What's Happening with Suspended Military Aid for Egypt?
Will the US continue to withhold its military aid to an undemocratic Egypt?
Amy Hawthorne thinks it's unlikely. Given a choice between the el-Sisi
regime and the violent chaos now engulfing Egypt's neighbors, it's only a
question of time before Washington's policymakers reverse their course.
By Amy Hawthorne for Atlantic Council
. 28 October 2014
Last October, the Obama administration
<
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215258.htm> announced it was
holding back <
http://uspolicy.be/headline/us-officials-us-assistance-egypt>
four large-scale weapons systems purchased for Egypt, including 125 M1-A1
battle tank kits, twenty F-16 fighter jets, twenty Harpoon cruise missiles,
and ten Apache attack helicopters. It made their delivery contingent upon
"credible progress toward an inclusive, democratically elected civilian
government through free and fair elections." This was a significant move,
the first time a US administration had ever suspended any of the annual $1.3
billion military aid package. The administration lifted its hold on the
Apaches,
<
http://thecairopost.com/news/126997/news/u-s-apache-jets-expected-in-novemb
er-kerry> which are now on their way to Egypt, but the other weapons remain
in storage in the United States, more than a year later.
The new aid policy, along with restrictions on military assistance enacted
by Congress, sought to alter the bargain with Egypt from weapons in exchange
for peace with Israel, to weapons in exchange for peace and democratic
progress. This has of course angered Egypt, used to a steady flow of
American weapons since the 1979 Peace Treaty regardless of its human rights
record. On his first trip to the United States as president last month,
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi complained about the suspension in a
<
http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/egyptian-president-el-sisi-backs-u-s-attacks-
on-isis/> Charlie Rose interview. The Peace Treaty remains secure, but the
policy has not advanced stated US democracy goals. During the past year,
Egypt has
<
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/10/09/egypt-s-resurgent-authoritarianism-
it-s-way-of-life/hrf0> slid back into authoritarian rule, experiencing one
of the worst periods of repression in its modern history. This article
discusses why the suspension has not been an effective democracy promotion
lever; a forthcoming article will cover the status of the military aid on
which Congress has imposed democracy conditions.
The Suspension Decision
The decision to suspend these weapons came reluctantly, several months after
the Egyptian military's July 3, 2013, ouster of President Mohamed Morsi of
the Muslim Brotherhood. Fearing a rupture with the military that would
jeopardize US security interests, the US administration did not take any
punitive action immediately after Morsi's overthrow. Instead it adopted a
cautious, wait-and-see approach, hoping, along with many Egyptians, that the
coup would set the country quickly on a more democratic path.
The security forces' bloody dispersal of pro-Morsi sit-ins in Cairo's Raba'a
and Nahda squares last August 14 shattered the administration's wishful
thinking and threatened to unleash a destabilizing cycle of violence. The
sheer scale of the state violence by a US ally-Human Rights Watch has
<
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/12/egypt-rab-killings-likely-crimes-against
-humanity> documented that a minimum of 900 protestors were killed that
day-cried out for a response. The following morning, President Barack Obama
<
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/15/remarks-president-sit
uation-egypt> declared that "while we want to sustain our relationship with
Egypt, our traditional cooperation cannot continue as usual when civilians
are being killed in the streets and rights are being rolled back."
It was not until nearly two months later, however, that the administration
announced what the no-business-as-usual policy would mean in practice. This
was a partial aid suspension, designed to express strong displeasure to
Cairo and to demonstrate, especially to US domestic critics, the
administration's commitment to human rights, but without upending bilateral
ties or having to terminate US defense contracts (the weapons had been paid
for, just not delivered).
Challenges and Opportunities for US Influence
There are several reasons why the suspension has not had results as a
democracy promotion tool. Heavy factors in Egypt have been stacked against
such external influence. The post-coup government has felt itself in a
battle of survival against the ousted Brotherhood. It has enjoyed strong
support from many Egyptians as well as from its Gulf donors to crush the
group, clamp down other dissent, and restore "stability." In such
circumstances the preferences of an outside power immediately are
diminished. In addition, Egypt's new leadership needs to legitimize itself
and one obvious way to do so is to thumb its nose at Egypt's former patron,
the United States. Furthermore there is no vocal constituency inside Egypt
to amplify US messages on democracy. Association with the unpopular United
States on such sensitive matters is dangerous and the US administration has
done little to build trust among those Egyptians who do oppose a return to
autocratic rule.
