years of disrepair and destruction by the
Derg＊s military campaigns. The task of repairing them was entirely
Eritrea＊s own responsibility.
4. In these three instances, Eritrea＊s benefits in financial terms were the
various agreed revenues accruing to it from port activities and the fringe
benefits thereof. This cannot compare with the privileges of the freedom of
access to the ports that Ethiopia was enjoying. Eritrea actually saw the
arrangement more as a gesture of friendship and cooperation and as the
grounds on which the projected move towards economic integration, currency
union＃etc., was to proceed. Maintenance of the peace and security of the
area was also of prime consideration in this matter.
5. On 3-4 April, 1995, the Joint High Ministerial Commission led by Minister
Mahmoud Sherifo of Eritrea and the then Prime Minister Tamrat Layne of
Ethiopia met in Asmara to evaluate the 1993 agreements. The Commission
※expressed its profound satisfaction on the progress made.§ Indeed, in the
areas of education, culture, air-line services, telecommunications＃.. etc.,
the agreements were assessed to have worked well.
The Commission, however, identified two problem areas 每 the issue of
citizenship and the commodity or trade sector.
C. The Issue of Citizenship
The first case, raised in the joint Political Committee, regarded ※a few
minor problems in the areas of security and justice. Here, the Commission
noted,
※In the area of security, the Ethiopian side presented that the free
movement of people has been hampered due to unclarity of ID cards. It also
raised the issue that a significant number of Eritreans who have already
taken Eritrean Nationality are still carrying Ethiopian passport and are
requesting for its renewal.§
The point was actually the result of the divergent policies of the two
parties regarding the issue of nationality. Eritrea recognized the dual
citizenship of all its citizens living everywhere else in the world. Eritrea
automatically accepts as its citizens, those of Eritrean parentage on both
or either side. Nationals of other countries may also be granted Eritrean
citizenship by law.
Ethiopia does not allow dual citizenship to its nationals; or so it is
claimed, for it is hard to believe that all the Ethiopian exiles who have
adopted various citizenships are no longer Ethiopian. But, with respect to
Eritreans also holding Ethiopian citizenship, the Ethiopian Government had
been wavering. On the one hand, the present Ethiopian Government saw them as
strong allies in its own struggle against its opposition, but on the other,
and for reasons that are becoming clear only after the conflict, it wanted
to curb their activities.
Be that as it may, the Ethiopian Government never took any legal steps to
put the matter to rest by either asking its citizens of Eritrean origin to
drop their Eritrean citizenship and become only Ethiopian, or by allowing
them to choose which citizenship they wanted to adopt. Since this was not
done, Ethiopians of Eritrean origin continued to consider themselves also as
Ethiopian citizens and the Ethiopian Government continued to accept them as
such.
This situation did raise some problems, especially in the issuance of
licenses in both countries. To put it simply, the Ethiopian side felt that
Eritreans in Ethiopia were taking a fairer advantage of the free movement,
residence and business agreements and demanded reciprocity in Eritrea.
Eritrea insisted that those Eritreans were mostly holders of Ethiopian
citizenship. Thousands of Eritreans of Ethiopian origin were enjoying the
same rights as Eritreans in Eritrea. The latter had, and still has, no
problem recognizing them as Eritreans. The reciprocity, therefore, was
already there.
The problem arose when it came to the issuance of new licenses to citizens
of one country only wanting to do business in the other. According to the
Eritrean side, equality and reciprocity of treatment was needed here.
A great percentage of the tens of thousands of Eritreans who have been
expelled from Ethiopia to date, fall under the first category, i.e., they
are Ethiopians of Eritrean origin. No similar measure has been taken on any
Ethiopian living in Eritrea. Eritreans of Ethiopian origin have full
Eritrean citizenship rights and do not even come into question.
D. The Commodity or Trade Sector
This is the sector that showed some signs of incompatibility right from the
outset. The agreement of 23-27 September provided for the following:
* free movement of goods and services between the two countries except
those that were short in supply;
* free re-export of goods imported from third countries in accordance
with the rules and regulations of the exporting country;
* no re-export to a third party of goods exchanged as export between
the two countries;
* introduction of trade and customs procedures to both countries to
facilitate trade; and
* transaction between the two countries to be settled in Birr.
Here, the Eritrean side found the restriction on ※goods in short supply§,
which was an Ethiopian inclusion, difficult to understand and work with, as
any product could be so declared at any time, thus hampering free trade
movements. The ban on the re-export of the other country＊s products was
also noted as overly restrictive by Eritrean negotiators, as it left
※traders at the mercy of the staff of the customs administration.§
Re-exporting products is a common practice of international trade and
Ethiopia was the beneficiary of Eritrean re-exports to Ethiopia.
Nevertheless, the Eritreans went along with the restriction.
Subsequent agreements in May and November 1994 tried to work around these
problems. A memorandum of understanding signed by the two sides on 7 October
1994, indicates that the Ethiopian delegation expressed appreciation for the
following measures taken by the Eritrean Government:
1. § Goods and commodities originating from Ethiopia will not be subjected
to any customs tariff payment,
2. Ethiopian traders who have valid Ethiopian trade licenses will
personally, without going through Eritrean traders, purchase goods and
commodities from Eritrea, and
3. One point five percent (1.5%) transit charge (sic) levied on goods and
commodities coming through the port of Massawa destined for Ethiopia.
