South Sudan peace talks: Possibility of re-locating to South Sudan?
Josephine Chandiru Drama
2014-10-24, Issue <
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/issue/699> 699
The South Sudan peace talks which are currently taking place in Addis Ababa
under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
are inadequate and badly suited to the task at hand. Citizens are completely
absent from the process, warring groups feel no pressure to halt the
violence and huge sums of money are being wasted. The peace process should
be taken back home.
INTRODUCTION
It has been almost eleven months since the South Sudan peace negotiations
began in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. So far, huge sums of money amounting to over
17 million dollars (12 million euros) [1] have been spent on per diem and
hotel bills, with little progress made towards ending the ongoing armed
conflict. Previous rounds of talks have reached four settlements, including
the January 23, 2014 cessation of hostilities agreement, the May 9, 2014
recommitment agreement, the June 10, 2014 agreed road map for Transitional
Government of National Unity (TGONU) and the August 25 meeting where no
commitments were made.
The South Sudanese people already made extraordinary sacrifices to achieve
independence two and a half years ago [2], only to be paralysed by fighting
that started on 15 December 2013 in Juba, the capital of South Sudan. The
fighting later spread to three other states, namely, Upper Nile, Jonglei and
Unity, with immense consequences for human security. According to the United
Nations (UN), thousands of people have been killed, about 1.5 million
displaced and at least 1.1 million people are facing emergency food
shortages [3]. The UN also estimates that aid agencies will need $1.8bn
(£1.08bn) to reach 3.8 million people before the end of this year. So far,
they have raised just over half.
This appalling human security situation in South Sudan could get worse if
other strategies to get the warring parties to come to an agreement are not
proactively sought. It may require a multi-faceted approach that allows for
the engagement of a wider spectrum of individuals, groups and communities at
national and local levels, so as to exert more pressure on the warring
factions to urgently end the conflict. This article seeks to mobilise a
national solution to the crisis by drawing the attention of the
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to the possibility of
re-locating the ongoing talks in Addis Ababa back home to South Sudan.
EMERGING THREATS TO STABILITY
With at least four agreements already breached and deadlines passing, the
people of South Sudan are increasingly loosing hope in the IGAD-led
mediation process unless a new strategy is quickly developed including
mandating the IGAD Special Envoys with powers to decide on certain
substantive matters [4]. It is also becoming increasingly clear that the
IGAD-led mediation process in Addis Ababa will not lead to a definitive
resolution to the conflict in South Sudan in the near future [5]. The
failure of IGAD to sustain decisions on the South Sudan crisis has been
viewed by many as a sign that it is ‘part of the problem rather than part of
the solution’ [6].
There is now a worrying trend of events that it is feared may escalate to
yet another form of rebellion in the country. And by the time the two sides
finally get to work in Addis Ababa, they may be drafting a solution to a
situation over which they no longer have any control [7], as seen in the
statements of Professor David de Chand [8].
‘Let the world and the IGAD know that because it has failed to address the
issues at hand, the Nuer nation and its resilient people shall pretty soon
declare war on the Dinka in Bahr-el-Ghazel … Assuredly, nothing would deter
us to declare war against the Dinka nationality at any time, at any place
and at anywhere until Salva Kiir is be defeated sooner rather than later,
whether he likes it or not, he will be defeated’. He continued to say that
‘Unless the IGAD mediators spin or turn the clock backward to adequately and
sufficiently address the root causes of genocide against the targeted Nuer
nationality or ethnicity, the roadmap to peace and the TGONU would be
imperatively impractical, if not impossible, to attain in South Sudan’.
Such messages of frustration should already be a clue for IGAD to change its
engagements. Echoing such threats again and again will easily mobilise
ethnic nationalism in an already volatile situation if appropriate and fast
measures are not employed. It will be the only way those who feel
marginalised in the peace and conflict processes are able to find ways of
getting involved in addressing their plight.
A CALL FOR A NATIONAL PROCESS: LESSONS FROM OTHER PEACE MEDIATION
INITIATIVES IN AFRICA
Societies around the world know intuitively of the role citizens can play in
bridging differences, large and small, and harmonising individuals and
groups. Yet mediation in national conflicts has tended to be seen as the
preserve of external actors. The wisdom of engaging citizens in making
decisions affecting their future has long been recognised, but understanding
the positive role that Insider Mediators play in reducing tensions and in
developing non-violent responses to political crisis is relatively new [9].