But it is also true that the United States is not without leverage that it
could have applied, especially early on. It could have maximized the
opportunity of timing and taken much stronger action, closely coordinated
with Europe, right after Morsi's ouster and Raba'a-when the eyes of the
world were on Egypt and the new government's international legitimacy was
the most vulnerable. The administration could have withheld other military
aid, as a more serious incentive for a course correction. The Egypt military
can live without the suspended weapons for a while-it already has 220 F-16s,
thirty-four Apaches (though not all are operable), and more than 1,100 M1-A1
tanks. Suspending maintenance for Egypt's existing stock of US-origin
weapons, more important for its day-to-day operations, would have been a
much tougher signal. The United States quietly could have frozen some of
Egypt's privileges, such as cash flow financing or the ability to use the
interest accrued from its special Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account
to procure additional US arms beyond the $1.3 billion annual package. The
administration could have put a moratorium on high-level visits. Rather,
Secretary of State John Kerry went to Cairo a few weeks after the aid
suspension.
The administration was averse to playing hard ball for many reasons.
Fundamentally it has been ambivalent about how much a democratic Egypt
really matters to core US interests. Thus it has not felt an imperative to
take stronger measures that could provoke a backlash and lead Egypt to
withdraw vital security cooperation. At the heart of the hesitancy seems to
be a perception that in the dynamic of the post-Mubarak era, Cairo holds
more cards than Washington.
Private Pressure, Public Praise
Instead, the administration has employed relatively soft tactics with the
aid suspension. The centerpiece of the approach has been Secretary Kerry's
frequent private diplomacy, trying to encourage Egypt's leadership to pursue
a more democratic path. (Obama has mostly kept his distance.) The focus,
quite appropriately, has been on the need to uphold
<
http://www.voanews.com/content/us-urgest-egypt-to-ease-civil-society-restri
ctions/2482707.html> freedom of association and assembly and protect human
rights, more than on holding elections per Sisi's "
<
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/75631.aspx> road map." Kerry reportedly
has pressed for revisions to the harsh protest law and for improvements to
the NGO law, as well as for the release of certain imprisoned activists and
journalists. (Accountability for the bloodshed at Raba'a, the original
trigger for the suspension, does not appear to have been a major part of the
agenda.)
None of this has borne fruit so far. Mixed and inconsistent US messages from
the outset have sapped US influence, weakened its standing, and drained the
policy of value even simply as a firm moral and political stance against
repression. US officials insist that Kerry delivers tough messages in
private. On a few occasions, after especially troubling events such as the
handing down of death sentences against hundreds of Morsi supporters in
March, he has issued
<
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/03/223967.htm> sharply critical
statements. But otherwise Kerry has shied away from public censure, leaving
this role to State Department spokespeople. Instead he mainly has conveyed a
positive message of Egypt's enduring importance, the government's commitment
to democracy, and the US commitment to the country, seemingly without much
regard to its worsening human rights situation. "We will work hard to
augment what is a longstanding and deep partnership between the United
States and Egypt,"
<
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/06/228234.htm> he said in June,
noting he detected a "serious sense of purpose and commitment" by Egypt's
leadership to meet popular demands for "dignity, justice." On a visit last
weekend, Kerry <
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/10/232898.htm>
expressed "our strong support for Egypt as it undertakes significant
reforms." Kerry has suggested that the "transition" is succeeding but needs
just a bit more progress before the United States can offer its full
endorsement. He has minimized the significance of the aid suspension,
<
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/kerry-in-cairo-egypt-aid-su
spension-not-a-punishment/2013/11/03/f5b14242-4491-11e3-a196-3544a03c2351_st
ory.html> calling it "not a punishment" and "a very small issue."
Presumably the hope has been that avoiding direct public criticism will make
Egyptian officials more responsive, but this has not worked. Egypt has
pocketed Kerry's praise, rebuffed his private entreaties (such as when a
court sentenced Al Jazeera journalists to prison the day after his visit in
June, over his exhortations), argued strenuously that Egypt is on the path
to democracy, and continued the crackdown. Recently, as the United States
has moved to
<
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/25/remarks-president-oba
ma-bilateral-meeting-president-el-sisi-egypt> strengthen ties with Sisi and
expand counter-terrorism cooperation, fatigue over pressing Egypt on human
rights seems to be setting in and the suspension has hardly been mentioned.