4. There will be no hindrance to border trade activities carried out between
our two countries.§
In this agreement, it was further stipulated that no additional intermediate
and local payments were to be imposed on goods and services traded between
the two countries. The setting up of a joint customs committee to oversee
this was also agreed upon. The request by the Eritrean delegation for
exemption form indirect (sales, excise＃.) taxes on all locally produced
goods and services traded between the two parties was referred by the
Ethiopian side for further study. But, both countries agreed that the free
movement of goods not be impeded or distracted by the ※short supply§
limitation.
In spite of all these seemingly genuine attempts at moving towards higher
levels of trade cooperation, however, the problems persisted. In its meeting
of 3-4 April, 1995, the Joint High Ministerial Commission headed by Eritrean
Minister Mahmoud Sherifo and Prime Minister Tamrat Layne of Ethiopia also
raised the trade issue. The Eritrean side complained that contrary to the
letter and spirit of the free trade agreement, Eritrean products were being
made to pay indirect taxes and intermediate payments of various descriptions
in every Ethiopian region or Kelil they entered. To this, the Ethiopian
response was as follows:-
※The Ethiopian delegation reiterated its position that Indirect Tax levied
in Ethiopia is non-discriminatory and thus cannot be lifted.
※It further stated that indirect tax are not considered to be a hindrance
to free trade and services in FTA (Free Trade Area). It is an internal tax.
Removing or changing these taxes will have serious implications for
Ethiopia. It should be understood that changing domestic tax policy on
grounds of trade relations will create problems for Ethiopia.
§ The Eritrean side reasserted that indirect taxes are trade barriers and
must be lifted. It further argued that indirect taxes levied under a policy
of import substitution as a protective fiscal measure is a trade barrier and
impressed upon the Ethiopian delegation to reconsider its position§.
On the issue of intermediate payments at the Kelil level, the Ethiopian
delegation again insisted that the payments would be adjusted or lifted only
if they were discriminatory.
These two problems, which eventually developed into major stumbling blocks
standing on the way of the attainment of the original vision, had their
roots in the divergent directions in economic policy and strategy that the
two sides were moving. Eritrea had adopted an outward looking, export and
free market-oriented strategy. It saw Ethiopia not as a competitor, but as a
partner and ally in the global market. The Ethiopian strategy, as officially
expounded, was based on the development of its agricultural potential and
the building up of a chiefly agriculture-related industry. Consequently, it
was protective of its local products, which it saw as substituting various
imports, including those from Eritrea. In other words, for Ethiopian
policy-makers, Eritrea was a competitor in their own local markets and not,
as the agreements seemed to originally indicate, an ally and a partner.
This difference in policy and practice had the net effect that Ethiopian
goods were entering Eritrea with full freedom, whereas Eritrean products
were being made to pay both indirect taxes and the embarkation charges and
development fees imposed especially by the Tigrai region. This put the
competitiveness of Eritrean goods in Ethiopian markets at a disadvantage.
The problem does not stop here. Eritrean products were mainly industrial in
nature, whose materials and chemicals were paid for from its own foreign
currency reserves. Its re-exports to Ethiopia too were always similarly paid
for from Eritrean reserves. That all these were exchanged for Birr in
Ethiopia was an added disadvantage to Eritrean trade.
Total value of imports from Ethiopia to Eritrea for the years 1995, 1996 and
1997 stood at 146.8, 261.8 and 274.6 million Birr, respectively. Total value
of Eritrean exports to Ethiopia for the same years show 259.7, 273.4, 218.2
million Birr. Total value of re-exports from Eritrea to Ethiopia, again for
the same years, stood at 94.57, 69.0 and 19.8 million Birr, respectively.
In view of the fact that there was Eritrean foreign currency in almost every
item exported or re-exported to Ethiopia, the favourable balance of trade
apparent in the 1995 and 1996 figures is deceptive. In any case, these had
dropped from 100 million to 10 million in just one year, 1995-1996. We
should also note that the value of imports from Ethiopia exceeded those of
Eritrean exports by about 60 million Birr in 1997. At the same time, the
value of re-exports fell to an all-time low of 19.8 million Birr, a drop of
50 million Birr from that of the preceding year. This was, of course, not
accidental as it resulted from Ethiopia＊s increasingly protectionist
measures and from the stringent controls and harassment of Eritrean traders
at the various check-points in Tigrai.
The fact is that, by 1995-1996, the Eritrean side was already realizing that
progress in the trade sector was not likely to proceed as intended.
Eritreans were being delayed at check-points, goods classified as ※export
items§ were barred form entering Eritrea＃.. and so Eritrea was, by 1996,
already de-escalating its traditional intensive trade practices with
Ethiopia and expanding its market alternatives. Hence, another reason for
its unfavourable trade balance in 1997.
Considering again the fact that most Eritrean exports and all of its
re-exports to Ethiopia involved payments in foreign currency being exchanged
for the Birr, Ethiopia＊s advantages in the trade sector were significant.
Add to this the use of free port and transport services, the employment of
thousands of Ethiopians throughout the country, but especially in Assab and
Massawa, and the non-payment by Ethiopian traders of Eritrean indirect taxes
and intermediate payments, and the picture will be clearer.
6. The Monetary Arrangement
Eritrea used the Birr until it introduced its own cur rency, the Nakfa, on
November 8, 1998. The relevant provision for this agreement was signed in
the Protocol Agreement on Harmonization of Economic Policies on September
1993. It provides as follows:
Article 1
The Use of the Ethiopian Birr until Eritrea has its own currency.
