Houthis on the Rise in Yemen
Mareike Transfeld ÚŃČí <
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=57088&lang=ar>
October 31, 2014
Although the Houthis are well-poised to acquire new territories and increase
their influence within Yemen, neither development will bring about peace or
prosperity for the country.
The Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) the Yemeni government
<
http://www.sabanews.net/ar/news369099.htm> signed with the Houthi movement
on September 21 has the potential to give the transitional process in Yemen
a positive bump, given its emphasis on inclusiveness and transparency. At
the same time, however, the agreement provides cover for the Houthis’
continued drive for territorial expansion and risks leading to further
instability.
The PNPA sought to halt escalation to the conflict that followed the lifting
of fuel subsidies by the transitional government in late July 2014. The wide
political concessions the Houthis received through the agreement weakened
the elites and made space for political change. Among the many reforms, the
PNPA stipulates the formation of an inclusive government—with Houthis and
members of the southern secessionist Hirak Movement, who had been excluded
from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative and marginalized in the
resulting transitional process—and requires the appointment of a Houthi and
Hirak representative as presidential advisors. Additionally, the PNPA calls
for a series of reforms to improve living conditions through social welfare
programs and pay increases for workers in the civil service and security
sectors, the reinstatement of fuel subsidies, and the implementation of the
outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference.
The Houthis hope the PNPA will establish a new transitional roadmap—one that
provides an alternative to the GCC-driven framework laid out in November
2011. Bolstered by their increasing popularity (drawn largely from their
non-elite status), their significant victories over the Islah party
including driving out General Ali Mohsen, and the widespread frustrations
with the performance of the transitional government, they are attempting to
give previously alienated local political actors a new stake in the process.
PNPA require that President Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi hold “inclusive and
transparent consultations with all of the constituencies represented in the
National Dialogue Conference” in order to ensure their representation and
meaningful engagement in forming a new, “competency-based” government.
As such, the Houthis and leading political parties are currently negotiating
the composition of the cabinet. Political infighting and distrust among the
parties prolonged the negotiations, risking further instability. The new
Prime Minister Khaled Bahah
<
http://www.yementimes.com/en/1828/news/4499/Prime-minister-allocates-minist
ries-JMP-opposes.htm> announced on October 25 that out of 34 ministries the
ruling General People's Congress (GPC) and the former opposition bloc, the
Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) which includes Islah, will receive nine
portfolios each. The Houthis and Hirak are to head six ministries each, and
another four will be appointed by President Hadi, who belongs to the GPC,
but the JMP rejected this distribution. They threatened to boycott the next
government if the JMP—along with other parties, such as the Salafi Rashad
Union Party—does not receive fair representation. Given this deadlock in
negotiations, compounded by the hostilities between the Houthis and the
JMP’s Islah, the parties agreed on October 29 that the government should not
be formed on the basis of political parties. Although unlikely to satisfy
the Houthis, President Hadi and Prime Minister Bahah are instead going to
select “competent” ministers and form a technocratic government.
Since signing the PNPA, the group has been selective about its commitment to
the agreement. While they claim to push for more inclusion and transparency
in the formation of the government, the PNPA gives them cover in their drive
for territorial expansion. But this drive jeopardizes any progress the PNPA
promises on the political front; and although the Houthis signed the PNPA’s
Annex, which addresses the security situation and stipulates the removal of
armed groups, Houthi militias remain in the capital. They are likely to
remain for as long as they continue to distrust the elites driving the
political process. In the meantime, they have taken up security functions
and established checkpoints in the city, hoping to be seen as a legitimate
provider of security, rather than a militia subject to the conditions of the
PNPA Annex. Rather than resolving an armed conflict between the Houthis and
the state, the PNPA used the language of peaceful political change to
legitimize the violent takeover of Sanaa.
In addition to keeping their militias and armed forces in Sanaa, the
movement has continued unabated with its expansion south of the capital.
Formerly restricted to the northern governorate of Saada, the Houthis are
now in control of the entire northwest of the country. They also reached the
port city of Hodeida, located by the Red Sea, on October 14. At the moment,
the movement is moving further south toward Bab al-Mandab, one of three
crucial straits along the oil shipment routes between the Middle East and
the West. In central Yemen, the Houthis are running into al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), one of their main opponents, and the tribes
supporting it. Since mid-October, there has been heavy fighting in Ibb and
Bayda, where the Yemeni army has frequently fought against AQAP over the
past two years. These violent confrontations in central Yemen, however, may
push tribes unaligned with AQAP and disenfranchised supporters of Islah into
al-Qaeda’s arms
The Houthis are poised to play a dominant role in Yemen’s transitional
process. Although genuine political cooperation between the Houthis and
Islah is doubtful, a technocratic government might be able to reconcile the
political groups and implement the PNPA. It is, however, more likely that
political infighting will continue, while the de facto distribution of power
is determined by the fighting on the ground. Given the Houthis’ strength,
and their involvement with the Yemeni army against AQAP, the Houthis will
have the upper hand in this conflict. Their territorial expansion and their
selective commitment to the PNPA show that they are determined to shape the
transition on their own terms. In both the short and long term, however,
this strategy will not lead to political or social stability in Yemen.
Mareike Transfeld is a fellow at the German Institute for International and
Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin.
Received on Fri Oct 31 2014 - 18:57:38 EDT