Date: Tue Dec 2 12:33:36 2014
Black Market-How the Charcoal Trade Fuels Al Shabab
By <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/tom-keatinge> Tom Keatinge
December 02, 2014
To take out al Shabab, one need look no further than charcoal. The United
Nations has repeatedly called for countries in the region to disrupt the
group's trade in this environmentally destructive product, but, as the most
recent Somalia UN Monitoring Group report revealed, such efforts have been
lackluster. And so, with its patience wearing thin, the UN has now taken
matters into its own hands by approving a naval intervention.
The trade in Somali charcoal is immense, amounting to at least $250 million
per year, a third of which, according to UN estimates, lines al Shabab's
pockets. Most of the charcoal goes to buyers in the Gulf region, a dhow trip
away from Somalia across the Arabian Sea. It circulates within the Gulf
countries' free trade zone and might then be distributed to markets in the
Arabian Peninsula and further afield. In these markets, demand for Somali
charcoal to fire meat grills and heat shisha pipes is particularly high
because it comes from acacia wood, which burns longer and with a more
pleasant aroma than charcoal sourced from most other regional suppliers. As
a result, charcoal from Somalia sells for almost
<http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21623793-unlikely-link
-between-gulf-lounges-and-somalias-jihadists-charred-harvest> twice the
price of that from Sudan or Nigeria.
Al Shabab's role in the Somali charcoal trade is significant. Even after
setbacks in recent weeks-including the death of its leader Ahmed Abdi Godane
at the hands of the U.S. military and its loss of control of Barawe, a port
through which the group had conducted much of its business since it lost
Kismayo in September 2012-it still profits from the charcoal trade. Al
Shabab's financial model of "cash-flow surveillance" ensures that it
benefits at every stage of the trade. For example, the group controls most
of the hinterland transport network for the product and is estimated to earn
more than <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/413> $25
million per year through taxes on it. Some claim that charcoal is the
<http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2013/10/31/The-busines
s-woes-behind-al-Shabaab-s-latest-attack.html> largest contributor to the
group's war chest. (Levying taxes on businesses is another major source of
funding.)
The United Nations first took note of the charcoal trade in 2012, when it
adopted Security Council Resolution 2036 and "expressed concern that
charcoal exports from Somalia are a significant revenue source for
Al-Shabaab." It called on UN member states, presumably meaning the Gulf
States through which the charcoal trade flows, to "take the necessary
measures to <https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10550.doc.htm>
prevent the direct or indirect import of charcoal from Somalia" and urged
Somali authorities to take measures to prevent the export of charcoal.
The trade in Somali charcoal is immense, amounting to at least $250 million
per year, a third of which, according to UN estimates, lines al Shabab's
pockets.
Over the next two years, media and UN reports indicated that the charcoal
trade persisted, in breach of Resolution 2036, with no obvious attempts to
disrupt it. Meanwhile, al Shabab continued to hold territory and launch
attacks. In response, in May 2014, the UN published
<http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/pdf/Implementation%20Assistance%20Notic
e1-E.pdf> Implementation Assistance Notice No. 1. In an apparent attempt to
encourage regional trading nations to make more of an effort to stop Somalia
from exporting al Shabab-linked charcoal, the notice reminded member states
of their obligation to enforce relevant Security Council resolutions and
encouraged authorities to inspect vessels and to seize charcoal consignments
coming from Somalia.
Even that does not seem to have helped. According to the latest UN
Monitoring Group report on Somalia, published in mid-October, the charcoal
trade continues at a rate consistent with prior years. Until Barawe was lost
in October, al Shabab still loaded and exported charcoal from the port. And
even today, traders and brokers continue to facilitate "systemic violations"
of the UN-mandated ban, and Somali charcoal continues to show up in Gulf
Cooperation Council markets. All in all, the report noted, al Shabab's
continued survival is secured by its trade operations,
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/726> the cornerstone
of which remains the charcoal trade.
Days after the report was issued, the Security Council passed
<http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11613.doc.htm> Resolution 2182,
authorizing the use of naval force to disrupt the trade. If trade hubs in
the Gulf region will not stop the trade, it seems, the warships of the
Combined Maritime Forces, a 30-nation naval partnership that patrols the
region to deter piracy will have to do the work for them. It is too soon to
tell if the new mission is tightening the screws on al Shabab. If it works,
though, it will signal a new era in the war against the terrorist group.
For too long, the countries of the Gulf region have been overly permissive
when it comes to terrorist financing. In recent weeks, much of the
finger-pointing has been directed at several of those countries for their
weak efforts to disrupt the financing of the Islamic State of Iraq and
al-Sham and other designated terrorist organizations. But their trade with
Somalia is also a problem, and it must stop if the Horn of Africa is ever to
be rid of al Shabab, a group that has held territory and imposed violent
rule on those under its control for far longer than ISIS.
AMISOM soldiers patrol near stockpiles of charcoal close to the Kismayo sea
port, February 27, 2013.
AMISOM soldiers patrol near stockpiles of charcoal close to the Kismayo sea
port, February 27, 2013. (Feisal Omar / Courtesy Reuters)
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