In so far as a common currency is in use, the Contracting Parties agree:
1. To harmonize exchange rate policies including consideration of pooling of
reserves with the aim of establishing uniform exchange rates within the
currency area.
2. To harmonize interest rate structures in both countries.
3. To work out a mechanism by which the increase in money stock is
consistent with the growth and inflation objectives of the two countries.
4. To work out a scheme to synchronize policies related to foreign exchange
surrender requirements, allocation of foreign exchange to importers, capital
flows and external debt management.
We have been hearing and we will yet hear allegations that this arrangement
favoured Eritrea more than it did Ethiopia. How a country that uses someone
else＊s currency can be deemed an exploiter is yet to be convincingly
explained. It is like the US feeling raped because its dollar is spread all
over the world.
In actual fact, throughout its use of the Birr, Eritrea was a victim of the
Ethiopian monetary policy as it had no say in its formulation. Here, again,
differences in economic policy between the two states created incongruities
in the use of the Birr. On this topic we refer to an Eritrean economist＊s
expert opinion, that of Dr. Woldai Fitur of the IFC, who says:-
※＃.it was clearly Ethiopia that benefited more from arrangements concluded
between the two countries. For instance, the arrangements in the de facto
currency union, which did not allow Eritrea a voice in Ethiopia＊s conduct
of monetary policy, worked more in favour of Ethiopia. All seigniorage
associated with issuing new Birr notes accrued to the National Bank of
Ethiopia, while the costs associated with the overvalued exchange rate and
unreasonably high interest rates imposed by the Ethiopian Government on the
Birr area spilled over to the Eritrean economy, forcing Eritrea to adopt an
independent exchange and interest rate structure.
It is important to appreciate that this interest and exchange rate structure
was necessitated by the divergent economic (fiscal, monetary, trade,
investment, etc.) policies that the two countries have chosen to pursue.
Immediately after liberation, Eritrea adopted liberal trade, investment, and
financial and foreign exchange regimes. These policies were quite different
from those of Ethiopia. Under such circumstances, it behooved Eritrea to
issue its own currency and pursue independent interest and exchange regimes
for an effective management of its economy. Ethiopians should not have any
reason to resent Eritrea＊s independent monetary, interest and exchange rate
policies. The development of an active black foreign exchange market, which
hadn92t existed for decades, was the natural consequence of the distortions
by Ethiopia＊s foreign exchange policy. The Eritrean Government has in no
way contributed to the development of this black market and should not be
blamed for it. Moreover, Ethiopia paid in Birr for all Eritrean exports,
including re-export of goods imported from third parties in hard currency.
In view of this, it was Ethiopia and not Eritrea that benefited more form
the de facto currency union. (Eritrea Profile, Vol. 5 No 1, August 15,
1998).
The Nakfa-Birr ※controversy§ is actually an Ethiopian creation. The
accusation leveled on Eritrea by the Ethiopian government and media is that
it sought to force upon Ethiopia a Nakfa convertible with the Birr on parity
and that it insisted that both currencies circulate freely in both
countries. Why the Ethiopians would think such a suggestion, though it was
never made, a blasphemy cannot be rationalized. However, the records show
that Eritrea never presented such a proposal or suggestion to the Ethiopian
government. In March, 1997, the National Bank of Eritrea had entertained the
following three points as payment options that ※could be considered
depending on the level of political commitment for closer cooperation and
prospects for accelerated harmonization of economic policies of the two
countries§. These options were:
1. a foreign exchange-based payment system, as is the case with the rest of
the world;
2. freely convertible Nakfa-Birr payment system in which trade between the
two countries could be conducted with or without opening a letter of credit
with a bank; and
3. a partial convertibility of Nakfa-Birr system in which trade between the
two countries could be conducted only by opening a letter of credit with a
bank. (Bank of Eritrea, ※Progress Towards the Introduction of Nakfa and the
Disposition of the Birr, March 13, 1997, Asmara, Eritrea. P.14.)
The Bank of Eritrea did not make a secret of its preference for the second
option which it saw as ※the most appropriate for stimulating rapid
expansion of trade and greater economic integration between Eritrea and
Ethiopia.§ By the ※free convertibility§ of Nakfa-Birr in this option, it
was not suggesting parity or the free circulation of both currencies. It
was, rather, to put it in layman＊s terms, giving traders in either country
the opportunity to agree on the use of the currency of their choice for
settlement and to do so through the intermediary of banks in both countries.
Any imbalances accruing from such a practice, according to this option,
would be settled in foreign currency through the banking systems of Eritrea
and Ethiopia. The assumption here, of course, was that the trade would be
carried out without resorting to the opening of letters of credit.
In the joint committee meeting of 19 November, eleven days after the Nakfa
had been introduced and the new Ethiopian Birr put into effect, the
Ethiopian delegation presented the LC option as its final preference except
in limited petty-trade. The US dollar was to be the official medium of
exchange between the two countries. Later, the Ethiopians stipulated that
the border petty-trade was not to exceed the value of 2000 Birr in each
instance. The Eritreans felt that the Ethiopian preference was not in the
interest of the people of both countries as it would encumber the
traditional free flow of goods.
When the Nakfa came into operation, Ethiopian reaction was unexpectedly and
astonishingly violent. Holders of that currency were harassed at all
Ethiopian points of entry, the Nakfa was confiscated and sometimes torn or
burned and the atmosphere of the complete break-down of trade created by
Ethiopian authorities. In fact, trade from Eritrea to Ethiopia came to a
virtual halt.
