The Horn of Africa as considered here includes Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia,
Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia/Somaliland. The problems of the Horn are
frequently interlinked and often cross national boundaries. The root causes
of the conflicts include economic inequality, political marginalization,
poor governance, ethnic tension, competition for scarce resources including
water and arable land, periodic drought, and poverty. Contributory factors
are porous borders, widespread availability of weapons, corruption, a poor
record by governments on human rights, and interference in the region by
organizations and countries outside the Horn. The Horn is also located on a
Muslim/Christian religious fault line. In terms of numbers of conflicts, the
Horn has arguably been the most conflicted corner of the world since the end
of World War II.
The Horn has posed a serious challenge for U.S. policy for more than three
quarters of a century. While Africa, among major world regions, has always
been at the bottom of the U.S. foreign policy priority list, the Horn has
received a disproportionately high amount of attention within the context of
Africa. This was due to the security importance the United States attached,
especially to Ethiopia, during World War II and the Cold War until the
overthrow in 1974 of Emperor Haile Selassie. In the mid-1970s, Soviet
influence replaced American influence in the country. The United States
shifted its security ties to the Siad Barre government in Somalia and
somewhat later to the Gaafar Nimeiri government in Sudan. The end of the
Cold War witnessed a U.S. pullback from the region during the 1990s.
Following the 1998 al-Qaeda attacks on the U.S. embassies in nearby Kenya
and Tanzania and, especially, the attack on the United States in 2001, U.S.
security interests in the Horn reemerged as the focus of U.S. policy shifted
to the global War on Terrorism. In 2002, Washington established a military
base in Djibouti known as Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa
(CJTF-HOA), provided significant support to the African Union mission in
Somalia aimed at countering the al- Shabaab terrorist group, and stepped up
security cooperation with Ethiopia, including establishment of a small drone
surveillance operation at Arba Minch in the southwestern part of the
country. U.S counterterrorism policy has driven its policy in the Horn
throughout the 21
St century.
The Cold War, the Horn, and U.S. Policy
The Cold War determined U.S. policy in the Horn until the beginning of the
1990s. The United States concentrated its economic and military support on
Ethiopia¡¯s Emperor Haile Selassie, who was a reliable ally of the United
States. The U.S. military maintained a critical communications station known
as Kagnew outside Asmara, which at the time was part of Ethiopia. In the mid
and late 1960s, Ethiopia received the United States¡¯ largest economic and
military assistance program and hosted the largest American embassy in
Sub-Saharan Africa. When Ethiopia was threatened by Somali irredentism or
Eritrean separatism, the United States backed the Haile Selassie government.
In 1974, the military junta led by Mengistu Haile Mariam seized power. The
United States tried initially to maintain cordial economic, political, and
military relations with the newleft-wing regime. The United States refused,
however, to provide all of the military assistance requested by Mengistu and
Ethiopia turned increasingly to the Soviet Union for support. As Ethiopia
slipped into the Soviet camp, the United States looked for a new ally in the
Horn.
During the early 1970s, Sudan was not interested in close ties with the
United States. Eritrea had begun a war of secession from Ethiopia. Djibouti
did not obtain independence from France until 1977 and, in any event, was
not seen at the time as sufficiently important for purposes of U.S. security
interests. This left only Somalia as a possible U.S. ally in the region.
Somalia had relied heavily during the 1960s and first half of the 1970s on
the Soviet Union for military assistance and was aligned with Moscow. As the
Soviet Union turned its attention to neighboring Ethiopia, Somalia¡¯s
traditional enemy, this opened the door for the United States to replace
Soviet influence in Somalia.
Somalia had a long-standing irredentist policy aimed at incorporating
Somali-inhabited parts of Ethiopia and Kenya and all of Djibouti. In fact,
Somalia invaded the Somali region of Ethiopia in 1977 and briefly captured
most of the southeastern part of the country. Soviet military equipment and
advisers and troops from South Yemen and Cuba helped Ethiopia to push the
Somalis out. While the United States did not provide military equipment to
the Somalis during the war, it initiated the delivery of military aid not
long after the war ended.
Ethiopia and Somalia became classic examples of pawns in Cold War policies
with the Soviet Union supporting Ethiopia and the United States allied with
Somalia. It was not until the late 1980s as the Cold War was coming to an
end that the United States concluded Somalia¡¯s Siad Barre was no longer a
satisfactory ally and began to cut back its economic and military support.
