Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 23:25:59 +0200
Twenty-First-Century Energy Wars
Global Conflicts Are Increasingly Fueled by the Desire for Oil and Natural
Gas -- and the Funds They Generate
By <http://www.tomdispatch.com/authors/michaelklare> Michael T. Klare
09/07/2014
Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, South Sudan, Ukraine, the East and South China Seas:
wherever you look, the world is aflame with new or intensifying conflicts.
At first glance, these upheavals appear to be independent events, driven by
their own unique and idiosyncratic circumstances. But look more closely and
they share several key characteristics -- notably, a witch's brew of ethnic,
religious, and national antagonisms that have been stirred to the boiling
point by a fixation on energy.
In each of these conflicts, the fighting is driven in large part by the
eruption of long-standing historic antagonisms among neighboring (often
intermingled) tribes, sects, and peoples. In Iraq and Syria, it is a clash
among Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, Turkmen, and others; in Nigeria, among
Muslims, Christians, and assorted tribal groupings; in South Sudan, between
the Dinka and Nuer; in Ukraine, between Ukrainian loyalists and
Russian-speakers aligned with Moscow; in the East and South China Sea, among
the Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Filipinos, and others. It would be easy
to attribute all this to age-old hatreds, as suggested by many analysts; but
while such hostilities do help drive these conflicts, they are fueled by a
most modern impulse as well: the desire to control valuable oil and natural
gas assets. Make no mistake about it, these are twenty-first-century energy
wars.
It should surprise no one that energy plays such a significant role in these
conflicts. Oil and gas are, after all, the world's most important and
valuable commodities and constitute a major source of income for the
governments and corporations that control their production and distribution.
Indeed, the governments of <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=IZ>
Iraq, <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=NI> Nigeria,
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=RS> Russia,
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=SU> South Sudan, and
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=SY> Syria derive the great bulk
of their revenues from oil sales, while the major energy firms (many
state-owned) exercise immense power in these and the other countries
involved. Whoever controls these states, or the oil- and gas-producing
areas within them, also controls the collection and allocation of crucial
revenues. Despite the patina of historical enmities, many of these
conflicts, then, are really struggles for control over the principal source
of national income.
Moreover, we live in an <http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175487/>
energy-centric world where control over oil and gas resources (and their
means of delivery) translates into geopolitical clout for some and economic
vulnerability for others. Because so many countries are dependent on energy
imports, nations with surpluses to export -- including Iraq, Nigeria,
Russia, and South Sudan -- often exercise disproportionate influence on the
world stage. What happens in these countries sometimes matters as much to
the rest of us as to the people living in them, and so the risk of external
involvement in their conflicts -- whether in the form of direct
intervention, arms transfers, the sending in of military advisers, or
economic assistance -- is greater than almost anywhere else.
The struggle over energy resources has been a conspicuous factor in many
recent conflicts, including the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, the Gulf War of
1990-1991, and the Sudanese Civil War of 1983-2005. On first glance, the
fossil-fuel factor in the most recent outbreaks of tension and fighting may
seem less evident. But look more closely and you'll see that each of these
conflicts is, at heart, an energy war.
Iraq, Syria, and ISIS
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24179084> ISIS), the Sunni
extremist group that controls large chunks of western Syria and northern
Iraq, is a well-armed militia intent on creating an Islamic caliphate in the
areas it controls. In some respects, it is a fanatical, sectarian religious
organization, seeking to reproduce the pure, uncorrupted piety of the early
Islamic era. At the same time, it is engaged in a conventional
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/world/middleeast/rebels-fast-strike-in-ir
aq-was-years-in-the-making.html> nation-building project, seeking to create
a fully functioning state with all its attributes.
As the United States learned to its dismay in Iraq and Afghanistan,
nation-building is expensive: institutions must be created and financed,
armies recruited and paid, weapons and fuel procured, and infrastructure
maintained. Without oil (or some other lucrative source of income), ISIS
could never hope to accomplish its ambitious goals. However, as it now
occupies key oil-producing areas of Syria and oil-refining facilities in
Iraq, it is in a unique position to do so. Oil, then, is absolutely
essential to the organization's grand strategy.
