Kenya: KDF must review Somalia strategy to tackle Al Shabaab
- By Ben Rawlence
Posted on
<
http://africanarguments.org/2014/12/04/kenya-kdf-must-review-somalia-strate
gy-to-tackle-al-shabaab-by-ben-rawlence/> December 4, 2014
Al-Shabaab strikes again. With the security services seemingly unable to
protect Kenyans, it is time to reflect on strategy. In the commotion since
last week's brutal murder in Mandera, much ink was spilled in outrage at the
hopelessness of the security services and at the callousness of absent
politicians. More will no doubt now follow. But, once gain, I am sure,
little attention will be paid to trying to understand the attacks themselves
beyond a lazy assumption that al-Shabaab is 'evil' and that they want to
incite religious war for the sake of it. Such attitudes will not take Kenya
very far. What is al-Shabaab's strategic goal? And what is Kenya's strategy
to counter it?
First let's take a look at what the terrorists themselves are saying.
Survivors of Westgate quoted their attackers as saying, "You are killing our
people in Somalia now it is your turn." The notice justifying the attack on
Mpeketoni included as its second point, "the massacre of innocent Muslims in
Somalia." A survivor of the Mandera bus attack reported the gunmen making
similar claims, and now al-Shabaab's statement following the quarry murders
states they are "a response to Kenya's occupation of Muslim lands and their
atrocities therein."
Given the centrality of the Kenyan occupation and the killings of civilians
inside Somalia in al-Shabaab's justifications for reprisals against innocent
Kenyans, it is surprising and alarming that the debate has focused so little
on these facts. In three years since the Kenyan invasion of Somalia in
October 2011, through a mixture of fear and complacency, no journalist or
human rights organisation has attempted to visit Somalia to investigate. To
do so is entirely possible and absolutely necessary so that Kenyans can
begin to assess whether the KDF's Somalia adventure is worth the price being
paid by ordinary citizens.
Every military intervention is inevitably accompanied by human rights
violations. The question is, how bad is it? Anecdotal evidence from
returning KDF officers suggests atrocities and collective punishment have
been widespread. We have seen how the security forces treat Kenyan citizens
even in the full glare of the media spotlight; in the twilight of a foreign
country against a people whom the government is happy to vilify, who knows
what horrors they can commit?
This leads to a second question: are the abuses being dealt with fairly and
promptly in a way that does not undermine the military and political
objective? This is important. Senior US commanders are currently wondering
in public about whether drone strikes "create more terrorists than they
kill." Recent research published by the rights group Reprieve in the UK
showed that for 41 one men targeted by US drones in Pakistan and Yemen,
<
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/nov/24/-sp-us-drone-strikes-kill-11
47> 1147 people were killed.
Kenyan airstrikes (and US drones) have killed hundreds of people in Somalia.
But no one knows, least of all the KDF, how many of them were innocent
civilians. How are we to assess the terrifyingly imprecise claims of the KDF
that, in response to the Mandera bus killings, air strikes killed 20, 50, 45
"militants"? And what of the Vice President's vague boast of killing "over a
hundred"?
These numbers matter. More than once NATO mistakenly bombed weddings in
Afghanistan and Yemen - incidents which resulted in major investigations,
millions of dollars in compensation and months of confidence building. How
confident is the KDF that last week it did not unleash the equivalent of 4
Manderas on innocent Somalis? And why should the Kenyan public trust their
version of events? Innocent victims whether of terrorist attacks or
collateral damage from air strikes have the same value and must be counted -
and accounted for.
This core grievance, plus the police excesses against muslims and refugees
within Kenya (which everyone knows is counterproductive and yet which
apparently no one can stop) are central to al-Shabaab's strategy: it is
pursuing growth; in territory, income and followers.
Since Westgate, al-Shabaab attacks have been distinguished by the separation
of Muslims and Christians. This is not a war against Christians rather, as
the French scholar Gilles Keppel put it over a decade ago, it is "a battle
for Muslim minds." The very specific focus of the Mandera attack on
teachers, and the reported urging of them not to come back after the school
holidays brings to Kenya one of al-Shabaab's signature policies in Somalia:
the attack on secular education. Like Boko Haram in Nigeria, whose very
names means "secular education is haram", al-Shabaab well understands that
its capacity to radicalise relies on eliminating the possibility for young
minds to be formed in anything other than a religious context: the religious
self, not a secular one, is their goal.
While al-Shabaab appears to have a clear strategy, the KDF does not. The
Kenyan government is a victim of its own lies and hubris: there is no peace
in southern Somalia, there never was. Instead, it appears that since the
2011 invasion, Operation Linda Nchi has amounted to little more than a
financial accommodation with al-Shabaab on the charcoal trade punctuated by
spasms of indiscriminate vengeance every time there is an attack inside
Kenya. Both activities fuelling the growth of al-Shabaab in terms of
rhetoric and cash. It would not be too much of a stretch to say that Kenyan
lives are being lost to pay for the greed of senior military and political
figures.
So, what now?
Firstly, if the KDF cannot define and execute a clear military and political
strategy for bringing peace to southern Somalia beyond making money and
propping up Ahmed Madobe, it should withdraw.
Second, the government must invest in, and protect, North East Province
before it's too late. The dire service provision in NEP is a scandal that
should not have been allowed to persist for so long. The state and the rest
of Kenya must stand with the embattled communities of NEP, not abandon them
as some union leaders and Moses Kuria have suggested. Otherwise, Kenya may
assume other Nigerian characteristics such as al-Shabaab moving into swathes
of north eastern Kenya that have been abandoned by a terrified state.
Ben Rawlence is working on a book about Dadaab refugee camp and is the
author of "Radio Congo: Signals of Hope from Africa's Deadliest War" (2012).
Received on Thu Dec 04 2014 - 17:40:55 EST