Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2014 23:50:50 +0200
Somalia: a client state?
By Asha-Kin F. Duale
June 02, 2014
My formative experiences that shaped my views on conspiracy theories (not
the paranoia-based) , globalization and the crude reality of the war on
resources made me question whether there are 'entities' engaged in plotting
against Somalia to the extent of reconfiguring its sovereign status to a
client state.
By definition a client state is a country that is dependent on a larger and
more powerful country for its political, economic or military welfare.
If there are, who are such entities? How could a sovereign state be reduced
to a sub-servant status? What is the process that made achieving such aim
possible? How long does it take? Is there any benefit for becoming a client
state?
Somalia has been in socio-economic and political turmoil since gaining
independence; mainly due to a two decade long history of being under a
brutal military regime and subsequent vicious civil war that lead to total
anarchy.
Although the international community claims to have tentatively contained
the Somali tragedy and that it is no more a 'failed' state, the road to
recovery has proven e very hard, slow and extremely controversial.
With the introduction of a 'Provisional Federal Constitution,' in August 12,
2012, 275 MPs were selected through the unconventional 4.5 clan-based power
sharing formula, followed by the election of a President, an executive
andquasi non-existent judiciary system. With these key elements and
institutional support columns, Somalia was set to step onto the path of
stabilization and recovery, and in due course, reclaim its sovereignty.
This was further enhanced by the selfless andtangible help of various UN
Agencies, IGAD, AU, EU, USA, and AMISOM including our neighbouring
countries, not to mention the support of Turkey and some Arab countries has
had positive effects. In fact the financial and human resources that
weremade available to the Somali government and in the case of AMISOM the
sacrifice of their solders' lives were all meant for the protecting Somalis
from 'Al-Shabab' and from themselves.
Under such appropriate environment, the question that begs answer is: Why
has Somalia not yet recovered just like the countries that have suffered
different levels of civil strife' e.g., Ethiopia (1974-1991), Liberia (1999-
2003) Sierra Leone (1991-2002) Congo (1998-2003) and Mali (2013)?
Especially, when they had fewer interventions of 'well wishing' countries
and International institutions compared with the Somali case?
Is this because Somalis are by nature untameable people even before their
own suffering and socio-political and economic demise? Have they got no
sense of nationhood, governance, unity or understanding of the meaning of
coexistence and living in peace? Are they so selfish and caring of their own
individual and clan's interests at the expenses of the national ones? Are
they aware and as such are consenting parties of the process to disintegrate
and balkanize their own country into clan enclaves under the banner of
federalism?
All these questions leave head-spinning feelings to the majority of Somalis
who care about their beloved country but are not brave enough to search for
answers.
A concerned and a brave Somali nationalist would ask himself/herself
questions such as these probing and introspective ones:
1) What is left of the Somali sovereignty and independence? How much more
humiliating instances does the Somali Republic has yet to endure?
2) How and when the term federal ended up in our primary law? Why the
Provisional Federal Constitution that was presented to the six signatures
'entities' on 28 May 2012 (in accordance with the UN Road Map) was changed
twice by an unknown Technical Committee in Addis Ababa and in Nairobi before
being presented to the Provisional Constituent Assembly in August 2012?
Particularly why the model of regional autonomy and devolution of powers was
changed into the current model of con-federate system of states within the
Somali State? Who might be gaining from the balkanization of Somalia into
tribal enclaves camouflaged into federal states?
3) How did Al-Shabab come to be? Who created it, who is financing it, and
whose agenda is it fulfilling? Can anyone dispute that Al-Shabab's is not a
home grown Somali ideology?
4) Is the International donors' community genuinely concerned about the
welfare of Somali people? What happened to the 2013 pledges of the New Deal
aimed to reconstruct Somalia?
5) Why with AMISOM's huge number of military arms and personnel the pace
to eradicate Al-Shabab is extremely slow and frustrating? Is the tactics of
military 'temporizing' fulfilling a grand design that does not have the
welfare of Somalia at heart? Why there is no an agreed upon deadline for
their exit?
6) What are the 'real 'roles of UN Agencies and the whole plethora of
INGOs? Why with more than 17,000 AMISOM military personnel the UN Envoy
needs 400 soldiers more at Mogadishu airport for its own protection?
7) Are our neighbour countries genuinely supporting the emerging of a
stable and functioning Somalia or they got vested interests in keeping the
status quo until they achieve their goals? When will their naked meddling
into the Somali affairs achieve their aim of establishing the client-state
relationship?
As usual it is easy to beat the drum of blaming 'others' for one's failure
and inability to face one's mistakes. The role of the Somali people is
practically non-existent because it has embraced an ideology which at its
core states that governance is about maximising clan interest at the
expenses of national interest and citizenship.
Meanwhile, the role of so-called intellectuals who opted to wait and see
situation is not helpful.
According to Julien Benda in his 'Treason of intellectuals'there are two
options for the learned section of any society: Either to serve the
privilege and power principles or the justice and the truth ones. In the
Somali situation it is a rarity to evidence that those who tried to bring
changes asinsiders have not been corrupted by the power and the privilege.
On the other hand, the so-called business sector is hell bent to further
only their own interests. Profiting from war-like situations and not paying
due taxes clearly will not promote any national development and peace. The
sad part is that they are very conscious of their actions or inactions and
they feel very comfortable with their current de factoarrangement and
profiteering advantage.
The current political leadership is unable of reconfigure appropriate
responses to the dangerous situation facing our state and nationhood. They
neither try to seriously reclaim the full meaning of the Somali people's
sovereignty and independency nor are they diligently executing all
executive, legislative and judicial priorities as half of their respective
mandate in terms of time has ticked away.
That said, the tragedy is that we, as usual, will continue to underestimate
the magnitude and the implications of our self-defeating political
conditions at this juncture our history.
The bitter reality is that after almost two years the fanfare of being
'internationally' recognized as a 'sovereign' is replaced by the emerging
signs that the aspirations of the Somali people for peace, security, unity
and progress are by far unattainable.
Granted, Somalia cannot operate or exist in vacuum. It needs to interact
with different states that are there to promote their own interests, but not
at the expense of our statehood or nationhood. Clearly there are state
stakeholders who have vested interests to keep Somalia'sstatus quo of
'instability' by furthering more divisions to push Somalia into civil war
relapse.
Under such dilemma, I question the benefit of reclaiming symbolic
sovereignty for Somalia if that only means we would ultimately surrender and
trade our sovereignty for being a client state to one or both of our
immediate neighbouring countries of Ethiopia and Kenya.
___________________________________________________________
Asha-Kin F. Duale
Human Rights Lawyer
London - UK
akduale_at_gmail.com
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