Nothing approaching that level of irrationality was seen prior to the Nakfa
incident 每 not even at the time of Eritrean independence, especially by the
TPLF cadres and their supporters. Suddenly, pictures of an economically weak
Eritrea trying to get an easy ride on the back of Ethiopia started to be
painted. Eritrea was now ※the exploiter§, a bully that ※coerced§
Ethiopian authorities into unbalanced and unfair agreements§. The idea,
apparently, was to teach Eritrea the lesson that (the old fallacy) its
existence was irrevocably and forever tied to Ethiopia＊s abundant
resources; that what amounted to a trade embargo, would bring it down to
submission.
The mood in Eritrea was different.
The old traditional trade ties with Ethiopia, which were re-enforced by the
mutual friendship apparent at independence had, in a way, clouded Eritrea＊s
vision in many ways. So, the strain in trade relations following the Nakfa,
though obviously lamentable, was a good thing, as it widened the nation＊s
perspective and alternatives. That was how the incident was assessed and
explained to the Eritrean public.
F. Concluding points
In the areas of trade and currency policies, the post-1991 agreements
between Eritrea and Ethiopia did not work and, in fact, led to some
confrontations. In other areas, including the issue of citizenship, no
insurmountable problems were encountered and, one may say, they were
generally successful.
We now hear a lot of ※learned analysis§ surmising that the root cause of
the border crisis of May 1998 is Eritrea ＆s ※failed§ economy; that ※the
Badme Incident§ was a tactic by the Eritrean Government to divert its
people from its internal problems＃.etc. These are all Ethiopian
allegations, so often repeated and so made wide-spread through the
relentless use of every media, propaganda and diplomatic resource at their
disposal that they, initially, confused quite a few people.
The facts are different. The latest economic indicators issued by the
independent studies of the IMF and the World Bank attest to the following:-
The IMF Executive Board, which met on July 13, 1998, issued its official
findings on July 16, 1998. Here it expressed its concern over the border
conflict but, otherwise, fully endorsed the Eritrean government＊s policies
and practices in every field of economic activity. Eritrea＊s ※impressive
progress made in economic reconstruction and social rehabilitation during
the past six years§ was welcomed by the Directors. They also welcomed the
※further progress§ made in 1997 ※particularly in implementing structural
reforms, reducing the fiscal deficit and successfully introducing the
Nakfa.§ They also commended the ※authorities92 strong commitment to
strengthen macroeconomic performance and reform the institutional
framework.§ Looking ahead, the Directors saw the present conflict as an
impediment to the Eritrean authorities92 plans of ※further reducing
macroeconomic imbalances and accelerating growth.§ They also noted the
adverse effects the conflict can play on the nation＊s fiscal policy, in
spite of ※the commendable reduction of the budget deficit in 1997.§ (IMF,
No.98-277, July 16, 1998.)
The IMF further noted the boost that the private sector got through the
privatization of 700 small-scale and 39 big and medium-scale manufacturing
enterprises. It further stated, ※Prices were decontrolled while
differential interest rates between private and public sectors were
eliminated.§ Consequently, the IMF pointed out, ※the role of the private
sector was boosted, resulting in buoyant growth in manufacturing and
services exports.§With the benefit of these reforms, the report continued,
※real output growth averaged 7 percent during 1993-96 and rose to 8 percent
in 1997, translating into significant growth in per capita income§.
The report also found the annual inflation rate for 1993-96 to have been at
less than 4 percent. The reduction of government expenditure by about 10
percentage points and the increase in revenues by 6 percentage points was
also noted as a result of both ※the completion of some programs and the
intention of the authorities to bring down the deficit to sustainable levels
※, and the ※broadening of the tax base and the ongoing strengthening of
the collection effort respectively§. As a result, ※the deficit came down
sharply from 16.4 percent in 1996 to 5.5 percent of GDP in 1997∪. Finally,
the report notes, ※the medium-term targets of real output growth of 6-7
percent per annum, annual rate of 3-5 percent and a built-up of reserves to
5.5 months of imports are quite ambitious and consistent with the
authorities92 track record of perseverance with implementation of good
economic policies.§(IMF, BUFF/ED/98/105, July 10, 1998.)
The World Bank has more recently also given high marks to Eritrea＊s
implementation of programs and projects. Last August, the Bank＊s
representative for Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan declared that
Eritrea was one of the five countries in the world with whom the World Bank
maintains exemplary relations. Its ※impressive economic performance§, the
official also noted, ※mainly emanates from its effective implementation of
home-grown development strategies.§ (Eritrea Profile, Vol.5 No.24, August
22, 1998.) The virtual absence of corruption in the country and the safety
and stability prevalent even in spite of the border conflict are invariably
mentioned as great assets for Eritrea＊s future development.
There is, in short, no evidence whatsoever of the Ethiopian government＊s
continuous claim that the Eritrean economy is in dire straits. At the time
of writing this paper, mid-August, 1998, the Nakfa stands at 7.45-7.50 to
the US dollar, still maintaining its pre-conflict levels. At this particular
time (August, 1998), the Ethiopian Birr＊s position vis-角-vis the dollar is
about the same. The price of fuel in Eritrea stays constant at 2.80 Nakfa
per litre and bread is available at 0.20 cents Nakfa or about 0.03 cents US
apiece, a price maintained since independence. Whereas it would be
self-deceiving to claim that the conflict is not adversely affecting the
Eritrean economy, the fact that it is still withstanding this adversity
attests to its strong base.