By the late 1970s, Sudanese President Gaafar Nimeiri had become a Cold War
ally of the United States. By the end of his regime in the mid-1980s, the
largest American economic and military assistance program in all of Africa
was in Sudan, which had replaced the position formerly occupied by Ethiopia.
The U.S. oil company, Chevron, discovered and was developing Sudan¡¯s oil
wealth. These close ties to the Nimeiri government resulted in the
reluctance of the United States to support John Garang¡¯s Sudan People¡¯s
Liberation Movement (SPLM), which began operations in 1983 with the goal of
toppling the Nimeiri government. The United States tried to walk a fine line
by supporting the Nimeiri government and maintaining relations with the SPLM
and southern Sudanese generally.
The 1985 overthrow of Nimeiri, as he was en route to the United States for a
meeting with President Ronald Reagan, led to a rapid decline in relations
with Sudan. U.S. ties with the successor interim military government were
correct, but not warm. They improved slightly following the democratic
election of Sadiq al-Mahdi early in 1986 but then slowly deteriorated during
his rule. Sudan¡¯smilitary coup in 1989 and installation of an Islamic
government led by Omar al-Bashir led to deep concern in Washington and
progressively worsening relations between the United States and Sudan.
As the Cold War wound down at the end of the 1980s, Washington had poor
relations with Mengistu¡¯s failing regime in Ethiopia, growing concerns
about the autocratic Siad Barre government in Somalia, and poor prospects
for cordial relations with the new Islamist al-Bashir government in Sudan.
Eritrea was not yet independent and Djibouti remained a minor player in the
Horn.
U.S. Policy in the Horn during the 1990s
The end of the Cold War coincided with dramatic political developments in
the Horn. There was a new Islamic government in Sudan. In 1991, the
left-wing Mengistu government fell to rebel forces that became known as the
Ethiopian People¡¯s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and a
secessionist rebel movement in Eritrea. The same year, several opposition
groups removed Said Barre from power in Somalia and northwest Somalia, known
as Somaliland, unilaterally declared independence. In 1991, Eritrea achieved
de facto independence and two years later held a referendum that ratified
secession from Ethiopia.
The Cold War and competition with the Soviet Union no longer dictated U.S.
policies in the Horn; its termination presented an opportunity for the
United States to focus on economic development throughout Africa. Instead,
there was a major competition for scarce U.S. financial resources and
diminishing U.S. interest in Africa. As a result, the 1990s witnessed a
series of adhoc policy decisions in Washington for dealing with both the
Horn and Africa generally.
In 1991, the United States played a key role in helping to broker the
departure of Mengistu from Addis Ababa, the replacement of his regime with
the EPRDF, and the independence of Eritrea. The United States quickly
developed cordial relations with both Ethiopia and Eritrea and strengthened
personal ties with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Eritrean
President Isaias Afewerki.
In late 1992, at the end of the George H.W. Bush administration, the United
States led a large, international military coalition to end a horrific
famine in Somalia, which had no national government and had become a failed
state. While this international effort ended the famine, the operation
became focused by mid-1993 on capturing warlord Mohammed Aideed, whose
militia was responsible for killing Pakistani peacekeepers attached to the
UN peacekeeping mission that had replaced the U.S.-led coalition. In October
1993, the famous ¨DBlackhawk Down¡¬ incident resulted in the death of 18
American soldiers and a decision by the United States to pull its forces out
of the UN mission in Somalia. The entire UN peacekeeping operation ended a
year and a half later as a failed nation-building mission. The negative U.S.
experience in Somalia caused it to minimize engagement in the country
throughout the rest of the 1990s.
Due to concerns about Sudan¡¯s growing support for terrorist organizations,
U.S. relations with its Islamic government deteriorated in the 1990s. Osama
bin Laden moved his head quarters to Khartoum late in 1991. The United
States put Sudan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1993; this
was followed by a major U.S. sanctions regime against Sudan. Under pressure
from the United States, the Sudanese government asked bin Laden to leave
Sudan in mid-1996,when he relocated to Afghanistan. This did not result,
however, in improved relations with the United States that Sudan
anticipated.
