Enhancing the Efficiency of the African Standby Force: The Case for a Shift
to a Just-in-Time Rapid Response Force
14 October 2014
Is it time for the African Standby Force (ASF) to revise its operating
model? Cedric de Coning believes so. By transforming itself from a standing
readiness to a just-in-time force, the ASF would enhance the African Union’s
ability to deploy military, law enforcement and civilian resources in its
peace operations.
By Cedric de Coning for African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of
Disputes (ACCORD)
When political or social tensions result in violent conflict, the solution
that is usually most prominently on the table is the rapid deployment of a
peace support operation, as in the recent cases of the Central African
Republic (CAR) and South Sudan. This is why the 2002 Protocol establishing
the African Union’s (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) provided for the
establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF is composed of
standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian, police and military
components in their countries of origin. When fully operational by end-2015,
the rapid deployment capacity (RDC) of the ASF should be on standing
readiness to deploy within 14 days, in response to mass atrocity crimes.
This target has, however, proven to be quite a challenge. In fact, there is
no international or regional organisation that can deploy such a force
within 14 days. There are only a handful of countries in the world that have
the kind of standing readiness capacity to deploy at such speeds. If
pursuing this kind of response time is unrealistic, is it not time to take
stock and question whether this is the type of model in which we should
continue to invest our efforts? This article questions whether it is time
for the ASF to shift from a standing readiness model to a just-in-time rapid
response model. An overview is provided of the progress made with the
establishment of the ASF to date.
Then, on the basis of an assessment of the actual African capabilities, as
reflected in its deployments and operations, an argument for adjusting the
ASF model to a more realistic and efficient just-in-time rapid response
model is made.
The African Standby Force
The ASF is one of the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture
(APSA), alongside the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the
Wise, the Military Staff Committee, the Peace Fund and the AU’s PSC. The ASF
is thus part of a holistic African approach to engaging in conflict
prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
The ASF is a continental standby capacity with a brigade-sized
multidimensional (military, police and civilian) standby arrangement in each
of the AU’s five regions: North, South, East, West and Central Africa. The
policy framework envisaged six scenarios for ASF deployments, ranging in
intensity and complexity from Scenario 1 to Scenario 6, with Scenario 5
providing for a complex peace operation and Scenario 6 providing for a rapid
(14-day) peace enforcement response to mass atrocity crimes. Each regional
standby arrangement should have an RDC with units that are pre-identified,
prepared and verified, and then placed on standing readiness so that they
are able to deploy within 14 days. The model also implies that the AU and
its regions must have functioning headquarters, with matching continental
and regional logistical bases that can plan and support such operations,
including the strategic lif t arrangements necessary to deploy the RDC
within the 14-day time period.
The ASF Policy Framework was approved in 2003, and has been implemented in
several phases or ‘roadmaps’. The initial target was set for 2010, but when
that target was only partially met, a new target for full operational
capability was set for 2015.
The African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC)
Over the last decade, in a parallel development to the establishment of the
ASF, the AU has deployed several peace operations, including to Burundi
(AMIB), Darfur (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM). Over time, frustration built up
around the tension between the investment in an ASF capability that would
only be ready in 2010 – later postponed to 2015 – and the need to deploy
troops, police officers and civilians, as well as their equipment, to actual
and ongoing operations. This tension came to a head in 2012, when the
Government of Mali asked France to intervene in its crisis because the AU
and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) were perceived
not to be able to deploy their forces rapidly enough to deal decisively with
the unfolding crisis in Mali.
<
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=184350#_e
dn1> [i]
As a result of this frustration, a number of African countries decided to
jointly create the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC)
in January 2013. The ACIRC was presented as an interim measure, aimed at
addressing the rapid response deficit until such time as the ASF and its RDC
reached full operational capability. The ACIRC is a voluntary arrangement,
where those countries with the necessary capabilities make them available
under the auspices of the AU. The distinguishing feature of the ACIRC is
that it proposes a coalition-of-the-willing model that will be deployed by
its contributors, initially at their own cost, under a lead-nation model.
However, such a coalition will require AU approval for it to operate under
AU auspices.