Why, then, would a government that is doing so well on the economic, social
and political fronts, want to start a border conflict and create problems
for itself? Why would it want to dismantle all of its achievements of the
past seven years?
The answer, definitely, lies somewhere else 每 on the border conflict that
has its own background and history, not directly related to the cooperation
agreements discussed above or to the performance of the Eritrean economy.
We now turn our attention to the events leading to the border conflict of
May 6, 1998, where the real cause of the hostilities lie.
III. Events Leading to the May 6 Incident at Badme
1. Incidents and disputes along the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia are
not a new phenomenon and they were never about the boundary. Like all
colonial divides the boundary between Eritrea and Ethiopia is, at points, an
arbitrary line that separated people who once lived together; people related
by blood and intermarriage for whom international borders mean very little.
The nature of the conflicts in these areas, therefore, was never different
from any similar conflicts within Tigrai or within Eritrea 每 for the
population, that is. Problems usually arose when one coveted the others 92
grazing area or places of settlement. Thus one cannot accuse simple farmers
of deliberately crossing boundaries to cause international conflicts and the
same with those who rise to defend what they consider their own.
Previous administrators on both sides of the border, even during the Italian
and British periods in Eritrea, understood this very well and never gave
more attention to land disputes around the border than they deserved. In the
1950∩s, during the decade of the Ethio-Eritrean federation, the Ethiopian
Ministry of Interior is known to have issued directives warning against
alterations of the old Italian boundary lines as it thought such an act
would give rise to serious complications.
Border incidents, therefore, were seen as problems that required careful and
proper handling, probably also ways of creating an atmosphere whereby both
sides could develop disputed areas together. Upon Eritrean independence and
the coming to power of the TPLF, there was every reason to believe that old
border disputes would finally come to rest.
2. However, that is not what happened. Ever since its creation in the 1970∩
s, the TPLF had given to the border issue an attention that was not
reciprocated by the EPLF. Whereas the TPLF invariably exacerbated existing
border problems, EPLF people chose a different approach. They were of the
opinion that border misunderstandings were not an urgent matter, that they
could be deferred to the settlement of the whole issue at the state level.
There was, however, no reciprocal disposition on the other side.
Thus, beginning in 1990, when the TPLF took over Tigrai, new conflict areas
were added to the old ones. This is particularly true of the upper Indeli (a
border-demarcating river), where bands armed by the TPLF invaded an Eritrean
village inhabited by the unarmed Hazo. On this incident of 30 December,
1993, 32 Hazo houses were completely destroyed and the inhabitants driven
out of their original habitat. Attempts at compensating the victims and
resettling them, undertaken by joint efforts, were often frustrated by a
lack of commitment of the TPLF and by the insistence of its members that the
village invaded was Tigrayan and the rebuilding should take place on what
they pointed out as Eritrean territory.
3. At this same time, the rumblings of a dispute were being heard from
Badme. By now, everyone knows that the village of Badme forms a small part
of the Badme Plains, through which the Ethio-Eritrean border crosses,
joining the Tekezze-Setit river with the Mereb at Mai Anbessa. The town
itself is on the north-eastern side of the border, secure in Eritrean
territory. Decades ago, this wild country, a haven for wild animals, started
to be settled by Eritreans descending from the highlands. These even crossed
deep inside the Tigrai side to establish settlements.
Until the mid-1990∩s, movement along this border was probably the freest as
no cause ever arose for strict border controls. Eritrean administrators
never doubted where the boundary lay, and always deferred that issue to the
more formal demarcations expected to be effected by both governments. From
1993 onwards, however, some incidents started to take place and these caused
a lot of concern for Eritrea.
In 1992-93, Tigrayan authorities in the Lower Adiabo area, adjoining the
Badme sections of Eritrea, started to talk about a demarcation line.
Eritrean farmers who had lived in the area for decades were reporting that
they were being penalized and their property confiscated for ※illegal
entry§.
4. On 20-21 July 1994, a high-level meeting was held between the EPLF and
the TPLF, led by Secretary Alamin Mohammed Said and Politbureau member
Tewelde Weldemariam, respectively. Regarding the border issue, they agreed:-
* that both parties should work towards the strengthening of the
relationship between the people, officials of the two fronts and government
administrators in the border areas; ways of solving minor misunderstandings
existing in those areas were also to be found.
* that the disputes between neighbouring villages and people on both
sides of the border were similar to those found within one country and, in
order to solve the problems in conflict resolution seen amongst officials on
both sides, the political activities of the fronts were to be strengthened
and misunderstandings to be quickly avoided in the spirit of friendship
* cadres from both fronts in the border area were to meet every three
months to discuss issues of common interest.
5. The meetings foreseen by the above decision did not take place as soon as
expected. Two meetings scheduled for first and 15th November 1994, the
records show, had to be postponed because the Tigray side sent minor
officials to meet with high-level delegates from Eritrea, and it often
turned out that the former had no authority to decide even on minor matters.
In the meantime, 1995 saw the unabated continuation by the Tigrai
authorities of the harassment of Eritrean farmers for ※trespass§ into
unilaterally demarcated territory.
6. In 1996, TPLF officials intensified their campaign of harassment and
expulsion of Eritreans from border villages. A few examples follow:-
On June 7, 1996, 12 villagers of Adi Mahrai (Zibra) were taken into custody
On July 19, six armed TPLF members entered Gheza Sherif, and demanded that
34 farmers leave the village. These had lived there for 15-20 years. When
the farmers refused, a confrontation ensued and this was stopped by the
intervention of the Eritrean administrators of the sub-region.