Syria was never a major oil producer, but its prewar production of some
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=SY> 400,000 barrels per
day did provide the regime of Bashar al-Assad with a major source of income.
Now, most of the country's oil fields are under the control of rebel groups,
including ISIS, the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front, and local Kurdish militias.
Although production from the fields has dropped significantly, enough is
being extracted and sold through various clandestine channels to
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/world/middleeast/rebels-in-syria-claim-co
ntrol-of-resources.html> provide the rebels with income and operating funds.
"Syria is an oil country and has resources, but in the past they were all
stolen by the regime,"
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/world/middleeast/rebels-in-syria-claim-co
ntrol-of-resources.html> said Abu Nizar, an anti-government activist. "Now
they are being stolen by those who are profiting from the revolution."
At first, many rebel groups were
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/middleeast/syrias-oil-a-source-of-c
ontention-for-competing-groups.htm> involved in these extractive activities,
but since January, when it assumed control of
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raqqa> Raqqa, the capital of the province of
that name, ISIS has been the dominant player in the oil fields. In
addition, it has seized fields in neighboring Deir al-Zour Province along
the Iraq border. Indeed, many of the U.S.-supplied weapons it acquired from
the fleeing Iraqi army after its recent drive into Mosul and other northern
Iraqi cities have been
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/18/isis-iraq-syria-two-wars-one-n
ightmare> moved into Deir al-Zour to help in the organization's campaign to
take full control of the region. In Iraq, ISIS is fighting to gain control
over Iraq's largest refinery at
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27917824> Baiji in the central
part of the country.
It appears that ISIS
<http://www.syriadirect.org/main/36-interviews/1114-oil-sales-fuel-rebel-gro
ups-in-eastern-syria> sells oil from the fields it controls to shadowy
middlemen who in turn arrange for its transport -- mostly by tanker trucks
-- to buyers in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. These sales are
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/21/world/middleeast/isis-iraq-insurgents-rea
ping-wealth-as-they-advance.html> said to provide the organization with the
funds needed to pay its troops and acquire its vast stockpiles of arms and
ammunition. Many observers also claim that ISIS is selling oil to the Assad
regime in return for immunity from government air strikes of the sort being
launched against other rebel groups. "Many locals in Raqqa accuse ISIS of
collaborating with the Syrian regime," a Kurdish journalist, Sirwan Kajjo,
<http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/03/fight-for-raqqa/hcgh> reported in
early June. "Locals say that while other rebel groups in Raqqa have been
under attack by regime air strikes on a regular basis, ISIS headquarters
have not once been attacked."
However the present fighting in northern Iraq plays out, it is obvious that
there, too, oil is a central factor. ISIS seeks both to deny petroleum
supplies and oil revenue to the Baghdad government and to bolster its own
coffers, enhancing its capacity for nation-building and further military
advances. At the same time, the Kurds and various Sunni tribes -- some
allied with ISIS -- want control over oil fields located in the areas under
their control and a <http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175860/> greater share
of the nation's oil wealth.
Ukraine, the Crimea, and Russia
The present crisis in Ukraine
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/middleeast/syrias-oil-a-source-of-c
ontention-for-competing-groups.html> began in November 2013 when President
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yanukovych> Viktor Yanukovych repudiated an
agreement for closer economic and political ties with the European Union
(EU), opting instead for closer ties with Russia. That act touched off
fierce <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25182823> anti-government
protests in Kiev and eventually led to Yanukovych's flight from the capital.
With Moscow's principal ally pushed from the scene and pro-EU forces in
control of the capital, Russian President Vladimir Putin moved to seize
control of the Crimea and foment a separatist drive in eastern Ukraine. For
both sides, the resulting struggle has been about political legitimacy and
national identity -- but as in other recent conflicts, it has also been
about energy.
