Electoral Politics and Power Strategies in Ethiopia
By Elise Dufief, 4 July 2014
Analysis
International democracy promotion is challenged by the global retreat of
democracy. The case of Ethiopia demonstrates how political space can be
narrowed, a hegemonic regime strengthened, and election observer missions
constricted in their capacity to influence outcomes. Election monitoring can
deepen the contradictions between regime practices and democratic
objectives. *
Why does the Ethiopian government regularly organize elections and invite
election observers only to reject their findings? How did the governing
party come close to losing the 2005 election yet triumph in 2010 with 99.6%
of the vote? Why do international actors such as the EU Observer Mission
continue to participate in these processes where their credibility is likely
to be tarnished? Such questions must be answered about the manipulation of
democracy promotion instruments by a non-democratic regime.
Since the overthrow of the communist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in May
1991, Ethiopia has organized regular elections in which an increasing number
of international actors, especially election observers, have been involved.
During this period, one political organization, the Ethiopian Peoples
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), has been dominant. During its rule,
Meles Zenawi served continuously as head of government until his death in
August 2012. He was succeeded by his vice-Prime Minister, Haile Mariam
Dessalegn.
The tensions and contradictions between external democracy promoters and the
practices and ideals of the Ethiopian leadership were brought into sharp
focus after the 2005 and 2010 elections. Both elections led to a diplomatic
crisis, especially between the regime and EU observers. However, this
conflict did not substantially affect the levels of external aid or the
continued dominance of the EPRDF.
The interaction between international and domestic actors is relevant to
understanding the persistence of a hegemonic regime that endorses democratic
principles while shrinking political space.
Elections in many countries are no longer exclusively a national affair but
are embedded in international relations. Strategies of power in both
international and domestic arenas influence the nature of power relations.
However disputed the nature of elections, actors on the ground must maintain
diplomatic relations while pursuing their political objectives. The
Ethiopian regime interacts with external democracy promoters in ways that
weaken the democratic enterprise while strengthening the regime. Such goals
are accomplished in three following ways.
Multiple discourses and authority
This dimension involves employing discourses of democracy promotion in the
interaction between international and national actors. In this phase, the
Ethiopian regime uses a strategy of advancing its position on the
international scene while protecting the domestic sphere through practices
of inclusion, exclusion, and fostering divisions among international actors.
The regime seeks inclusion in the international system by implementing
accepted indicators of a democratic system such as holding national
elections and inviting international observers.
In 2005 three US organizations were originally invited, including a Carter
Center mission led by Jimmy Carter himself. The EU sent one of its biggest
missions, and the African Union and the Arab League also participated. In
2010, however, only the AU and the EU took part. The latter deployed again a
large number of observers and sought to influence the electoral process
despite its limited capacity to realistically observe the elections.
In a second aspect of this phase, observers who were initially invited are
excluded by the regime. In 2005, IRI and NDI were expelled from the country
before election day.
The EU Mission's final report was rejected by the government, the
inconsistencies of the Mission denounced, and the chief of the Mission
banned from the country.
Similarly, in 2010, the EU final report was rejected, its chief observer
banned from the country, and public demonstrations organized against it. The
rejection of election observers represents an assertion of national
authority and also an opportunity to reverse power hierarchies. By
presenting election observers as destabilizing actors, the regime justifies
excluding them from the political process.
This exclusion is extended to local opposition parties which are presented
as linked to these allegedly destabilizing factors. This exclusion is
further extended beyond the state to civil society and the media via a
series of restrictive laws enacted after the 2005 elections.
In the end, through the manipulation of practices and ideals set by
international observers and their organizations, the ruling party solidifies
its control and becomes the sole and indispensable actor in the country's
politics.
In the final stage, the state, now in a stronger position, can exploit
disagreements among international actors who remain involved regardless of
the defective electoral process.
Local authorities are aware of these ambiguities and seek to enhance their
bargaining power: "If it is too difficult to negotiate with Sweden," they
might reason, "then let us talk to the Italians". "If Europe is proving too
difficult, let us meet with the Indians", and so on. In this web of shifting
alliances, the Ethiopian state emerges stronger by avoiding constraints and
conditionalities.
Alternatives to the policies of international actors
The second phase involves developing alternatives to the recommendations of
observers and democracy promoters while keeping a tight control of domestic
politics.
The rejection of observers not only undermines the role of international
actors in democracy promotion, it also forces them to change their methods.
This strategy contributes to the narrowing of political space.
In response to these tactics, international actors are gradually withdrawing
from democracy promotion in Ethiopia. The Democratic Institution Programme
(DIP) implemented in 2007 to support seven institutions, including the
Parliament, the National Electoral Board, and the Human Rights Commission,
is coming to an end. Its aim to "develop a fully operational democratic,
accountable and responsive constitutional federalism, ensuring citizens
empowerment and participation" was clearly foiled by the 2010 elections.
In parallel, the work of international actors in supporting civil society
organizations has been limited after 2005 since the passing of new laws
restricting international funding for NGOs working on human rights and
democratization. Most of these organizations were made to re-register and
adjust their activities which considerably transformed the landscape of
civil society organizations.
