Tomdispatch.com: What Could Possibly Go Wrong? Seven Worst-Case Scenarios in the Battle with the Islamic State

From: Berhane Habtemariam <Berhane.Habtemariam_at_gmx.de_at_dehai.org>
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 18:38:35 +0200

What Could Possibly Go Wrong?
Seven Worst-Case Scenarios in the Battle with the Islamic State
By <http://www.tomdispatch.com/authors/petervanburen> Peter Van Buren

17.10.2014

You know the joke? You describe something obviously heading for disaster --
a friend crossing Death Valley with next to no gas in his car -- and then
add, "What could possibly go wrong?"

Such is the Middle East today. The U.S. is again at war there, bombing
freely across Iraq and Syria, advising here, droning there,
coalition-building in the region to loop in a
<http://www.timesofisrael.com/arab-states-play-meager-role-in-anti-is-campai
gn-figures-show/> little more firepower from a collection of recalcitrant
allies, and searching desperately for some non-American boots to put on the
ground.

Here, then, are seven worst-case scenarios in a part of the world where the
worst case has regularly been the best that's on offer. After all, with all
that military power being brought to bear on the planet's most volatile
region, what could possibly go wrong?

1. The Kurds

The lands the Kurds generally consider their own have long been divided
among Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. None of those countries wish to give up
any territory to an independence-minded ethnic minority, no less find a
powerful, oil-fueled Kurdish state on their borders.

In Turkey, the Kurdish-inhabited border area with Iraq has for years been a
low-level war zone, with the powerful Turkish military
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/19/world/europe/19turkey.html?_r=0>
shelling, bombing, and occasionally sending in its army to attack rebels
there. In Iran, the Kurdish population is smaller than in Iraq and the
border area between the two countries more open for accommodation and trade.
(The Iranians, for instance, reportedly
<http://www.aina.org/news/20140508185001.htm> refine oil for the Iraqi
Kurds, who put it on the black market and also buy natural gas from Iran.)
That country has nonetheless
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/19/world/europe/19turkey.html?_r=0> shelled
the Kurdish border area from time to time.

The Kurds have been fighting for a state of their own since at least
<http://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-crisis-iraq> 1923. Inside Iraq today,
they are in every practical sense a de facto independent state with their
own government and military. Since 2003, they have been strong enough to
challenge the Shia government in Baghdad far more aggressively than they
have. Their desire to do so has been constrained by pressure from Washington
to keep Iraq whole. In June, however, their military, the
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28738975> Peshmerga, seized the
disputed, oil-rich city of Kirkuk in the wake of the
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/mosul-isis-gunmen-middle-east-
states> collapse of the Iraqi army in Mosul and other northern cities in the
face of the militants of the Islamic State (IS). Lacking any alternative,
the Obama administration let the Kurds move in.

The Peshmerga are a big part of the current problem. In a near-desperate
need for some semi-competent proxy force, the U.S. and its NATO allies are
now arming and training them, serving as their air force in a big way, and
backing them as they inch into territory still in dispute with Baghdad as an
expedient response to the new "caliphate." This only means that, in the
future, Washington will have to face the problem of how to put the
proverbial genie back in the bottle if the Islamic State is ever pushed back
or broken.

 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/insurgents-seize-iraqi-city-of-mosul-as
-troops-flee/2014/06/10/21061e87-8fcd-4ed3-bc94-0e309af0a674_story.html>
Mosul, Iraq's second largest city and now under the control of the Islamic
State, is the most obvious example. Given the woeful state of the Iraqi
army, the Kurds may someday
<http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iraq-mosul-front-20141005-sto
ry.html> take it. That will not go down well in Baghdad and the result could
be massive sectarian violence long after IS is gone. We were given a
small-scale
<http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iraq-mosul-front-20141005-sto
ry.html> preview of what might happen in the town of Hassan Sham. The Kurds
took it back last month. In the process, some Shia residents reportedly
sided with their enemies, the Sunni militants of IS, rather than support the
advancing Peshmerga.

