Revolution Phase 2? The Houthi Advance on Yemen's Capital
by GABRIELE vom BRUCK
Weekend Edition Oct 31-Nov 02, 2014
Last month the international media awoke to the fact that while the world
has been focused on the fight against Islamic State (IS) militants in Syria
and Iraq, Yemen's capital had been seized by Shia rebels, known as the
Houthis, who, they said, had become "Yemen's new masters". Jamal Benomar,
the UN special envoy to Yemen, said: "Yemen will now be seen as linked to
other situations in the region, with regional and international involvement"
( <
http://mondediplo.com/blogs/the-houthi-advance-on-yemen-s-capital#nb1>
1).
However, few outlets have explored how the Houthis came to be important
political stakeholders after a new government was formed in 2012 in
accordance with a transition agreement sponsored by the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC). The Houthis (also known as Ansar Allah, Partisans of God)
have been at the forefront of popular criticism of the agreement, and its
outcome, and they claim that the revolution that began in 2011 must
continue. This explains why, in the early days of their takeover of the
capital Sanaa, few of the city's residents - even while wondering about the
Houthis' ultimate goals and disapproving of their occupation of government
buildings - opposed them.
The Houthis' astonishing advance can best be understood against the backdrop
of the previous regime's policies, the power constellations generated by the
transition agreement, elite conflict and growing sectarian faultlines.
After Yemen became the third country to be engulfed by anti-regime protests
in 2011, its long-serving president, Ali Abdullah Salih, accepted a deal
guaranteeing him immunity from prosecution and enabling him to remain leader
of the party he had founded, the General People's Congress (GPC). He thus
chose a "third way": he neither met the fate of the Tunisian, Egyptian and
Libyan leaders, nor did he decide to fight to the bitter end, like Syria's
Bashar al-Assad. Salih's resignation paved the way to a power-sharing
agreement between the GPC and the parliamentary opposition dominated by the
Sunni Islamist Islah Party, sanctioned by the GCC countries and the United
Nations.
Salih's successor, President Abd Rabbu Mansur Hadi, who has been in power
since February 2012, has announced a plan for a federal system of
government. A constitution-drafting committee is to present its first draft
later in the year. A National Dialogue Conference (NDC), a remarkable
exercise in democratic deliberation involving all sectors of Yemeni society,
ended on 21 January 2014.
The Houthis emerged from the Zaydi-Shia revival movement that took root in
the northern governorate of Saadah in the 1980s (
<
http://mondediplo.com/blogs/the-houthi-advance-on-yemen-s-capital#nb2> 2).
The movement's leader, the late Husayn al-Houthi, elected member of
parliament in 1993 and killed by government forces in 2004, took issue with
what he conceived as the discrimination against Zaydis and the
marginalisation of Saadah province. Since Salih's ascent to the republican
leadership in 1978, a neo-Salafist movement has grown in confidence. This is
seen by the Zaydi elites as a threat to their status and the doctrine they
represent (Salafists consider the Shia to be non-believers.) The Dar
al-Hadith of Dammaj, a Salafist teaching centre outside Saadah city, became
one of Yemen's epicentres of anti-Shia agitation and, prior to its closure
by the government in 2014, a focus of global jihadism.
In 2003, leaders of the Zaydi revival movement organised protests against
the US invasion of Iraq and against the Yemeni government, which was accused
of cooperation with the US (particularly after 9/11) and of corruption and
injustice. The Yemeni government, which had offered President George W Bush
its full co-operation in the "war on terror", interpreted the protests as
incitement against the US, and declared military operations against the
followers of Husayn al-Houthi as part of that war - a pretext for the
elimination of a new charismatic leadership in the northern region. Between
2004 and 2010, Saadah and some of the adjacent provinces were engulfed in
intermittent warfare. Aiding the Yemeni army, in 2009-10, Saudi Arabia
pursued what it saw as a "jihad" against the Houthis - the first in the
history of the third Saudi state.
Following the end of hostilities in 2010, the parties involved failed to
draw up an adequate peace agreement covering reconciliation, confidence
building measures and reconstruction, thereby leaving the door open for
further conflict. Several of those issues were addressed at the National
Dialogue Conference, which provided a forum forthe Houthis to express their
grievances. The government offered an apology for the war, offered to
reconstruct the war-torn region, and granted the Zaydis freedom of belief.
So the politics of amnesia that had emerged after the end of civil war in
Lebanon in 1990 was avoided, even though political assassinations and armed
conflict in the southern and northern regions undermined realistic prospects
for the early implementation of the NDC's resolutions. Among those murdered
in the last days of the conference was Dr. Ahmad Sharaf al-Din, Dean of the
faculty of law at Sanaa University. Representing the Houthis, he advocated
their ideas of a federal civic state built on the German model. They also
argue in favour of a separation of state and religion.