In recent years, peace mediation has become a field where more flexible
methods and diverse actors are needed to complement the efforts of official
state actors [10]. This is because conflicts have over the years changed in
contexts, drivers and actors, and citizens are increasingly the
disproportionate victims. The craft and approach to bringing peace must also
change to include a broader participation of people, because the agreements
reached are repeatedly breached even before the ink dries, giving war a
chance instead of peace.
Evidence suggests that successful peace processes in Africa have involved
significant levels of public participation and minimal external mediation
[11]. For instance, during the 2008 post-election violence (PEV) in Kenya, a
peace movement that tried to mobilise Kenya’s citizens for a non-violent
peace-process at a time when the public space was highly critical was
successful. This created a forum to transform the violent conflict and
reconstruct the social fabric that initially held the country together.
Citizens can be a driving force to achieve a desired goal if conditions such
as proximity to venues of peace talks and an open platform are set to allow
citizen participation in whichever form. For instance, during the Liberia
peace talks in the neighbouring Ghana, women were a driving force for peace
through their pressure groups and actions. At one point they demanded the
doors of the building where the negotiations were taking place be closed
until a settlement was made [12]. This created a lot of pressure on the
negotiating parties to reach a decision. Such groups and many others who
have non-violent capabilities should be encouraged to offer their free time
and service to end violence against the people.
RATIONALE FOR ADDIS ABABA PEACE MEDIATION TALKS TO RE-LOCATE TO SOUTH SUDAN
The proposal for a change of venue from Addis Ababa to South Sudan is to
allow for broader conversations to take place among the people. For almost
eleven months now, the people in South Sudan have been living with anxiety
and uncertainty as to when their deteriorating situation will return to
normalcy. Re-locating the talks to South Sudan would help provide an avenue
for citizens to get their concerns included in the agenda of the
negotiations, and influence public support for them. This is because broader
participation brings more voices to the negotiations and thus enhances the
quality and sustainability of the agreement [13]. It also allows them to
closely monitor the implementation of the outcomes and commit to longer term
peace process.
Experience has shown that local resources, if properly mobilised, do improve
the overall peacebuilding efforts [14]. Of course the question of venue and
safety of mediators may arise in this case, considering that the country is
still at war. But the talks can be organised in one of the other states in
the country that is relatively peaceful. Of the ten states in South Sudan,
the conflict is visible in four states, including part of Central Equatoria
State where Juba is located, the Jonglei State, the Unity State and the
Uppernile State. This offers an opportunity for community leaders in
relatively safer states to mobilise their people to lay down arms as a call
for peace and give feedback to their warring allies. For example, as far as
I know, it is only these community leaders who can avert threats such as
Prof. Chand’s.
In the past, community leaders such as chiefs and religious leaders have
played vital roles as intermediaries in South Sudan. For instance during the
Wunlit peace process in 1999, the chiefs led a series of community meetings
to mobilise support for a wider peace process, culminating in the
construction of a temporary village to house over 1,200 participants at
Wunlit [15]. On the other hand, the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC)
facilitated peace and reconciliation, and provided logistical and financial
support for people-to-people dialogue [16] . This has been said to be one of
the most successful talks in the history of the country.
Historically, ethnic, religious and women’s groups have been excluded from
offering their efforts towards negotiated conflict resolution, despite being
experts in mediation among their communities and homes. In South Sudan for
instance, one of the functions and duties of the traditional authorities as
provided for in Section 121(1) (c) of the Local Government Act, 2009 is to
foster peace building and resolution of conflicts through mediation and
other conciliatory mechanisms, as noted by Juliana Bol. Dialogues involving
such people, as opposed to military interventions, improve political power
negotiations with political commitments.
It would therefore be imperative to make use of such statutory bodies to
arrest the situation in South Sudan. The challenge in this case is that
there is little or no tolerance for open political debate, thus the use of
Insider Mediators such as traditional authorities will be less useful [17].
Further, if peace talks are brokered in locations that are tens and thousand
kilo meters away, only accessible by air, how can the capabilities of such
people be utilised? Peace does not come by plane or car; peace is rather in
the hearts and hands of the people affected. If round table talks to broker
peace were initiated in South Sudan, ordinary citizens would participate,
the negotiators would become messengers of the people, costs of hotels and
other facilities would be minimal, there would be immense pressure on
warring parties by the citizens to cease hostilities and begin meaningful
dialogue [18]. IFurthermore,, the brokers and representatives of both
parties would be in a position to feel what it means to be at the actual
scene of the conflict, thereby encouraging them to reach durable peace
agreements and also enforce them. This would make negotiations achieve more.
