Sudan: Exclusive Interview With Amb. Tim Morris, UK Special Envoy for South
Sudan
22 April 2014
Following the sacking by South Sudan's President of his former deputy Riek
Machar for alleged coup attempt in December 2013, South Sudan had quickly
slid down into what many fear would become a potentially protracted civil
war that turned the nation's two major ethnic groups, the Dinka and the
Neur, where President Kiir and rebel leader Machar hail from respectively,
against each other. A mediation effort led by the regional block
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and supported by, among
others, the Troika (Norway, UK, and the US), as well as the EU, the UN and
China has produced a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement that helped ease
major violence but it is far from bringing peace to South Sudan and its
people. Our Editor-In-Chief Tsedale Lemma interviewed Ambassador Tim Morris,
the British Representative in the Troika, on the current situation in South
Sudan and progresses made in the IGAD led negotiations: Excerpts:
Q: Let me start by asking you the outcome of the 25th extra ordinary session
of IGAD heads of state and government summit in Addis Abeba in Mid march. It
agreed to deploy "protection and deterrent" force in south Sudan. This is
not exactly a peace keeping force is it?
A: We absolutely should talk about this proposed force. But I think it is
also very important when you look at the result of the summit to see how,
very importantly, it is a way of pressurizing the political process on
negotiations on South Sudan. So the proposed force is one element in that.
But what, as observes and supporters, we think was very important from the
summit was the demonstration that the IGAD heads of state and government
came together, agreed very much on the need for all parties to keep to the
cessation of hostilities agreement and to work for political process and
indeed to mandate again the IGAD mediation to proceed with the negotiations
with the parties. So the idea of the proposed force in itself is an idea
which clearly has implications for the international community, for the UN,
and for how the international community is structured in south Sudan. It is
a very interesting idea and there is a lot of discussion needed now between
IGAD leaders, the United Nations and the international community to make
sure that as the international community we are well organized in terms of
the intervention in south Sudan. The force itself has a clear mandate which
fits with what the UN and the international community is doing in the
country. At the same time it is clearly very significant that the IGAD heads
of state and government have identified a project in this area. We certainly
as the United Kingdom and as a member of the UN Security Council, will look
at that very carefully and consider how we can support it. I think the one
very important point is that there can't be parallel operations in the
country which might cause confusion. But the progress in this discussion
made by IGAD is very significant and the idea of protecting the monitoring
operation as a core mandate is clearly one which needs to be taken very
seriously.
Q: From the list of countries which want to contribute to this force Uganda
is missing. What do we make of that?
A: No Sudan or Uganda, yes. All I can say is this is a proposal and this is
a project by the countries involved who have agreed on a certain way of
doing it. Ugandan forces have been operating within South Sudan and part of
the cessation of hostilities agreement will involve the progressive
withdrawal of those [Ugandan] troops. So this is, as we understand it, an
agreement that there will be a progressive withdrawal of Ugandan troops and
this force will come in particularly as we understand it to protect the
cessation of hostilities agreement monitors. From the international
community point of view we are strongly supporting the IGAD's mediation
effort which has a core element on the cessation of hostilities agreement
and its implementation. The fact at the moment is neither party is fully
complying with the cessation of hostilities agreement. That has to change.
The monitoring of that which at the moment is being set up is an essential
operation. But as the discussion goes along, we need to be absolutely clear
as to what the mandate of this proposed force is and how that fits best with
the international operation already on the ground.
The plan is to deploy this force in mid April. Do you think there is enough
time? There is a work head. I can't put an exact timeline on it now. There
is work ahead in terms of discussion with the UN; there is work ahead
certainly in terms of the deployment of the monitoring and verification
mechanism set up by the cessation of hostilities agreement which is at
present on the ground in Juba. So a number of actions need to take place at
the same time.
Riek Machar was quick enough to denounce any such act as deployment of any
sort of force and threatened to pull out of the negotiations in Addis Abeba.
well I think within the wording of that you have the answer that blanket
refusal to a proposition which is still not being fully discussed is
something which one hears but which we should not allow to interfere with
the planning and mediation process. There have been a number of threats to
withdraw from the negotiation along this road. The parties are obliged by
what they have signed to take part in it. There clearly are many things to
be negotiated.
Q: Do you see it as a worrying trend that we are witnessing individual
countries of the region competing for their own strategic interests with
Eritrea and Egypt allegedly giving a hint of their own interest in South
Sudan, not to mention Uganda which singlehandedly intervened to support
President Salva Kiir. Does it worry you that South Sudan may become a
contemporary battleground for regional proxy war?
A: This region clearly is a region of countries who have their own
interests; they have their history together and relationship together and
there are delicate aspects of those relationships. The reason that we as the
Troika and the international community are supporting the mediation process
is that this is precisely a process which seeks to bring together the
countries of the region. I think the IGAD summit on the 13th of March was an
example of that. Each of the countries of the region saw the lack of
stability in South Sudan as being profoundly concerning to all of them.
There are of course parts of relationships between individual countries and
there are also series of allegations made without evidence. We think, or the
way I see it, is that it is a great concern to the countries of the region
that, left unsolved, South Sudan could become an area which will be a center
of conflict and tension for the countries of the region. We do identify or
we do recognize that countries in the region see it that way. We hear that
from the individual countries with which we speak. This is something which
is the result of many years and we are working together on this issue. With
President Kiir's constant bashing of the international community, once
bluntly accusing the UN of running, I quote, "a parallel government" and
certainly an uneasy relation with various organizations representing the
international community on the ground, this "protection and deterrent" force
is expected to be financed by none other than the international community
itself. What sort of compromise are we looking at here? How is that
affecting IGAD's mediation process which is financed by the international
community?