The Houthis are dismayed by the lack of progress in implementing the points
agreed at the NDC. They also rejectthe "government by consensus" that has
been the outcome of the transition accord. Like the youth movement, which
began anti-regime protests in 2011, they hold that it derives its legitimacy
above all from regional powers rather than the Yemeni electorate.
After they entered Sanaa in August 2014, they held sit-ins and
demonstrations that provided a challenge from the extra-parliamentary
opposition to the government; this threw light on the shortcomings of the
transition agreement, which, guaranteeing the survival of the political
elites, has failed to establish an inclusive government. No transitional
justice system has been put in place. None of the politicians and military
accused of human rights violations have yet been brought to justice, nor
have any of those people who plundered public and private wealth in the
south, during the war of 1994 between northern and southern forces, been
held accountable.
Since the transition accord stipulates that only members of established
political parties are to be included in the new government, representatives
of groups such as the Houthis or the Southern Movement, which has demanded
reparations after the war of 1994, were not given either cabinet posts or
governorships. The Houthis' role as a well-armed militia is resented. And in
2011 an opportunity was missed to integrate them into the political process
beyond their participation at the NDC, which would have given them a stake
in the new government.
Tensions also arose because the Islah Party, which is opposed to the
Houthis, gained a large number of portfolios and governorships, especially
in the northern region. Resentment of those appointments by the Houthis
added momentum to the fighting in governorates south of Saadah province in
2013-14 (the province was taken over by the Houthis in 2011).
During a period hailed by Yemeni and UN officials as an exemplary peaceful
transition to a new government, Yemenis came to witness a present embattled
with the past. Salih's divide and rule strategy, which according to
political scientist Lisa Wedeen had led to manageable levels of disarray and
was (paradoxically) conducive to his maintenance of power for three decades,
has come to haunt the new government (
<
http://mondediplo.com/blogs/the-houthi-advance-on-yemen-s-capital#nb3> 3).
Salih, a self-proclaimed Zaydi, promoted and used radical Sunni groups
opportunistically, hoping they would undermine the Zaydi elites and the
Socialist People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, which came to power
after the end of British rule in the South in 1967).
Along with fighters of the tribal Hashid confederation, Islamist
paramilitaries helped Salih's army to defeat the army of the former PDRY in
1994, four years after the ill-conceived unification of the two Yemens.
Fighters belonging to those two groups also joined the army during the war
in Saadah and once again fought against the Houthis in the most recent
conflict in 2013-14, giving it a sectarian tenor. In the latest battles they
were joined by Ansar al-Sharia fighters from southern provinces which have
become central foci of AQAP operations and the army's and the United States'
counter-offensive.
The conflict was linked to cycles of revenge and sectarian tensions which
have been exacerbated by a paralysed state that is unravelling before its
citizens' eyes. Someleaders of the Hashid confederation, the al-Ahmars, are
linked with the Islah Party and have been the Houthis' rivals in the
northern region. In the battles in Amran province, north of Sanaa, which
were tied to national power struggles, they were defeated by the Houthis who
were aided by Hashid leaders opposed to the unpopular al-Ahmars.
Ever since the Saadah governorate was ravaged by war, the Houthis' survival
and expansion (both territorially and ideologically) have been due partly to
their ability to capitalize on rivalries within the political elite. During
the later phase of the war, Salih's priority was to outmanoeuvre and expose
the poor military performance of his rival Major-General Ali Muhsin - then
commander of the First Armoured Division - rather than to defeat the
militarily inferior Houthis. Likewise, after 2011, the strained relations
between Salih, General Ali Muhsin and the al-Ahmars, who fought street
battles with the republican guards in 2011, have favoured the Houthis.
During the latest conflict between the al-Ahmars and the Houthis, Salih
offered logistical support to the latter and reassured loyalists among
Hashid that taking sides against the al-Ahmars was tenable. Success on the
battlefield and local alliances emboldened the Houthis and led them to
challenge the government. In August 2014, followers of Abd al-Malik
al-Houthi, the movement's young leader since 2006, set up vast encampments
in and around the capital. They demanded that a new government based on "a
national partnership" and "consensus" be established; that violations of
what had been agreed upon in the NDC be identified; that the decision to cut
fuel subsidies be withdrawn.