U.S. policy towards Khartoum became increasingly hostile as the al-Bashir
government continued to support several terrorist groups and U.S. domestic
advocacy groups urged a harsher policy towards the government. In 1995,
Sudan was implicated in the attempted assassination of Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak, a close ally of the United States, as he arrived in Addis
Ababa for an Organization of African Unity summit meeting. The United States
increasingly gave rhetorical and humanitarian support to Khartoum¡¯s
nemesis, the SPLM. In the mid-1990s,the United States pursued a ¨Dfront line
states¡¬ policy that encouraged Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda to put pressure
on Sudan and backed up the initiative with a $20 million grant of non-lethal
military equipment.
Close ties to Meles, Isaias, President Yoweri Museveni in Uganda and Vice
President Paul Kagame in Rwanda led to a personalization of African policy
in the second Clinton term and the brief designation of these officials as
the new leaders of Africa. (Nelson Mandela in South Africa was in a class of
his own.) In 1998, the unexpected outbreak of war between Ethiopia and
Eritrea brought a quick end to the Clinton administration¡¯s focus on these
four leaders. It also resulted in the termination of military assistance to
Ethiopia and Eritrea and the cancellation of that part of the $20 million in
¨Dfront line states¡¬ military aid that had not already been delivered. At
the beginning of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, the Clinton team tried to
follow a balanced approach towards both countries, angering each one in the
process.
The most constructive Clinton administration policy in the region was the
Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI). It was intended to mitigate
conflict and improve food security in the five countries of the Horn, in
addition to Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi. While it had some
positive impact on improving food security, it failed as a conflict
mitigation effort for many reasons, not the least of which were new
conflicts such as the Ethiopia-Eritrea war that broke out in 1998 and then
overwhelmed the GHAI. During the last two years of the 1990s, the United
States struggled to regain its position in the region. A period of U.S.
policy retrenchment in the Horn was underway at the end of the Clinton
administration and beginning of the George W. Bush administration. U.S.
engagement in Somalia was limited to modest amounts of humanitarian
assistance. Policy level officials in both the Clinton and Bush
administrations fled from the Somali issue. Having had a bad experience in
Somalia in 1993, neither administration had any desire to reengage there.
Relations were worsening with Sudan, especially following the 1998 al-Qaeda
bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and the mistaken
belief in some quarters that Sudan had something to do with the bombings. In
retaliation, the U.S. launched a cruise missile attack following the embassy
bombings on a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum suspected of producing
chemical weapons. This was the low point in U.S.-Sudan relations.
U.S. ties with Eritrea were beginning to get testy in the aftermath of the
Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, especially following Ethiopia¡¯s military victory
in 2000 and its unwillingness to accept the decision following binding
arbitration that gave the original locus Badme of the dispute to Eritrea.
Djibouti remained relatively unimportant to U.S. policy although it did
begin to play a more significant role in the Somali peace process. The
United States focused its efforts on rebuilding relations with Ethiopia
while trying to maintain tolerable ties with Eritrea as the 20th century
came to an end.
U.S. Policy in the Horn during the 21st Century
The Bush administration took office with some interest in Sudan, but
otherwise the Horn was not a high foreign policy priority. Following the
terrorist attacks of 9/11, that view began to change. The war on terrorism
drove U.S. policy throughout the region except for Sudan where the United
States also played a major role in the North-South peace process and worked
hard to end the crisis in Darfur. Counterterrorism was about the only U.S.
policy in Somalia during the Bush administration although the United States
continued to send modest amounts of humanitarian assistance and food aid.
At the end of 2002, the United States established CJTF-HOA at a former
French Foreign Legion post in Djibouti. The stated mission was to disrupt
and defeat international terrorist groups posing an imminent threat to the
United States, it allies, and their interests in the region. Following the
creation of this installation, the only American military base in Africa,
CJTF-HOA Djibouti took on an importance for U.S. policy that it never had
before. Today, CJTF-HOA has grown to about 4,000 military and civilian
personnel.
Ethiopia, which itself felt threatened by extremist groups, became an
increasingly important ally in U.S. counterterrorism policy in the region.
The United States found it more difficult to maintain cordial relations with
Eritrea as its ties with Ethiopia strengthened. Eritrea was angry at the
United States, claiming that it could have forced Ethiopia to accept the
binding arbitration that gave Badme to Eritrea.
