Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 19:38:57 +0200
Omar Al-Bashir: We cannot allow Shi'ite presence in Sudan
Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat about Sudan's
regional foreign policy
Written by : <http://www.aawsat.net/author/f-yousef> Fatah Al-Rahman
Youssef
on : Sunday, 12 Oct, 2014
Medina, Asharq Al-Awsat-Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir was at pains to
highlight Khartoum's ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf during his latest
visit to the Kingdom, stressing that Sudan does not have any "strategic"
ties to Iran.
He dubbed claims of Iranian-Sudanese cooperation and coordination as "false,
fabricated and exaggerated," warning that these allegations were being put
forward by enemies of Sudan in order to harm Khartoum's relations with the
Arab Gulf.
In a broad-ranging interview with Asharq Al-Awsat after performing Hajj, the
Sudanese president discussed Khartoum's ties with Iran and the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), as well as Sudan's ties to Egypt and Libya.
Bashir talked about the Sudanese Interior Ministry's recent decision to shut
down Iranian cultural centers-affiliated to the Iranian consulate in
Khartoum-across the country, stressing that he completely rejects
"Shiitization."
Asharq Al-Awsat: There has recently been a lot of talk about the strained
ties between Saudi Arabia and Sudan. What is the reality of the relations
between Riyadh and Khartoum? How important are these ties to you?
Omar Al-Bashir: Sudanese-Saudi ties are entrenched and well-rooted in
history on all levels. Ties between the two countries are based on historic
links driven by a common destiny. Yes, we admit that our ties with Saudi
Arabia were frosty but these were not strained because there is no reason
for that. Relations would not have reached this stage were it not for false
information being leaked about the situation in Sudan and the country's
foreign ties, particularly with Iran. This information was exaggerated.
Thanks to our ongoing communication with the Saudi leadership, which we do
not wish to suspend, we explained our firm positions, including our keen
desire to strengthen our ties with the Kingdom.
Q: Did you clarify the truth behind this leaked information to the Saudi
leadership, particularly regarding Khartoum's alleged ties to Tehran?
Certainly, we explained our view and the true image of our ties with Tehran
was clarified. All of the information that reached the Saudi leadership
within this context was false, fabricated and exaggerated. This was clearly
shown following the issuance of the recent decision stipulating the closure
of Iranian culture centers [in Sudan]. This was a strategic step rather than
a move to conceal the truth from Gulf States or gain their trust. There are
Shi'ites in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, among others, [but] we cannot
allow them to have a presence in Sudan.
Q: How do you respond to those who say that Sudan is adopting an approach of
political dissimulation in its ties with Iran and the GCC; holding firm to
its strategic ties with Tehran while at the same time denying this?
First of all, there are no strategic ties between [Sudan] and Iran. Our ties
with Iran are very normal. As I said, some sides with particular agendas aim
to pump exaggerated information. I can give you a simple example of this.
You may recall the controversy that was raised over [Iranian] warships
entering the regional waters of Port Sudan. The fact is that these two
warships arrived in the Red Sea two months before and requested to access
Port Sudan from the Sudanese Ministry of Defense. The defense ministry did
not respond. The warships took our silence for rejection. However these same
two warships [later] entered Saudi ports because the whole idea behind ports
is to provide fuel services. On their next journey the two warships were
granted access to Port Sudan.
This clearly explains the extent to which our ties with Iran have been
exaggerated and amplified. Let me ask you this: What strategic aspects are
there in our ties with Iran? I do not think that these ties include any
"strategic" features. The bottom line is that any talk of Sudan having
strategic ties with Iran is pure fabrication and cheap propaganda through
which some sides are seeking to achieve their own goals at the expense of
our ties with our brothers in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia in particular.
Q: And the closure of Iranian cultural centers across Sudan? This was not an
attempt to contain the domestic and foreign outrage over what has been
described as the "Shiitization" of Sudan?
We are first and foremost Sunnis, not Shi'ites, and so we are working toward
strengthening the Sunni community which is already entrenched in Sudanese
society and does not require any effort from us in this regard. We cannot
have "strategic" ties with Iran at this time when everybody is familiar with
the escalating tensions between Sunnis and Shi'ites. Let me assure you that
we already have enough problems in Sudan, whether factional or tribal, and
therefore are not willing to create new and unnecessary crises. We are
completely against Shiitization.
Therefore, when we started to hear the talk about Shiitization in Sudan with
reports suggesting that there were as many as 12,000 Shi'ites in Sudan, we
had no choice but to confront this and not remain silent about this danger.
The fact that Iran has a cultural centre in Khartoum and that we have one in
Tehran does not mean that either side is seeking to exploit Sunni-Shi'ite
tensions. We do not intend to convert their Shi'ites into Sunnis. Therefore,
we do not accept them converting our Sunnis into Shi'ites.
Q: Can Sudan have a role in bridging the rift in the Gulf region,
particularly by mending fences between Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain on the
one hand and Qatar on the other?
Absolutely, we are extremely keen to unite Gulf ranks since it represents
the basic building block towards uniting Arab ranks. We have a strong desire
to fortify our ties with the Gulf because at the end of the day we share the
same destiny. And we are also currently seeking to deepen our ties with
Saudi Arabia. Our main concern is to work together to push against the
genuine threats to the region. At this point, I would like to issue general
reminder that we should not let the fog of war against the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) blur our vision regarding what the Houthis are doing
in Yemen.
Q: According to recent reports, you are set to visit Egypt in the near
future. What is on your agenda for your meeting with Egyptian President
Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi? How do you view Sudanese-Egyptian ties?
I have to emphasise that there are deep bilateral ties [between the two
countries] without any sort of problems. These ties have been practically
translated into a number of achievements on the ground including the
establishment of road links between the two countries. These roads are open
and so is trade between Egypt and Sudan.
Q: You have been accused by Libya and particularly by the government of
Abdullah Al-Thinni, of supporting Islamist militias there. Can you tell us a
little more about the circumstances behind these accusations? Is Khartoum in
contact with the Thinni government in Tobruk?
How can Prime Minister Thinni make this accusation which is based on false
information when he is the one who signed the agreement between Sudan and
Libya stipulating the deployment of joint forces in Libya to secure the
border? Under the agreement, we have trained 1,200 military students for the
National Army, not the rebel army.
We emphasize that we are working towards supporting the Libyan government
and have always said that neither Sudan nor any of Libya's neighbors should
be a party to the conflict that is going on there. We do not wish to be
involved in the conflict in Libya, and insist that our role be limited to
employing our ties for the purpose of uniting Libyan ranks rather than
working on behalf of one side against another.
Q: What about claims that you supported the Muslim Brotherhood during the
Libyan revolution.
The Brotherhood did not have any presence in Libya when the revolution broke
out. This is because Muammar Gaddafi had pursued, killed and imprisoned
them. We supported the Brotherhood at the time because we knew they
represented the Libyan people, not a certain side or political trend. We
have supported all rebels by providing them with weapons and ammunition.
This is why we have ties with all the rebel groups in Libya. Therefore, we
can make use of these ties to mend fences and unite the ranks of all Libyan
parties.
This is an abridged version of an interview originally conducted in Arabic.
Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir looks on during a meeting with former
South African President and head of African Union High-Level Implementation
Panel (AUHIP) Thabo Mbeki (unseen) in Khartoum on September 10, 2014. (AFP
Photo/Ashraf Shazly)
Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir looks on during a meeting with former
South African President and head of African Union High-Level Implementation
Panel (AUHIP) Thabo Mbeki (unseen) in Khartoum on September 10, 2014. (AFP
Photo/Ashraf Shazly)
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