On August 4, 1996, 16 armed TPLF soldiers again entered Gheza Sherif and
demanded that all the inhabitants move out. When they refused, three
※representatives§ including a woman, were taken under custody.
On 17 June, 1996, 24 farmers of Adi Mahrai (Zibra) were ordered not to work
fields already plowed and cultivated, rendering 66 hectares of harvest
totally out of use.
At this same time, 29 farmers of Denbe Himbrty, were forced to leave their
habitat by similar orders of TPLF armed administrators and militiamen.
A total of 18 items of similar acts of arbitrary expulsion and harassment
are listed in the report of the rainy and cultivation season of 1996 alone.
7. When the destruction of houses and expulsion of Eritreans continued deep
into the first quarter of 1997, a joint-meeting of high level administrative
officials was held in Shire, Tigrai, with the aim of finding a temporary
solution to the problem. This meeting, which was led by the Vice President
of the Tigrai Region, Ato Tzegai Berhe and the Deputy Administrator of the
Gash-Barka Region of Eritrea, Ato Tesfamichael G.Medhim lasted for two days,
20-21 April 1997, and included all the major officials of the corresponding
border districts.
In this meeting, the Eritrean side expressed its opposition and misgivings
about the series of unilateral demarcations effected by the Tigrai
Administration inside Eritrean territory. It pointed out that these
※demarcations§ were neither known nor acceptable to the Eritrean
government. It also demanded that the arbitrary expulsions of Eritrean
nationals stop immediately. The Tigrai representatives insisted that the
demarcations had been laid down in 1986-87, during the struggle, and that
the EPLF had known about them. After a serious discussion and exchange of
views, it was decided to set up a sub-committee from the adjacent districts
to study the matter on the ground and to see if some intermediate solution
could be found.
8. In accordance with the Shire decisions, the designated sub-committee met
from 22-27 June, 1997 to make a tour of the ※demarcations§, a length it
determined at about 40 kms. At the preliminary meeting of the 22nd, the
Tigrayan representatives argued that the purpose of the meeting and the tour
was for the Eritrean side to visit and accept the line as demarcated by the
Tigrayans. That, they said, was how they understood the Shire agreement.
The Eritreans rejected this. The purpose of the tour, they said, was for
them to see the Tigrayan unilateral demarcation and compare it with what
they believed to be Eritrean territory. They were not there to be told where
their boundary lay. Although this disagreement threatened to disrupt the
meeting the tour was made all the same.
It was established then that, not just one, but a set of at least three
demarcations, each creeping deeper into Eritrea had been laid on the ground.
This was, naturally, highly objectionable to the Eritrean representatives.
During the armed struggle, many EPLF fighters had seen or known about a the
map of a larger Tigrai that included parts of Eritrean territory. It had
been taken note of but, obviously, the more urgent matters of those days
took precedence over raising it as a matter of contention. Since, after
independence, the two governments were on very friendly terms, most of the
border incidents were consistently being down-played by Eritrea, as the
excesses of some border officials＃. Now, the Badme demarcations started to
bring the issue to the fore. As a border where Eritreans formed the clear
majority on both sides for decades, movement had been fluid. For the
Eritrean government or regional officials, the location of the border and
what belonged to whom was never a question. Raising it as a point of
difference, when such lofty objectives like breaking the trade barrier,
creating the free trade area (FTA), moving towards economic harmonization＃.
were being discussed was simply seen as inappropriate and
counter-productive. This is what all the directives and internal Eritrean
circulars show.
The Badme demarcations and the Tigrayan insistence that that was the border,
however, sent an ominous warning to the Eritrean side. The Eritrean
sub-committee consequently suggested that since matters affecting the border
should not be decided by border and district officials, the issue be very
seriously taken up and quickly settled at central government levels. It also
advised and demanded that the Tigrayan side stop any further moves at
harassing and expelling Eritreans.
The Tigrayan sub-committee in its response demanded that no armed Eritrean
enter the line of demarcation. In addition, it ordered that no Eritrean
farmer was to plough fields or build houses or sheds beyond the line and
that the inhabitants of two villages, Gheza Sherif and Enda Tchi 92a, were
to be evacuated.
All the elements of a border conflict were, thus, put in place.
9. By July, 1997, the harassment of Eritrean inhabitants in the whole
※unilaterally demarcated§ areas was intensifying. The exchange of letters
between the Eritrean administrator of the Shambuko sub-region and his
counterparts in Sheraro, Tigrai, tell an interesting story. One of these,
written by the Eritrean administrator on July 16, 1997, appeals for
restraint on the part of Tigrayan authorities and police, as tensions were
running high amongst the inhabitants from what they saw as unwarranted
expulsions from land they had developed over lifetimes. He calls on the
Tigrayans to ※observe maximum care and to wait for the meeting of a
higher-level committee so that the situation does not go out of control.§
The July 17 reply of the Tigrayan counterpart was to warn the Eritrean
administrator that in the event of any worsening of the situation, he would
be held responsible, since, as he put it, ※the incursions into our
demarcated territory are being carried out with your full knowledge.§
10. On 18-19 July 1997, three truckloads of Ethiopian troops entered the
Badme area and planted radio communications equipment. Toyota pick-ups were
also reported to be bringing in light and medium arms. Eritrean territory
inside the ※unilaterally demarcated§ area was, thus, put under patrol. On
the following week, 26-27 July 1997, 15 Eritrean families that had lived in
Gheza Sherif for at least 30 years each were evacuated and sent across what
the TPLF now determined was the new Ethio-Eritrean border. 11 wells
belonging to the village were destroyed. The same day, 30 families were
evacuated from Enda Tchi 92a 每 their doors were broken, their silos
destroyed and their cultivated fields uprooted and opened up for grazing.