Worst-case scenario: A powerful Kurdistan emerges from the present mess of
American policy, fueling another major sectarian war in Iraq that will have
the potential to spill across borders. Whether or not Kurdistan is
recognized as a country with a U.N. seat, or simply becomes a Taiwan-like
state (real in all but name), it will change the power dynamic in the region
in ways that could put present problems in the shade. Changing a long-held
balance of power always has unintended consequences, especially in the
Middle East. Ask George W. Bush about his 2003 invasion of Iraq, which
kicked off most of the present mess.

2. Turkey

You can't, of course, talk about the Kurds without discussing Turkey, a
country caught in a vise. Its forces have battled for years against a
Kurdish separatist movement, personified by the
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan_Workers%27_Party> PKK, a group
Turkey, NATO, the European Union, and the United States all classify as a
<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/20/eng20051220_229424.html>
terrorist organization. Strife between the Turks and the PKK took
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6537751.stm> 37,000 lives in the 1980s
and 1990s before being reduced from a boil to a simmer thanks to European
Union diplomacy. The "problem" in Turkey is no small thing -- its Kurdish
minority, some 15 million people, makes up nearly
<http://www.newsweek.com/isis-take-kobane-natos-second-largest-army-sits-sid
elines-275798> 20% of the population.

When it comes to taking action in Syria, the Turks exist in a conflicted
realm because Washington has anointed the Kurds its boots on the ground.
Whatever it may think it's doing, the U.S. is helping empower the Kurdish
minority in Syria, including
<http://www.todayszaman.com/_turkish-security-forces-clash-with-kurds-as-pkk
-sends-aid-to-kobani_359364.html> PKK elements arrayed along the Turkish
border, with new weapons and training.

The Turkish ruling party has no particular love for those who run the
Islamic State, but its loathing for Syrian ruler Bashar al-Assad is such
that its leaders have long been willing to assist IS largely by looking the
other way. For some time, Turkey has been the obvious point of entry for
"foreign fighters" en route to Syria to
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/biden-apologizes-to-turkeys
-erdogan/2014/10/04/b3b5dc84-d97d-4381-ab7f-1754d495f84a_story.html> join IS
ranks. Turkey has also served as the
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/world/middleeast/struggling-to-starve-isi
s-of-oil-revenue-us-seeks-assistance-from-turkey.html?module=Search&mabRewar
d=relbias:r,%7b%221%22:%22RI:10%22%7d> exit point for much of the
black-market oil --
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/world/middleeast/struggling-to-starve-isi
s-of-oil-revenue-us-seeks-assistance-from-turkey.html?module=Search&mabRewar
d=relbias:r,%7b%221%22:%22RI:10%22%7d> $1.2 to $2 million a day -- that IS
has used to fund itself. Perhaps in return, the Islamic State released
<http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/20/world/europe/turkey-iraq-diplomats-freed/> 49
Turkish hostages it was holding, including diplomats without the usual
inflammatory beheading videos. In response to U.S.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/world/middleeast/struggling-to-starve-isi
s-of-oil-revenue-us-seeks-assistance-from-turkey.html?module=Search&mabRewar
d=relbias:r,%7b%221%22:%22RI:10%22%7d> requests to "do something," Turkey is
now
<http://news.yahoo.com/turkey-crackdown-oil-smugglers-feeding-121625624.html
?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter> issuing fines to oil smugglers,
though these have totaled only $5.7 million over the past 15 months, which
shows the nature of Turkey's commitment to the coalition.

The situation in the IS-besieged town of
<http://news.yahoo.com/kurds-halt-thrust-heart-syrias-kobane-monitor-0738186
11.html> Kobani illustrates the problem. The Turks have so far refused to
intervene to aid the Syrian Kurds. Turkish tanks sit idle on hills
overlooking the hand-to-hand combat less than a mile away. Turkish riot
police have
<http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-turkey-syria-military-2014100
2-story.html> prevented Turkish Kurds from reaching the town to help.
Turkish jets have <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29611582> bombed
PKK rebels inside Turkey, near the Iraqi border.

