Yemen at a Glance: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
* By Fernando Carvajal
<
http://www.fairobserver.com/author/Fernando%20Carvajal>
. August 1, 2014
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has gained a new sense of empowerment from
its relations with ISIS.
The <
http://www.fairobserver.com/?s=yemeni> Yemeni army launched military
operations in the southern provinces of Abyan and Shebwa on April 28, in
order to thwart the resurgence of <
http://www.fairobserver.com/?s=al-qaeda>
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its affiliate,
<
http://www.fairobserver.com/?s=ansar-al-sharia> Ansar al-Sharia (AAS). The
offensive followed a series of events, including a major AQAP gathering
following a prison break and a <
http://www.fairobserver.com/?s=america> US
drone strike campaign over the Easter weekend. The outcome of ongoing
battles will shape the security environment for months to come, posing
monumental challenges during the post-conflict period, and influence
<
http://www.fairobserver.com/?s=yemen> Yemen's relations with vital regional
and international partners.
As of April, President Abdo Rabbo Mansour
<
http://www.fairobserver.com/?s=hadi> Hadi appeared to have nearly exhausted
his leverage with regional and international partners supporting his
political transition plan, and has given into pressure to focus on the
deteriorating security situation, at the expense of a deepening economic
crisis and political stalemate in Sana'a. Evidence of mounting pressure
surfaced as Saudi Arabia
<
http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-designates-muslim-
brotherhood-as-terrorist-group> labeled the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Zaydi- <
http://www.fairobserver.com/?s=shia> Shia Houthi rebels as terrorist
organizations. Caught between regional rivals -
<
http://www.fairobserver.com/?s=qatar> Qatar and
<
http://www.fairobserver.com/?s=saudi+arabia> Saudi Arabia - who provide the
largest portion of foreign aid to Yemen - and Western partners, securing
much needed political support at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),
Hadi is now forced to shape an acceptable security environment that balances
domestic politics and international relations.
The president must also deal with violent clashes between political rivals
in the north and an unwavering secessionist movement in the south. Threats
posed by AQAP are part of a myriad of challenges faced by Yemen's transition
government. The inability to address simultaneous challenges to Hadi's
authority is a direct consequence of a weak coalition government engulfed by
legacy conflicts. The conflict between Zaydi-Shia Houthi rebels and tribal
militias loyal to al-Islah are far more complicated than mere images of
sectarianism. The secessionist movement (Hirak) remains peaceful but
fractured, while the potential for escalation to violence remains.
Deteriorating Security
A deepening security vacuum has been exacerbated by further evidence of
AQAP's persistence and ability to expand operations and counter the US-led
drone campaign. In March, AQAP claimed responsibility for a prison escape
freeing 29 known <
http://yemen-press.com/news28965.html> militants from the
capital city's central prison. The escapees later appeared in a video
published by al-Malahem on March 27, which included a speech by Nasser
al-Wuhayshi, the emir of AQAP. The prison break in Sana'a served to
replenish the organization's ranks with experienced militants. It also sent
a strong warning to Hadi's government and the US as nearly
<
http://www.criticalthreats.org/gulf-aden-security-review/gulf-aden-security
-review-october-24-2013> 200 militants remain inside the political security
prison (PSO) in Sana'a.
The frequency of brazen attacks by AQAP have increased since US intelligence
purportedly intercepted messages between al-Wuhayshi and Ayman al-Zawahiri
in August 2013. Mid-level losses among AQAP's "
<
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/05/15/hunting-al-qaeda-america-s
-epic-yemen-fail.html> rising stars," resulting from nearly 100 US-led
surgical strikes across Yemen, caused the group to escalate operations, not
only to remain relevant but also to benefit from the expanding security
vacuum. Recent figures published by Yemen's government have showed the group
still relies on a large number of Yemeni and foreign fighters, in addition
to mercenary assets within AAS. Yet the current pace of military operations
in Abyan and Shebwa proves AQAP has suffered from its own success as the
number of battle-ready elements depletes.
