Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 12:13:40 +0200
Is Djibouti a Reliable Partner in the Fight Against Terrorism?
by Aaron Kovac
<http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/author/aaron-kovac/>
October 14, 2014
Sandwiched between basket-case Somalia and Eritrea, Djibouti is a surprising
safe heaven of stability in the Horn of Africa. Thanks to its geographical
position, some 20 miles off the coast of war-torn Yemen, this small,
impoverished country has become in the past 15 years the West's unsung hero
in the never-ending war on terror and piracy. Serving as a military
<http://www.wired.com/2012/10/secret-drone-base/> foothold for the U.S.,
France, Germany and Japan, its strategic importance for the West is
unparalleled in Africa. More than 4000 U.S. personnel are deployed on the
ground at the Camp Lemonnier military base, a halcyon inherited by
Washington from the former French colonial masters.
According to a sweeping investigation carried out by the
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-us-base-at-cor
e-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story
.html> Washington Post's Craig Whitlock in 2012, "Camp Lemonnier is the
centerpiece of an expanding constellation of half a dozen U.S. drone and
surveillance bases in Africa." Indeed, Djibouti is now the epicenter of
America's drone shadow war started in the aftermath of 9/11. The military
base saw a multibillion-dollar revamp and is now home to hundreds of
secretive Special Forces operatives, rows of helicopters and fighter jets
plus an undisclosed number of Predator drones. Together they occupy a slice
of land of some 2 square kilometers in a country the size of New Jersey.
Under the cover of the government's tantrum provoking refrain of "we can
neither confirm nor deny," surveillance infiltrations, counter-terrorism
raids, pirate take-downs and terrorist assassination have been staged from
Camp Lemonnier. Drones that have as port of call this low-profile African
base took out headline grabbing targets such as
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/aden-hashi-ayro-militant-islam
ist-leader-in-somalia-820385.html> Aden Hashi Farah, a top al-Qaida Somali
operative, or <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/12/23/manhunt> Qaed
Salim Sinan Al Harethi, one of the perpetrators of the 2000 attack on the
U.S.S. Cole.
An article published by <http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175891/> Tom's
Dispatch in September 2014 cited an unreleased Pentagon investigation into
the military's "ill-planned" war for hearts and minds in Africa, which
points that operations conducted from Camp Lemonnier were kept hidden under
press releases touting humanitarian projects, further surrounding the
activities of the base in an impenetrable shroud of secrecy.
As of 2012, the base played a central role in
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/remote-us-base-at-core-of-
secret-operations-8227588.html> three classified military operations,
codename Copper Dune, Jupiter Garret and Octave Shield. As Africa Command
declined to provide details for the latter two over security restrictions,
we only know that Copper Dune is the name assigned to the military's
counterterrorist operations in Yemen. Moreover, government and military
officials have <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26078149> repeatedly
refused calls to answer journalists' questions and the few investigations
conducted in the bases' affairs were largely based on public-records
requests.
What is clear though is that the U.S. heavily relies on this military base,
after Washington
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/world/africa/us-signs-new-lease-to-keep-s
trategic-military-installation-in-the-horn-of-africa.html> recently renewed
its lease contract for 10 years (with an option for extension for 10 more),
even as the Djiboutian government doubled the rent. Indeed, upkeep costs
jumped from roughly $30 million to $63 million per year, to which an extra
$7 million in economic aid to the government was added. The announcement
came following a 40-minute meeting at the White House between Barack Obama
and his Djibouti counterpart, Ismail Omer Guelleh. "Obviously, Camp
Lemonnier is extraordinarily important not only to our work throughout the
Horn of Africa but throughout the region," Obama was quoted as saying in the
New York Times.
The French government, along with the Japanese and German governments have
<http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa
/0413bp_djibouti.pdf> closed similar deals in order to secure access to the
strategic port of Djibouti, Africa's largest. This allows them to maintain a
naval presence in the pirate infested waters of the Bab-el-Mandeb strait and
protect essential trade lanes. Even Moscow tried to negotiate a
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/world/africa/us-signs-new-lease-to-keep-s
trategic-military-installation-in-the-horn-of-africa.html> military presence
in the tiny African country, but its efforts were rejected by the
government.
