Sudan: Failure to talk?
What would it take for a breakthrough in Sudan's 'national dialogue'?
Abdelwahab El-Affendi
<
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/profile/abdelwahab-el-affendi--.ht
ml>
Last updated: 22 Apr 2014 10:14
Two Videos:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/sudan-failure-talk-20144161
42751634267.html
The current constitution, agreed in 2005 as part of the
<
http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=515> Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, became largely redundant when the South separated following a
referendum in 2011. A new one is now needed in advance of the elections
slated for 2015. The government has been offering talks since 2011, but the
opposition continues to question its sincerity.
In January, however, some of the regime's bitterest enemies, led by former
ally Hassan Turabi of the Popular Congress Party (PCP), stunned observers by
<
http://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/-Bashir-calls-for-national-dialogue--/-/195
0946/2163892/-/format/xhtml/-/y1xupp/-/index.html> attending the function at
which Bashir delivered his speech. The PCP had been the leading party in the
more radical opposition coalition which demanded the removal of the regime.
In early April, leading opponents were again present at a meeting held to
launch the dialogue, boycotted by only a handful of left wing parties. Those
rejecting the overture
<
https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/politics-sudan-opposition-clarify-boyco
tt-%E2%80%98national-dialogue%E2%80%99> insisted that concrete steps be
taken in advance to make the dialogue meaningful.
Bashir partially responded to these demands,
<
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/04/sudan-bashir-unveils-political
-reforms-201447132053503789.html> ordering in his April 6 speech the release
of political prisoners and the lifting of restrictions on freedoms of
expression and association. He also offered safe conduct for representatives
of rebel groups wanting to take part in the dialogue.
Civility no more?
However, in tandem with these encouraging developments, armed conflict
<
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-26962187> continued in Darfur and
Sudan's "New South" (the states of
<
http://www.unocha.org/sudan/top-stories/sudan-humanitarian-update-blue-nile
-and-south-kordofan-states> South Kordofan and Blue Nile), despite ongoing
mediation efforts. No less worrying, however, were signs of alienation
nearer to home. In early April, the family of the renowned Sudanese
dissident poet, Mahgoub Sharif, prevented the Khartoum State Health Minister
from visiting him as he lay dying in a Khartoum hospital. A few months
earlier, mourners at the home of a young pharmacist
<
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/world/africa/killing-in-sudan-stokes-the-
anger-of-a-protest-movement.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> shot dead during last
September's protests, barred Dr Nafi Ali Nafi, then the third man in the
regime, from offering his condolences to the family.
These steps signalled a radical departure from habitual Sudanese civility,
which is unique in spite of the country's well-deserved reputation as a
locus of endemic barbaric violence. Sudanese are weary from having to
explain to outsiders this "paradox of barbarity and civility", as
<
http://www.amazon.com/Genocidal-Nightmares-Narratives-Insecurity-Atrocities
/dp/1628920718> Alex de Waal calls it.
I recall how former US President Jimmy Carter, perplexed by another
improbability in Sudanese dealings, recounted to me his shock at the opening
of Sudanese talks he was chairing in Nairobi in 1989. Having spent days
preparing himself for a frosty encounter and even memorising some jokes to
lighten up the atmosphere, he watched in amazement as SPLA rebels and
government representatives warmly greeted each like old friends, leaving him
to wonder, as he said, why these people were fighting in the first place.
This inexplicable civility still reigns, and was evident at the recent
meetings. However, some activists, especially among the younger generation,
are no longer happy to play along. The late Mahgoub Sharif would have
probably courteously received the minister and thanked him for his visit,
but some of the younger members of his family had other ideas.
Is this a sign of a further deterioration in social relations, or a positive
indication that people are now expressing themselves with increasing
frankness, which is essential for genuine dialogue? At another Sudanese
"dialogue" encounter in 1989, the veteran Sudanese diplomat Francis Deng
provocatively <
http://www.fou.uib.no/fd/1996/f/712001/> told the
participants that "what is not said is what divides us". He meant habitual
Sudanese courtesies hide and camouflage latent racism and other problems
that were not sufficiently articulated to enable them to be challenged.
Resolving unresolvable differences
What is not being talked about in the current dialogue sessions is what
would happen if the talks succeeded and change took place. Bashir is wanted
by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges that include genocide
and war crimes. But the ICC may be the least of his worries if regime change
were to eventually come. The regime and its supporters stand accused of
committing atrocities and of unlawfully enriching themselves.
At a minimum, many supporters could lose their jobs and livelihoods. Many
could stand trial or even face extra-judicial punishments and revenge
attacks. Indeed, the uncompromising (not to say abusive) language one
encounters on the myriad of websites expressing dissident views is very
disturbing, and is one sure sign of the deterioration of Sudanese politics.
Contributors regularly deploy a language of hate and vindictiveness, not
just against the regime and its supporters, but against rival opposition
formations or figures. It does not help that some of those expressing
themselves this way have weapons, and many rebel factions they support are
no less guilty of atrocities.
Sudan thus does have serious problems, which the stalled dialogue has not
even begun to address, let alone resolve. Politics continues to deteriorate
at a precipitate rate, and the quality of leadership (within the government
and the opposition) is not improving either. We lack our Mandelas as well as
our De Klerks. This problem is compounded by the very structural conditions
which made the dialogue imperative (the failure of the regime to stabilise
itself and build a viable political system), since these very conditions
militate against a successful outcome.
The ruling party has up to now failed to make the political breakthrough
that would make it secure enough to agree to power-sharing, while the
opposition continues to make exorbitant demands that bear no connection to
its fragmented status and lack of either political or military muscle. Thus,
neither side feels strong enough to be magnanimous, or weak enough to make
concessions. So neither is offering compromise, or even contemplating it.
The opposition is demanding a total dismantling of the regime, and calling
for its leaders to be held to account for their past misdeeds. The regime,
in turn, insists on maintaining full control and has yet to offer meaningful
concessions. The armed factions reject the call to join the dialogue. It
would be naive to expect the regime to sign up to a deal which would send
its president to The Hague and the rest of its strong men to jail, or worse.
However, the situation is not entirely hopeless. Many observers, including
the African Union's High Level Panel on Sudan, led by former President Thabo
Mbeki of South Africa, see potential for a breakthrough, and is doubling its
efforts to bring the parties together. The panel has worked a few miracles
before, but squaring the current circle may need an even higher display of
wizardry.
A lot of imaginative political thinking is needed to convince the regime and
its entrenched supporters that they have nothing to fear from real change,
and to persuade the opposition to accept a gradualist approach which would
attain regime change in stages. Whether Mbeki can work this miracle remains
to be seen.
Dr Abdelwahab El-Affendi is Reader in Politics and the Centre for the Study,
University of Westminster and Co-ordinator of the Centre's Democracy and
Islam Programme since 1998.
Inside Story - Rebuilding Darfur
Received on Tue Apr 22 2014 - 16:48:31 EDT