Meanwhile, U.S. air strikes do little more than make clear the limits of air
power and provide material for future historians to write about. American
bombs can slow IS, but can't recapture parts of a city. Short of destroying
Kobani by air to <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B%5Fn_Tre> save it, U.S.
power is limited without Turkish ground forces. Under the present
circumstances, the fighters of the Islamic State will either take the city
or it will slowly burn as they slug it out with the Kurds.

The Turkish price for intervention, publicly proclaimed, is the creation of
a U.S.-enforced
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/world/middleeast/turkish-support-of-coali
tion-fighting-isis-centers-on-border-buffer-zone-.html> buffer zone along
the border. The Turks would need to occupy this zone on the ground,
effectively ceding Syrian territory to Turkey (as a buffer zone occupied by
Kurds would not do). This would involve a further
<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2014/10/obama_s
_mission_creep_the_president_s_campaign_against_isis_is_pulling_him.html>
commitment from Washington, potentially placing American warplanes in direct
conflict with Syria's air defenses, which would have to be bombed, widening
the war further. A buffer zone would also do away with whatever secret
<http://consortiumnews.com/2014/09/17/reported-us-syrian-accord-on-air-strik
es/> agreements may exist between the U.S. and Assad. This zone would
represent another open-ended commitment, requiring additional U.S.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iraq/stories/nofly01069
9.htm> resources in a conflict that is already costing American taxpayers at
least
<http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/cost-u-s-campaign-against-isis
-roughly-1-billion-n215126> $10 million a day.

On the other hand, Washington's present policy essentially requires Turkey
to put aside its national goals to help us achieve ours. We've seen how such
a scenario has worked out in the past. (Google "Pakistan and the Taliban.")
But with Kobani in the news, the U.S.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/14/world/europe/not-so-fast-turkey-says-on-u
s-use-of-air-bases.html> may yet succeed in pressuring the Turks into
limited gestures, such as allowing American warplanes to use Turkish
airbases or letting the U.S. train some Syrian rebels
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29591916> on its territory. That
will not change the reality that Turkey will ultimately focus on its own
goals independent of the many more Kobanis to come.

Worst-case scenario: Chaos in Eastern Turkey's future, while the sun shines
on Assad and the Kurds. An influx of refugees are already
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/230-the-r
ising-costs-of-turkey-s-syrian-quagmire.aspx> taxing the Turks. Present
sectarian rumblings inside Turkey could turn white hot, with the Turks
finding themselves in open conflict with Kurdish forces as the U.S. sits
dumbly on the sidelines watching one ally fight another, an unintended
consequence of its Middle Eastern meddling. If the buffer zone comes to
pass, throw in the possibility of direct fighting between the U.S. and
Assad, with Russian President Vladimir Putin potentially finding an opening
to reengage in the area.

3. Syria

Think of Syria as the American war that never should have happened. Despite
years of
<http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10
886:ford-doesnt-mince-words-about-us-failures-in-syria&catid=1523&Itemid=428
> calls for U.S. intervention and some
<http://www.nationalreview.com/the-feed/343949/report-us-training-syrian-reb
els-jordan> training flirtations with Syrian rebel groups, the Obama
administration had managed (just barely) to stay clear of this particular
quagmire. In September 2013, President Obama walked right up to the edge of
sending bombers and cruise missiles against Assad's military over the
purported use of chemical weapons. He then used an uncooperative
<http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175746> Congress and a clever
<http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-quickly-jumped-on-kerrys-rhetorical-o
ffer-of-no-us-strike-if-assad-gives-up-chemical-weapons-2013-9> Putin-gambit
as an excuse to back down.