The UN's presence is based on the will of the international community and
therefore it is completely unacceptable for certain voices in South Sudan to
be criticizing and attacking that presence. Of course there could be
occasional disagreements but the UN is there for the sake of the country;
the development and security of the country. In terms of discussions with
IGAD, that is something which needs to be preceded with, it is a posi tive
development. IGAD is already working with the monitoring mission which we
are all supporting including practically and financially in Juba. That is
working in coordination with the UN. There is further discussion on what
needs to be done on the way the mandate of any future force is expressed; in
the way it is technically and financially funded by the international
community. The idea, of course, of the international community's presence in
south Sudan is something of considerable significance to the South Sudanese
government and to the opposition. It is inevitable that on occasions that
will create tension and criticism from the various parties but it is an
expression of the international community's will for the protection of the
South Sudanese people that there should be a presence there.
That brings the discussion to the level of coordination on the ground. There
is the UN, the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), China, the EU, and the Troika,
among others. How are all these forces working together? Well I think there
are probably two parts to this. One is the way that those groups work
together in support of the mediators in Addis Abeba during the talks and the
other is in South Sudan. The first thing to say is this is very harmonious.
There is a unanimous support by the international community for the efforts
of IGAD expressed by the UNSC and expressed by the various international
organizations that you have mentioned. We support IGAD's role for bringing
the parties together in the negotiation. In terms of mechanisms in Addis
Abeba that is done by briefing, and by meetings. This is not done in a
mechanical way or by a bu reaucratic way; it is done by our presence as
representatives. We do not do the detail negotiations ourselves. We leave
that to the parties involved.
Perhaps more controversial is the presence of China in the picture. Many
believe it has created some tension with the Western courtiers involved in
the negotiations such as your country.
There is no single example of that. We work closely with our colleague the
Chinese ambassador here. We have regular talks and regular meetings
together. It is immensely significant that China is participating in a very
active way. On the humanitarian support, China is doing a major contribution
in the construction of the camp for Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) in
Juba. So there is a great degree of shared approaches and discussions.
Q: Last February the two rival parties have signed the Implementation
Modalities of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities. But they
haven't come far enough in implementing that and the situation on ground
remains dire. How is that affecting the entire peace negotiation?
A: You are absolutely right that the cessation of hostilities agreement
itself has not stopped the fighting. One can argue that some of the bigger
military moves have perhaps been restrained but that is hypothesis. We are
very concerned the parties involved are not showing the real willingness and
a real sincerity about stopping fighting. We are absolutely insistent that
they comply and cooperate with the monitoring mechanism being set up which
has been somewhat held up by non-cooperation on both sides. We are concerned
that a number of elements wish to continue fighting. This thing came up very
clearly at the IGAD heads of state and government summit in mid March and
some very strong comments were made by governments, which we fully endorse.
The principle of the mediation is that a political process has started at
the same time as the cessation of hostilities agreement is enforced. It is a
very important point that IGAD, with our strong support, should not accept a
scenario where there are first a series of military negotiations and then
somehow national reconciliation and political discussions are left until
later. We would see that as a recipe for continued delay, and we insist that
the parties proceed along the line that is suggested by IGAD.
One of the most controversial issues is Uganda's military involvement, which
individual countries of the region complain about it separately, but
something that IGAD failed to call the shots. On top of that the communiqué
at the 25th extraordinary summit "commends" Uganda's military involvement.
What am I missing here? I am not sure I quite agree with that analysis.
Clearly it is a question of facts that after the events of December Ugandan
military strengthened their presence in the south of South Sudan and
provided a level of security and support for the South Sudanese Government
but what subsequently became controversial was Ugandan action further north.
I think it is very important to look at the situation as it is now where
IGAD heads of state and government are sitting together after all. And to
look at the agreement which talks about the progressive withdrawal of the
Ugandan forces from the theater of operations in line with the cessation of
hostilities agreement. I think it is also very important, and this is a
comment from the international and the UK perspective, to recognize the
point that each of the countries of the region is potential player in the
solution to this crisis. The cooperation between those countries, difficult
as it may be, is an extraordinarily important thing to aim at.
Let's look at President Salva kiir's personality as a partner in peace
talks. Since July last year, he sacked Riek Machar, suspended and jailed his
party's Secretary General Pagan Amum, removed the governor of Unity state
Taban Deng, suspended cabinet Affairs minister Deng Alor, and finance
minister Kosti Manibe. How can you consider him as a partner for peace talks
when he kept on eliminating the key figures around himself, and kept on
aggravating the situation? What I would like to say is that we and the
Troika and the international community are very clear that there has been a
failure of political leadership in South Sudan and that has resulted in a
divided country and a country which is not fully functional as a political
entity. That needs a fundamental review. The political process being
suggested by the mediators with our full support in a sense answers that
question. It addresses directly the point that this country should not
revert to the status quo ante; there should be a wider discussion of what
type of politics the country needs to move forward. I wouldn't want to
single out one individual; it is to say that our view very strongly is that
there is a failure of political leadership which needs rectifying by a
careful process of constructing a new type of politics in South Sudan.
Q: There are growing voices as of late that suggest perhaps dismantling the
SPLM as a political party and SPLM/A as its military wing is not a bad ideas
after all in terms of creating a fresh start for the people of South Sudan.
Do you see that as a viable idea?
A: I think I would simply say that those decisions are for South Sudan
people to take, both political leaders but also groups representing public
opinion, representing the wider interest of South Sudanese society. On
viability I think it clearly is very important that this process should be
undertaken with care and support from outside. The country is a country of
traumatized people, of displaced people, of suffering people; we have to be
very realistic in expecting political solutions to be devised overnight.
What would clearly be wrong would be for outsiders to design a political
solution for South Sudanese people without their wider involvement