But this favorable status quo is now under threat, as the African continent
is undergoing its most dramatic political shift since the fall of the Iron
Curtain.
Turning East?
For the better part of a decade, China has been courting strategic "
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/6/inside-china-long-march-to-a
frica/?page=all> choke points" in Africa, striking generous military deals
with countries such as Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Algeria or Ethiopia. In 2013,
China became
<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2014/0319/China-s-trad
e-with-Africa-at-record-high> Africa's largest trading partner, with over
$200 billion in total trade, surpassing the E.U., the U.S. and Japan. As a
point of reference, bilateral trade between the two blocs stood at a paltry
<http://www.globaltradealert.org/sites/default/files/GTA5_danchie.pdf> $12
billion in 2002.
In recent years though, Djibouti seems to have succumbed to China's buying
spree in Africa. A series of ambivalent deals closed with Beijing on
delicate matters of infrastructure and defense could very well signal a
change of course in the country's future strategy.
Since 2008, China has been involved in the Gulf of Aden due to its first
major security operations outside its sovereign territory aimed at
protecting Chinese vessels. For this, Beijing has extensively relied on
Djibouti's port, so much so that it even bought a 23.5% share for
<http://www.capitalethiopia.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=2289:chinese-company-buys-share-in-djibouti-port&catid=54:news&Itemid=27>
$185 million in 2013. Moreover, the two countries have signed a contract to
start building a new multi purpose port in 2013, a railway link between
Ethiopia's capital Addis Abada and the capital of Djibouti plus a
far-reaching defense partnership to enhance the capacities of the African
country's armed forces.
Naturally, the U.S. didn't take these developments lightly, and National
Security Advisor Susan Rice
<http://www.africaintelligence.com/ION/politics-power/2014/03/21/washington-
offers-sweetener-to-iog,108013609-ART> expressed deep concerns over China's
plans for an aero-naval base in the Obock region during a meeting had with
the Djiboutian President earlier this year. Her visit was part of an effort
mounted by Washington to maintain Djibouti in its sphere of influence.
Djibouti's foreign policy agenda cannot be understood without looking at the
nation's haphazard political class. Guelleh, who has ruled the country with
an iron hand since he succeeded his uncle Hassan Gouled Aptidon in 1999, has
become increasingly erratic in recent years. Infighting between allies,
coupled with his failing health, have led the president take some unexpected
decisions. A strategic partnership with Dubai, which saw trade links between
the two countries expand exponentially thanks to a
<http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/12/africa-ports-trade-business-oxford-analyti
ca.html> $400 million investment in a new container terminal at Doraleh, is
now teetering after the principal business agent in the Dubai venture
challenged Guelleh's decision to run for a third consecutive term in 2010.
This internal fight prompted the Djiboutian government to
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-11/djibouti-opposition-blames-politic
s-for-dp-world-concession-row.html> rescind Dubai's concession at Doraleh,
accusing the former ally of receiving bribes while negotiating the
concession agreement. This internal rivalry between Guelleh and opposition
leader Abdourahman Boreh has escalated to such an extent that it now
threatens Djibouti's foreign agenda with Dubai. Such signs do not bode well
for the country's other allies.
According to a
<http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa
/0413bp_djibouti.pdf> paper released by the Chatham House in April 2013,
"Djibouti's strategic role as host to US, French and other foreign military
facilities is unlikely to change in the medium term." With Djibouti's
strategic importance beyond a shadow of a doubt, the only question that
remains unanswered is whether the West can actually trust this small country
wedged between so many competing spheres of influence.
U.S. Marines exit a MV-22 Osprey aircraft during an exercise at the Arta
Range training area near Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, Oct. 26, 2013. Chad
Thompson
U.S. Marines exit a MV-22 Osprey aircraft during an exercise at the Arta
Range training area near Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, Oct. 26, 2013. Chad
Thompson
(image/jpeg attachment: image001.jpg)