Ukraine is not itself a significant energy producer. It is, however, a
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=UP> major transit route
for the delivery of Russian natural gas to Europe. According to the U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA), Europe
<http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15411> obtained 30% of its
gas from Russia in 2013 -- most of it from the state-controlled gas giant
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gazprom> Gazprom -- and approximately half of
this was transported by pipelines crossing Ukraine. As a result, that
country plays a critical role in the
<https://csis.org/publication/russia-eu-gas-relationship-partnership-necessi
ty> complex energy relationship between Europe and Russia, one that has
proved incredibly lucrative for the shadowy elites and oligarchs who control
the flow of gas, whille at the same time provoking intense controversy.
<http://www.cfr.org/ukraine/business-politics-behind-russia-ukraine-gas-disp
ute/p18178> Disputes over the price Ukraine pays for its own imports of
Russian gas twice provoked a cutoff in deliveries by Gazprom, leading to
diminished supplies in Europe as well.
<http://www.amazon.com/dp/1250023971/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20>
<http://www.amazon.com/dp/1250023971/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20>
http://www.tomdispatch.com/images/managed/klarepbk2012.jpeg
<http://www.amazon.com/dp/1250023971/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20> Given
this background, it is not surprising that a key objective of the "
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93European_Union_Association_Agr
eement> association agreement" between the EU and Ukraine that was
repudiated by Yanukovych (and has now been signed by the new Ukrainian
government) calls for the extension of EU energy rules to Ukraine's energy
system -- essentially eliminating the cozy deals between Ukrainian elites
and Gazprom. By entering into the agreement, EU officials
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/eu_ukraine/association_agreement/
index_en.htm> claim, Ukraine will begin "a process of approximating its
energy legislation to the EU norms and standards, thus facilitating internal
market reforms."
Russian leaders have many reasons to despise the association agreement. For
one thing, it will move Ukraine, a country on its border, into a closer
political and economic embrace with the West. Of special concern, however,
are the provisions about energy, given Russia's economic reliance on gas
sales to Europe -- not to mention the threat they pose to the personal
fortunes of well-connected Russian elites. In late 2013 Yanukovych came
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ukraine-under-pressure-from-russ
ia-puts-brakes-on-eu-deal/2013/11/21/46c50796-52c9-11e3-9ee6-2580086d8254_st
ory.html> under immense pressure from Vladimir Putin to turn his back on the
EU and agree instead to an economic union with Russia and Belarus, an
arrangement that would have protected the privileged status of elites in
both countries. However, by moving in this direction, Yanukovych put a
bright spotlight on the
<http://csis.org/blog/russia%E2%80%99s-gas-clash-ukraine-geopolitics-or-just
-money> crony politics that had long plagued Ukraine's energy system,
thereby triggering protests in Kiev's Independence Square (the
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euromaidan> Maidan) -- that led to his
downfall.
Once the protests began, a cascade of events led to the current standoff,
with the Crimea in Russian hands, large parts of the east under the control
of pro-Russian separatists, and the rump western areas moving ever closer to
the EU. In this ongoing struggle, identity politics has come to play a
prominent role, with leaders on all sides appealing to national and ethnic
loyalties. Energy, nevertheless, remains a major factor in the equation.
Gazprom has repeatedly
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/world/europe/russia-ratchets-up-ukraines-
gas-bills-in-shift-to-an-economic-battlefield.html> raised the price it
charges Ukraine for its imports of natural gas, and on June 16th
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/world/europe/russia-gazprom-increases-pre
ssure-on-ukraine-in-gas-dispute.html> cut off its supply entirely, claiming
non-payment for past deliveries. A day later, an explosion
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27891018> damaged one of the main
pipelines carrying Russian gas to Ukraine -- an event still being
investigated. Negotiations over the gas price remain a major issue in the
ongoing negotiations between Ukraine's newly elected president, Petro
Poroshenko, and Vladimir Putin.