These factors – voluntary participation, coalition-of-thewilling, lead
nation, self-funded – are all designed to make this mechanism more rapid.
However, because the ACIRC model is voluntary, it will also fail to address
the AU’s need to have a predictable rapid deployment capability.
In practice, it means that countries will only be willing to deploy at their
own cost when they have dire national interests at stake.
<
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=184350#_e
dn2> [ii]
2013 Assessment of the ASF
In the context of the Mali experience and the decision to establish the
ACIRC, the January 2013 AU General Assembly asked for an assessment of the
progress made to date with the establishment of the ASF. To meet this
request, the chairperson of the Commission appointed an independent panel of
experts in July 2013 to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the ASF.
<
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=184350#_e
dn3> [iii] The panel submitted its report in December 2013, and in January
2014 the report and the recommendations of the panel were endorsed by both
the ministers of Defence and Security and the AU Summit.
The panel found that despite progress towards operationalising the ASF,
significant shortcomings, gaps and obstacles still remain. The panel was of
the opinion that at the current pace and scope of effort, it is unlikely
that the ASF will achieve full operational capability by the end of 2015.
Therefore, the panel recommended that to achieve full operational capability
by the end of 2015, a major effort will be needed over the following 18 to
24 months. The panel presented a plan of action that was aimed at addressing
those key areas which, if left unaddressed, would make it impossible to
achieve full operational capability.
The panel also recommended that the AU gives special attention to the
financing of its peace support operations. The most significant constraint
on AU peace operations, and its ability to respond rapidly to unfolding
crises, is the inability of the AU member states to fund their own
operations. The AU cannot make its own independent decisions regarding the
mandate, scope, size and duration of its peace operations, as long as it is
dependent on external partners to cover the cost of its peace operations.
The panel thus strongly supported the emphasis the AU is currently placing
on generating its own resources. At the same time, the panel recommended
that the AU takes steps to reduce the cost of the ASF by right-sizing its
concept, structures and policies, including the concept of mission support,
in particular.
The panel also recommended that the AU considers undertaking a Brahimi-type
high-level strategic review of the future of the ASF and African peace
support operations. The ASF was designed on assumptions derived mainly from
the UN’s multidimensional peacekeeping experiences of the 1990s. Since then,
the AU has managed peace operations of its own in Burundi, the CAR, Darfur,
Mali and Somalia. As a result of these operational experiences, the AU, the
regions and the member states involved have started to develop their own
body of knowledge on African-led peace operations. A significant gap has
opened up between the consensual peacekeeping model the ASF is designed for,
and the actual peace enforcement and stability operations the AU has been
called on to undertake in Somalia, Mali and the CAR. The panel argued that
the existing ASF Policy Framework should be reviewed against these
experiences, and be aligned with the realities of the African peace
operation experience. This will ensure that a new strategic vision for
African peace operations and the ASF will be in place, which can inform the
future of the ASF beyond 2015.
Impact of the ASF on New and Ongoing AU Peace Operations
The panel also noted that it is artificial to reflect on the standby
capacity of the ASF, without also reflecting on the significant increase in
actual African peace operations capacity since the launch of the ASF project
a decade ago. This increase is reflected in the number and scale of peace
operations undertaken by the AU over this period, and the contributions from
African troop-contributing countries to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping
operations.
In total, approximately 40 000 uniformed and civilian personnel were
mandated to serve in AU peace operations in 2013 (approximately 71 000, if
the joint AU-UN hybrid mission in Darfur is also taken into account).
<
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=184350#_e
dn4> [iv] In addition, African contributions to UN peacekeeping operations
have increased steadily during this period – from a little over 10 000 per
annum in 2003, when the ASF project was launched, to approximately 35 000
per annum by 2013. This means that, in 2013, more than 75 000 African
peacekeepers served in African and UN peace operations.
<
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=184350#_e
dn5> [v]
Since the establishment of the ASF, the AU has deployed missions of its own
to Burundi, Darfur, Somalia, Mali and the CAR.