The exact number of militants in the country remains a point of contention
for analysts and the governments of the US and Yemen. The estimates produced
regarding the group's members and sympathizers were simply based on
casualties from operations until 2011 - estimates from videos of training
camps and discussions on jihadist online chat rooms. Yemen's foreign
minister, <
http://www.sabanews.net/en/news227045.htm> Abu Bakr al-Qirbi,
was the first official to publicly announce an estimate in 2010, when he
claimed about 400 militants in Yemen were loyal to al-Qaeda. Not until the
rise of
<
http://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/deepening-crise
s-breed-local-support-ansar-al-sharia-part-1/> AAS in 2011 did anyone
imagine AQAP to have followers in the thousands. The expansion of AAS, which
at best has an internally incoherent foundation, may lay in the hands of a
new generation with weak ideological links, but shared interests with its
patron, AQAP. AAS' localized priority is to grab power and create safe
havens for a patron with global ambitions.
As Yemen's government claimed a number of victories in Abyan and Shebwa, AAS
launched a number of well-coordinated attacks in Hadhramawt governorate. As
early as March, a month before the US drone campaign escalated, AQAP claimed
an attack on a military
<
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26712897> checkpoint. Sources
indicated that AAS militants in the eastern province carried out the
attacks. Later in May, nearly a month after the military offensive began,
Jalal Bil'ayd, AAS' emir, spearheaded simultaneous
<
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/xinhua-news-agency/140524/31-killed
-multiple-attacks-al-qaida-gunmen-yemen> attacks on a military post, a
number of banks and a museum in the center of Hadhramawt's second largest
city, Sayyun. Bil'ayd, who was thought to be hiding in the Maraqasha
mountains of Abyan in April, was featured in a number of pictures taken in
Sayyun, which were published online on the evening of the attack. The
significance of this operation was that it illustrated AAS' persistent
ability to launch effective operations, while the military claimed victories
in Abyan. It also sent a strong message regarding Bil'ayd's freedom of
movement.
AQAP's Evolution and Ties With ISIS
The morning of June 26 witnessed another well-coordinated AAS attack in
Sayyun, this time on the city's
<
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/al-qaeda-fighters-attack-y
emen-airport-2014626922774787.html> airport and a government
telecommunication's office. Such attacks not only prove the resilience of
militants, but also add to challenges faced by President Hadi's government.
The evolution of AQAP since 2011 and the role played by AAS now present a
clear threat to the survival of the political transition, representing a
widespread insurgency similar to events in Iraq and Libya. In early 2012,
Yemen-based journalist
<
http://www.businessinsider.com/top-reporter-in-yemen-explains-whats-really-
going-on-in-the-covert-us-war-there-2012-7> Hakim al-Masmari described
AQAP's strategy as changing from holding safe havens to guerrilla tactics.
AAS, at times believed to act under AQAP and others independently, according
to journalist Abd al-Razeq al-Jamal, is definitely a local actor with local
ambitions, a phenomenon not seen in Yemen since the
<
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero101800> Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan (IAA-A)
last operated in 2003.
Furthermore, the US still views
<
http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369> AQAP as
"the most active operational
<
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11483095> franchise" of
al-Qaeda, the global jihad organization; a view supported by the August 2013
alert in Sana'a and the most recent warning to airlines of a possible bomb
<
http://rt.com/usa/170080-heightened-security-international-direct-flights/>
threat. AQAP's resilience has certainly added to Yemen's transition
problems, as well as to the challenges to close the security vacuum created
by an unprecedented breakdown in government authority and capability to
enforce law and order throughout the country.
Political conflicts have also created an environment of distrust in Hadi's
government, as well as weakened the government's ability to address public
needs such as access to water, electricity and shelter for displaced
persons. As a consequence, AQAP and AAS have been able to expand relations
with local clients, providing safe havens throughout Yemen. Hadi's failure
to improve the efficiency of government services, and his weak political
position also impede necessary efforts to gain allegiance of tribal elements
that aid and harbor militants. The US also finds itself in a difficult
position as the Obama administration has extended unwavering support to Hadi
during the transition period, while acknowledging his weaknesses concerning
the ability to pursue militants with existing military and intelligence
capabilities.
Efforts to target AQAP's upper echelon - Nasser al-Wuhayshi (named general
manager of al-Qaeda), Ibrahim al-Asiri (expert bomb-maker) and the likes of
Makmun Abdul Hamid Hatim (spiritual leader of AAS) - are hampered by
politicized intelligence agencies under Hadi and weak US human intelligence
(HUMINT) capabilities. Hadi's acquiescence mainly to pressure from Saudi
Arabia and the US, partly to agree to American drone strikes, primarily
extends from the fact that AQAP has made it a priority to target government
facilities and officials, and AAS has evolved from an insurgency group in
Abyan to a national threat to wider stability.