Energy also played a key role in Russia's determination to take the Crimea
by military means. By annexing that region, Russia virtually
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/world/europe/in-taking-crimea-putin-gains
-a-sea-of-fuel-reserves.html> doubled the offshore territory it controls in
the Black Sea, which is thought to house billions of barrels of oil and vast
reserves of natural gas. Prior to the crisis, several Western oil firms,
including ExxonMobil, were
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/shifting-energy-trends-blunt
-russias-natural-gas-weapon/2014/02/28/7d090062-9ef7-11e3-a050-dc3322a94fa7_
story.html> negotiating with Ukraine for access to those reserves. Now,
they will be negotiating with Moscow. "It's a big deal,"
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/world/europe/in-taking-crimea-putin-gains
-a-sea-of-fuel-reserves.html> said Carol Saivetz, a Eurasian expert at MIT.
"It deprives Ukraine of the possibility of developing these resources and
gives them to Russia."
Nigeria and South Sudan
The conflicts in South Sudan and Nigeria are distinctive in many respects,
yet both share a key common factor: widespread anger and distrust towards
government officials who have become wealthy, corrupt, and autocratic thanks
to access to abundant oil revenues.
In Nigeria, the insurgent group
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13809501> Boko Haram is fighting to
overthrow the existing political system and establish a puritanical,
Muslim-ruled state. Although most Nigerians decry the group's violent
methods (including the kidnapping of hundreds of teenage girls from a
state-run school), it has
<http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2013/11/northern-nigeria/verini-text>
drawn strength from disgust in the poverty-stricken northern part of the
country with the
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2387359/Nigeria-country-corrupt-b
etter-burn-aid-money.html> corruption-riddled central government in distant
Abuja, the capital.
Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa,
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ni> pumping out some 2.5 million
barrels per day. With oil selling at around $100 per barrel, this
represents a potentially staggering source of wealth for the nation, even
after the private companies involved in the day-to-day extractive operations
take their share. Were these revenues -- estimated in the tens of billions
of dollars per year -- used to spur development and improve the lot of the
population, Nigeria could be a great beacon of hope for Africa. Instead,
much of the money <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26535530>
disappears into the pockets (and foreign bank accounts) of Nigeria's
well-connected elites.
In February, the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Lamido Sanusi,
told a parliamentary investigating committee that the state-owned Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) had failed to transfer some $20
billion in proceeds from oil sales to the national treasury, as required by
law. It had all evidently been diverted to private accounts. "A
substantial amount of money has gone," he
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/10/world/africa/nigerians-ask-why-oil-funds-
are-missing.html> told the New York Times. "I wasn't just talking about
numbers. I showed it was a scam."
For many Nigerians -- a majority of whom subsist on less than $2 per day --
the corruption in Abuja, when combined with the
<http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/05/14/how-nigeria-s-stupidly-bru
tal-cops-botch-the-hunt-for-boko-haram.html> wanton brutality of the
government's security forces, is a source of abiding anger and resentment,
generating recruits for insurgent groups like Boko Haram and winning them
begrudging admiration. "They know well the frustration that would drive
someone to take up arms against the state,"
<http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2013/11/northern-nigeria/verini-text>
said National Geographic reporter James Verini of people he interviewed in
battle-scarred areas of northern Nigeria. At this stage, the government has
displayed
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/world/africa/nigeria-shows-its-weakness.h
tml> zero capacity to overcome the insurgency, while its ineptitude and
heavy-handed military tactics have only further alienated ordinary
Nigerians.
The conflict in South Sudan has different roots, but shares a common link to
energy. Indeed, the very formation of
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14069082> South Sudan is a product of
oil politics. A <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Sudanese_Civil_War>
civil war in Sudan that lasted from 1955 to 1972 only ended when the
Muslim-dominated government in the north agreed to grant more autonomy to
the peoples of the southern part of the country, largely practitioners of
traditional African religions or Christianity. However, when oil was
discovered in the south, the rulers of northern Sudan repudiated many of
their earlier promises and sought to gain control over the oil fields,
sparking a <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Sudanese_Civil_War> second
civil war, which lasted from 1983 to 2005. An estimated two million people
lost their lives in this round of fighting. In the end, the south was
<http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/sudan-comprehensive-peace-agreement-and-
south-sudan-independence> granted full autonomy and the right to vote on
secession. Following a January 2011 referendum in which
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12317927> 98.8% of southerners voted
to secede, the country became independent on that July 9th.
