South Sudan: Looming Military Offensives in South Sudan
30 October 2014
Analysis
Warring parties in South Sudan's civil war are preparing for major
offensives as seasonal rains ease.
Hardliners in both the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army-In
Opposition (SPLA-IO) are entrenching their positions, and think, as one
opposition commander declared, "we will settle this with war".
Renewed conflict is likely to be accompanied by widespread displacement,
atrocity crimes and famine.
Despite some progress, nine months of peace talks in Addis Ababa have been
unable to stop the fighting. With splintering interests, weak command and
control and proliferating militias and self-defence forces, the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional body
mediating peace talks, must expand and strengthen its political links on the
ground with senior commanders, armed groups and militarised communities not
represented in Addis Ababa if a future agreement is to have meaning.
The coming violence will present new challenges for UNMISS as it prioritises
protection of the nearly 100,000 civilians sheltering in their bases.
The soon-to-end rainy season was accompanied by reduced fighting, which
allowed both sides to import arms and marshal forces that were hastily
mobilised at the outset of war in December. The government is emboldened,
perceiving a diplomatic swing in its favour, following Kiir's July visit to
Washington and the August IGAD heads of state summit, giving it the space to
launch a major offensive while stalling in Addis Ababa.
It has spent tens of millions of dollars on arms - largely from oil revenues
- (rather than humanitarian assistance for its people); strengthened its
military cooperation agreement with Uganda; undertaken mass recruitment,
including of children; and mobilised police units in efforts to regain some
of the strength it lost with the defections of troops and loss of weapons to
the SPLA-IO. However, major government victories are unlikely to end the
rebellion.
Furthermore, given the Ugandan army and Sudanese rebel deployments on its
behalf, government advances will likely threaten Sudan's national security
interests, increase regional tensions and further inflame the conflict.
At the same time, state and opposition-supported, ethnically-based armed
groups, such as the Nuer White Armies, have flourished and are only
tenuously controlled by their sponsors. Including the Ugandan army and
Sudanese rebels backing the government, there are now at least two dozen
armed entities operating in South Sudan. The fragile coalitions threaten to
further fracture, particularly in oil-producing Upper Nile State.
Many of them, as well as some powerful generals from both the government's
Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the SPLA-IO, have expressed
their intention to fight on, even if the political leaders sign an
agreement.
Despite these obstacles, the IGAD mediation team has focused on trying to
broker a deal between Kiir and Machar in Addis Ababa, ignoring other actors.
As Crisis Group warned in July, this lack of broad-scale engagement has led
many commanders and armed groups to reject the political process. Most of
these parties have their own interests. IGAD should work with the African
Union High-Level Panel on Sudan and South Sudan (AUHIP)(that is supporting
the Sudanese dialogue process), led by former South African president Thabo
Mbeki, in order to secure the withdrawal of the Sudanese armed groups as
called for in the January cessation of hostilities agreement and previous
AU-mediated agreements.
Furthermore, despite many threats, IGAD has not taken punitive measures
against the two main parties for violating cessation of hostility
agreements, committing war crimes and otherwise undermining the peace-talks,
and nor has it requested the African Union or UN Security Council to do so.
Armed actors increasingly believe there is little muscle behind the
mediation, which is challenged by divisions within the regional body. IGAD
should continue the process with the two main parties, but given the
deteriorating situation on the ground, it must expand its efforts and
strengthen its links to other groups and militarised communities not
represented in Addis Ababa, through increased political presence on the
ground (not simply the Monitoring and Verification Teams observing the
ill-implemented cessation of hostility agreements).
Its mediation should be supplemented by separate but linked negotiation
tracks on issues not being comprehensively discussed in Ethiopia,
particularly the Tanzanian-led SPLM party talks; a re-activated Political
Parties Forum; engagement with armed groups; and processes to address
violent communal conflict. Promising internal SPLM party talks have begun,
sponsored by Tanzania's ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM; in English
Party of the Revolution), however they have not yet changed the calculus for
war on the ground. The Political Parties Forum should be re-activated and
the leader of the largest opposition party, the SPLM-Democratic Change,
should be permitted to travel from South Sudan to re-join the talks. Much of
the dialogue and work with community representatives, armed groups and
militarised communities should take place in South Sudan, not in Addis
Ababa.
China and the U.S. should play a more active, neutral, consistent and
transparent role in ameliorating the regional divisions to help break the
impasse. The two should take a harder line with their allies within the
region who continue to enable the war and are party to cessations of
hostilities violations. The limited U.S. and EU individual sanctions, aimed
at punishing a few commanders on both sides that are seen to have broken the
cessation of hostilities, have thus far had little impact on the combatants'
calculations and individual IGAD, AU or UNSC sanctions are similarly
unlikely to turn the tide unless used as leverage to further political
negotiations.
In light of the anticipated intensification of fighting, UNMISS' mandate,
due to be renewed on 30 November, should continue to focus on civilian
protection. This is particularly true of protection of civilians already
sheltering inside UNMISS and, where possible, it should extend protection
beyond bases. Hosting nearly 100,000 civilians inside of its bases for an
extended period is far from ideal, however the mission must continue to
provide protection until conditions allow for their safe and voluntary exit
from the bases. Civilians should not be moved into less protected UN
humanitarian sites or other specially-designated sites where protection
standards will not be the same as within a peacekeeping base. Supporting
further ethnic divisions by moving people to their "ancestral" lands where
famine and conflict are likely in the coming months is also not a viable
option.
Many recommendations Crisis Group made in its December 2013, Open Letter to
the UN Secretary-General, its April report, A Civil War by Any Other Name,
and July conflict alert, Halting South Sudan's Civil War, remain relevant to
averting further escalation, improving the peace process and ensuring UNMISS
has an appropriate mandate and posture.
To stop further intensification of the war, IGAD should take the following
steps:
* increase its political presence on the ground in South Sudan, with a
specific focus on engagement with commanders and armed groups;
* start dialogue with all armed groups and militarised communities;
* open four separate negotiation tracks, both in Addis and South
Sudan, sequenced and pursued so as to contribute to the broader national
political dialogue and focused on: 1) the SPLM (supported by Tanzania's CCM
party); 2) a re-activated Political Parties Forum; 3) armed groups; and 4)
communal conflict; and
* work with the African Union High-Level Panel on Sudan and South
Sudan (AUHIP) to secure the withdrawal of the Sudanese armed groups as
called for in the January cessation of hostilities agreement and as well as
previous AU-mediated agreements between Sudan and South Sudan.
As the conflict threatens to intensify once again, the United Nations
Security Council should take the following actions:
* institute an arms embargo for South Sudan, which must then be
carefully monitored to prevent further escalation; identify the government's
and opposition's sources of weapons and how they are paying for them; and
increase leverage over the parties;
* establish a Contact Group that includes IGAD, the AU, UN, Troika
(U.S., UK, Norway), EU, China and Tanzania to facilitate coordination and
discussion on the way forward; and
* maintain UNMISS' core protection of civilians mandate, including
allowing civilians to shelter within UNMISS bases until they are able to
make a safe and voluntary exit.
Greater coordination between regional and international actors is urgently
needed to ensure the high-level peace talks better reflect the growing
number and power of increasingly autonomous armed groups in South Sudan as
well as the regional dynamics behind the war.
A clear strategy for engagement with armed groups and facility for linking
local negotiations with a wider national process will help prevent the civil
war deepening and spreading further in South Sudan and the region.