Kenya: Radicalisation - a Paradigm Shift From Brute Force to the Rule of Law
By James Gondi
30 November 2014
Given the recent spate of killings in Mandera and Kapedo, hot on the heels
of similar violence by illegal armed groups in Mpeketoni, Baragoi and Tana
River, much reflection is required on the state of the security sector in
Kenya, with particular regard to Northern Kenya and the former Coast
Province.
Northern Kenya is a region that has been marginalised and neglected in the
national development agenda since colonial times. Successive governments
have viewed Northern Kenya as peripheral to Kenya's economic agenda with
development focusing solely on Kenya's traditional agricultural, transport
and trade corridors.
The marginalisation of Northern Kenya and inequitable land ownership at the
Coast has caused disenfranchisement among the population in these regions.
With the globalisation of radical Islam and other forms of religious
fundamentalism, young unemployed citizens in these regions have become
susceptible to radicalisation and the lure of joining illegal armed groups,
which offer a sense of purpose, belonging and livelihood, in the absence of
mainstream income opportunities.
The lack of infrastructure and services in Northern Kenya has indirectly
entrenched radicalisation and violence with negative ethnicity and religious
fundamentalism as the key driving forces. Due to poor infrastructure,
security and services, investors have shied away from setting up industries
in Northern Kenya. This has denied the region's population key income
opportunities. Political manipulation of ethnicity has led to inter-ethnic
violence and decades of 'cattle rustling'.
Rather than recognise the underlying causes of violence and radicalisation,
the state has opted to deploy military personnel and heavy artillery to
pursue a scorched earth policy in affected areas at the Coast and Northern
Kenya. State security agencies in other jurisdictions have long realised
that violence caused by radicalised illegal armed groups is better dealt
with using effective intelligence and institutions in the justice sector to
investigate and prosecute perpetrators.
State sponsored economic and social programmes in marginalised areas go hand
in hand with security and justice sector efforts to curb terrorism. Several
specialised expert studies across the globe have revealed that terrorism is
more effectively challenged using the rule of law and constitutional means
as opposed to military might. The latter tends to further disenfranchise
affected communities making their young populations more oppressed and
inclined to recruitment by radical armed groups.
The approach employed by the state and its security apparatus in dealing
with terrorism therefore requires a paradigm shift towards professional
intelligence, early warning and use of strengthened formal justice
institutions. A similar shift is also required with regard to economic
policy to accelerate income opportunities in marginalised areas through
infrastructure, industrialisation and service provision.
The onset of devolved government and prospecting for natural resources has
added new dimensions to the ethnic tensions in Northern Kenya. Following the
demarcation of counties, dominant political elites have sought to drive out
ethnic groups perceived to be hostile to their interests in multiethnic
counties. The race towards speculative land buying by elites in order to
benefit from potential mineral prospecting in Northern Kenya and parts of
the Coast has caused further disillusionment among the respective
populations. These populations ought to be among the potential beneficiaries
of mineral exploration.
A parallel can be drawn between this scenario and that in the Niger Delta
where historically, marginalised communities were further excluded from the
exploits of mineral exploration, leading to civic unrest. The Nigerian
government, with the silent backing of multinational corporations chose to
clamp down on the unrest using force and military might. Decades later, this
approach resulted in the proliferation of radicalised illegal armed groups,
which have at times made the Niger Delta and other regions ungovernable.
Rather than negotiate rights with local groups, improve the economy of
geographical areas around the Niger Delta and apply intelligence together
with formal justice institutions, successive Nigerian dictators opted for
force and failed miserably.
Given these twin scenarios and the underlying similarities, it is unlikely
that brute force on the part of the executive and its security agencies will
yield long-term success in dealing with radicalisation in Northern Kenya and
the Coast. The closure of mosques at the Coast with heavy military presence
will only serve to entrench the allure of religious fundamentalism. The more
prudent approach is to use intelligence, strengthened formal justice
mechanisms under the rule of law and reform of the security sector. In
addition, economic investment in Northern Kenya and marginalised areas of
the former Coast Province through the creation of an enabling environment
for trade and investment is a priority. Improved infrastructure, industry
and cohesive social programmes are required.
Furthermore, the state ought to complete and make public the findings of
publicly funded inquiries into the killings in Tana River and Baragoi.
Another significant requirement is a conscious effort to implement the
recommendations of the Independent Police Oversight Authority with regard to
the killings in Lamu. In addition, the recommendations of the report of the
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, which underscored the nature
of historical injustices and marginalisation in Northern Kenya and the
former Coast Province, ought to be implemented in good faith.
The writer is a human rights lawyer and comments on issues of public concern