Addressing the grievances of communities who are for the most part excluded
from the process is an incomplete process. People who are affected by the
conditions of violence should be allowed to tell their stories and name
their perpetrators. Meeting of minds as opposed to meeting of weapons should
be a strategy employed to resolve issues. This is the road map to achieve
sustainable peace. This can only be viable such agendas are devolved to the
people as soon as they materialise.
Well aware that foreign countries offer neutral, quiet and peaceful grounds
for peace talks, there is usually a total disconnect between foreign venues
with what exactly happens on ground in conflict affected spaces. Agreements
may happen with limited contextualisation of situations. It also limits
participation of other stakeholders who have a say in the matter. It further
complicates consultations with the people. A peace agreement would require
mediators to convince combatants to sacrifice the luxuries associated with
the negotiation process provided by international actors, free of charge
[19]. Instead of foreign countries offering comfort zones, displaying traits
of people on holiday [20], they should instead offer influence and support
in other ways such as supporting national initiatives and hosting refugees,
among others.
Of course the neutral role of the external mediators during peace talks
cannot be ignored. External mediators have played significant roles in
brokering peace between warring parties in many parts of Africa. In the case
of South Sudan, it will take a lot of courage and sacrifice to volunteer to
broker peace if the talks re-locate to the conflict zone. The government on
its part should be able to offer a secure ground to ensure deliberate safety
of its external actors/friends. However, experience has also shown that a
neutral mediator is not the only precondition for a successful mediation. It
is the acceptance of the parties concerned, rather than neutrality, that
matters.
CONCLUSION
Considering the worrying trends outlined above, IGAD should consider the
said option of relocating the peace talks to South Sudan so as to encourage
full participation and monitoring of the implementation of the agreements.
This would also minimise costs and guarantee its presence in South Sudan for
a longer period, ensuring conscious implementation and making it easier to
hold accountable those who fault their own agreements, including issuance of
sanctions and enforcing the same. At the same time, the more communities
participate in the mediation, the more pressure is exerted on the warring
parties to end the conflict and create a safe space for all citizens. As it
is currently, the representatives from both sides seem not to be in a hurry.
After all, the costs are not on them.
Creation of an opportunity to re-build relations between citizens and their
governments can only be achieved by opening spaces that are accessible to
the citizens. This makes citizens have confidence in their leaders, attracts
those in the diaspora to return, and allows external actors to faithfully
contribute to positive state building and peace building. It makes leaders
exchange influence with the citizens. It makes people negotiate what is best
for them. The leaders cannot do it alone. Negotiations held at home are
national projects. Homemade decisions end up building institutions that are
internal as opposed to external. These projects such as agreements reached
can be reviewed periodically depending on the availability of resources. The
periodic reviews should bring people together to affirm their commitments
and discuss emerging issues, and draw the arts and science towards lasting
peace. Let IGAD give peace a real chance by allowing peace talks to
re-locate to South Sudan.
* Josephine Chandiru Drama is a Women Fellow at the African Leadership
Centre/Kings College London. She is currently a Peace and Security Intern at
the African Union, Addis Ababa. An earlier version of this paper is
available on
<
http://strifeblog.org/2014/06/20/south-sudan-peace-talks-need-to-return-hom
e/>
http://strifeblog.org/2014/06/20/south-sudan-peace-talks-need-to-return-home
/
END NOTES
[1] Warring S. Sudan leaders agree deadline for new government. Available on
<
http://tinyurl.com/kvqxxjq>
http://tinyurl.com/kvqxxjq
[2] Waal, 2014
[3] <
http://tinyurl.com/numcfkx>
http://tinyurl.com/numcfkx
[4] The dilemma of IGAD-led peace process for South Sudan. Available on
<
http://www.sudantribune.con/spip.php?article51558>
http://www.sudantribune.con/spip.php?article51558 accessed on 8.7.14.
[5] Bol, 2014
[6] Odong, 2014
[7] <
http://tinyurl.com/numcfkx>
http://tinyurl.com/numcfkx
[8] Chand, 2014
[9] Hislaire, 2011
[10] Artisaari, 2013
[11] Bol, 2014
[12] Olanisakin, 2011
[13] Paffenholz, 2014
[14] Einstein
[15]Bol, 2014
[16] Ibid
[17] Ibid
[18] Bol, 2014
[19] Helms, 2011
[20] Delegates for Kiir and Machar have been meeting in luxury hotels in the
Ethiopian capital since January, with both sides bickering over the agenda
and even the venue of discussions. Available on
<
http://tinyurl.com/kvqxxjq>
http://tinyurl.com/kvqxxjq
[21] Frazer, 2014
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Received on Fri Oct 24 2014 - 15:17:24 EDT