Upper Nile Diary - Atrocities, Federalism and the Shilluk
By James Copnall
8 October 2014
Even in a war of rapidly fluctuating military fortunes, Malakal stands out:
the capital of Upper Nile state changed hands six times between December and
March. And even in a war characterised by massive atrocities, Malakal has
been hit particularly hard: the number of civilians killed by both sides may
never be known, but it is clear that patients were shot in their hospital
beds, among numerous other human rights violations.
Malakal is now a shrunken shadow of its former self, a distressing sight for
anyone who knew the town before. Market stalls are shuttered, where the
doors haven't been bashed in, or burnt. Some abandoned residential areas,
which bore the brunt of the fighting, are now over-run by foliage, the town
returning to the bush; the UN estimating that 22% of it town was destroyed.
Now Malakal is populated mainly by soldiers, with large houses and NGO
offices requisitioned for the war effort. Most civilians have fled. More
than six months after the government regained control of the town, over
17,000 people still live in the grotesquely swollen UN base a 10 minute
drive from the main urban area, coping as best they can with their temporary
shelters, the lack of hygiene, and the reality of their newly reduced
circumstances.
Some of the displaced cautiously make their way into town during the day, to
sell goods in the market, or check on what is left of their houses. Most
believe it is still too dangerous to leave the camp.
Those now living in muddy squalor in the UN base are, like the population of
Upper Nile state itself, mainly Nuer, Dinka and Shilluk. Their interactions
inside and outside the UN base mirror the shifting dynamics of politics in
the state.
In the years before independence, there was considerable frustration in the
Shilluk kingdom, which borders the White Nile around Malakal. Many
complained that their land had been stolen by the Dinka, with the support of
the 'Dinka-dominated' SPLA. Several Shilluk self-defence groups sprang up.
Tensions increased during the 2010 elections. South Sudan's major opposition
leader, Lam Akol, is a Shilluk, and received considerable support from his
home region, increasing the perception within the SPLM/A that the area and
its people represented trouble. Shilluk politicians within the SPLM,
including Pa'gan Amum, then the Secretary General of the party, lost
popularity at home because of their apparent inability to help 'their'
people in a time of need.
Armed resistance grew. In March 2011, in the run-up to independence, a
Shilluk militia leader, Johnson Olony, attacked Malakal town. He eventually
joined the South Sudan Democratic Movemement/Army (SSDM/A), a loose
coalition of rebel groups backed by Khartoum, and became its leader after
the death of George Athor. However, in June 2013, Olony accepted a
presidential amnesty, reportedly after receiving an ultimatum from the
Shilluk king.
Six months later, South Sudan slid into civil war. As thousands of SPLA
soldiers (predominantly Nuer) defected to him, Riek Machar could have been
forgiven for hoping for significant reinforcements from among the Shilluk.
They, too, had many grievances with President Salva Kiir's government. If
sizable Shilluk forces, perhaps led by Olony, had turned on the government,
Machar's chances of hanging on to Malakal, and over-running the Paloich
oilfields to the north, would have increased considerably. This did not
happen.
Shilluk chiefs, elders and others told me that things could have been very
different if Machar's forces had stopped their bloody march at Malakal in
the early days of the war. Instead, the rebels attacked several Shilluk
villages, on both banks of the White Nile.
"We were surprised when the Nuer came and killed our people," says Jok Wanh
Adiang, a sub-chief in the small town of Wau Shilluk, a 20 minute boat raid
north of Malakal, which is now home to thousands of Shilluk displaced. "It's
very bad." The chief of Wau Shilluk, Obieny Jako Adhok, says that "when the
Nuer came, we thought it was to fight Dinka. But when they arrived, they
came and killed Shilluk and looted property. So that's why the Shilluk
didn't join the rebels."
Instead, Olony's forces played a major role in the government campaigns to
regain control of Malakal. At the otherwise muted Independence Day
celebrations in July, Olony, a giant man, received warm cheers. He told the
crowds that he had a "doctorate in fighting", both a boast about his
military prowess, and a rebuke to the academically-qualified Shilluk
politicians who have not protected and developed the area.
According to the chiefs, Olony is actively recruiting Shilluk into his
forces. The men are given 'the price of soap', small incentives, rather than
a salary. They are seen not as a component of the SPLA, but as a 'Shilluk
self-defence force', the chiefs say. As elsewhere in South Sudan, the
creation of ethnic militias, while an understandable counter-insurgency
strategy, is deeply damaging to the cohesion of the nation.
The politicians in Juba and Addis Ababa usually say that ethnicity is not a
driving factor in the conflict. Although this may have been true at the very
outset, a succession of atrocities targeting one ethnic group or another, in
Juba, Bentiu, Bor, Malakal and elsewhere, make it harder and harder to deny
that ethnicity is at least part of the equation. And very often,
lower-ranking officials, civilians and traditional authorities identify
ethnic animosity or community self-preservation as the key motivation for
the fighting.
Some of those tensions are felt inside the UN base. Nuer camp dwellers in
general are too scared to go into town, which is controlled by the SPLA and
Olony's forces. They also know they are mistrusted by the other displaced
people: "because I am from Nassir, they think I am with the rebels", says
one. In February, several people were killed as fighting outside the camp
brought skirmishes within. Since then, the divisions have largely been kept
under control. The end of the rainy season is likely to bring more conflict
in Upper Nile state, and may raise the temperature within the camp too.
The fighting has also strengthened the desire of many Shilluk to call for
greater autonomy, a wish that, ironically, is also the ideology of the
federal system demanded by Riek Machar. Sitting on a plastic chair outside a
makeshift shelter in the UN camp, a social worker and respected elder,
Stanislas Obul, tells the story of the Hyena, the Leopard, the Lion and the
Snake, who end up killing each other. "These are the animals that cannot
live together", he says, before referring explicitly to the Nuer and the
Dinka.
Obul, like the chiefs in Wau Shilluk, and others in Upper Nile state, argues
for greater independence for the Shilluk and by extension everyone else in
South Sudan - a larger terrain in which the dangerous animals will not have
to mingle. This may not happen - and it may not be desirable, given the
danger of creating 'tribal islands' which would dilute any sense of a strong
national identity. But certainties in South Sudan are being swept away by
the day.
James Copnall is a journalist and author of '
<
http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/a-poisonous-thorn-in-our-hearts/> A
Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts: Sudan and South Sudan's Bitter and Incomplete
Divorce'. He is editor of 'Making Sense of the Sudans'.
Received on Wed Oct 08 2014 - 15:07:32 EDT