The Story of the Apaches
Because the suspension was an executive branch decision, not a congressional
requirement, the administration can adjust its policy and change course at
any time. This is exactly what happened with the Apaches. Initially the
administration held firm as Egypt argued that it needed more Apaches for its
campaign against a jihadist insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula. A senior
Department of Defense official
<
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg85312/html/CHRG-113hhrg85312.htm>
testified to Congress last October that the hold on the Apaches was "not
affecting [Egypt's] operational effectiveness in the Sinai at all." In the
subsequent months, Kerry tried to convince Egyptto make modest human rights
gestures to justify releasing the helicopters, without success. By last
spring, the administration changed its mind, in the face of growing worries
over the extremist threat in the Sinai (as well as lobbying from Egypt, its
Gulf supporters, and Israel). On April 22, before a high-level Egyptian
visit to Washington, the administration
<
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-to-partially-resum
e-military-aid-to-egypt/2014/04/22/b25f68c6-ca91-11e3-93eb-6c0037dde2ad_stor
y.html> announced that it was sending the Apaches for use in Sinai
counter-terrorism. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Chairman of the Senate
subcommittee that oversees foreign assistance, quickly blocked the move.
Leahy, a congressional human rights champion and a strong advocate of
linking military aid to Egypt's democratic progress, was
<
http://www.democraticunderground.com/101692059> highly disturbed by the
mass death sentences. Another
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/egypt-helicopters-apaches
-hold-up-leahy-obama.html> concern was that the United States didn't have
enough visibility about whether the Apaches were being used in attacks on
noncombatants in the Sinai. Leahy set tough conditions, including releasing
certain political prisoners and allowing access for journalists and NGOs to
the Sinai.
Over the months, Kerry tried to convince his former Senate colleague to set
aside his concerns. On August 29, the State Department
<
http://news.yahoo.com/kerry-reassures-egypt-over-apache-delivery-012416791.
html> announced that the Apaches would be on their way for the Sinai
campaign. Several factors may have contributed to Leahy's change of heart. A
major one is the new US preoccupation with the rise of the Islamic State of
Syria and al-Sham (ISIS), which gives more urgency to Egypt's Sinai
campaign. Another is congressional dynamics: although some members of the
Appropriations Committee share Leahy's human rights concerns, none were
willing to join him in this case. Finally, perhaps Leahy concluded that
holding the Apaches was not having any effect. He and other lawmakers may be
gearing for a harder stance on a separate bucket of aid, $728 million in new
FMF, some of which will require Kerry to make democracy certifications to
Congress.
What Happens Next?
The tanks, F-16s, and missiles suspended last October are still on hold. If
the administration doesn't want to take action any time soon, the weapons
could sit in storage for a while longer. Ultimately, the United States could
decide to redirect them to other uses, although such a step would be rare.
There is a constituency inside the administration and Congress, however,
that wants to phase out the traditional big-ticket weapons and focus the FMF
program more on counter-terrorism and capacity-building. The suspension has
chipped away at a longstanding argument against such a change-that the
uninterrupted flow of these weapons is required to protect US security
interests. Over the past year, Egypt has continued to provide expedited
approval for overflights of its territory, head-of-the-line privileges for
US Navy warships to traverse the Suez Canal (the special surcharge paid by
the United States surely helps), and counter-terrorism cooperation. Egypt's
relations with Israel are the best in recent memory. Thus, this experience
could nudge open the door to a long-overdue, politically arduous
restructuring of the aid package.
Given the pattern of US-Egypt relations since 2011, in which the United
States has at times taken a stand on democracy and human rights only to back
down in the face of intense Egyptian pushback, the administration probably
will relent and release the other three weapons systems, in order to start a
fresh chapter with Sisi. If Egypt continues on an authoritarian trajectory,
the administration would have to credit Sisi with false democratic progress
to justify such a decision. Or, it could assert that the other weapons
(tanks?) are now essential for counter-terrorism. Either move would meet
some resistance in Congress and further erode US democracy credibility, but
the administration may view these as tolerable costs.
Conclusion
The administration is unlikely to adopt a tougher democracy stance anytime
soon, especially after the frustrating experience with the aid suspension.
To many in Washington, Sisi's strongman state is preferable to the violent
fracturing of Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. The hard questions that few
seem to be asking, however, are whether repression can ever create lasting
stability in Egypt and whether Sisi's oppressive rule will worsen the very
problem of regional terrorism the United States seeks to combat.
<
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/about/experts/list/amy-hawthorne> Amy
Hawthorne is a senior fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East
at the Atlantic Council.
Received on Tue Oct 28 2014 - 17:40:23 EDT