The new state had barely been established, however, when conflict with the
north over its oil resumed. While South Sudan has a plethora of oil, the
only pipeline allowing the country to export its energy stretches across
North Sudan to the Red Sea. This ensured that the south would be dependent
on the north for the major source of government revenues. Furious at the
loss of the fields, the northerners
<http://sudanreeves.org/2012/01/25/sudan-south-sudan-and-the-oil-revenues-co
ntroversy-khartoums-obstructionism-threatens-war/> charged excessively high
rates for transporting the oil, precipitating a cutoff in oil deliveries by
the south and sporadic violence along the two countries' still-disputed
border. Finally, in August 2012, the two sides
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/south-sudan/
9452032/Sudan-and-South-Sudan-reach-agreement-over-oil-after-tense-eight-mon
th-dispute.html> agreed to a formula for sharing the wealth and the flow of
oil resumed. Fighting has, however, continued in certain border areas
controlled by the north but populated by groups linked to the south.
With the flow of oil income assured, the leader of South Sudan, President
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salva_Kiir> Salva Kiir, sought to consolidate
his control over the country and all those oil revenues. Claiming an
imminent coup attempt by his rivals, led by Vice President
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riek_Machar> Riek Machar, he
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23428557> disbanded his multiethnic
government on July 24, 2013, and began arresting allies of Machar. The
resulting power struggle quickly turned into an
<http://www.enoughproject.org/conflicts/sudans/conflicts-south-sudan> ethnic
civil war, with the kin of President Kiir, a Dinka, battling members of the
Nuer group, of which Machar is a member. Despite several attempts to
negotiate a cease-fire,
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudanese_conflict_%282013%E2%80%932014%2
9> fighting has been under way since December, with thousands of people
killed and hundreds of thousands forced to flee their homes.
As in Syria and Iraq, much of the fighting in South Sudan has centered
around the vital oil fields, with both sides determined to control them and
collect the revenues they generate. As of March, while still under
government control, the Paloch field in Upper Nile State was
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-30/south-sudan-s-rebel-leader-machar-
vows-to-target-key-oil-fields.html> producing some 150,000 barrels a day,
worth about $15 million to the government and participating oil companies.
The rebel forces, led by former Vice President Machar, are trying to seize
those fields to deny this revenue to the government. "The presence of
forces loyal to Salva Kiir in Paloch, to buy more arms to kill our people...
is not acceptable to us," Machar
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/04/world/africa/from-a-quiet-rebel-base-plot
ting-an-assault-on-south-sudans-oil-fields.html> said in April. "We want to
take control of the oil field. It's our oil." As of now, the field remains
in government hands, with rebel forces reportedly making gains in the
vicinity.
The South China Sea
In both the <http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=ecs> East
China and <http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs> South
China seas, China and its neighbors claim assorted atolls and islands that
sit astride vast undersea oil and gas reserves. The waters of both have
been the site of recurring naval clashes over the past few years, with the
South China Sea recently grabbing the spotlight.
An energy-rich offshoot of the western Pacific, that sea, long a focus of
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349> contention, is rimmed
by China, Vietnam, the island of Borneo, and the Philippine Islands.
Tensions peaked in May when the Chinese
<http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-oil-rig-gambit-south-china-sea-game-c
hanger/> deployed their largest deepwater drilling rig, the HD-981, in
waters claimed by Vietnam. Once in the drilling area, about 120 nautical
miles off the coast of Vietnam, the Chinese surrounded the HD-981 with a
large flotilla of navy and coast guard ships. When Vietnamese coast guard
vessels attempted to penetrate this defensive ring in an effort to drive off
the rig, they were
<http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/27/world/asia/vietnam-china-paracels-fishing-boa
t-collision/> rammed by Chinese ships and pummeled by water cannon. No
lives have yet been lost in these encounters, but
<http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/19/world/asia/china-vietnam-islands-oil-rig-expl
ainer/> anti-Chinese rioting in Vietnam in response to the sea-borne
encroachment left several dead and the clashes at sea are expected to
continue for several months until the Chinese move the rig to another
(possibly equally contested) location.