Document No. 62 01/90 of 21/8/1997 (or 16/12/1989 Ethiopian calendar),
written by a Tigrayan police chief of the border sub-district refers to the
campaigns of 11, 19 and 20 July. Here, he gives the following figures as the
result of the campaign of the said dates:-
The officer further indicates that a total of 755 campaigners, that is,
Tigrayan soldiers, members of the police force, militiamen and farmers
participated in the operation. ※We only have ten trespassers on the Deda
side still at large,§ he concludes ※In other areas, no person or crop has
been spared. Our mission has been accomplished.§
The Case of Adi Murug
11. The date of 19 July, 1997 ought to be noted as very significant. On this
same day of the arrival of Tigrayan troops into Badme and their subsequent
massive expulsion of Eritreans, a potentially more dangerous situation was
developing at Adi Murug (Bada), at the northern tip of the former Denkalia,
but now within the North Red Sea Region of Eritrea.
Historically, Adi Murug has figured as the fourth village of the Bada
district 每 Boleli, Li 92en and Irimali are the three remaining and there
was an Eritrean administrative unit at Adi Murug. Prior to July 19,
Ethiopian administrators from the Afar Kelil had asked permission to
assemble the inhabitants of Adi Murug for various purposes, but the Eritrean
administrators had turned them back since the matters they wanted to discuss
did not concern the inhabitants of Adi Murug.
On July 19, two battalions of the Ethiopian army came to Adi Murug and its
commander met with representatives of the Eritrean army in the area. The
Ethiopians explained that they were there to chase armed Ethiopian
opposition elements whom they believed to be in the Bada area, and requested
entry. The battalions were let in on this understanding.
Five days later, July 24, Ethiopian administrators from the Afar Kelil moved
into Adi Murug and instructed the Eritrean Administrators to disband 每 they
were taking over. The Eritreans resisted, but on July 28, at a meeting of
the whole Adi Murug inhabitants, the Ethiopians declared Adi Murug Ethiopian
territory and appointed their own administrative committee. The inhabitants
92 objections that they were Eritrean citizens with proper ID cards and that
they had known Adi Murug as Eritrean territory did not matter.
The Eritrean military commander tried to reason with his Ethiopian
counter-part, but to no avail. To the argument that border matters ought to
be referred to the central government and not be handled so high-handedly,
the Ethiopians replied that the Afar and Tigrai Kelils had declared Adi
Murug Ethiopian territory and there was nothing they could do to change the
decision. That the Adi Murug and Badme incidents fell on the same day or
week cannot be a coincidence and it certainly was not. Something was cooking
in the minds of the TPLF leadership. This could no longer be downplayed as
the excesses of ambitious or troublesome border officials. Although, as a
trend, it had been there, it was suddenly assuming a character that needed
urgent attention.
12. On 8 August 1997, about three weeks after the Adi Murug and Badme
incidents, Secretary Alamin Mohammed Said and Political Affairs Head Yemane
Ghebreab of the PFDJ travelled to Addis Ababa to discuss the matter with
Tewolde Welde- mariam of the TPLF (EPRDF). Here, they tried to impress upon
the other side that what was happening at Adi Murug and in Badme was
inconsistent with the friendly relationship between the two sides. They
argued that using force to create facts on the ground was not acceptable.
They also asked that the Ethiopian government reverse the steps it had
taken. Any outstanding matters, they maintained, could be handled in a
spirit of understanding and taking the welfare of the border population into
consideration
Mr. Tewolde＊s answer at the time was to flatly claim Adi Murug as Ethiopian
territory. On Badme, he alleged that the source of the problem were Eritrean
Administrators who were continuously instigating their farmers to cross
demarcated lines. He further refused to accept Eritrea＊s suggestion that
steps taken by the Ethiopian authorities be reversed.
13. Less than a month after the Adi Murug and Badme incidents of July 19,
Eritrea＊s President Isaias Afeworki wrote the following letter to
PrimeMinister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia on August 16, 1997:-*
Comrade Meles;
Greetings.
I am being compelled to write you to day because of the preoccupying
situation prevailing in the areas around Bada.
It cannot be said that the border between our two countries is demarcated
clearly although it is known traditionally. And we had not given the issue
much attention in view of our present and future ties. Moreover, I do not
believe that this will be a cause of much concern and controversy even in
the future.
Be this as it may, there have been intermittent disputes in the border areas
arising form different and minor causes. Local officials have been striving
to defuse and solve these problems amicably. However, the forcible
occupation of Adi-Murug by your army in the past few days is truly
saddening.
There was no justification for resorting to force as it would not have been
at all difficult to settle the matter amicably even if it was deemed
important and warranting immediate attention. It would also be possible to
quietly and without haste demarcate the boundaries in case this is felt to
be necessary.
I, therefore, urge you to personally take the necessary prudent action so
that the measure that has been taken will not trigger unnecessary conflict.
Best Regards
Your comrade
Isaias Afwerki
16/08/97
Prime Minister Meles＊s undated terse reply came subsequently. It read as
follows:
Comrade Isaias,
Greetings.