Against the background of the wars fought by the Houthis since 2004 and the
distribution of power in the new government, it comes as no surprise that
when they entered Sanaa, their first targets were Al-Iman University (a
Salafist-inspired college run by the controversial Islahi leader Abd
al-Majid al-Zindani and illegally built on an endowment belonging to the
Houthi family), a military complex under the command of General Ali Muhsin,
and the homes of members of the al-Ahmar family and other leaders of Islah.
Reminiscent of the pictures of the luxurious homes of the Qaddafi family in
2011, Yemenis are now presented with images of the villas of Islah leaders
on a television channel owned by the Houthis. Sanaa residents tell tales of
beautifully lush gardens with gazelles and swimming pools, large diwans and
automatic generators - aware of the fact that half of Yemen's population
lives under the poverty line. The underlying moral discourse serves to
reinforce the Houthis' claim that the "real" revolution is only now
occurring. By the time Houthi militias occupied central government buildings
in Sanaa, the losers appeared to be Islah and the GCC countries. Those
countries sponsored the transition agreement because they saw it as a way to
demobilize the very social and political forces who had in 2011 demanded
wide reaching structural changes which might have collided with their
interests in Yemen and the demands of their own domestic constituencies.
After the situation deteriorated inside the capital, on 21 September 2014 a
Peace and National Partnership Agreement was brokered by UN envoy Jamal
Benomar and signed by President Hadi, delegates of Ansar Allah and leaders
of major political parties. The document, which is based on the final
guidelines of the National Dialogue Conference, calls for an immediate
ceasefire, an end to all forms of violence and the formation of a
non-partisan 'government of experts' which will work to enhance government
transparency and implement economic reforms in addition to ongoing military
and security reforms.
The president has appointed a political advisor affiliated with the Houthis
and a new prime minister, Khalid Bahah, who has served as Yemen's ambassador
to the UN and minister of oil and higher education. The Houthi movement has
been able to cash in on the unpopularity of a government widely seen as
corrupt and ineffectual. The government has made efforts to introduce
political reforms but in the face of a collapsing economy, corruption, a
resurgent AQAP and armed conflict in several parts of the country, has been
unable to deliver on its promises. For this reason alone it has not been
difficult to challenge its political legitimacy. The Houthis have succeeded
in driving some much resented members of the old elite out of the country,
among them General Ali Muhsin and Hamid al-Ahmar, a wealthy businessman who
is closely affiliated with Islah. (Within the framework of the transition
agreement politicians against whom popular grievances had been brought could
not be obliged to leave the country temporarily.)
By October 2014, the people of Sanaa were grateful for an improved supply of
electricity and for security provided jointly by the police and the Houthis,
but were less sure about the direction their revolution might take and
fearful of renewed violence and a coup led by disaffected military. The
Houthis have not yet proved themselves in government, and it is unclear
whether they will reach a political settlement with the government in the
near future. Their methods of attempting to influence decision-making
processes are increasingly resented, and they may have overreached
themselves by expanding into ever more provinces in the western and southern
parts of the country. To avoid getting caught up in endless cycles of
revenge, they will need to seek reconciliation with their enemies and
endorse a pluralistic society. They have reached a crossroads, if not an
impasse.
Gabriele vom Bruck lectures in the Anthropology of the Middle East at the
School of Oriental and African Studies, London, and is currently Senior
Research Fellow at the Berlin Graduate School of Muslim Cultures and
Societies. She is the author of
<
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1403966656/counterpunchmaga> Islam,
mMemory and Morality in Yemen: Ruling Families in Transition, Palgrave
Macmillan, New York, 2005.
Notes.
( <
http://mondediplo.com/blogs/the-houthi-advance-on-yemen-s-capital#nh1> 1)
Hamza Hendawi, "
<
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/shiite-rebels-are-yemens-new-masters/20
14/10/05/fce4fbca-4c07-11e4-b72e-d60a9229cc10_story.html> Shiite rebels are
Yemen's new masters", Associated Press, 5 October 2014.
( <
http://mondediplo.com/blogs/the-houthi-advance-on-yemen-s-capital#nh2> 2)
The Zaydis are a moderate branch of the Shia whose jurisprudence is closer
to Sunni Islam than to the "Twelver" Shia movement.
( <
http://mondediplo.com/blogs/the-houthi-advance-on-yemen-s-capital#nh3> 3)
L. Wedeen, Peripheral visions: Publics, power, and performances in Yemen,
Chicago University Press 2008.
This article appears in the excellent Le Monde Diplomatique, whose English
language edition can be found at <
http://www.mondediplo.com/>
mondediplo.com. This full text appears by agreement with Le Monde
Diplomatique. CounterPunch features two or three articles from LMD every
month.
Received on Fri Oct 31 2014 - 19:00:51 EDT