The riots and clashes sparked by the deployment of HD-981 have been driven
in large part by <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349>
nationalism and resentment over past humiliations. The Chinese, insisting
that various tiny islands in the South China Sea were once ruled by their
country, still seek to overcome the territorial losses and humiliations they
suffered at the hands the Western powers and Imperial Japan. The
Vietnamese, long accustomed to Chinese invasions, seek to protect what they
view as their sovereign territory. For common citizens in both countries,
demonstrating resolve in the dispute is a matter of national pride.
But to view the Chinese drive in the South China Sea as a simple matter of
nationalistic impulses would be a mistake. The owner of HD-981, the China
National Offshore Oil Company (
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_National_Offshore_Oil_Corporation>
CNOOC), has conducted extensive seismic testing in the disputed area and
evidently believes there is a large reservoir of energy there. "The South
China Sea is estimated to have 23 billion tons to 30 billion tons of oil and
16 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, accounting for one-third of China's
total oil and gas resources," the Chinese news agency Xinhua
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-05/09/c_131576610.htm> noted.
Moreover, China
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/world/asia/china-plans-to-send-second-oil
-rig-to-waters-near-vietnam.html> announced in June that it was deploying a
second drilling rig to the contested waters of the South China Sea, this
time at the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin.
As the world's biggest consumer of energy,
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=CH> China is desperate
to acquire fresh fossil fuel supplies wherever it can. Although its leaders
are prepared to make
<http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-02/06/content_17269251.htm>
increasingly large purchases of African, Russian, and Middle Eastern oil and
gas to satisfy the nation's growing energy requirements, they not
surprisingly prefer to develop and exploit domestic supplies. For them, the
South China Sea is not a "foreign" source of energy but a Chinese one, and
they appear determined to use whatever means necessary to secure it.
Because <http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs> other
countries, including Vietnam and the Philippines, also seek to exploit these
oil and gas reserves, further clashes, at increasing levels of violence,
seem almost inevitable.
No End to Fighting
As these conflicts and others like them suggest, fighting for control over
key energy assets or the distribution of oil revenues is a
<http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175540/> critical factor in most
contemporary warfare. While ethnic and religious divisions may provide the
political and ideological fuel for these battles, it is the potential for
mammoth oil profits that keeps the struggles alive. Without the promise of
such resources, many of these conflicts would eventually die out for lack of
funds to buy arms and pay troops. So long as the oil keeps flowing,
however, the belligerents have both the means and incentive to keep
fighting.
In a fossil-fuel world, control over oil and gas reserves is an essential
component of national power. "Oil fuels more than automobiles and
airplanes," Robert Ebel of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies <http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/p/of/proc/tr/10187.htm> told a State
Department audience in 2002. "Oil fuels military power, national
treasuries, and international politics." Far more than an ordinary trade
commodity, "it is a determinant of well being, of national security, and
international power for those who possess this vital resource, and the
converse for those who do not."
If anything, that's even truer today, and as energy wars expand, the truth
of this will only become more evident. Someday, perhaps, the development of
renewable sources of energy may invalidate this dictum. But in our present
world, if you see a conflict developing, look for the energy. It'll be
there somewhere on this fossil-fueled planet of ours.
Michael T. Klare, a
<http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175848/tomgram%3A_michael_klare,_what%27s_b
ig_energy_smoking/> TomDispatch regular, is a professor of peace and world
security studies at Hampshire College and the author, most recently, of
<http://www.amazon.com/dp/1250023971/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20> The Race
for What's Left. A documentary movie version of his book Blood and Oil is
available from
<http://www.mediaed.org/cgi-bin/commerce.cgi?preadd=action&key=124> the
Media Education Foundation.
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