By the end of the Clinton administration there was modest improvement in
relations with Sudan as the al-Bashir government decided to test possible
cooperation on counterterrorism. This cooperation expanded after the 2001
bombings in the United States. Following progress on the North-South peace
process and signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005,
there was a serious prospect for the normalization of relations with Sudan
and eventual removal of U.S. sanctions against Sudan. The United States
played a key role in encourage in both Khartoum and the SPLM to sign the
CPA; this was the Bush administration¡¯s signal political achievement in its
African policy.
While there was progress on ending the conflict between Sudan and South
Sudan, the outbreak of conflict in Darfur in 2003 ended prospects for the
normalization of relations between Sudan and the United States. Under
pressure from Congress and domestic advocacy groups, the Bush administration
declared in 2004 that genocide had taken place and put the blame on the
government of Sudan. (The United States was the only government that
designated the situation in Darfur as genocide.)
U.S. charges of continuing genocide, or at least a failure to assert that
the genocide had ended, continued well into the Obama administration. In
fact, the worst of the situation in Darfur ended in 2004. Former Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, stated at a
September 2011 public meeting in Washington that there was no genocide in
Sudan when she assumed her position late in 2005. Neither the Bush nor the
Obama administration was willing, however, to acknowledge this fact in the
face of intense pressure to the contrary from some members of Congress and
domestic pressure groups such as the Save Darfur Coalition. Sudan provided a
rare case in U.S. foreign policy where all domestic interest groups opposed
the actions of the government in Khartoum. There were no organizations
arguing for a more balanced position on Sudan related issues.
The United States welcomed Khartoum¡¯s willingness to move forward with the
CPA and its cooperation on counterterrorism. But there were always new
issues, first Darfur, and subsequently conflicts in Abyei and Southern
Kordofan along the North-South border that prevented normalization of
relations with Sudan. The heavy focus on Sudan¡¯s North-South peace process
and the Darfur crisis by the Bush administration and, to a considerable
extent, by the Obama administration sucked all the diplomatic oxygen out of
the air. It was difficult to get high level attention on other issues in the
Horn, except for Somalia when it became a center for extremist activity.
In 2006, Somalia became a major issue for U.S. policy in the Horn when a
group of Islamists threatened to seize power in Mogadishu. The United States
made its biggest policy blunder in Somalia since the ill-fated focus on the
hunt for Mohammed Aideed in 1993. It financed a group of discredited Somali
warlords who took the name Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and
Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) to attack the Islamists. The Union of Islamic
Courts (UIC), which included both moderate and extremist elements, defeated
the ARPCT by mid-2006and quickly seized control of most of central and south
Somalia. While it was anti-Western and hostile to Ethiopia, the UIC
reestablished law and order, something the warlords failed to do. U.S.
policy in Somalia became a shambles.
The Somali Transitional Federal Government, which was located in Nairobi and
had the support of the international community, invited Ethiopian forces
into Somalia to remove the UIC. By early 2007, Ethiopian troops forced the
UIC out of Mogadishu and most of Somalia. Many analysts argue that the
United States not only encouraged Ethiopia to invade Somalia but financed
the operation. There is no proof of this and most evidence suggests
otherwise. While the United States did not do enough to discourage this
inadvisable operation, this was a decision taken by the government of
Ethiopia. Once Ethiopia seized Mogadishu, however, the United States
encouraged Ethiopian troops to stay so that Islamist forces could not
return.
Eritrea seized upon the conflict in Somalia and Ethiopia¡¯s direct
involvement to put pressure on Ethiopia. Eritrea was still smarting from the
fact that Ethiopia had not returned Badme as required in the binding
arbitration. Eritrea supported extremist groups in Somalia, including one of
the successor groups to the UIC, al-Shabaab, which opposed the Ethiopian
intervention and wanted to establish an Islamic caliphate. This Eritrean
action, in addition to hostile actions towards its neighbor to the south,
Djibouti, caused a further deterioration in U.S.-Eritrea relations. The
United States and Eritrea are barely on speaking terms today. Although the
United States has a small embassy in Asmara, it has no ambassador.
The independence of South Sudan in 2011 and reduced level of violence in
Darfur offered once again the possibility of a normalization of relations
between Washington and Khartoum. But new problems in Sudan¡¯s Blue Nile and
Southern Kordofan regions that border South Sudan complicated the
normalization process. U.S. domestic advocacy groups argued strongly against
normalization.