 <http://www.amazon.com/dp/1935462911/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20> This
year's model --
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/world/middleeast/fighting-on-multiple-fro
nts-in-syria.html?ref=world> ignore Assad, attack IS -- evolved over just a
few weeks as a limited
<http://wemeantwell.com/blog/2014/08/13/questions-about-the-yazidis-on-that-
iraq-mountain/> humanitarian action morphed into a fight to the finish
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/world/middleeast/obama-weighs-military-st
rikes-to-aid-trapped-iraqis-officials-say.html> against IS in Iraq and then
into <http://www.democracynow.org/2014/9/29/how_the_us_concocted_a_terror>
bombing Syria itself. As with any magician's trick, we all watched it happen
but still can't quite figure out quite how the sleight of hand was done.

Syria today is a country in ruins. But somewhere loose in that land are
unicorns -- creatures often spoken of but never seen -- the Obama
administration's much publicized "
<http://www.newyorker.com/humor/borowitz-report/moderate-syrian-rebel-applic
ation-form> moderate Syrian rebels." Who are they? The working definition
seems to be something like: people who oppose Assad, won't fight him for
now, but may in the meantime fight the Islamic State, and aren't too
"fundamentalist." The U.S. plans to throw
<http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/17/congress-arming-syriarebels
.html> arms and training at them as soon as it can find some of them, vet
them, and transport them to Saudi Arabia. If you are buying stock in the
Syrian market, look for anyone labeled "moderate warlord."

While the U.S. and its coalition attacks IS, some states (or at least
wealthy individuals) in that same band of brothers continue to funnel money
to the new caliphate to support its self-appointed role as a protector of
Sunnis and handy proxy against Shia empowerment in Iraq. Vice President Joe
Biden recently called out some of America's partners on this in what was
billed as another of his famous
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/biden-apologizes-to-turkeys
-erdogan/2014/10/04/b3b5dc84-d97d-4381-ab7f-1754d495f84a_story.html> gaffes,
requiring
<http://news.yahoo.com/uae-demands-clarification-bidens-comments-110626566.h
tml> apologies all around. If you want to see the best-case scenario for
Syria's future, have a look at Libya, a post-U.S. intervention country in
chaos, carved up by militias.

Worst-case scenario: Syria as an ungoverned space, a new haven for
terrorists and warring groups fueled by outsiders. (The Pakistani Taliban
has already
<http://news.yahoo.com/pakistani-taliban-vows-send-fighters-help-group-21431
0967.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter> vowed to send fighters
to help IS.) Throw in the potential for some group to grab any leftover
chemical weapons or SCUD-like surface-to-surface missiles from Assad's
closet, and the potential for death and destruction is unending. It might
even spread to Israel.

4. Israel

Israel's border with Syria, marked by the
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/world/in-golan-imagined-risks-become-all-
too-real.html?ref=world&_r=0> Golan Heights, has been its quietest frontier
since the <http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/northernfront.asp> 1967 war,
but that's now changing. Syrian insurgents of some flavor recently seized
border villages and a crossing point in those heights. United Nations
peacekeepers, who once patrolled the area, have mostly been
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/world/middleeast/israel-syria.html>
evacuated for their own safety. Last month, Israel
<http://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-shoots-down-syrian-fighter-plane-over-gola
n/> shot down a Syrian plane that entered its airspace, no doubt a warning
to Assad to mind his own business rather than a matter of military
necessity.

Assumedly, the Obama administration has been in behind-the-scenes efforts,
reminiscent of the 1991 Gulf War when Iraqi SCUDS began
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/18/newsid_4588000/
4588486.stm> raining down on Israeli cities, to keep that country out of the
larger fight. It is not 1991, however. Relations between the U.S. and Israel
are far more
<http://blogs.marketwatch.com/capitolreport/2014/08/14/obama-netanyahu-clash
-on-phone-as-u-s-israel-relations-sink-to-new-low/> volatile and much
testier. Israel is better
<http://www.theweek.co.uk/world-news/middle-east/59368/iron-dome-how-israels
-missile-defence-system-works> armed and U.S. constraints on Israeli desires
have proven significantly weaker
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28252155> of late.