The transitional president made clear that AQAP is an enemy of the state,
and his cooperation with regional and international partners simply serves
his own survival. America has also been hampered by the lack of options
beyond drone operations, as it can neither commit extensive troops on the
ground, nor can it simply rely on intelligence provided by Yemen's
intelligence apparatus or Saudi Arabia.
The Islamic State
Moreover, evolving relations between the
<
http://www.fairobserver.com/?s=Islamic+State+of+Iraq+and+the+Levant>
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), now known as the Islamic State,
and elements within AQAP potentially present Hadi and the US with a new set
of <
http://yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=7835&MainCat=6>
challenges. Any gains made against AQAP in Abyan and Shebwa since late April
may be reversed by the organization's new sense of empowerment from its
relations with ISIS, as well as financial and material support from this
ambitious jihadist group in Iraq. AQAP's evolution since 2009 has
illustrated an ability to advance transnational threats against Western
interests, as well as the ability to engage a local strategy that delivers
safe havens to host training camps, recruiting propaganda for foreign
militants, and space to develop plans such as the attempted
<
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/28/prince-mohammed-bin-nayef_n_270999
.html> assassination of Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in Saudi Arabia, and the
attempted bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner in
<
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-yemen-planned-northwest-flight-253-b
omb-plot/story?id=9426085> 2009. Further evidence of the group's success
include a number of attacks on government facilities, namely the Ministry of
Defense in <
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/05/world/meast/yemen-violence/>
Sana'a in 2013, while 2014 has seen an increase in activity and veracity in
threats posed to Yemen's own stability and the West.
Recent events, such as the arrest of an alleged AQAP/ISIS cell in
<
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230341710457954561206772
7876> Saudi Arabia and the
<
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/07/05/Two-militants-b
low-themselves-up-in-southern-Saudi-Arabia-.html> attack on a Yemen-Saudi
border post, have illustrated how threats posed by AQAP are equally credible
for Yemen, Persian Gulf monarchies and the West. A failure to tackle threats
posed by such militants groups in the short-term will present the
international community with deepening instability in the Middle East and
North Africa, as groups like AQAP and AAS will benefit from the momentum
created by ISIS in Iraq.
The implications of closer relations between ISIS and AQAP, or a potential
split within AQAP, will exacerbate Yemen's security challenges for months to
come, undermining any progress achieved by Hadi in relations with his
political rivals in Sana'a. A split in AQAP or AAS would force Yemen's
government to face two enemies on two fronts and, if ISIS provides direct
support to either faction, a new degree of escalation would resemble Iraq or
Syria in regard to tactics and targets. For some of Hadi's loyalists,
continued US assistance is vital to preventing a decapitating blow to his
government.
While journalist Abdul Razeq al-Jamal indicates that differences within
AQAP's leadership are insignificant, other observers in Aden and Sana'a
believe closer relations with ISIS will affect the group's cohesion. Noting
the close relationship between al-Wuhayshi and al-Zawahiri, local analysts
cannot see how praising ISIS by some mid-level AQAP leaders would not cause
tensions when al-Zawahiri has yet to reconcile with ISIS.
The
<
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/30/isis-announces-islamic-calipha
te-iraq-syria> announcement of an Islamic Caliphate by
<
http://www.fairobserver.com/?s=abu-bakr+al-baghdadi> Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi
at the start of Ramadan, which was rejected by a number of jihadist groups
in the region, will have an impact as AQAP leaders such as Makmun Abdul
Hamid Hatim and Ibrahim al-Rubaish are said to be ready to grant allegiance
to the caliphate. A potential split within AQAP not only poses new
challenges to Yemen's neighbors, the US and President Hadi, but would also
create a new dynamic within the global jihadist movement as al-Zawahiri
holds onto its leadership in the post-Osama bin Laden-era, while ISIS gains
further support from jihadists in Yemen, the Caucasus and Southeast Asia.
AAS attempted a second attack on Sayyun's
<
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/868748.shtml> airport on July 3 and later
targeted a Saudi-Yemeni
<
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/militants-attack-yemen-saudi-
border-post-24435729> border post on July 4. The attack on the Saudi border
post illustrates the evolution of jihadist elements in Yemen. This attack
also coincided with claims of responsibility by AAS for assaults on Houthi
rebels in northern Yemen during the first week of July. Sources in southern
Yemen caution that ISIS may begin to claim direct responsibility for
operations in Yemen as the relationship with AQAP elements evolves.
Received on Fri Aug 01 2014 - 15:51:04 EDT