<
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=184350#_e
dn6> [vi] Each of these missions involved political decision-making
processes, planning, deployment, strategic and operational management and
mission support. Several of these missions were also handed over and
liquidated. Together, they represent a significant demonstration of capacity
and experience. All these missions have been undertaken with support from
the UN, European Union (EU) and bilateral partners, and they thus also
reflect a growing body of experience with various forms of partnerships and
collaborative action. In most of these missions, the ASF planning elements
at the continental and regional levels have been involved in the planning
and management of the missions, and the ASF regional centres of excellence
have been involved in the training, preparation and evaluation of these
missions.
Despite this record, some observers continue to criticise the ASF as
ineffective, because its standing readiness model has not yet been utilised
as envisaged. The panel argued that this distinction between the ASF –
understood as the units, equipment and personnel pledged under the ASF – and
the actual units and personnel deployed to AU peace operations, are
artificial. The 75 000 African peacekeepers deployed in 2013 come from the
same member states that have pledged contributions to the ASF, which
demonstrates that these member states do have these capabilities and are
able to deploy them when needed.
When it comes to rapid deployment, it should be noted that the AU, together
with its troop-contributing countries and partners, have deployed forces
into Somalia and the CAR far more rapidly over the last 24 months than the
EU or the UN. It can therefore be argued that Africa’s actual deployed
capacity is a stronger indicator of Africa’s real peace operation capability
than the pledges reflected in the ASF. At the same time, we need to
acknowledge that the ASF is not only going to generate value at some point
in future; it is already significantly contributing to preparing the
capabilities that are deployed to actual African and UN peace operations.
The Case for a Just-in-time Rapid Response Model
The logic behind the standby concept is that the ability to deploy a peace
operation rapidly will be greatly enhanced if you preselect soldiers, police
officers and civilian experts; prepare and train them; make sure they have
the necessary equipment and support systems in place; and then place them on
a standing readiness mode, waiting for a decision to deploy them. The
standby model assumes that such a standing readiness capacity is a necessary
precondition for rapid deployment, but acknowledges that it is not
sufficient to ensure that a peace operation can be rapidly deployed when
faced with a dire crisis. Two additional factors highlighted in the 2013 ASF
assessment – the political decision-making process and the financing of
peace operations – have already been mentioned.
The ASF and all other such standby arrangements suffer from two further
interrelated vulnerabilities. The first is the political will of the
contributing countries to participate in any given operation. Agreeing to
participate in a standby arrangement is one thing, but agreeing to
participate in a specific peace operation is a separate decision altogether.
The second is the match between the context-specific needs of a specific
mission at hand and the off-the-shelf generic design of the standby force.
It is a combination of these two vulnerabilities that has
undermined all international efforts to date to establish standby
arrangements that can generate predictable rapid response mechanisms. The UN
Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)
<
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=184350#_e
dn7> [vii] initiative, the EU Battle Group concept and the ASF share these
same vulnerabilities. The SHIRBRIG initiative has already been abandoned,
and it is unlikely that the EU Battle Group and the ASF’s standing readiness
capacity will be used as envisaged. This is because each crisis is unique,
and it is doubtful that a generic standby capacity can sufficiently match
the needs – both in terms of the political coalition and the operational
capabilities – posed by the specific challenge. Each crisis requires a
context-specific solution, including the coming together of a unique set of
countries that have a political interest in the resolution of the conflict,
or have an interest in being part of that particular mission. Each crisis
also requires a slightly different set of capacities, and the off-the-shelf
generic standby brigade model does not meet such needs. This explains why
the AU, EU and UN have not found a direct use for its standing readiness
arrangements to date.
Rapid deployment can, of course, only happen if there are capabilities at
national level that can be deployed. The basic assumption or logic of the
standby model thus holds true at national level, but falls apart when it is
applied at the multinational level. This is because at this level the
decisive factor is not capabilities and readiness, but how those
capabilities are coalesced in a political coalition that forges together
political will, financial means, the capacity to plan, deploy and manage an
operation and the national capabilities that can be deployed.
National interest is a subtle and often indirect driver in the consensual
type of peace operations the UN and EU typically undertake, but it is still
vitally important. In the AU context, where the operations undertaken to
date have almost all been peace enforcement operations, with
a stabilisation mandate that requires a higher degree of intensity,
robustness and risk, the national interest of the major troop-contributing
countries, in particular, has been of decisive importance. Both the missions
in Somalia and the CAR have sustained heavy losses.