Worst-case scenario: An Israeli move, either to ensure that the war stays
far from its Golan Heights frontier or of a more offensive nature aimed at
securing some Syrian territory, could blow the region apart. "It's like a
huge bottle with gas surrounded by candles. You just need to push one candle
and everything can blow up in a minute,"
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/world/in-golan-imagined-risks-become-all-
too-real.html?ref=world&_r=0> said one retired Israeli general. Still, if
you think Israel worries about Syria, that's nothing compared to how its
leadership must be fuming over the emergence of Iran as an ever-stronger
regional power.

5. Iran

What can go wrong for Iran in the current conflict? While in the Middle East
something unexpected can always arise, at present that country looks like
the potential big winner in the IS sweepstakes. Will a pro-Iranian Shia
government remain in power in Baghdad? You bet. Has Iran been given carte
blanche to move ground forces into Iraq? Check. Will the American air force
fly bombing runs for Iranian ground troops engaged in combat with IS (in a
purely unofficial capacity, of course)? Not a doubt. Might Washington try to
edge back a bit from its nuclear tough-guy negotiations? A likelihood. Might
the door be left ajar when it comes to an off-the-books easing of economic
sanctions if the Americans need something more from Iran in Iraq? Why not?

Worst-case scenario: Someday, there'll be a statue of Barack Obama in
central Tehran, not in Iraq.

6. Iraq

Iraq is America's official "graveyard of empire." Washington's "new" plan
for that country hinges on the success of a handful of initiatives that
already failed when tried between 2003-2011, a time when there were
infinitely more resources available to American "nation builders" and so
much less in the way of regional chaos, bad as it then was.

The first step in the latest American master plan is the creation of an
"inclusive" government in Baghdad, which the U.S. dreams will drive a wedge
between a rebellious and dissatisfied Sunni population and the Islamic
state. After that has happened, a
<http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/09/10/isis-iraq-airstrikes-us-fo
reign-policy-column/15303691/> (re)trained Iraqi army will head
<http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-envoy-warns-retaking-mosul-will-take-m
ore-year-2040891038> back into the field to drive the forces of the new
caliphate from the northern parts of the country and retake Mosul.

All of this is unrealistic, if not simply unreal. After all, Washington has
already sunk
<http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/articles/2014/6/28
/how-did-iraq-s-armycollapsesoquickly.html> $25 billion dollars into
training and equipping that same army, and
<http://www.armytimes.com/article/20120730/NEWS/207300301/U-S-audit-200M-was
ted-training-Iraqi-police> several billion more on the paramilitary police.
The result: little more than IS
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/world/isis-ammunition-is-shown-to-have-or
igins-in-us-and-china.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=HpSum&mod
ule=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news> seizing arsenals of
top-notch Americans weaponry once the Iraqi forces fled the country's
northern cities in June.

Now, about that inclusive government. The United States seems to think
creating an Iraqi government is like picking players for a fantasy football
team. You know, win some, lose some, make a few trades, and if none of that
works out, you still have a shot at a new roster and a winning record next
year. Since Haider al-Abadi, the latest prime minister and great inclusivist
hope, is a Shia and a former colleague of the once-anointed, now
disappointed Nouri al-Maliki, as well as a member of the same political
party, nothing much has really changed at the top. So hopes for
"inclusiveness" now fall to the choices to lead the key ministries of
defense and the interior. Both have been tools of repression against the
country's Sunnis for years. For the moment, Abadi remains
<http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/abadi-government-defense-
interior-ministry-issue.html> acting minister for both, as was Maliki before
him. Really, what could possibly go wrong?