I have seen the letter you sent me. I had also heard that the situation in
the border areas does not look good. I was also informed that the matter was
discussed between your colleague (Yemane), who had come here, and ours
(Tewolde). We did not imagine that what happened in Bada could create
problems. This is because the areas our comrades are controlling were not
controversial before and we believed that prior consultation was only
necessary for disputed areas. We moved to the areas to pursue the remnants
of Ougugume (Afar Opposition) who were obstructing our peace efforts from
positions there. We believe we can ease the tension concerning the borders
on the basis of the understanding reached previously between your team and
our colleague (Tewolde). Perhaps, it is also necessary to settle the border
demarcation issue after the necessary preparations are carried out by both
sides.
In the meantime, the situation was worsening in Badme and President Isaias
felt obliged to, once more, write to Prime Minister Meles on 25 August
1997:-
Comrade Meles,
Greetings.
Regarding the situation in the border areas, my information establishes that
the measures taken at Adi-Murug were not in areas that are undisputed but in
our own areas and by expelling our officials and dismantling the existing
administration. Concerning the Ougugume, your action (in Adi-Murug) came as
our Defence was preparing to co-operate on the basis of the request from
your Army. Moreover, similar measures have been taken in the Badme area.
I had indicated to you, these measures are unjustified. In order to
expediently check any further deterioration and pave the way for a final
solution, we have assigned on our part three officials (Defence Minister
Sebhat Ephrem; PFDJ Head of Political Affairs, Yemane Ghebreab; and National
Security Advisor, Abraha Kassa) I suggest that you also similarly (or in
ways you think best) assign officials so that both sides can meet as soon as
possible to look into these matters. I await your thoughts.
Best regards
Your Comrade
Isaias Afewerki
25/08/97
14. In accordance with President Isaias 92 suggestion, the Joint Border
Commission was set up 每 the Eritrean side to be led by General Sebhat
Efrem, Minister of Defence. The first meeting was scheduled for November,
1997.
Before this took place, the October 17 (12 October, 1990 Ethiopian calendar)
issue of the TPLF magazine Weyin, printed the new map of the Tigrai Kelil.
The official map of the Kelil, showing a much more enlarged Tigrai 每 from
large expanses carved out of Begemider, Wollo and Eritrea 每 was also
printed by the Ethiopian Mapping Authority. Here, the straight line linking
the Tekezze-Setit with the Mereb at Mai Anbessa had disappeared and was
replaced by an oblique line entering deep into Eritrean territory. Not only
the ※demarcated§ area that was causing concern, but large chunks of other
Eritrean land had been included. Besides this, Eritrean territory like
Alitena, Bada and areas south of Tzerona were also demarcated as Ethiopian
domain. The old colonial borders of Eritrea had been changed by the
unilateral actions of the TPLF government.
15. In November, 1997, the Joint High Commission met in Asmara and agreed to
meet again within three months. There was no discussion on substantive
matters. In the meantime, in January 1998, Ethiopian troops were deployed to
the border on the Assab line to demand that the Eritrean border post
situated on the Assab-Addis Ababa road move several kilometres towards
Assab, as the area was being claimed by Ethiopia. A patient handling and
quiet diplomacy on the part of Eritrea averted a what could have been a
dangerous confrontation.
16. When all this was happening, tension was building up in and around
Badme. Land confiscated from Eritreans evacuated from the unilaterally
demarcated areas was being re-allocated to Tigrayan farmers who moved into
the area. A letter by the Administrator of Tahtai Adyabo, Ato Abraha
Berhane, written on March 10, 1998, clearly indicates that that practice was
government policy and was to be encouraged. By May 1998, tensions had run
quite high.
On May 6, 1998, Ethiopian troops fired on an Eritrean platoon on routine
duty along the border around Badme. Several of its members were killed. This
triggered off a chain reaction on both sides that culminated in the May 13,
1998 declaration of war by the Ethiopian Parliament.
The Eritrean Government has already invited neutral parties to examine the
circumstances that led to the incident of May 6. That is, of course, meant
to determine who made the first move as far as the armed clashes of that
date is concerned. As this paper has attempted to show, however, all the
elements of the conflict had been put in place by the TPLF＊s continuous and
provocative incursions into Eritrean territory and its cadres 92 willful
harassment of Eritrean inhabitants of the border areas.
17. As suggested in the introduction to this paper, the border issue had
nothing to do with the post 1991 cooperation agreements between the two
sides. The trend that this problem had been following has its own origin and
runs way back to the time when the TPLF was still in the process of
formation.
The genesis and development of the border conflict being what it is, nothing
can explain the Ethiopian military build-up at Zalambessa, the Assab border
and elsewhere along the boundary when the area of conflict, according to the
Ethiopian Parliament＊s decision and subsequent declarations by Ethiopian
officials, is Badme. Nothing can ever justify the hate-campaign against
Eritrea and Eritreans immediately launched by the Ethiopian government. Nor
can the Ethiopian boycott of Assab and Massawa port facilities, the
cancellation of Ethiopian Airlines flights, the bombing of Asmara on June 5,
and, worst of all, the expulsion of thousands of Eritreans from Ethiopia
ever be rationalized.
The border conflict is senseless and neither party is likely to gain from
its continuation. It has its roots in the TPLF＊s persistent incursions into
Eritrean territory, an act that can only be explained in terms of the
expansionist tendencies of that Front＊s leadership.
The chance for peace lies in the immediate cessation of hostilities, direct
talks, demilitarization, demarcation of the whole border in accordance with
existing international treaties and, as a final resort, adjudication by
international courts. War will only further complicate a simple problem.
＃＃＃＃＃＃＃.to be continue
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