<
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=184350#_e
dn8> [viii] A country with no interest in a given crisis is unlikely to
agree to its capabilities being deployed in a high-intensity and high-risk
operation, just because they agreed to be part of a regional standby
arrangement. What can be concluded from the ASF experience to date is that
the general effort to establish the ASF has contributed significantly to the
capacity of the AU, the regions and AU member states to plan, prepare, train
and deploy military, police and civilian capacities to actual missions.
However, the standing readiness dimension of the ASF concept – that is, the
idea of specific pre-identified military and police units being prepared,
verified and then placed on standing readiness, so that they can be deployed
rapidly when called upon to do so – has not, and is unlikely to be used as
assumed in the design of the ASF.
This leads to the recommendation that we should adjust the post-2015 ASF
concept to one that is aimed at generating a just-in-time capacity, rather
than a standing readiness capacity. A just-in-time model will focus on
developing common standards and procedures, including through joint training
and exercises. It should also have a special focus on developing AU,
regional and national planning, command, mission management and mission
support capabilities.
There may be a place for the ACIRC lead-nation model, especially in dire
emergencies when rapid response is critical, but the just-in-time ASF model
proposed here foresees situations where the AU, in close cooperation with
the regions, plays the lead role in putting together, planning, deploying
and commanding its own peace operations.
This proposal does not imply that we abandon the ASF – only that we move
away from the standing readiness model and, in its place, develop a
just-in-time model. At the national level, many AU member states should, and
do, have some units on standby to respond to national and international
crises, regardless of the ASF, so the suggestion is not that member states
move away from the standing readiness concept at national level.
A just-in-time model will require a leaner ASF investment, because less
effort will be needed to manage the pledging and verification of specific
units, and to manage the model of rotating the responsibility for being on
standing readiness among regions. This shift will allow the AU and the
regions to focus more on the preparation of just-in-time modalities and the
planning for and management of actual missions. This would be a much more
realistic use of limited resources.
The one exception is the civilian dimension of the ASF. Nations have
military and police capacities that they can make available for AU peace
operations, but they do not deploy civilian experts in the same way.
Civilian experts are hired by the AU in their individual capacities. This is
why it is necessary for the AU, in cooperation with the regions and member
states, to continue to identify, train and roster civilian experts in
political affairs, human rights, public information, humanitarian liaison
and all the other specialities identified in the ASF Civilian Policy
Framework.
<
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=184350#_e
dn9> [ix]
It is now time, based on our experience with the ASF and actual AU
operations over the past decade, to take stock and acknowledge that the
standing readiness aspect of the ASF concept is not going to generate the
kind of predictable rapid response the AU member states desired when they
agreed to establish the ASF. Instead, we should shift our focus to a
just-in-time model based on three elements:
1. the modalities necessary to put together contextspecific coalitions
consisting of the AU, regions, member states and partners;
2. the ability of member states to contribute military, police and civilian
capabilities; and
3. the ability of the AU and regions to plan, deploy, manage and support
peace operations.
We also have to invest much more in prevention, peacemaking and
peacebuilding, so as to limit the cases where rapid responses may be
necessary. Mali may have been a reminder that we will not always succeed in
deploying rapidly, but Somalia and the CAR have also shown us that the AU,
together with its member states and partners, can deploy troops at
remarkable speed. The reasons why we were able to deploy much faster in the
latter cases has less to do with predesigned standing readiness arrangements
and more to do with the kind of political will the AU was able to generate,
and the context-specific coalitions the AU, interested member states and
partners were able to put together. This is why a just-in-time standby
arrangement is likely to be the more realistic and costeffective option for
the future of the ASF.
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_____
<
http://weai.isn.ethz.ch/weai/plugins/KmsWeai.Context/webapp/javascript/FCKe
ditor/editor/fckeditor.html?InstanceName=INEWSARTICLE_NEWSTEXT&Toolbar=INEWS
ARTICLE_NEWSTEXT#_ednref1> [i] For an overview of these developments, see:
Théroux-Bénoni, Lori-Anne (2013) ‘Mali in the Aftermath of the French
Military Intervention: New Opportunities or Back to Square One?’, Available
at: [Accessed 12 May 2014].
