Date: Fri Dec 12 08:57:55 2014
The trap of insecurity: Extrajudicial killings in Kenya
Kenya's failed security policies have led to a string of extrajudicial
killings in the past decades.
Last updated: 12 Dec 2014 17:28
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/profile/abdullahi-boru-halakhe.htm
l> Abdullahi Boru Halakhe
Watch this Video link below: Inside Kenya's Death Squads
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lUjOdjdH8Uk
Over the years, Kenyan police have acquired a dubious reputation of being a
source of
<http://www.irinnews.org/report/97499/rising-insecurity-in-northern-kenya>
<http://www.irinnews.org/report/97499/rising-insecurity-in-northern-kenya>
insecurity instead of one of security. In many instances, the police
represent clear, palpable and imminent danger to the lives of Kenyan
citizens.
The transformation of the police from a security institution into a bastion
of insecurity didn't occur overnight, nor did it come as a surprise; it was
the inevitable outcome of a number of factors. Some of these factors are
beyond their control. For instance, policemen are
<http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000107514> underpaid and
ill-equipped to do their job; others seem to be an institutional choice,
such as the endemic corruption within the police force.
Under the previous constitution, the police were at the beck and call of the
executive, which used it as a tool of coercion to further its political
goals. As a result, when confronted by a new security situation, the
executive's default response has been to set up a "special" police unit to
address the situation. In most cases, t he unit would operate under minimum
oversight and maximum impunity.
More than any other institution in the country, the police has deep
institutional problems, but one of the most detrimental ones is its
involvement in
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-18/kenyan-anti-terrorism-police-accus
ed-of-extrajudicial-killings.html> extrajudicial killings . Remarkably, this
is not only a new phenomenon, but it is deeply entrenched with a clear
pattern.
Rising crime
In the 1990s, crime was on the rise in Kenya. In order to stem the high
rates of carjacking and violent robberies, in 1995 the government formed a
new police unit called the
<http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Flying-Squads-smoking-gun-/-/1056/1093742/-/w0
jrvy/-/index.html> Flying Squad . This special unit was given the express
authority to shoot any suspect on sight without due process. As a result,
the unit was implicated in multiple and egregious extrajudicial killings,
which they claimed was their way of dealing with the new security reality.
In some cases, the police officers were caught shooting suspects after they
had surrendered or were lying face down.
The unit executed several innocent people in cold blood. The police command
instead of seeing the unit's trigger-happy attitude as dangerous, celebrated
it as the only "medicine" with which to treat spiralling crime.
The late 1980s and 1990s saw deep economic problems, shrinking political
space for dissent and increasing insecurity. This was the time when criminal
gangs emerged and flourished.
These gangs e stablished their "spheres of influence", mostly in slum areas,
where the state's presence was negligible. To establish loyalty from the
community and enhance their legitimacy, these groups provided security for a
token fee. To exert their superiority, from time to time, these groups
engaged each other over "territories" and business interests. Among these
groups were the Mungiki, the Taliban, the Kosovo boys, the Baghdad boys,
Chinkororo, and the Kalenjin Warriors.
Mungiki is a Kikuyu word for multitude. The organisation had both a cultural
and political element to it. In the beginning of the group's existence, the
social aspect was more prominent and it involved traditional Kikuyu beliefs
in the god named Ngai . But as the organisation expanded, it began taking an
overtly political posture, which brought them into confrontation with the
state.
Mungiki operated primarily in the Nairobi slums, in the Central Province and
parts of the Rift Valley. In these areas, the group started providing the
poor in slum areas with protection and social services for a fee. Refusal to
pay the protection <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=53CFjIgRfOk> "
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=53CFjIgRfOk> tax " almost always resulted
in violence and killings.
In 2002, the Kenyan government banned 18 of these criminal gangs.
The spread of Mungiki's influence forced the government in 2007 to establish
a special police unit called Kwekwe which was tasked primarily with hunting
down members of Mungiki.
But Kwekwe's operation against the criminal group went too far.
According to a National Commission on Human Rights 2008 report:
"Extrajudicial executions and other brutal acts of extreme cruelty have been
perpetrated by the police against so-called Mungiki adherents and that these
acts may have been committed pursuant to official policy sanctioned by the
political leadership, the police commissioner and top police commander". HRW
observed in 2008 that, "The brutality of the police crackdown matched or
even exceeded that of the Mungiki itself."
Counterterrorism measures
Kenya has been in the crosshairs of the transnational jihadi movement. In
the past, the fact that Kenya was seen as being firmly in the western sphere
of influence made Kenya a target , with most of the incidents, including the
1998 US embassy attack, targeting western interests.
However, after Kenya's intervention in Somalia in 2011, the country itself
become a target. Terrorism activity in Kenya reached a peak with the attack
on the Westgate shopping mall in September 2013, when unidentified gunmen
killed 67 people and injured almost 200 others.
As a response to the growing terrorism threat, the Kenyan government created
the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) in March 2003, following the 2002
attack on an Israeli-owned Mombasa hotel. This was also accompanied by the
passage of Anti-Terrorism Act in 2012. As part of the wider counterterrorism
effort, the government also began a huge crackdo
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/04/cracking-down-nairobi-som
alis-201442012628685801.html> wn on the Somali and Muslim communities
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/04/cracking-down-nairobi-som
alis-201442012628685801.html> especially in Nairobi, parts of Northern Kenya
and coastal Kenya.
As the crackdown intensified, a number of extrajudicial killings of Muslim
preachers took place, some in the coastal city of Mombasa. Most of the
victims were <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24395723> suspected of
having connections <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24395723> with
Somalia's al-Shabab group.
While in almost all the cases the police deny culpability, research by human
rights organisations reveals the ATPU's involvement. In its August 2014
report, "Kenya: Killings, disappearance by anti-terror police," HRW
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/18/kenya-killings-disappearances-anti-terro
r-police> points to " .evidence of at least 10 cases of extrajudicial
killings of terrorism suspects, some of whom were last seen in ATPU custody
or had been threatened by the unit's officers after courts had released
them".
The Kenyan government has accused some of the clerics who were killed of
recruiting Muslim youth for terrorism activities through their mosques.
However, despite initiating investigations against them, the government
never followed through to prosecute the imams.
After public outcry over the killing of Muslim cleric Ibrahim "Rogo" Omar,
the government set up a task force to investigate his murder. The director
of public prosecution promised in 2013 that he will institute an inquest,
but has not done so yet.
One of the commissions established following the 2007-2008 violence to look
at the role of the police, was the Waki Commission. Established to look into
the circumstances and facts surrounding the violence and provide
recommendations, the Waki Commission found that of the 1,500 deaths, the
police was responsible for more than 30 percent
<http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Reports/Commission_of_Inquiry_into_Post_E
lection_Violence.pdf> of them.
As a result several reform measures were proposed including the
establishment of a civilian oversight of the police, and many other reforms.
However, due to lack of political will, the police reforms have stalled.
The extrajudicial killings by the police in Kenya are anchored in a systemic
lack of accountability and deeply entrenched culture of pervasive impunity.
While the police undoubtedly face ever changing security challenges, its
involvement in extrajudicial killings make matters worse. Effective security
sector reform is the only way forward.
Abdullahi Boru HalakheAbdullahi Boru Halakhe is a Horn of Africa security
analyst.
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