The international community, including the United States, was excessively
optimistic about the prospects for an independent and democratic South
Sudan. While 75 percent of Sudan¡¯s oil wealth went to the new country,
Sudan retained control of the infrastructure for exporting oil. Following a
long dispute between Juba and Khartoum over the fees that Juba was required
to pay Khartoum for use of the infrastructure, Juba made the ill-fated
decision to terminate all oil production, which accounted for about 98
percent of its foreign exchange revenue. Not long after this dispute with
Khartoum was resolved, a power struggle broke out in Juba in December 2013.
The situation has deteriorated into an ethnic war between the two largest
ethnic groups in South Sudan the Dinka and the Nuer. This poses a new and
unpleasant challenge for U.S. policy in the region.
South Sudan has become an enormous foreign policy disappointment for the
United States, which played a key role in its achievement of independence.
It has lectured the South Sudanese President, Salva Kiir, and the principal
rebel leader, Riek Machar, and placed sanctions on military commanders from
both sides of the dispute. Washington is considering the possibility of
further sanctions as the internal conflict continues to rage in South Sudan.
U.S. policy in Somalia has had somewhat more success. It continues to
support the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the new Somali
Federal Government (SFG) that was established in 2012. Together, AMISOM and
the SFG have removed al-Shabaab from all but one town in Somalia, although
al-Shabaab continues to move freely in rural parts of south/central Somalia.
Washington also remains concerned about the ability of the SFG to establish
a viable government in Somalia that has the support of the Somali people. It
has not been possible to undertake development assistance in those parts of
Somalia that remain under al-Shabaab control.
The United States has cordial relations with Somaliland, which in 1991
declared its unilateral declaration of independence. On the other hand, it
is not prepared to recognize Somaliland¡¯s independence until the African
Union does so. It is providing more economic assistance to Somaliland and to
semi-autonomous Puntland. Nevertheless, the amounts have been modest and the
leaders of both entities are disappointed with the results so far.
The United States continues to treat counterterrorism as the most important
part of its policy in the Horn, but is implementing that policy in a more
nuanced manner than was the case during the Bush administration. In Somalia,
surveillance drones have been in widespread use for years. The United States
has conducted occasional aerial strikes and on-the-ground special forces
operations against al-Shabaab targets inside Somalia.
U.S. contributions to the anti-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden and Western
Indian Ocean have become an important part of U.S. policy in recent years.
While the United States pays lip service to improved human rights conditions
in the region, security interests usually trump concerns about human rights,
particularly in countries that are supportive of U.S. policy. One common
thread through U.S. policy in the Horn since the end of World War II has
been to provide assistance to counter hunger and famine. In terms of lives
saved, this effort and the more recent programs aimed at combatting HIV/AIDS
have been America¡¯s most successful policies in the region.
U.S. trade with and foreign direct investment in all countries in the Horn
are modest. Its largest trading partner in the region is Ethiopia, which in
2011 had well under $1 billion in trade with the United States. Its trade
with other countries in the Horn barely registers statistically. No American
oil company is active in the region and few American companies have offices
or production facilities in the Horn. The principal interest remains
counterterrorism and security as demonstrated by the growth at CJTF-HOA in
Djibouti. The United States and Djibouti just signed a new ten year, $70
million annual lease for the facility. This includes $63 million in lease
fees and the rest in development aid each year.
Conclusion
U.S. security interests in the Horn often conflict with U.S. policy that
encourages democratization and improved human rights practices. It is
difficult to solicit successfully the support of governments to combat
terrorism and provide personnel for peacekeeping operations, on the one
hand, while demanding, on the other, that those governments end human rights
abuses and democratize. Human rights organizations, which have the luxury of
being able to ignore U.S. security and political interests, tend to be
critical of U.S. human rights policies in the region. The fact is that,
since the end of the Cold War, concerns about political stability, security,
and countering terrorism in the Horn have usually trumped concerns about
human rights practices and good governance.
The challenges for U.S policy in the Horn remain huge. From the perspective
of American policy, relations today with the governments of Ethiopia,
Djibouti, and Somalia are good. They are poor with Eritrea and Sudan and
complicated with South Sudan because of the recent outbreak of internal
conflict there. Washington has a cordial dialogue with the authorities in
Somaliland and Puntland. The interrelationships of the countries in the Horn
are such that it is virtually impossible for a country as engaged
politically and militarily in the region as the United States to have good
relations will all of them at the same time.