As for the Sunnis, American strategy rests on the assumption that they can
be bribed and coerced into breaking with IS, no matter the shape of things
in Baghdad. That's hard to imagine, unless they lack all memory. As with
al-Qaeda in Iraq during the American occupation years, the Islamic State is
Sunni muscle against a Shia government that, left to its own devices, would
continue to marginalize, if not simply slaughter, them. Starting in 2007,
U.S. officials did indeed bribe and coerce some Sunni tribal leaders into
accepting arms and payments in return for fighting insurgent outfits,
including al-Qaeda. That
<http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175898/tomgram:_peter_van_buren,_back_to_th
e_future_in_iraq> deal, then called the
<https://www.understandingwar.org/report/anbar-awakening-displacing-al-qaeda
-its-stronghold-western-iraq> Anbar Awakening, came with assurances that the
United States would always stand by them. (
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/us/retired-general-is-picked-to-lead-effo
rt-vs-isis.html> General John Allen, now coordinating America's newest war
in Iraq, was a key figure in brokering that "awakening.") America didn't
stand. Instead, it turned the program over to the Shia government and headed
for the door marked "exit." The Shias promptly reneged on the deal.

Once bitten, twice shy, so why, only a few years later, would the Sunnis go
for what seems to be essentially the
<http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2014/02/can-another-anbar-awakening-save-ir
aq/78053/> same bad deal? In addition, this one appears to have a
particularly counterproductive wrinkle from the American point of view.
According to present plans, the U.S. is to form Sunni "
<http://kwbu.org/post/obamas-isis-plan-sunni-awakening-part-two> national
guard units" -- up-armored Sunni militias with a more marketable name -- to
fight IS by paying and arming them to do so. These
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/04/world/middleeast/coalition-leader-warns-o
f-long-fight-in-iraq.html?hp&target=comments&module=Search&mabReward=relbias
:r,%7b%221%22:%22RI:10%22%7d&_r=0> militias are to fight only on Sunni
territory under Sunni leadership. They will have no more connection to the
Baghdad government than you do. How will that help make Iraq an inclusive,
unitary state? What will happen, in the long run, once even more sectarian
armed militias are let loose? What could possibly go wrong?

Despite its unambiguous history of failure, the "success" of the Anbar
Awakening remains a persistent
<http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume6/april_2008/4_08_3.h
tml> myth among American conservative thinkers. So don't be fooled in the
short term by media-trumpeted
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/07/world/middleeast/promise-is-seen-in-deals
-with-tribes-in-iraqs-battle-against-isis.html?action=click&contentCollectio
n=Middle%20East%C2%AEion=Footer&module=MoreInSection&pgtype=article> local
examples of Sunni-Shia cooperation against IS. Consider them temporary
alliances of convenience on a tribe-by-tribe basis that might not outlast
the next attack. That is nowhere near a strategy for national victory.
Wasn't then, isn't now.

Worst-case scenario: Sunni-Shia violence reaches a new level, one which
draws in outside third parties, perhaps the Sunni Gulf states, seeking to
prevent a massacre. Would the Shia Iranians, with forces already in-country,
stand idle? Who can predict how much blood will be spilled, all caused by
another foolish American war in Iraq?

7. The United States

If Iran could be the big geopolitical winner in this multi-state conflict,
then the U.S. will be the big loser. President Obama (or his successor)
will, in the end, undoubtedly have to choose between war to the horizon and
committing U.S. ground forces to the conflict. Neither approach is likely to
bring the results desired, but those "boots on the ground" will scale up the
nature of the ensuing tragedy.

Washington's post-9/11 fantasy has always been that military power --
whether at the level of full-scale invasions or "surgical" drone strikes --
can change the geopolitical landscape in predictable ways. In fact, the only
certainty is more death. Everything else, as the last 13 years have made
clear, is up for grabs, and in ways Washington is guaranteed not to expect.