>From the Ethiopian leadership's perspective, the weakening of international
actors called for a policy shift in the form of 'The African Renaissance'.
The shift began after the 2005 elections but became more visible after 2010.
The political stability achieved by the EPRDF allowed the ruling party to
shift its priorities. Economic performance became the central focus as
Ethiopia launched the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), an ambitious
program with both a pro-poor dimension and a commitment to achieve
middle-income status by 2025. The GTP has been successful so far as Ethiopia
has become one of the fastest growing non-oil exporting economies in the
world with an average GTP growth of 10% per year.
With the enhanced economic focus has come the reactivation of the
Revolutionary Democracy ideology, treating the grassroots as the key
support-base of the regime. To reach the grassroots, the party- state
considerably expanded its local structures. In preparation for the 2013
local elections, the EPRDF mobilized 3.6 million candidates, transforming
the administrative structure of the country. It also expanded the party
membership to more than 5 million Ethiopians.
Various institutions were also considerably expanded and decentralized. The
National Elections Board, for instance, opened branch offices in each
federal state and increased its personnel and presence outside Addis Ababa.
>From about 100 people in 2008, this body now has more than 200 employees
working in and outside the capital city. It also announced a broadening of
its mandate before the 2010. The Elections Board is now in charge of civic
and voter education. In these calculated ways, the EPRDF has used the
resources offered by election observers and democracy promoters to increase
its capacity to reinforce the state and further entrench the ruling party's
domination.
Reordering power relations
The first two dimensions now permit the reordering of power relations:
external actors are weakened and the Ethiopian regime strengthened. Three
further implications are identified which affect, on the one hand, the
capacity of international actors to work on democracy promotion and
governance and, on the other, the sustainability of the Ethiopian regime's
power strategies.
First, the meaning of democratic governance and human rights in Ethiopia has
been altered. International actors now treat these issues as including
social accountability.
Thus, donor assistance has been steered towards support for women, youths,
and other vulnerable categories in keeping with the GTP. In parallel, a
number of legal aid centers have been created, making the provision of legal
services a new arena to gain popular support.
Secondly, sensitive political issues have been depoliticized. The Ethiopian
state tends to adopt a technocratic approach to implementing development
programs. Similarly, the electoral discourse focuses on the increased number
of party members, the level of voters' participation, and so on. In
response, international actors similarly present election monitoring as an
attempt to fix a technical problem, providing an aura of neutrality to a
very political process.
GTZ, the German Cooperation agency, was voted the best election observation
mission in 2010 in Ethiopia, emphasizing the technical success of the
mission while ignoring the failures of some of its observers. It has become
difficult to object to this technocratic discourse. Political space is
increasingly uncontested while the EPRDF's domination is further
consolidated.
Finally, the suspension of politics does not resolve existing challenges.
Rather, it potentially creates more of them. Although the death of Meles
Zenawi was followed by a relatively smooth transition, his successor, Haile
Mariam Dessalegn, does not seem to be fully in charge.
Internal struggles in the party might present a challenge in the lead-up to
the May 2015 elections. The emergence of new parties such as the Semayawi
Party and the organization of public demonstrations, even if still marginal,
pose challenges to the uncontested rule of the EPRDF.
On the economic front, the forecast of growth rates has been revised
downward as the first phase of the GTP ends in 2015. In addition, huge
development projects such as the construction of the Blue Nile Dam is
experiencing financial difficulties and can affect balances of power among
countries in the region. The EPRDF cannot count on the small middle class
which has emerged as this part of society is shying away from politics.
Ethiopia is not immune to social unrest as localized protests occur
throughout the country. Recent signs of potential unrest include religious
tensions between Muslims and adherents of the Orthodox Church, students'
demonstrations in Oromia in opposition to the Addis Master Plan, and the
arrest of Zone Nine bloggers and journalists.
Nevertheless, the Ethiopian regime continues to be the beneficiary of
considerable international support. Prime Minister Dessalegn's first
European visit was to EU headquarters in Brussels to negotiate trade
contracts.
Ethiopia remains an important strategic partner for the West despite the
regime's dilution of democratic processes and the further entrenchment of
hegemonic power.
The EPRDF has shown that embracing the trappings of democracy while
subverting its content is an effective way to counter external critics while
reinforcing the state.
Buoyed by economic growth and effective political control, the regime is
well positioned to continue the strategy of out-maneuvering donors, critics,
and anyone demanding political reform.
In addition, it can draw on the involvement of non-traditional partners,
such as China and India, to further erode the impact of western powers and
the agencies they control. These features of political life and the
well-honed power strategies of the regime should be kept in mind in the
run-up to the May 2015 elections.
*This essay is based on a talk given by Elise Dufief at the Program of
African Studies, Northwestern University, on May 8, 2014. It is drawn from
her doctoral research at Northwestern and the École des Hautes Études en
Sciences Sociales on the politics of electoral observation.