<
http://weai.isn.ethz.ch/weai/plugins/KmsWeai.Context/webapp/javascript/FCKe
ditor/editor/fckeditor.html?InstanceName=INEWSARTICLE_NEWSTEXT&Toolbar=INEWS
ARTICLE_NEWSTEXT#_ednref2> [ii] Ero, Comfort (2013) ‘The Problems with
African Solutions’, Available at: [Accessed 12 May 2014].
<
http://weai.isn.ethz.ch/weai/plugins/KmsWeai.Context/webapp/javascript/FCKe
ditor/editor/fckeditor.html?InstanceName=INEWSARTICLE_NEWSTEXT&Toolbar=INEWS
ARTICLE_NEWSTEXT#_ednref3> [iii] The author was a member of the panel of
experts, but writes here in his own capacity.
<
http://weai.isn.ethz.ch/weai/plugins/KmsWeai.Context/webapp/javascript/FCKe
ditor/editor/fckeditor.html?InstanceName=INEWSARTICLE_NEWSTEXT&Toolbar=INEWS
ARTICLE_NEWSTEXT#_ednref4> [iv] For deployment figures, see: and
bit.ly/1g02Wrz> [both accessed 8 May 2014].
<
http://weai.isn.ethz.ch/weai/plugins/KmsWeai.Context/webapp/javascript/FCKe
ditor/editor/fckeditor.html?InstanceName=INEWSARTICLE_NEWSTEXT&Toolbar=INEWS
ARTICLE_NEWSTEXT#_ednref5> [v] See Lotze, Walter (2013) ‘Strengthening
African Peace Support Operations’, Available at: [Accessed 12 May 2014].
<
http://weai.isn.ethz.ch/weai/plugins/KmsWeai.Context/webapp/javascript/FCKe
ditor/editor/fckeditor.html?InstanceName=INEWSARTICLE_NEWSTEXT&Toolbar=INEWS
ARTICLE_NEWSTEXT#_ednref6> [vi] For a comprehensive list of African peace
operations, see Williams, Paul D. (2013) ‘Peace Operations in Africa:
Lessons Learned Since 2000’, Available at: [Accessed 12 May 2014].
<
http://weai.isn.ethz.ch/weai/plugins/KmsWeai.Context/webapp/javascript/FCKe
ditor/editor/fckeditor.html?InstanceName=INEWSARTICLE_NEWSTEXT&Toolbar=INEWS
ARTICLE_NEWSTEXT#_ednref7> [vii] Koops, Joachim and Varwick, Johannes (2008)
‘Ten Years of SHIRBRIG: Lessons Learned, Development Prospects and Strategic
Opportunities for Germany’, Available at: SQV4yF> [Accessed 12 May 2014].
<
http://weai.isn.ethz.ch/weai/plugins/KmsWeai.Context/webapp/javascript/FCKe
ditor/editor/fckeditor.html?InstanceName=INEWSARTICLE_NEWSTEXT&Toolbar=INEWS
ARTICLE_NEWSTEXT#_ednref8> [viii] Leijenaar, Annette and Heitman, Helmoed
(2014) ‘Africa can Solve its own Problems with Proper Planning and Full
Implementation of the African Standby Force’, Available at: [Accessed 12 May
2014].
<
http://weai.isn.ethz.ch/weai/plugins/KmsWeai.Context/webapp/javascript/FCKe
ditor/editor/fckeditor.html?InstanceName=INEWSARTICLE_NEWSTEXT&Toolbar=INEWS
ARTICLE_NEWSTEXT#_ednref9> [ix] De Coning, Cedric and Kasumba, Yvonne (2010)
The Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force. AU and ACCORD, South
Africa.
_____
Cedric de Coning is an Advisor to the Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Units
at ACCORD. He is also a Senior Research Fellow with the Norwegian Institute
of International Affairs (NUPI).
Received on Tue Oct 14 2014 - 08:54:57 EDT