Among the likely scenarios: IS forces are currently only miles from Baghdad
International Airport, itself only
<http://www.examiner.com/article/isis-reaches-baghdad-suburbs-us-troops-bloc
k-the-way-to-bgw-int-l-airport> nine miles from the Green Zone in the heart
of the capital. (Note that the M198 howitzers IS
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/15/isil-captured-52-us-made-ho
witzers-artillery-weapo/> captured from the retreating Iraqis have a range
of <http://www.military.com/equipment/m198-howitzer> 14 miles.) The airport
is a critical portal for the evacuation of embassy personnel in the face of
a future potential mega-Benghazi and for flying in more personnel like the
Marine Quick Reaction Force recently
<http://online.wsj.com/articles/marines-deploy-new-quick-reaction-force-in-k
uwait-1412204565> moved into nearby Kuwait. The airport is already protected
by 300-500 <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/11/world/meast/isis-threat/>
American troops, backed by Apache attack helicopters and drones. The Apache
helicopters recently
<http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-fighters-try-shoot-down-us-led-coalition-planes
-near-raqqa-1703559> sent into combat in nearby Anbar province probably flew
out of there. If IS militants were to assault the airport, the U.S. would
essentially have to defend it, which means combat between the two forces. If
so, IS will lose on the ground, but will win by drawing America deeper into
the quagmire.

In the bigger picture, the current anti-Islamic State coalition of "more
than <http://www.state.gov/s/seci/index.htm> 60 countries" that the U.S.
patched together cannot last. It's fated to collapse in a heap of
conflicting long-term goals. Sooner or later, the U.S. is likely to once
again find itself alone, as it eventually did in the last Iraq war.

The most likely outcome of all this killing, whatever the fate of the
Islamic State, is worsening chaos across Iraq, Syria, and other countries in
the region, including possibly Turkey. As Andrew Bacevich
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/even-if-we-defeat-the-islamic-state-
well-still-lose-the-bigger-war/2014/10/03/e8c0585e-4353-11e4-b47c-f5889e061e
5f_story.html> observed, "Even if we win, we lose. Defeating the Islamic
State would only commit the United States more deeply to a decades-old
enterprise that has proved costly and counterproductive." The loss of
control over the real costs of this war will beg the question: Was the U.S.
ever in control?

In September, Syria became the
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/even-if-we-defeat-the-islamic-state-
well-still-lose-the-bigger-war/2014/10/03/e8c0585e-4353-11e4-b47c-f5889e061e
5f_story.html> 14th country in the Islamic world that U.S. forces have
invaded, occupied, or bombed since 1980. During these many years of American
war-making, goals have shifted endlessly, while the situation in the Greater
Middle East only worsened. Democracy building? You're not going to hear that
much any more. Oil? The U.S. is set to become a
<http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/07/america-the-oil-exporter-108
707.html#.VDKi_XWx3UY> net exporter. Defeating terrorism? That's today's
go-to explanation, but the evidence is already in that picking fights in the
region only fosters terror and terrorism. At home, the
<http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175904/tomgram%3A_engelhardt%2C_inside_the_
american_terrordome/> soundtrack of fear-mongering grows louder, leading to
an amplified national security state and ever-expanding justifications for
the
<https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/09/civil-rights-organizations-de
mand-answers-white-house-surveillance-muslim-leaders/> monitoring of our
society.

Worst-case scenario: America's pan-Middle Eastern war marches into its third
decade with no end in sight, a vortex that sucks in lives, national
treasure, and Washington's mental breathing room, even as other important
issues are ignored. And what could possibly go wrong with that?

Peter Van Buren blew the whistle on State Department waste and mismanagement
during the Iraqi reconstruction in his first book,
<http://www.amazon.com/dp/0805096817/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20> We Meant
Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi
People. A
<http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175898/tomgram:_peter_van_buren,_back_to_th
e_future_in_iraq> TomDispatch regular, he writes about current events at his
blog, <http://www.wemeantwell.com/> We Meant Well. His latest book is
<http://www.amazon.com/dp/1935462911/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20> Ghosts
of Tom Joad: A Story of the #99Percent.

 
Received on Fri Oct 17 2014 - 12:38:52 EDT